IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF WILLIAM C. OGAN, DECEASED. NECITAS V. BINAMIRA, EXECUTRIX-APPELLEE, ISABELO V. BINAMIRA, CLAIMANT, VS. NECITAS OGAN-OCCENA, FEDERICO OGAN,…

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Orders of April 18, 1966 and July
16, 1966 of the Court of First Instance of Bohol in Special Proceedings No. 423,
interposed by the executrix and the heirs of William C. Ogan.

From the
records of the case, it appears that on February 20, 1961, William C. Ogan, a
resident of Tagbilaran, Bohol now deceased, executed a will providing among
others for the institution of his natural children, namely:  Lily Paz Ogan,
Federico Milani Ogan, Nancy Paparan, Liboria Pocoy Ogan, Necitas Pocoy
Ogan-Occena, William Loserena Ogan and Ruth Alcordo Ogan, appellants herein, as
his heirs and the apportionment of their respective shares; the designation of
Necitas Ogan Occena as executrix and Atty. I. V. Binamira, appellee herein, as
co-executor, both without bond.  On March 28, 1961, while the testator was still
alive, said will was duly admitted to probate.  In the proceedings the testator
was assisted by Atty. Felimon Barria.

On February 1, 1963, after the
testator’s death, on an ex-parte petition, Atty. I.V. Binamira assisted
by Attys. Barria and Doron, was appointed Special Administrator of the estate of
the late William C. Ogan.  The executrix filed a motion for reconsideration and
asked for the immediate issuance of letters testamentary in her favor and her
co-executor, but it was denied.  On March 17, 1963, after due hearing and
compliance with the required publication, letters testamentary issued in favor
of the designated executors.  On the same date the court a quo issued
notice to the creditors requiring them to file their respective claims against
the estate within six (6) months from the first publication.  It appears that
the notice was published in the newspaper of general circulation of the place on
March 17, 24 and 31, 1963.

On March 19, 1963, Binamira filed a Motion for
Approval of his fees as special administrator for thirty five (35) days in the
amount of P190,000.00 representing 7% of the gross estate in the amount of
P2,782,799.40 as per his submitted inventory of the estate.  On March 30, 1963,
Binamira’s lawyers, Barria and Doron, filed an opposition to the approval of the
fees and a manifestation asking that they be excused from defending Binamira’s
claim, alleging that although they acknowledge the great and diligent efforts,
and dedication executed by Binamira, they believe the claim to be excessive. 
After the parties filed their respective evidence and memoranda, the case was
deemed submitted for decision.

On July 10, 1963, Binamira filed a motion
indicating among others that aside from his pending claim, he may file
additional claims for not more than P300,000.00 between July 8 to September 12,
1963, the last day for the expiration of the six months period.  On September
16, 1963, Binamira filed a claim for 33% of the gross estate, and a claim
against the lot of the deceased in Puerto Princesa, Lot No. 5806, covered by TCT
No. RT-2223, alleging that said lot was given to him by the testator as
acknowledgment of the services he rendered particularly during the Japanese
times, and ½ of the shares of stock of the testator in Bohol Land Transportation
consisting of 2,363 shares, for alleged various services he rendered in favor of
the testator dating back in 1923 for acting as guardian in fact; family
consultant; caretaker; business, financial and legal adviser; and as attorney of
the testator.  The executrix filed an answer setting up Statute of Frauds, bad
faith, and due compensation and denied allegation of guardianship.  Previous to
Binamira’s claim it appears that his wife, Dr. Leocadia Binamira filed a claim
for P180,000.00 for alleged medical services rendered in favor of the testator
since 1945, whereas, Attys. Barria and Doron filed their claims for P160,000.00
and P17,600.00 respectively.

On the other hand, it appears that on
September 1, 1964, some of the heirs namely Lily Ogan-Peralta, William Ogan,
Jr., Ruth Ogan, and the aforesaid claimants entered into a compromise for the
release of the estate against claims.  However, said compromise did not
materialize.  On October 27, 1965, the instituted heirs and the executrix
desiring to expedite the settlement of the estate of their late father, entered
into a settlement with various claimants against the estate, including Atty.
Binamira and his wife, Atty. Barria, and Atty. Doron.  The agreement provided
among others for the release of P820,000 of the estate’s fund, P240,000.00 of
which is for the claimants, P100,000.00 for the protection of the estate’s
interest in Bohol Land Transportation, and the rest for partial distribution of
the heirs’ shares.  In the joint motion dated October 27, 1965, the parties
submitted the compromise to the court for its approval and prayed among others
that:

“x x x upon acknowledgment of Atty. I.V. Binamira of the amount
due him under the agreement, an order issue confirming his resignation as
co-executor.”

On October 28, 1965, the Court issued a resolution providing
among others the approval of the compromise and the release of P820,000.00 and
requiring each heir to give a bond of P75,000.00 conditioned for the payment of
the inheritance tax and estate tax.  On October 29, 1965, Atty. Binamira and his
wife acknowledged the receipt of P141,000.00 and P40,000.00 respectively, as
full payment of their claims and fees against the estate pursuant to the
agreement dated October 27, 1965.  On November 29, 1965, the court, upon joint
manifestation of the executrix and Atty. Binamira, issued a resolution
confirming the approval of the resignation of Binamira as co?executor.

On
December 18, 1965, the court issued a resolution requiring Atty. Binamira to
submit the final and closing account of the estate.  On January 14, 1966,
Binamira submitted his final report together with a manifestation and motion
praying among others for the payment of P23,000.00 as full settlement of his
claim, P2,000.00 as compensation for services rendered from October 27, 1965 to
January 14, 1966 and for the annotation of his 40% individual interest over Lot
5306 or for the cancellation of the title and the issuance of a new one in his
name and the estate.  On February 24, 1966, the executor and the heirs filed an
opposition praying that the motion for additional fees be denied on the ground
that it is already barred by the compromise agreement.  Binamira filed a reply
alleging among others that the compromise refers only to past services rendered
and not to those subsequently rendered.  On April 18, 1966, the court a
quo granted the claim and later denied the motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, the present appeal before Us, on pure questions
of law, raising the following assignment of errors:

“FIRST ERROR

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING FORMER CO-EXECUTOR-APPELLEE
I. V. BINAMIRA’S NEW CLAIM OF P2,000.00 FILED UNDER DATE OF JANUARY 14, 1966,
DESPITE THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT INVOLVING THE HEREIN PARTIES DATED OCTOBER 27,
1965, EMBODIED IN A LONG FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT DATED
OCTOBER 28, 1965 x x x.

SECOND ERROR

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN PROVIDING IN ITS ORDER OF APRIL 18,
1966 THAT FORMER CO-EXECUTOR I. V. BINAMIRA’S ‘OTHER CLAIMS BE PRESENTED IN 30
DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF COPY’ OF THE QUESTIONED ORDER OF APRIL 18, 1966 ‘OR IN 30
DAYS FROM THE DATE THE ACCOUNT BECOMES ACTUALLY DUE AND DEMANDABLE’ DESPITE THE
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 27, 1965, x x x AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT SUCH
PERIOD WAS NOT EVEN SOUGHT BY CLAIMANT-APPELLEE.

THIRD ERROR

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION AND IN HOLDING x x x THAT ‘CLAIMS ORIGINATING FROM
TRANSACTIONS AFTER THE DEATH OF DECEDENT ARE ALLOWABLE AS EXPENSES OF
ADMINISTRATION AND ARE NOT BARRED BY STATUTE OF NON-CLAIMS..’

FOURTH ERROR

IN THE LIGHT OF THE PREVIOUSLY-DISCUSSED ERRORS, THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN NOT DENYING OR STRIKING OUT FORMER CO?EXECUTOR-APPELLEE’S NEW
CLAIM OF JANUARY 14, 1966, WITH DOUBLE OR TREBLE COSTS AGAINST
CLAIMANT.”

(Note:  During the pendency of this appeal, Atty. Binamira died
and he was substituted by his heirs as appellees)

Appellants contend that
it is an error for the lower court to approve the additional claim of Atty. I.
V. Binamira for P2,000.00 representing his compensation for services rendered in
filing the final accounts of the estate of the deceased William C. Ogan, as
directed in the order of April 18, 1966, of the court a quo, and
directing Binamira to present other claims within thirty (30) days from receipt
of the aforesaid order, despite approval and finality of the compromise
agreement of October 27, 1965, and the receipt by Binamira of P141,000.00, which
serves to bar not only re-assertion of all claims against the estate and that
the order directing Binamira to present other claims was issued in excess of
jurisdiction as it was never prayed for in his motion for additional fees of
P2,000.00.

The appeal is meritorious.  A close examination of the
compromise agreement of October 27, 1965 will disclose that claims against the
estate existing at the time of its execution and all future claims of the
parties to the compromise including that of Binamira, are barred by the
compromise when it provided:

‘5. xxx That all lawyers of the claimants and of the
CO-EXECUTOR, AS WELL AS THE CO-EXECUTOR, WAIVE WHATEVER RIGHTS, IF ANY, TO
COLLECT FROM THE ESTATE AND/OR THE HEIRS ANY AMOUNTS OTHER THAN THOSE MENTIONED
IN PAR. 1 ABOVE; EXCEPT THE REIMBURSEMENT DUE THE CO-EXECUTOR I. V.
BINAMIRA FOR ALL LEGITIMATE EXPENSES HE INCURRED UP TO THE FINAL APPROVAL OF
THIS COMPROMISE by the Court;’ (underscoring ours)

In the case at bar, it would be seen and as admitted by
appellee himself (p. 3, Appellee’s brief) that the second compromise agreement
(Oct. 27, 1965) was entered into by the appellants to expedite settlement of
claims.  Thus, the essence of compromises being mutual concessions by the
parties to avoid or end litigation, it is to be expected that neither will be
able to maintain his initial demands wholly unaltered.^[1]

Hence, the well-settled rule that
“a compromise, once approved by final orders of the court has the force of
res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for
vices of consent or forgery”^[2] none of
which is alleged herein, is applicable and thus bars the claims of Atty.
Binamira.

The lower court ruled that the payment of the additional
P2,000.00 is allowed under paragraph 5 of the compromise as reimbursement for
expenses of administration incurred by Binamira and accordingly not barred under
the statute of non-claims.  It ruled further that the compromise cannot be
considered as final due to the absence of approval of all concerned.

We
do not agree.  First, the compromise was signed by Atty. I.V. Binamira and he
duly acknowledged receipt of the P141,000.00 as full consideration of his claim
and it was the very reason why he acceeded to the compromise.  He even joined
the appellants in their motion to approve his resignation as co-executor.  Thus,
the right to impugn the finality of the compromise, if ever, may be availed of
by the heirs who have not signed the compromise and not by Binamira, who by
virtue of his acts is estopped to contest the finality of the compromise, hence,
the statute of non-claims finds no room for application.

Second, the
provision regarding the allowable reimbursement refers only to legitimate
expenses incurred from the time Binamira was appointed co-executor up to the
final approval of the compromise, hence, considering that his claim is for
compensation of services rendered from October 27, 1965 up to January 14, 1966,
it is crystal clear that it does not fall within the ambit of the exception
neither as to the nature nor as to the time frame.

Lastly, the finality
of the compromise should not be taken to mean that, it in effect terminates
Binamira’s obligation as co-executor.  Under the Revised Rules of Court, Rule
85, Section 8, Atty. Binamira is obliged to render further accounts as the court
may require until the estate is wholly settled.  Thus, it has been held
that,

“x x x the duty of an administrator to render an account is
not a mere incident of an administration proceeding which can be waived or
disregarded when the same is terminated, but that it is a duty  that has to be
performed and duly acted upon by the court before the administration is finally
ordered closed and terminated.  x x x.”^[3] (underscoring ours)

Hence, the award of the additional amount of P2,000.00 to Atty.
Binamira for the submission of the final accounts of the estate of the late
William C. Ogan, is contrary to law.

With the doctrine of res
judicata at hand, the act of the lower court in incorporating in the
questioned order the right of Binamira to file other claims against the estate
within the period of thirty (30) days, is in excess of jurisdiction and without
jurisdiction considering that Binamira did not seek authority to file other
claims against the estate and the matter was never raised as an issue by the
claimant, hence the court a quo could not legally grant the same.  It
is a well-known principle in proceedings that courts of justice have no
jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue^[4].

IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the orders of the court a quo dated April 18, 1966
and July 16, 1966, in Special Proceedings No. 423, are hereby set aside, with
double the costs against appellees.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Narvasa, Cruz, and Sarmiento,
JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., on
official leave.