AMADO S. CENIZA, PETITIONER, VS. ALEJANDRO E. SEBASTIAN, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO, 16TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH VIII, RESPONDENT.

This Court has been and continues to be committed to the authoritative
doctrine that the power to punish for contempt should be exercised on
the preservative and not vindictive principle.^[1] In deciding this certiorari and prohibition proceeding with a plea for a mandatory preliminary injunction, we do so again.

The immediate cause that resulted in an order of arrest for contumacious conduct arose from an ex-parte motion
to have respondent Judge Alejandro E. Sebastian, now retired, inhibited
from trying a civil case in the then Court of First Instance of Davao,
16th Judicial District, Branch VIII. The paragraph in such motion that
apparently gave offense follows: “That because of certain personal acts
or conduct displayed by the Presiding Judge in handling the above case,
which the Defendant and her counsel deem as highly irregular, corrupt
and a gross misconduct for a Judge to do, the undersigned counsel for
Defendant has already filed an Administrative Case against the herein
Presiding Judge in the Supreme Court, now docketed therein as
‘Administrative Matter No. 846-CFI, Atty. Amado S. Ceniza vs. District
Judge Alejandro Sebastian, CFI, Br. VIII, Tagum, DN’, and the Defendant
in the above case is one of the material witnesses for the complainant
in said Adminis­trative Case; and, that by virtue of these, the bias and
prejudice of the Presiding Judge against the Defendant and her counsel
in the above case, is intensified and heightened, and consequently the
Presiding Judge in the above case, will no longer have that sense of
justice, that equanimity of emotion, that detached and unaffected
feeling and that disinterested and impartial comportment which all
judges ought to have and maintain while hearing and deciding a case
before them.”^[2]

As a result, according to the Petition, “respondent Judge herein issued a
‘Warrant for the Arrest’ of the petitioner herein, so that he will be
locked-up in jail for having committed, according to said respondent
Judge, ‘Direct Contempt’.”^[3]
It was further alleged that copies of such warrants of arrest of
petitioner “are now in the hands of several Peace Officers, who are
specifically ordered to arrest the herein petitioner wherever found.”^[4]
Then the Petition went on to state: “That firmly believing that these
warrants for his arrest issued by the herein Respondent Judge is
grossly unlawful and is inspired by the Respondent Judge’s desire for
vengeance, hatred and yearning to persecute and destroy the herein
Petitioner, the latter had fled from his office and resi­dence at
Visayan Village, Tagum, Davao, and dodged arrest by hurriedly and
secretly going to various places and ultimately here in Manila, in order
to have the chance of filing this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.”^[5]
After reiterating what for him was the patent illegality of such order
for contempt and the warrant of arrest issued in pursuance thereof thus
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or at the very least grave
abuse of discre­tion, petitioner prays that there be an immediate
prohi­bition for their enforcement, even prior to declaring them null
and void.^[6]

The Court required respondent to file a comment and issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the enforcement of such warrant of arrest.

Respondent Judge, accordingly, submitted his Comment to the petition.
There was a clear admission in such comment that it was the allegation
in paragraph 6 of the Ex-Parte Motion to Have Presiding Judge
Inhibit Himself from Trying the Case which led to the issuance of the
warrant of arrest, petitioner being guilty of direct contempt. Thus:
“For calling the respondent ‘corrupt’ in said motion, the Court issued
an Order dated December 20, 1974 holding petitioner guilty of direct
contempt and sentenced him to 10 days imprisonment and P200 fine. To
enforce the Order, a warrant for the arrest of Atty. Amado Ceniza was
issued on December 23, 1974. He could not be arrested, however, because
he went into hiding. It is this unserved warrant of arrest and the
unexecuted Order holding him guilty of contempt that he questions in
this special civil action of Certiorari and Prohibition.”^[7]
For respondent Judge, the punishment for contempt being inherent in
all courts, the only question is whether or not he had committed a grave
abuse of discretion. That accusation he denied in these words: “He
merely exercised his right and power to punish the petitioner for his
act or conduct that tended to bring the authority of the Court and the
administration of justice into disrepute.”^[8]
He referred to the well-settled doctrines that the use in pleadings of
language disrespectful to the court or con­taining offensive words
constitutes direct contempt, amounting as it does to misbehaviour in the
presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice. He stressed the point further in this way:
“In the instant case, the Court held Atty. Ceniza guilty of direct
contempt for stating in his motion for the judge’s inhibition, among
others, that he was ‘corrupt’. No self-respecting judge will tolerate
such a vile language in a lawyer’s pleading; and punishing such a
presumptuous and insolent lawyer can never be termed abuse of power or
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari or
prohibition. Under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court, contempt
includes ‘disrespect toward the court or judge.’ Mr. Ceniza was plainly
guilty of direct contempt.”^[9]

This Court, on the above facts, sustains respondent Judge in finding
that there was a direct contempt committed but likewise holds that,
conformably to the controlling doctrine that the power to punish for
contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not vindictive
principle, modifies the judgment by lifting the warrant of arrest but
increasing the fine imposed to P500.

1. This Court from Carag v. Warden of the Jail of Cagayan,^[10] a 1929 decision, to Sulit v. Tiangco,^[11]
has consistently ruled that the contempt power may be availed of by a
judge, who is the victim of insulting and offensive epithets. A member
of the bar as an officer of the court is not justified to use vile and
disrespectful language. If there be such a failing on his part, he
cannot complain if he is adjudged guilty of contempt. Where the words
appear in a pleading submitted to the Court, that is contempt in facie curiae and thereore may be dealt with in a summary manner. ^[12]

2. There are circumstances however that militate in this case
against the imposition of imprisonment for ten days. In the comment
submitted by respondent Judge, reference was made to an injunction
issued by him in a civil case where the client of petitioner Ceniza was
the defendant. Then came this portion of such comment: “After the
issuance of the injunction, the respondent took steps to settle the case
amicably. Before the break-up, the parties were quite close to the
respondent and his wife, whom they fondly addressed as tatang and nanang.
He succeeeded in convincing the defendant that if she no longer liked
to live with plaintiff, who is legally married to another woman, at
least, she should be agreeable to the division of their properties
before they evaporated in a long litigation, eaten up by expenses and
enormous attorney’s fees. Before the amicable settlement could be
signed, however, the petitioner was able to dissuade the defendant from
signing, telling her that all the real estate, businesses, trucks, and
vehicles were hers because they were all registered in her name. But
the petitioner was aware that the defendant had signed a document
wherein the properties that were to be her share were listed, as
‘agreed’ upon between her and the plaintiff. To avoid the effect of
this document, the petitioner concocted a false story in the Answer that
he prepared and filed that the defendant was forced to sign the
document thru intimidation of being killed and her honor exposed by the
plaintiff, in the residence of the respondent and with the aid of one
Col. Callejo and the respondent. For this shameless fabrication,
derogatory to the integrity and honor of respondent, the petitioner and
his client were held guilty of direct contempt of Court and sentenced to
10 days imprisonment and P200 fine.”^[13] Then it was stated that after petitioner was released from prison, an administrative case was filed against respondent Judge.^[14] That led to the ex-parte motion
for inhibi­tion where the contemptuous language appeared. It thus
appears that because of the deep-seated ill-will that existed between
petitioner and respondent Judge – a fact made manifest by their
voluminous pleadings – it would be most difficult for respondent Judge
to act with restraint and judiciousness. The power to punish for
contempt could then be a manifestation of whim, caprice, or
arbitrariness, or something analogous to it.^[15]
Here, while the words were contumacious, it is hard to resist the
conclusion, considering the background of this occurrence that
respondent Judge in imposing the ten-day sentence was not duly mindful
of the exacting standard that preservation of the dignity of his office
not indulging his sense of grievance sets the limits of the authority he
is entitled to exercise. It is the view of the Court that under the
circumstances the fine imposed should be increased to P500.00.

WHEREFORE, certiorari is granted declaring null and void the
ten-day sentence and quashing the warrant of arrest. Respondent Judge,
or whoever acts in his stead, is prohibited from enforcing such order.
The temporary restraining order is made permanent as regards the
imposition of the ten-day imprisonment and the serving of the warrant of
arrest. The fine imposed should be increased to P500.00. No costs.

Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Escolin, and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concurs and thinks no fine should be imposed.
Petitioner already served 10 days’ imprisonment due to a prior contempt
order of Judge Sebastian. The charges filed by Judge Sebastian was
dismissed.

Makasiar, J., did not take part.

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^[1] Cf. Entelera v.
Amores, L-41361, March 8, 1976, 70 SCRA 37; Blancaflor v. Raya, L-31399,
March 17, 1978, 82 SCRA 148; Calo Jr. v. Tapucar, L-47244, January 16,
1979, 88 SCRA 78; Sulit v. Tiangco, L-35333, July 20, 1982, 115 SCRA
207; Manalad v. De Vega, L-59866, February 22, 1983, 120 SCRA 749;
Lipata v. Tutaan, L-61643, September 29, 1983, 124 SCRA 877, Repeque v.
Aquilizan, G.R. No. 62979, June 29, 1984.

^[2] Petition, Annex A, par. 6.

^[3] Ibid, par. 10.

^[4] Ibid, par. 11.

^[5] Ibid, par. 12.

^[6] Ibid, par. 14 and Prayer.

^[7] Comment, 5-6.

^[8] Ibid, 6.

^[9] Ibid, 8.

^[10] 53 Phil. 85.

^[11] L-35333, July 20, 1982, 115 SCRA 207.

^[12] Cf. Yangson v. Salandanan, Adm. Case No. 1347, November 12, 1975, 68 SCRA 42.

^[13] Comment, 4.

^[14] Administrative Case No.
846-CFI, for libel and serious misconduct. After an answer duly filed
and an investigation it was dismissed for failure to prove prima facie
case.

^[15] Cf. People v. Estenzo, L-24522, May 29, 1975, 64 SCRA 211, 214.