CLEMENCIA B. VDA. DE VILLONGCO, ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLEES, VS. HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS AND BEN…

The above-entitled case involves the application and interpretation of
Republic Act No. 2056, entitled “An Act to prohibit, remove and/or demolish the
construction of dams, dikes or any other works in public navigable waters or
waterways and in communal fishing grounds, to regulate works in such waters or
waterways and in communal fishing grounds, and to provide penalties for its
violation, and for other purposes.” The pertinent provisions thereof in issue
are Section 1 and the first part of Section 2, which read as follows:

“SEC. 2.—When it is found by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, after due notice and hearing, that any dam, dike or any other
works now existing or may hereinafter be constrscted encroaches into any public
navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any other public navigable waters or
waterways, or that they are constructed in areas declared as communal fishing
grounds, he shall have the authority to order the removal of any such works and
shall give the party concerned a period not to exceed thirty days for the
removal of the same: Provided, That fishpond constructions or works on communal
fishing grounds introduced in good faith before the areas were proclaimed as
fishing grounds shall be exempted from the provisions of this Act, provided such
constructions or works do not obstruct or impede the free passage of any
navigable river, stream, or would not cause inundations of agricultural areas: * * *.”

The facts involved in the case may be briefly stated as follows: On August 15, 1958, Senator Rogelio de la Rosa complained with the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications against several fishpond owners in Macabebe, Pampanga,
amongwhom is petitioner herein Clemencia B. Vda. de Villongco. The complaint
charges that petitioner herein Vda. de Villongco has appropriated a portion of
the coastal waters of Pampanga, locally known as “Pantion”, converting portions
of the coastal areas into fishponds. Investigations were conducted under the
authority of the Secretary, who thereafter rendered the following decision:

“Complainants allege that the conversion of this area into a fishpond by the
respondents deprived them of the uses of the area as a fishing ground and for
navigation. On the other hand, the respondents contend that this area is owned
by them as shown toy the title above-adverted to.

“A relocation survey, based on the title, was made on the area in question to
determine whether the fishpond constructions and/ or works of the respondents
are within the titled property. Said survey shows that a portion of Manila Bay
covering an area of approximately 24,860 square meters was included as part of
the fishpond by the respondents.

“The defense of respondents that the area in question being a private
property, is not subject to the provisions of Republic Act 2066 deserves
consideration. The area being covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, the
respondent’s title thereon is indefeasible and imprescriptible. As sufficiently
established, the area in question is a foreshore land and is disposable under
Section 59 of the Pablic Land Law. However, of the enclosed portion, the area,
of 24,860 square meters has been conclusively shown by the relocation survey as
not within the boundaries of the titled property. Be that as it may, tins,
portion is still of public ownership and the complainants should, therefore, not
be deprived of its uses as a fishing ground and passageway.

“Premises considered, it is hereby ordered that the respondents remove
their fishpond works and/or constructions insofar as it encroaches upon that
portion of Manila Bay covering the area of approximately 24,860 square meters
and restore the original condition of said coastal water within thirty (30) days
from receipt of this decision; otherwise, this Office or its duly authorized
representative shall remove the same at the expense of the respondents within
ten (10) days following the expiration of the thirty-day period, without,
prejudice to instituting judicial action against them under the provisions of
Section 3 of R. A. 2056.” (Annex “C”, pp. 20-21)

Clementia B. Vda. de Villongco filed a motion to reconsider the decision, but
the same was denied by the Undersecretary in a resolution dated August 5, 1959.
Thereupon, on August 20, 1959, petitioner herein filed the present suit in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, calling attention to the above proceedings,
especially the decision of the Secretary and the resolution of the
Undersecretary denying the motion for reconsideration, and arguing that Republic
Act No. 2056, under which the Secretary issued the order above-quoted, is null
and void as conferring upon the Secretary power to decide as to whether or not
the dikes and other constructions encroach upon coastal waters, public streams,
communal fishing grounds, etc.; that the Undersecretary acted without or in the
excess of jurisdiction in delegating reception of evidence, in causing resurvey
of the premises by a person who is not a duly licensed surveyor, in violation of
the agreement to that effect, in the absence of petitioner Villongco; that the
Secretary’s order of demolition of the fishponds was beyond the jurisdiction of
said Secretary and is unconstitutional as an encroachment upon the private
rights of the petitioners, etc. Upon the presentation of the petition, the court
below issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the
Secretary’s disputed order. Trial of the case was had, with the submission of a
stipulation of facts, with exhibits, entered into between the parties, after
which the court, through Hon. Andres Reyes, rendered a decision declaring that
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was in error in ordering the
demolition of the dikes and other constructions of the petitioner Vda. de
Villongco, on the ground that said dikes and other constructions fall under the
exception mentioned in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2056. We quote the order
herein:

“Without the necessity of resolving the various incidental issues raised by
the parties, the Court is of the opinion that the case at bar hinges on only one
vital issue—that is whether the petitioners properly fall within the benefits of
the exemption expressly provided for under section 2 of Republic Act 2056, to
wit:

‘PROVIDED, That fishpond constructions on communal fishing grounds introduced
in good faith before the areas were proclaimed as fishing grounds shall be
exempted from the provisions of this Act, provided such constructions or works
do not obstruct or impede the free passage of any navigable river, stream, or
would not cause inundations of agricultural areas.

‘AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, that the removal of any such works shall not impair
fishponds completed or about to be completed which do not encroach or obstruct
any public navigable river or stream and/or which would not cause inundations of
agricultural areas and which have been constructed in good faith before the area
was declared communal fishing grounds.’

“A perusal of the above provisions reveals that the petitioners herein would
be entitled to the benefits of said exemptions provided the following
requisites are present: first, that the constructions or works in question were
constructed in good faith before the areas were declared communal fishing
grounds; second, that said constructions or works would not impede the free
passage of any navigable river or stream; and lastly, that the same would not
cause inundations of agricultural areas.

“There is no question that the constructions of petitioners would not cause
inundation of agricultural areas. This was admitted in the answer of respondent
Secretary and later included in the stipulation of facts. There is also no
dispute as to the fact that the same were constructed in good faith before June
13, 1958 when Republic Act No. 2056 took effect and therefore before any fishing
ground could have been declared communal.” (pp. 2-3 of the
decision).

The respondent Secretary has appealed from the above decision, alleging the
following errors:

I

“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE INSTANT CASE FOR
CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION AND IN DECIDING THE SAME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE
ISSUES INVOLVED THEREIN.

II

“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
2056 WHICH, OTHERWISE, IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, AND IN CONSTRUING THE EXEMPTING
CLAUSE PROVIDED IN SEC. 2 THEREOF TO INCLUDE FISHPOND CONSTRUCTIONS OR WORK
OUTSIDE THE AREAS DECLARED AS COMMUNAL FISHING GROUNDS.

III

“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLEES FALL WITHIN SAID
EXEMPTING PROVISION OF SECTION 2 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 2056.

IV

“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ISSUING EX-PARTE THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION, AND LATER MAKING IT PERMANENT.

V

“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE INSTANT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION.”

An examination of the facts adduced at the trial shows that petitioner Vda.
de Villongco is the owner of a fishpond situated in Macabebe, Pampanga, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7087 dated January 28, 1952, containing an
area of 90 hectares, 26 ares and 54 centares, bounded on the SW and W by the
Manila Bay and on the NW by the Manila Bay and the Supang Maruginas (Annex
B-Stipulation). A competent surveyor in the person of the Dredge Operation
Supervisor of the Department of Public Works conducted an investigation and
submitted a report (Annex E of the Stipulation of Facts), with an accompanying
sketch of the fishpond showing the disputed portion, included within the dike of
the petitioner. The existing dike of the petitioner is a straight line from
point A of Annex E-1 to point D, and it includes a portion of public land
indicated in red (portion B-c) in said Annex E-1, containing an area of 2
hectares, 48 ares and 60 centares (24,860 square meters). The surveyor found the
following:

“It seems that the average depth along the sea side of the dike A-D as shown
in the attached plan may be about one (1) foot M.L.L.W.

“That section B-C of the dike is along the prolongation of section A-B
towards point C and that no part of dike B-C is protruding towards the sea.

“That navigation along dike A-D during low tide is limited to Vessels with a
draft of about one foot.

“That section B-C of the dike will obstruct navigation towards a public
domain (shaded red in the attached plan) with an indicated area of about 24,880
square meters.

“In my opinion, section B-C of the dike will not obstruct navigation along or
parallel to it.” (Annex E-Stipulation)

The court below held that said portion falls under the exception of Section 2
of Republic Act No. 2056, because it does not interfere with navigation and does
not produce inundation and the dikes were constructed before the area was a
fishing ground. (The parties have stipulated that there is yet na order declaring the area as a fishing ground.)

A study of the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056, especially the sections
we quote above disclose that the authority granted the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications is to declare that the construction or building of dams,
dikes or any other works encroaching on navigable rivers, streams, or any other
navigable public waters or waterways is prohibited and to order their removal or
demolition. The area included in the dikes of the petitioner, indicated in the
red shaded portion in the Stipulation, Exh. E-1, was not a part of the land
titled in the name of the petitioner, as shown by the fact that the titled land
bounds on the W by a line from point 1 to point 19, point 19 ,to point 20 and
point 20 to point 21 of Lot No. 2 indicated in the plan of the land. Said red
shaded portion, which contains an area of 24,860 square meters, is clearly,
therefore; a portion of the Manila Bay area or coastal area, which the
petitioner has evidently included within her dikes, perhaps to straighten the
same. As the shaded portion has a depth of 1 foot at low tide, it is evidently
navigable at high tide for vessels of deeper draft of 1 foot and at low tide navigable to those of 1 foot drafts. It is, therefore, a part of the waterways,
taking into account that the Manila Bay area, especially those bordering the
fishponds in the provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan and Rizal are waterways,
especially used by fishermen and fishpond owners to bring in their catch to
market. The shaded area, therefore, is a public property, not susceptible to
appropriation by any private individual, not only because it belongs to the
State but also because it is used as a waterway.

“Article I.—The following are part of the national domain open to public
use:

1. The coasts or maritime frontiers of Spanish territory, with their coves,
   inlets, creeks, roadsteads, bays and ports.

2. The coast sea, that is, the maritime zone encircling the coasts, to the full
   width recognized by international law. * * *.” (Art. 1, paragraphs 1 and 2,
   Spanish Law of Waters; See also Insular Government vs. Aldecoa, 19 Phil., 505,
   510).

The error of the court below lies in the fact that it considered the coast
sea as falling under the exception of Section 2. But an examination of Section 2
shows that coastal waters or public waterways are not included in the exception.
Only those works constructed on communal fishing grounds are exempted;
constructions on coastal waters or public waterways are not subject to the
exception. Aside from that fact, no inundation or free passage of any navigable
river can take place on the coastal waters or waterways, so coastal waters are
not subject to the exception. The exception, apparently, applies only to
constructions on navigable rivers, when these constructions do not impede or
obstruct the passage of the river and when they do not cause inundation of
agricultural areas. Coastal waters are not within the contemplation of the
exception because there is no navigable river or stream in coastal waters and
neither may there be an inundation therein.

We, therefore, find that the court below erred in its decision that the
constructions of the petitioner, subject matter of the case at bar, fall within
the exception mentioned in Sec. 2 of the Act and its order in issuing the
prohibition is therefore, unwarranted.

The other error is the failure of the petitioner to avail of the
administrative remedy, which consists in appealing from the decision of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the
Philippines. We find this assignment of error also to be well taken. We have,
however, chosen to consider the merits of the issue involved for the more prompt
determination of the case and for a proper understanding of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 2056.

Wherefore, the decision and the injunction issued by the court below are
hereby set aside, and the petition against the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.