ROMUALDO F. DUMUK, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ANGEL A. DAQUIGAN, BERNARDO MIRANDA Y JUGAL AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, RESPONDENTS.

The center of controversy in this case is whether or not a civil
action that was filed arising from the acts or omissions subject of a separate
criminal action had already prescribed or is pre-mature.

On March 2, 1962, private respondent was charged with the crime
of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in an information that
was filed in the Municipal Court of Bacnotan, La Union. An amended information was filed on October
17, 1969 charging private respondent Miranda with the higher category of
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.

On November 20, 1969, pending trial of said respondent Miranda in
the Municipal Court of Bacnotan, La Union, the petitioner who is the offended
party in the case filed an express reservation to file a separate action as to
the civil liability arising from the offense. In a decision rendered by the Municipal Court dated October 12, 1971 the
private respondent was convicted of the offense charged. He appealed his conviction to the Court of
First Instance.

Before any information could be filed by the provincial fiscal’s
office, the petitioner wrote the provincial fiscal on February 3, 1972
informing him that on account of the felony committed by the private respondent
he suffered P100,000.00 damages and he requested the provincial fiscal to
include the said damages in the information. He stated that the reason why he reserved his right to file a separate
civil action for damages in the inferior court was because his claim was beyond
the jurisdiction of said court.^[1]
Hence, on February 14, 1972 an information was filed by the fiscal for the same
offense alleging therein the claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages in
the amount of P100,000.00 of the petitioner.^[2]

During the trial of said criminal case a private prosecutor
appeared in behalf of petitioner who attempted to prove the damages suffered by
petitioner but the trial court refused to receive the evidence on the civil
aspect. Thus, in the decision of the
trial court of October 14, 1977 private respondent was found guilty of the
offense charged and sentenced to
three months of arresto mayor and to pay the costs. It was also therein stated that the right to
file a separate civil action for damages was reserved in favor of
petitioner. The said decision was
appealed by private respondent to the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner earlier filed a complaint for damages against private
respondent and the Philippine National Railways (PNR) in the Court of First
instance of La Union on August 17, 1977 arising from the criminal acts of
private respondent on January 2, 1962 apparently because of the refusal of the
trial court to receive evidence on the civil liability in the criminal
case. An amended complaint was filed by
petitioner which added as allegation that the defendant corporation failed to
exercise care in the selection and supervision of its employees which was
clearly manifest in this case. In the
answer of the defendants in said
case the defense of prescription was interposed. The trial court, acting on the motions of respondents for a
hearing on the affirmative defenses and after receiving the memoranda of the parties, issued an order on
September 2, 1977 dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription of
action and/or for lack of cause of action.^[3]

A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in an
order dated November 28, 1977. Hence,
the herein petition for review on certiorari of the said orders of the
trial court.

The main thrust of the appeal is to the effect that the trial
court erred when it held that the filing of the civil action had prescribed
and/or was otherwise premature.

In the questioned order it was ruled that if the civil liability
is based on quasi–delict the period of
prescription arises from the date the alleged quasi–delict was
committed on January 2, 1962 and it prescribes in four (4) years in accordance
with Article 1146 of the Civil Code, so the civil action has prescribed. On the other hand it also held that if the
civil action arises from the criminal act which is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, the filing of the civil action is premature because the
liability of respondent PNR is subsidiary. Petitioner must await final judgment in the
criminal action against respondent Miranda before the civil action impleading
respondent PNR may be instituted.

On the other hand petitioner contends that prescription has not
set in that although he has made a reservation to file a separate civil action
in the Municipal Court on November 20, 1969, when the information was filed in
the Court of First Instance on February 14, 1972, it included the claim for
civil liability of petitioner, thus the filing of the information tolled the
running of the period of prescription. As such, only two years, four months and 25 days had expired.

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court then in force
provide as follows –

SECTION 1.- Institution of criminal and civil actions.- When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves
his right to institute it separately.

SECTION 2.- Independent civil action.- In the cases provided for in
Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal
case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.

From the foregoing rules it is clear that once a criminal action
is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. However, for damages arising under Articles
31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the
right is reserved in the criminal action.

In the present case when an information for the crime of serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed on March 2, 1962 in the
Municipal Court of Bacnotan, La
Union, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense was deemed impliedly instituted with the filing of said information and
amended information thereafter. However, on November 20, 1969, the petitioner informed the inferior
court in writing that he was making an express reservation to file a separate
civil action as to the civil liability arising from the offense. Thus on October 12, 1971 when respondent
Miranda was convicted by the municipal court, no damages were awarded to the
petitioner.

When respondent Miranda appealed to the CFI, petitioner then
wrote the provincial fiscal on February 3,
1972 asking that the damages that he suffered in the amount of
P100,000.00 be included in the information explaining that he reserved his
right to file a separate civil action in the municipal court because his claim
exceeded the jurisdiction of the municipal court. Forthwith the provincial fiscal on February 14, 1972 filed an
information which included the claim for damages of the petitioner.

The period of prescription within which to file a civil action as
to the civil liability arising from the offense started to run on November 20, 1969 when the petitioner informed the
municipal court in writing that he was reserving his right to file a separate
civil action. It was interrupted upon
the filing of the information in the CFI on February 14, 1972 alleging the claim for damages. On said date a period of only two (2) years, three (3) months and
twenty-three (23) days more or
less have lapsed then.

Obviously, at the time the information was filed the four-year
prescriptive period for the action had not yet lapsed. Because of the refusal of the trial court to
accept evidence of damages in the criminal case (perhaps because the express
reservation of petitioner was still in the records of the case), a separate
civil action was instituted by petitioner on August 17, 1976.

Consequently, in the criminal case, the trial court rendered
judgment affirming the conviction of private respondent Miranda but recognizing
the right of petitioner to file a separate civil action for damages.

From the foregoing set of facts, it is clear that the civil
action instituted by the petitioner for damages arising from the offense has
not prescribed. It was filed well
within the period of prescription.

However, the civil action based on quasi-delict had
prescribed. Petitioner did not reserve
the filing of an independent civil action arising therefrom nor did he file the
civil action within the four (4) year reglementary period. The acts complained of
occurred on February 2, 1962 while the separate civil action for damages was
filed by petitioner only on August 17, 1976 which was amended only on January
17, 1977 to include the claim for damages arising from quasi-delict. No doubt the civil action arising from
quasi-delict had prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders of the trial court
dated September 2, 1972 and November 20, 1979 are hereby modified in that the
civil action arising from the offense has not prescribed and must take its due
course. However, the civil action based
on quasi-delict had prescribed.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Annex D to Petition, page 34, Rollo.

^[2]
Annex E, page 35, Rollo.

^[3]
Pages 45 to 49, Rollo.