AMALIA B. CELESTE, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, COURT OF APPEALS, AND JUDGE RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., (IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE, BR. XVIII, CFI, MANILA), RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Amalia B. Celeste, under
confinement in the jail of the City of Manila, invoking the protection that
habeas corpus affords, would seek the restoration of her liberty, alleging the
nullity of a decision of the Court of Appeals of March 2, 1966, now final and executory, convicting her of the crime of estafa, the only thing lacking being the reading of the
sentence by respondent Judge Ruperto Kapunan.  She would
support such a plea on her being acquitted by an earlier Court of Appeals
decision on what she alleged to be essentially the same transaction, the sale
of jewelry on commission, considered in such decision as giving rise at most to
a civil liability.  There were different
cases filed apparently as there was more than one offended party.

There is no specific
claim that thereby there was a denial of
constitutional right, but it was more than hinted at in her petition, which
would characterize the circumstances under which she was deprived of liberty as
“utterly illegal and [unchristian if not inhuman.” Apparently not
unaware that her petition could have been more strongly buttressed in the law,
she would likewise invoke
“humanity, justice and equity” to regain her freedom.  This Court, however, feels that even with all
the sympathy that her plight evokes, there is no legal justification that would
entitle her to the writ prayed for.

This petition for habeas
corpus originally started as a special proceeding for certiorari,
injunction and mandamus against the Court of Appeals and
respondent Ruperto Kapunan
whom she would enjoin from reading the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals of March 2, 1966.  She
would have this Court annul it, notwithstanding its finality, justifying her rather unorthodox plea on the ground, above
noted, that earlier on April 11, 1960, another decision of the Court of
Appeals considered the liability she incurred as a result of a transaction wherein she was given
jewelry for sale on commission basis
as civil in character.  The alleged offended party in that case was a certain Victoria Vda. de Tengco.  In the Court
of Appeals decision where she was
convicted for estafa, while it was apparent that the transaction did occur at about the same time, the
complainant was a certain Eden Patdo, who entrusted
the jewelry to her.  It was the holding
of the Court of Appeals in this case that the agreement being clear to the effect that if she were
not successful in selling the same she
was under obligation to return them and there being a failure on her
part to do so resulting from her entrusting them to a third party, who apparently was another sub-agent, she would be held liable for estafa.

While the decision was
rendered as far back as March 2, 1966, petitioner alleged that she never knew
about its existence as her
previous lawyer did not notify her.  It
thus became final but no reading could be had in the meanwhile as she was out on liberty under bond.  It was only on December 13, 1969 that she was arrested and lodged in jail
pending the reading of the sentence which she would, in her original petition,
postpone indefinitely while this Court was passing on the question on whether
or not its nullity could be decreed considering
the above circumstances.  This proceeding
was filed on January 5, 1970. 
Thereafter, on January 8, 1970 she sought to convert it into a petition for habeas corpus, based on the
same facts but insisting on the illegality of her detention, not to mention
what she considered its unchristian if not inhuman character.

On January 10, 1970,
this Court, adopted a resolution commanding the warden of the City Jail to
appear and produce the body of petitioner before it and to make a return of the writ on January 15, 1970. Such a return was duly made, the offense charged,
according to such Acting City Warden, being one for estafa.^[1]
The decision convicting petitioner on appeal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as already made mention
of, on March 2, 1966.

In the light of the above facts, this Court finds itself unable to accede to the plea of petitioner.  This is not to deny the latitudinarian scope of the writ of
habeas corpus as the most effective remedy against illegal restraint or detention. 
Correctly has it been aptly referred to as protean in its reach.  The duty is
thus cast on the judiciary to put an end to any form of denial of physical
freedom, which in a constitutional regime is intolerable except according to law No deviation from the
legal norm is permissible.  It is in that
sense that Chafee could refer to it as
“the most important human rights provision” in the fundamental
law.^[2]
That is to assure the rule of law.

So it was affirmed in one of the truly outstanding opinions of
Justice Malcolm, Villavicencio
v. Lukban.^[3]
As was there stated: “The writ
of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful freedom.”^[4]
It cannot be denied, to follow
the language of a leading American Supreme Court decision, that while the writ “is simply a mode of procedure, its
history is inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of
personal liberty.  For its function has
been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to
be intolerable restraints.  Its root
principle is that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable
to the judiciary for a man’s imprisonment x x x.”^[5]

Moreover, it has the procedural advantage, to paraphrase Holmes,
of cutting through all forms and going to the very tissue of the structure.^[6]  There is no higher duty cast on courts then
than to maintain it unimpaired and to assure the utmost respect for the
amplitude of its coverage.^[7]
So we have consistently acted.  We have
not allowed technicalities to stand in the way of the writ being given the
effectiveness and efficacy, implicit in its recognition in our Constitution.
There is no thought of our deviating from such a norm. That would be to fail to
accord supremacy to its dictate.

The moment, however, the detention or confinement is the result
of a process issued by the court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
sentence, a different question arises. 
The writ ordinarily cannot be availed of.  It still may be invoked though if the
process, judgment or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be
assailed.  Even if it had authority to
act at the outset, it is now the prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of
constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction. In such
a case, habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain one’s liberty.^[8]

To repeat, while the original suit was for certiorari,
injunction and mandamus, it was subsequently converted primarily to a
habeas corpus proceeding.  It is not to
be attended with success, not being persuasive enough to justify the issuance
of the writ prayed for.  There is no
explicit allegation of a denial of a constitutional right.  At the most, such an
intimation is sought to be yielded by the circumstances above narrated
which could indicate that on what practically appeared to be the same
transaction resulting, however, in two criminal actions in view of there being
more than one offended party, two divisions of the Court of Appeals, which
passed on the matter, reached different conclusions.  In the 1960 decision, petitioner’s liability
was declared to be merely civil.  In the
1966 decision, which petitioner would have annulled, she was held criminally
liable.

The fact, however, that the later decision is admittedly now
final and executory, interposes a bar to any judicial
relief.  If at all, recourse must be had
to executive clemency.  So this Court
holds.  Two members of this Court,^[9]
however, while in conformity with such result, the controlling legal principles
being what they are, would not be averse to a further inquiry on the
matter.  Petitioner could thus be
afforded an opportunity to explain precisely, if she could, why under the
circumstances an element of arbitrariness could be plausibly asserted and maintained.  A due process question might arise. Then if
there were really such a denial, this habeas corpus petition would not be
impressed with the apparent hopelessness which now characterizes it,
considering only the pleadings thus far submitted.  As the Court, however with full support from
settled doctrines views the matter differently, it being undeniable that the
petition on its face lacks merit, the above observation falls short of calling
for a different outcome.

WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
denied.  So is the original petition for certiorari,
injunction and mandamus.  Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs
in the result.

Villamor, J., took no part.

^[1] Criminal Case No. 41974.

^[2]
Chafee, The Most Important Human Right in the
Constitution, 32 Boston Univ.
Law Rev. 143 (1947).  Textwriters are agreed on the significance and importance
of the writ in the protection of individual liberty. Cooley spoke of it as “one of the principal safeguards to personal liberty.“ (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations
709 [1927]).  Willoughby,
not to be outdone, referred to it as “the greatest of the safeguards erected by the civil law against arbitrary and
illegal imprisonment by whomsoever detention may be exercised or ordered.”
(3 Willoughby, on the Constitution 1612 [1929]).  Burdick considered it as “one of the
most important bulwarks of liberty.” (Burdick, The Law
of the American Constitution 27 [1922]). 
Fraenkel in stressing its importance,
said “that ‘without it much else would be of no avail.” (Fraenkel, Our Civil Liberties 6 [1944]).

^[3] 39 Phil. 778 (1919).

^[4] Ibid, p. 788.

^[5]
Fay v. Noia, 372 US 391, 401-402 (1963).

^[6]
Cf. Frank v. Mangum, 237 US 309, 346 (1915).

^[7]
Cf. Bowen v. Johnston, 306
US 1926 (1939).

^[8] Rule 102, Section 4, Rules
of Court.  Harden v. Director of Prisons, 81
Phil. 741 (1948); Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 (1949); Chavez v. Court of
Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, L-29169 (August 19, 1968).

^[9] Justice Teehankee
and the writer of this opinion.