ARCADIO G. MATELA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. CHUA TAY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

On January 13, 1959, Chua Tay, engaged in the manufacture of
furniture, filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, an amended
petition for injunction with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 38862,
entitled “Chua Tay vs. Arcadio Matela, et al.” At the time, Arcadio
Matela was one of the members of the Board of Directors of the Central
Cooperative Exchange, Inc. (CCI). In said amended petition, Chua Tay,
made the following allegations, to wit—

* * * * * * *

“5. That while the Award Committee was processing and evaluating the bidders, the members of the Board of Directors of the Central Cooperative Exchange, Inc. as above-mentioned named, together with ACCFA Administrator Capt. Ernesto Jimenez, called
your petitioner for an interview which in reality was a feeler of how
much each prospective bidder can afford to give as kickback to the
members of the Board of Directors of the Central Cooperative Exchange,
Inc., made respondents herein, * * * such questions were never called for in the invitation to Bid
and were a gauge to bidder’s abilities to offer kickback of some forms
of benefits either to the Central Cooperative Exchange, Inc. or to the
members of the Board of Directors of the Central Cooperative Exchange
Management. * * *

“6. That on December 2, 1958, ACCFA
Governors Arcadio Matela, Arturo V. Miranda, Jr., and Nicolas Enciso,
respondent’s members of the Board of Directors of the Central
Cooperative Exchange, called your petitioner and the representatives of
the New Camarines and Metro Sawmill to another interview, this time at
the office of the ACCFA at Taft Avenue, in front of the De La Salle
College, and while there were asked if they have no objection to
increasing the height by five (5) inches more without additional cost
to the Central Cooperative Exchange, Inc., and after your petitioner
requested the ACCFA Governors Matela, Miranda Jr., and Enciso to
roughly sketch the projected increase by five (5) inches and after they
compelled same, your petitioner answered ‘Yes’ to their proposal to
increase the height by five (5) inches without additional cost and
after the same was rejected by the representatives of the New Camarines
and Metro Sawmill. That in said second interview, your petitioner had
already an inkling that ACCFA Gov. Arturo V. Miranda, Jr., respondent
member of the Central Cooperative Exchange, Inc., Board of Directors
was working for respondent Carried Lumber Company or butting for her on the trend of his questioning.* * *

“12.
That the joint acts of respondents Eliseo Aspillaga, Go vs. de Pedro,
Matela, Miranda, Jr., Enciso of the ACCFA, Sanvicente, Eamos, Ostrea,
Maddela, Tibe, Sr., Banez, Ignacio, all members of the CCE Board of
Directors, in giving the award to its correspondent Carried Lumber
Company, show a grave abuse of their discretion and authority, smacks
of favoritism, and detrimental to funds of the government which finance
the undertakings of the Central Cooperative Exchange * * *”,

The motion to dismiss the petition was denied, so with the two motions for reconsideration.

An Answer to the petition was presented by Arcadio Matela on
February 19, 1959, and after the admissions and denials, he alleged as
counterclaim, the following—

“* * * As a counterclaim, respondent, by virtue of
the unwarranted, unjustifiable and unlawful act of the petitioner, was
damaged immeasurably not only in the form of attorney’s fees which had
been contracted at Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), but likewise
suffered moral damages for wounded feelings, besmirched reputation,
social and public humiliation, which is conservatively assessed at One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). Furthermore, respondent has been
damaged in the form of another attorney’s fees in order to protect his
interest for having been damaged and libelously attacked in the
petition of petitioner, which likewise is conservatively assessed at
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20.000.00).”

In the collective Answer of all the respondents, dated March 2,
1959, prepared by the lawyers of the CCE, the following counterclaim
likewise appears, to wit—

“2, That because of the aforesaid imputations
against the respondents found in paragraphs 5, 6 and 12 of the Amended
Petition, which are not only false but malicious and libelous per se,
the answering respondents, who are men of integrity, of high standing
in the business, civic, social and political circles, and are respected
and trusted leaders in their respective community have suffered damages
in the amount of no less than P200,000.00 each. (See par. 2, of
Counter-claim, pages 6-7, Answer to Amended Petition dated Jan. 10,
1959, Annex ‘2-A’)”.

While the above civil case No. 38862, was pending with the Manila
CFI, Arcadia Matela on February 25, 1959, instituted with the Rizal
CFI, Quezon City Branch, the present action, which was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-4019, entitled “Arcadio G. Matela vs. Chua Tay”. The
first cause of action is anchored on allegations contained in the
amended petition (Civ. Case No. 38862), reproduced earlier (pars. 5, 6
and 12 thereof). Matela avers that the allegations in said paragraphs
are highly defamatory, absolutely libelous and has absolute tendency to
dishonor, discredit and humiliate him; that by reason of the
unjustifiable filing of the amended petition, he (Matela), has suffered
by way of moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00; that to defend
himself against the petition for injunction, he engaged the services of
counsel and bound himself to pay the amount of P5,000.00, and to
prosecute this instant case (Civ. Case No. 4019), he likewise engaged
the services of counsel to an agreed amount of P20,000.00. In the same
complaint, Matela asked the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment and sequestration of any and all known properties owned by
Chua Tay in the total amount of P125,000.00, plus the costs; to answer
for damages, it appearing that defendant being a Chinese citizen
engaged only in the manufacture of furniture, there is no security
whatsoever for the collection of any amount that may be awarded.

On March 18, 1959, Chua Tay filed his answer, with Opposition to
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Affirmative
and special defenses were interposed, to wit: that the supposed
malicious or libelous imputations were set forth in the petition as
pertinent and material allegations, made in good faith, and are merely
expressions of opinion; that there is pending before the FiscaPs Office
of Manila, a libel charge, based upon the above allegations, filed by
Matela and others against him (Chua Tay), entitled “Ernesto Jimenez, et
al. vs. Chua Tay, et al” (I.S. No. 2962); that same allegations were
made in Matela’s counterclaim in Civ. Case No. 33862, pending before
the Manila CFI; that there is a pending case (lis pendens) between the
same parties for the same cause; that the complaint states no cause of
action, and the court has no jurisdiction. Chua Tay set up a
counterclaim.

On March 31, 1959, the Quezon City Branch of the Rizal CFI approved
the application for the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment
upon Matela’s posting of. a P50,000.00 bond. A Motion to Lift the Order
of Preliminary Attachment was presented by Chua Tay on April 21, 1959.
On the same date, he also filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
(Q-4019), on three grounds, viz: (1) pendency of another action between
the same parties and for the same cause; (2) lack of jurisdiction of
the court; and (3) complaint states no cause of action. Attached to the
motion to dismiss was the Amended Petition in Civil Case No. 38862,
where the malicious and libelous imputations were made; the Answer of
Matela; the collective Answer of all the respondents in civ. case No.
38862, except Carried Lumber Co., prepared by lawyers of the GCE.
Matela opposed both the motions. After due hearing, the lower court on
May 27, 1959, rendered judgment, the pertinent portions of which read—

* * * * * * *

From a careful reading of the pleadings presented by
the parties in Civil Case No. 38862, the Court has arrived at the
conclusion that as between Arcadio G. Matela, plaintiff, against Chua
Tay, defendant in the present case, there is already a pending action
between the same parties for the same cause of action. * * *.

The
cause of action of the complaint of plaintiff Matela against Chua Tay,
defendant in the present case, is but a mere reproduction and
substantially the same as those alleged by Arcadio G. Matela in his
counterclaim embodied in the Answer to the Petition and Amended
Petition.

In view of the foregoing, as prayed for by the
defendant, the above-entitled case is ordered dismissed with costs
against the plaintiff.”

A citation of authorities in support of the opposition to the Motion
to Dismiss was filed two (2) days after the rendition of the above
judgment. The motion for reconsideration presented on June 1, 1959, was
denied on June 22, 1959. In the second motion for reconsideration filed
on July 3, 1959, plaintiff Matela pointed out that the motion to
dismiss was not opportunely presented because defendant Chua Tay had
already Answered the complaint, and consequently waived the ground for
the dismissal of the action (pendency of another case) since such
ground is a “plea in abatement” which is waivable. In denying the
second motion, the lower court said:

“* * *. Apparently, the contention of plaintiff
seems to be meritorious, but upon a careful perusal of the allegations
contained in the answer filed by the defendant, it is shown as
affirmative and special defenses there is a pending case between the
same parties for the same cause and that the filing of the instant case
amounts to a multiplicity of suits, which allegations are the very same
grounds relied upon by the defendant in his motion to dismiss.
Therefore, the procedure taken by the defendant is permissible and
allowed by the Rules (Rule 8, Sec. 5), and that the preliminary hearing
held by this Court covered not only the Motion to Dismiss but also the
affirmative and special defenses contained in the Answer of defendant.”

The Order of Dismissal and orders denying the Motions for
Reconsideration are now before Us on four (4) assignments of errors,
all of which raise the propriety or correctness of presenting a Motion
to Dismiss after Answer has been filed and the validity of the
dismissal of the complaint, on grounds stated in the Motion to Dismiss.

That there is a pending case between the same parties and for the
same cause is clear from the pleadings in said cases (Civ. Case No.
38862, entitled “Chua Tay vs. Arcadio Matela, et al.” CFI, Manila, and
Civ. Case No. Q-4019, entitled “Arcadio Matela vs. Chua Tay”, CFI,
Rizal, Quezon City Branch). Of course, in the former case the claim of
Matela against Chua Tay is contained in a counterclaim, while in the
latter case, his claim is in a formal complaint. Withal, the basis for
both claims are the allegations in Case No. 38862, which Matela
contends to be libelous and malicious. A counterclaim partakes of the
nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action against the plaintiff in
a case (Pomeroy’s Code Remedies, 868, cited in Francisco’s Rules of
Court, Vol. I, Part I, p. 544). To interpose a cause of action in a
counterclaim and again invoke it in a complaint against the same person
or party would be splitting a cause of action not sanctioned by the
rules (Berses vs. Villamera, 25 Phil. 473; Ledesma vs. Morales, 87
Phil., 199; 47 Off. Gaz. Supp. Dec. 1951, p. 382). Moreover, it has been
said: “When the pendency of such a suit is set up to defeat another,
the case must be the same. There must be the same parties, or at least
such as represent the same interest; there must be the same rights
asserted, and the same relief prayed for. This relief must be grounded on the same facts,
and the title or essential basis of the relief sought must be the same.
The identity of these particulars should be such that if the pending
case had already been disposed of, it could be pleaded in bar as a
former adjudication of the same matter between the same parties”
(Manuel vs. Wigett, 14 Phil. 9; Hongkong and Shanghai Bank vs. Aldecoa
and Co. 30 Phil. 255, italics supplied). In other words, the ground
of pendency of another suit between the same parties, has the following
requisites, to wit: (1) identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for; the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (3) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party
is successful, amount to res ajudicata in the other (Olayvar vs. Olayvar
98 Phil., 52; 51 Off. Gaz., 6219). The facts and circumstances of the
case at bar fly in the teeth of the requirements just enunciated.

Anent the observation of appellant that the dismissal was not proper
since the motion to dismiss was presented after Answer was already
filed, suffice it to state that both the Answer (which was filed
earlier) and the Motion to Dismiss, contained the defense’ and/or
ground of “pendency of another action”.

Conformably with all the foregoing, the Orders, subject of the
instant appeal, should be, as they are hereby, affirmed, with costs
against Arcadio G. Matela, in both instances.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion. Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.