SALVADOR APRUEBA AND ASUNCION MODOC, PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. HON. RODOLFO GANZON, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

Aprueba versus Ganzon

The Case

This is Aprueba versus Ganzon, a petition for mandamus filed by Salvador Aprueba and Asuncion Modoc against the City Mayor of Iloilo City. The petitioners operated a cafeteria in a stall of the city public market, and they asked the court to compel the mayor to reopen the stall and let them continue their business after he ordered it closed. The case matters because it draws a clean line between a privilege granted by the government and a duty enjoined by law, and it reminds every reviewee that mandamus is a remedy for the latter, never for the former.

Procedural History

The petitioners filed their petition for mandamus with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The respondent mayor answered with a counterclaim, later amended, and the petitioners replied to the counterclaim. The trial court then issued an order dismissing the petition. It held that mandamus was not the proper remedy, that the action, if any, should be one for specific performance based on a contractual obligation, and that the right to occupy the stall was a mere privilege the mayor may or may not grant, not a duty enjoined upon him by law. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, and the motion was denied. They then brought the case to the Supreme Court on appeal.

Facts

Salvador Aprueba and Asuncion Modoc owned and operated a cafeteria in Stall 17-C of the Iloilo City market from 1950 until October 1, 1960. On that date, the city mayor ordered his policemen to close the cafeteria for an alleged violation of a city ordinance, and they did so despite the petitioners' protest.

When Aprueba met the mayor on October 3, 1960, the mayor told him the store could reopen only if all back accounts were paid. Aprueba paid, but the mayor still refused to allow reopening. According to the petition, the mayor instead chided Aprueba for working against his candidacy in the last elections, then required compliance with health rules, which Aprueba did. The mayor later said the space would be used as an extension or bodega of the city health office.

The petitioners alleged they had no delinquency in rentals and had complied with health rules, so it was the mayor's ministerial duty to let them operate. They claimed the refusal was motivated by personal and selfish considerations and intended to harass his political enemies. They prayed for a preliminary mandatory injunction, moral damages, attorney's fees of 5,500 pesos, and 5 pesos daily from October 1, 1960 until reopening. The mayor, for his part, invoked the city charter and Ordinance No. 93, series of 1947, which prohibits a person other than the lessee of a market stall from conducting business therein, and he argued that Aprueba had allowed Modoc to do business in the stall.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of First Instance correctly dismissed the petition for mandamus.
• Whether or not the mayor's refusal to allow the reopening of the cafeteria was an exercise of discretion that mandamus cannot control.
• Whether or not the petitioners' right to occupy and operate the market stall was a well-defined legal right enforceable by mandamus.

Applicable Provisions

Section 10, paragraph m, of the City Charter of Iloilo provides:

SEC. 10. General duties and powers of the Mayor. - The mayor shall have immediate control over the executive functions of the several departments of the City, and shall have the following general duties and powers: (m) To grant and refuse municipal licenses and to revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinance are being committed under the protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have been granted is carried out, or for any other good reason of general interest.

This provision is the source of the mayor's discretion to grant, refuse, and revoke licenses, and it is the basis on which the Court found that his refusal was an exercise of judgment, not a ministerial duty.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court correctly dismissed the petition. Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes on him the right or duty to exercise judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. The Court cited a long line of decisions to this effect.

On the second issue, the Court held that the mayor's refusal was a valid exercise of discretion. The privilege of operating a market stall under license is always subject to the police power of the city government and may be refused or granted for reasons of public policy and sound public administration. Such privilege is not absolute but revocable under an implied lease contract subject to the general welfare clause. The Court noted that the privilege to obtain a renewal of the permit after the implied lease contract expired rested on the sound discretion of the respondent, especially after Aprueba's alleged violation of the city ordinance by allowing Modoc to operate business in the stall.

On the third issue, the Court held that where the legal rights of the petitioners are not well-defined, clear, and certain, the petition for mandamus must be dismissed. The Court also held that a contractual obligation, such as the lease to Aprueba of the stall, is not a duty specifically enjoined by law resulting from office, trust, or station, and the rule universally accepted is that mandamus never lies to enforce the performance of contractual obligations. As the trial court correctly observed, the petitioners' remedy is an action for specific performance, if proper, based on a contractual obligation, and not mandamus.

Doctrine

Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes on him the right or duty to exercise judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. The privilege of operating a market stall under license is not absolute but revocable, and it is always subject to the police power of the city government. Where the legal rights of the petitioners are not well-defined, clear, and certain, the petition for mandamus must be dismissed. Mandamus never lies to enforce the performance of contractual obligations, for a contractual obligation is not a duty specifically enjoined by law resulting from office, trust, or station. These rules tie directly to Section 10, paragraph m, of the City Charter, which vests in the mayor the discretion to grant and refuse municipal licenses.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing the petition, with costs against the petitioners.

Remember This

Mandamus lies only to compel a ministerial duty, never to control discretion or to enforce a contract. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between a privilege and a duty, and to ask whether mandamus is the proper remedy against a mayor's refusal to renew a market stall permit.