BENITO ARAMBULO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. €UA SO AND CUA PO CHOOH, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Aftermath of our Krivenko decision^[1]
is this action whereby plaintiff seeks to recover landed property he
sold to the alien defendants. The facts are simple:

Before the Pacific War, plaintiff, a Filipino, was the owner of two
parcels of land at Narra Street, Manila, his title thereto being
Transfer Certificate No. 59259 of the Manila Register of Deeds. On
February 23, 1948 he sold the said parcels to the defendants, who are
Chinese citizens. On January 28, 1948 he started these proceedings to
revoke the sale and recover the properties, invoking the aforesaid
Krivenko decision, the relevant portion of which declares that the
Constitution forbids the sale of. urban lands to foreigners.

The Manila court of first instance dismissed the complaint,
appllying our ruling on Cabauatan vs. Uy Hoo, 88 Phil., 103
that refused to annul a similar conveyance in March 1943 by Filipino
citizens to Chinese aliens on two grounds, namely: (1) during the
Japanese occupation the Constitutional prohibition was not in force; (2)
even if it was binding then, the seller could not now recover, because
the law should not help either party to an illegal transaction this
appeal is planted mainly on the proposition that the Oabauatan ruling
should be revised, it being erroneous because upon principle and
authority, the violation of the Constitution requires reconveyance to
the vendor. Appellant insists that the Constitution was obligatory even
during the Japanese regime,: that it prohibits alien-vendees from owning
and holding the property in question, thereby compelling recognition of
the Filipino-vendor’s previous ownership.

There is much to be said in favor of appellant’s propositions.
Indeed the Cabauatan opinion was not unanimous.

However the present issue is now settled. The Cabauatuan doctrine
denying recovery has subsequently been affirmed and re-affirmed in
Ricamara vs. Ngo Ki, 92 Phil., 1084; Rellosa vs. Gaw
Chee Hun, 49 Off. Gaz., (10) 4321, 93 Phil., 827; Caoile vs. Yu
Chiao, 49 Off. Gaz., (10) 4345, 93 Phil., 861; Cortes vs. O.
Po Poe L-2943, October 30, 1953; Talento and Talento vs.
Makiki, et al., 93 Phil., 856.

Paras C. J., Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador,
JJ., concur.

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^[1] Krivenko vs.
Register of Deeds, 44 Off. Gaz., 471; 79 Phil., 4W.

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REYES, A., J.:

For the reasons stated in my dissent in the case of Dionisio Rellosa
vs. Gan Chu Hun, G. R. L-1411, September 29, 1953, I concur
only in the result.

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DISIDENTE

PABLO, M.:

La venta de las dos parcelas a loa demandados en 23 de febrero de
1943 esnula porque la venta cle terrenos a extranjeros esta prohibida
por la Constitucion de Filipinas (art. XIII, section 5, Constitucion;
Krivenko contra Registrador de Titulos, 44 Off. Gaz., 471, 79
Phil, 461).

Dicho contrato de venta es nulo ab initio; no tiene existencia
legal, nulp de piano derecho (4 Sanchez Roman, 207; 8 Manresa, 619; 2
Castan, 641) y porque la venta es nulalos compradores deben devolver el
terreno comprado, y el vendedor el precio de venta o “las partes
contratantes deben restituirse reciprocamente las cosas que hubiesen
sido materia del contrato” (Art. 1303 Cod. Civ.). El demandante, que es
la parte interesada,—yno el Estado— “puede reclamar” la devolution del
terreno vendido en cantravencion de la Constitucion (2 Castan, 144). Tal
“action tiene que se ejercitada a instancia de parte” (3 Valverde,
299). El demandante tiene derecho a pedir que se declare nula la venta y
que se la devuela el terreno “para restablecer la virtualidad de la
prohibition” (Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de Espana de 11 de Abril de
1949; 25 Jur. Civ., 503).

La contention de los demandados de que la prohibition constitutional
no estaba en vigor durante el regimen japo ne’s carece de base: la
parte de la Constitucion que quiere conservar en manos filipinas la
propiedad inmueble—prohibiendo su venta a extranjeros—continuaba en
vigor, como continuaban en vigor las leyes que estan consideradas en
derecho International como leyes municipales. Solamente estaba
suspendida la parte de la Constitucion de caracter politico que se
consiredaba incompatible con los principinos que informan el gobierno
imperial del Japon de la misma manera como las disposiciones del C6digo
Penal, que tratan de materia3 como la de lesa maj estad y desacato contra
Jos ministros de la Corona, dejaron de regir en Filipinas al
implantarse el gobierno de tipo democratico presidencial (Pueblo contra
Perfecto, 43 Jur. FiL, 929).

“Military government—that is, the administration of the affairs of
civil government exercised by a belligerent in territory of an enemy
occupied by him—is not considered in modern times as doing away with all
laws and substituting therefor the will of a military commander. Such
government is considered as a new means or instrument for the execution
of such laws, natural and enacted international and domestic, as are
necessary to preserve the peace and order of the community, protect
rights, and promote the war to which it is an incident.” (Magoon, The
Law of Civil Government under Military Occupation, p. 14, cited in
Wilson on International Law, p. 309.)

“The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into
the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power
to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety,
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country.” (Art. 43, Hague Conventions of 1907.) “* * * in order that
the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily
deranged the municipal laws, that is, such as affect private rights of
persons and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are
generally allowed to continue in force, and to be administered by the
ordinary tribunals as they were administered before the occupation. They
are considered as continuing, unless suspended or superseded by the
occupying belligerent” (Dow vs. Johnson, 25 Law ed., 632.)

Por eso, el Comandante en Jefe de las Fuerzas Imperiales Japonesas,
en su Orden No. 3 de 20 febrero de 1942, dispuso lo siguiente;

“(1) Activities of the administrative organs and judicial courts
in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders,
ordinances and customs until further orders, provided that they are not
inconsistent with the present circumstances under the Japanese Military
Administration.” (1 Off. Gaz., 29.)

Se podria arguir que la prohibicion de la venta a extranjeros no es
una disposition legal sino constitutional. Esto no combia la naturaleza
del asunto. La prohibicion es mas bien materia de legislacion que de
constitucion; pero no se extrano que la asamblea constituyente hubiese
incluido en la Constitucion esa disposicion prohibitoria para darla
caracter permanente—pues trato de conservar el patrimonio nacional,—como
se la establecido en la Constitucion de la Ciudad Libre de Dansig la
concesion de los terrenos publicos por medio del homestead.

No existe en autos pruebas de que las partes, vendedor y
compradores, hayan abrado de mala fe. La mala fe no se presume: debe
probarse. A falta de prueba, la presuncion es que las partes obraron de
buena fe. Por tanto, no es aplicable en el caso presente la doctrina de
in pari delicto como se habia aplicado indebidamente en Cabatuan contra
Uy Hoo.

Reitero mis argumentos en mis disidencias en las causas de Rellosa contra
Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil., 827; Caoili contra Yu Chiao Peng, 93
Phil., 861; Cortes contra O Po Poe y otro, G. R. No. L-2943,
(October 30,1953), y Alberto contra Tan C. Sing y otra, G. R.
No. L-6336, (November 27, 1953).

En mi opinion, decision debe ser revocado, ordenandose la
restitucion de las cosas que fueron objeto de venta anticonstitucional.