SUSANA LUCILA BARLETA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. LORENZO V. RODRIGUEZ, AS TRUSTEE OF THE ESTATE OF MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEFENDANT…
DIMAAMPAO, J.:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED upon the ground of pres-cription.
SO ORDERED.”
The material precursor facts are synthesized hereunder:
Plaintiff-appellant Susan Lucila Barleta (appellant), lodged a Complaint for Conveyance of Property with Application for Issuance of Ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction[2] averring, inter alia, that she is the granddaughter of Luis Barleta (Luis) who died in 1919. Luis owned a parcel of land described as Lot 1180 with an area of 294,383 square meters located in Castanas, Sariaya, Quezon covered by Decree No. 151883.[3] The subject realty was then administered by Margarita Rodriguez (Margarita). However, through fraud and breach of trust, Margarita registered the disputed property in her own name and obtained the corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4587.
In the years 2009-2010, the Department of Public Works and Highway (DPWH) initiated a road project over a portion of the lot in question and decided to pay a just compensation to the estate of Margarita through its trustee, herein defendant-appellee Lorenzo Rodriguez (appellee). In 1998, appellant discovered that the aforesaid land was part of her inheritance from Luis. Whence, appellant prayed for the reconveyance of the property in dispute, and for the DPWH to be restrained from paying just compensation to appellee.
Traversing the material allegations of the Complaint, appellee asserted that Margarita was the absolute and lawful owner of the land. There was no fraud and irregularity in her title. She was in continuous possession of the property since 1924 until her death in 1960. Her heirs and estate had been paying the real estate taxes therein. Appellant’s cause of action had long prescribed as the case for reconveyance was filed after the lapse of 86 years or more than eight decades from the time the realty was registered in Margarita’s name. In actual fact, appellant was never in possession of the land. Thence, appellee prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. In the same vein, co-appellee DPWH moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of cause of action.
In due course, the court a quo rendered the repugned judgment.
Unruffled, appellant is now before Us asseverating that the court a quo erred in dismissing the Complaint based on the ground of prescription.
The Appeal lacks merit.
Appellant intransigently maintains that her cause of action is imprescriptible.
The evidence on record belies appellant’s stance.
An action for reconveyance can be barred by prescription. It is settled that an action for reconveyance based on fraud must be filed within 10 years from discovery of the fraud which as to titled lands referred to the registration of the title with the register of deeds. An action for reconveyance is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name, but then the action must be filed within ten years from the issuance of the title since such issuance operates as a constructive notice.[4]
In the case at bench, records evince that OCT No. 4587 was issued to Margarita in 1924. However, appellant sought the recovery of the property only in 2010. Quite palpably, appellant’s right to the reconveyance thereof, and the annulment of the covering title have no leg to stand on. Tout court, such an action has long prescribed.
Our jurisprudence abounds with iterations that the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years, reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title, if the plaintiff is not in possession, but imprescriptible if he is in possession of the property.[5] Here, the exception to the 10-year prescriptive period to commence an action for reconveyance is wanting as appellant failed to establish that she was in actual possession of the property. In order for prescription not to set in, the plaintiff must be in actual possession of the disputed property. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. The reason being, that his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.[6]
By the same token, appellant is guilty of laches.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which—by the exercise of due diligence—could or should have been done earlier. It is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable period, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. Under this time-honored doctrine, relief has been denied to litigants who, by sleeping on their rights for an unreasonable length of time— either by negligence, folly or inattention — have allowed their claims to become stale. Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt. The laws aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.[7]
The equitable principle of laches snugly fits into the factual milieu of the case. Appellant slept on her rights and allowed 86 years to pass before questioning the title of Margarita. It was only in 2010 that appellant asserted her purported successional rights and the alleged irregularity in the title. Even if we consider her avowal that she discovered the irregularity only in 1998, she still failed to assert her rights and waited for 12 years before resorting to reconveyance in 2010. Now, appellant should bear the brunt of such a long silence. Evidently, there was failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained period of time to assert her professed right. This being so, the rights of appellee as the registered owner of the disputed lot take precedence over appellant’s ostensible cause of action.
Along this grain, We resonate with approbation the disquisition of the court a quo, thusly—
“Clearly, (appellant) Barleta only filed an action after 86 years from the time of the registration of the subject property in the name of Margarita Rodriguez. x x x
x x x [T]his Court cannot hold that the instant case fall(s) under the exception of the ten-year period prescription for (the) reason that (appellant) Barleta failed to show that she or her ascendants is (sic) in possession of the subject property. On the other hand, (appellee) Rodriguez was able to show (that) Margarita Rodriguez and/or her descendants had been in possession since 1924 and still exercising acts of ownership over the subject property to this date. It is the defendants who have been paying for the taxes of the said properties, a fact that was never disputed by the (appellant).
x x x on the other hand, the (appellee) was issued an original certificate of registration way back in 1924. This Court can only rely on the said certificates issued by appropriate authorized government agency to issue the same because such certification enjoys the presumption of having been issued in the ordinary course of business and with regularity after eight (8) decades of undisturbed possession and ownership of the subject property.”
With this discourse, We find no compelling justification to deviate from the afore-quoted factual findings of the court a quo. It is doctrinally settled that findings of fact of the trial court carry great weight and are entitled to respect on appeal absent any strong and cogent reason to the contrary, since, it is in a better position to decide the question of credibility of witnesses.[8]
In synthesis, We perceive no reversible error committed by the court a quo in issuing the repugned Order.
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The Order dated 14 June 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch 56 in Civil Case No. 2010-33, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Ybañez and Manahan, JJ., concur.
[1] Original Records, pp. 228-231.
[2] Original Records, pp. 2-12.
[3] Id., pp. 16-18.
[4] See Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 375 SCRA 390, 406-407 (31 January 2002); See Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramas, 638 SCRA 444, 452 (15 December 2010).
[5] See Orduña v. Fuentebella, 622 SCRA 146, 162 (29 June 2010).
[6] Heirs of Dr. Mario S. Intac and Angelina Mendoza-Intac v. Court of Appeals, 684 SCRA 88, 105 (11 October 2012).
[7] See Soliva v. The Intestate Estate of Marcelo M. Villalalba, 417 SCRA 277, 286 (8 December 2003); See Akang v. Municipality of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat Province, 699 SCRA 745, 764 (26 June 2013 ).
[8] See Kaunlaran Lending Investors , Inc. v. Uy, 543 SCRA 474, 484-485 (4 February 2008).