APOLINARIO VALERIO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE & NATURAL RESOURCES, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, LUCERO DE GUZMAN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

On July 5, 1950, Apolinario Valerio filed an application with the Rural
Progress Administration to purchase Lot 10, Block 18, Pcs-2561 of the
Nstra. Sra. de Guia Estate Subdivision, which was acquired by the
government for resale to bona fide occupants in accordance with
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 20, 260, 378, 460 and 589. On August 5, 1950,
Lucero de Guzman filed a similar application to purchase the same lot.
Because of these conflicting claims, the Director of Lands ordered a
formal hearing in order to determine who has a better right to purchase
the lot, and on July 24, 1952, Assistant Director Zoilo Castrillo
rendered decision awarding the lot to Apolinario Valerio.

On September 23, 1952, Lucero de Guzman appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture & Natural Resources who, on January 14, 1953, rendered
decision reversing that of the Director of Lands and awarding the lot
to De Guzman.

On October 30, 1953, Valerio filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was denied by the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources,
whereupon Valerio filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila a
complaint praying that the decision of said Secretary be set aside and
that he be declared with preferential right to purchase the lot being
the lawful and actual occupant thereof. He also prayed that the order
of said Secretary denying his motion for reconsideration be set aside.

The Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources answered the
complaint alleging that the award he made of the lot in favor of Lucero
de Guzman was made in accordance with the evidence presented in the
administrative investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands.

The Director of Lands also filed his answer stating that Ms decision
was reversed by the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources
and hence he is bound by it, but nevertheless he was adopting the
answer filed by said Secretary.

Lucero de Guzman on his part answered denying the basic allegations of
the complaint and averring that he was the bona fide occupant of the
lot in question and that the award made in his favor was made in
accordance with the law and the evidence.

Based on the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, the court a quo
rendered its decision on March 18, 1960 wherein it annulled the
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as well
as the order he entered on November 6, 1953, denying the motion for
reconsideration interposed by the plaintiff. As a consequence, it
ordered that the application filed by the plaintiff for the purchase of
the lot be given due course.

Defendant Lucero de Guzman interposed the instant appeal.

From the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, the following
may be deduced: On July 5, 1950, Apolinario Valerio applied with the
Rural Progress Administration for the purchase of the lot in question.
On August 5, 1950, Lucero de Guzman also filed a similar application to
purchase the same lot with the same office. Because of the conflicting
claims, the Director of Lands ordered a formal hearing thereon to
determine who has a better tight to purchase the lot and, on July 24,
1952, Assistant Director Zoilo Castrillo rendered decision awarding the
lot to Apolinario Valerio. De Guzman appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture & Natural Resources who, on January 14, 1953, reversed
the decision of the Director of Lands, and awarded the lot to Lucero de
Guzman.

It appears that copy of this decision was received by Valerio’s
counsel on March 9, 1953, but he filed his motion for reconsideration
only on October 30, 1953, or after the lapse of the reglementary period
of 30 days provided for in the rules and regulations of the Bureau of
Lands within which a losing party may file a motion for reconsideration
of the decision either of the Director of Lands or the Secretary of
Agriculture & Natural Resources. And because of this late filing,
said Secretary denied the motion holding that his decision of January
14, 1953 has long become final and executory. Accordingly, he ordered
that his decision be enforced and executed giving his reasons as
follows:

“An examination of the records of this case reveals
that Atty, Dario Aquino, former counsel or the herein movant, received
a copy of the aforesaid decision March 9, 1953; and that the present
motion was filed only on October 30, 1953 or after the lapse of the
reglementary period of thirty (30) days provided for by the rules and
regulations of the land department within which a losing party may file
a motion for the reconsideration of its decision.

“Presumably
foreseeing the adverse effect of the failure of Apolinario Valerio and
his original counsel to file a motion for the reconsideration of the
decision dated January 14, 1953 of this Office in this ease within the
reglementary period of thirty (30) days, the new counsel for the said
applicant advanced the iheory that the counting of the prescriptive
period of thirty (30) days should not be applied an his case, claiming
that the original counsel had not notified his client of tho aforesaid
decision; and that the said attorney had already withdrawn his
appearance as his counsel in this case Consequently, he argues that
Valerio should be relieved ‘of any adverso effect caused by the
omission of his lawyer,

“From the records of this case, it
appears that Atty. Dario Aquino entered his appearance as counsel for
Apolinario Valerio at the proceedingg of this case in the Bureau of
Lands; that he continued to act as such counsel for the said applicant
when he filed a petition with this Office asking for an extension of
time within which-to file an answer to the memorandum on appeal of
Lucero de Guzman; that thereafter he filed his answer thereto; that on
March 9, 1953, he received a copy of the decision of this Office of
January 14, 1953; that on July 6, 1953 he informed the Director of
Lands that he was withdrawing as counsel for Apolinario Valerio; and
that said withdrawal lacked the consent of his client.

“It
will be seen from the foregoing facts that Atty. Dario Aquino has
always been considered by this Office as the attorney of record of
Apolinario Valerio and, hence, the notice to him of any decision or
order of this Office in this case is a valid notice to his client. His
withdrawal, therefore, as such counsel would not be a valid ground to
relieve his client from the effects of the decision rendered on January
14, 1953 by” this Office for the reason that when said counsel withdraw
his said appearance on July 6, 1953, the aforesaid decision of this
Office had already become final and executory as the expiration thereof
was on April 9, 1953. In other words, his withdrawal as such counsel
was filed about two months after the said decision had already become
final and executory.”

It is now contended that the court a quo erred in setting
tisiae the above order, of respondent Secretary which denies the motion
for reconsideration of appellee it appearing that take same was
justified by the facts and by the peitihent regulations on the matter.

We are inclined to agree to this contention not only because
appellee is bound by the negligence of his own attorney who failed to
notify him of the decision rendered in the case but also because the
Secretary did nothing but to comply with what is provided for in the
regulation on the matter of his own department. Moreover, appellee
should have known that his counsel filed a motion for reconsideration
which may be acted, upon sooner or latter By the Secretary and yet be
allowed more than seven months to elapse before inquiring into
the matter. It was only after the lapse of that period that he learned
that his counsel withdrew from, the case. He should, therefore, partly
be blamed for the delay which resulted in the decision becoming final
and executory.

And it cannot be contended, as the court a quo, intimated,
that an administrative regulation should not be given the the same
weight as a rule of court but should rather be given a more liberal
interpretation for, as is well-known, a regulation adopted pursuant to
law has the force and effect of law.^[1]
In fact, it is a wise policy that administrative regulations be given
the same force as rules of court in order to maintain the regularity of
administrative proceedings. Any way, there is no evidence to show that
the Secretary has abused his discretion in promulgating the questioned
order which on its face appears well justified.

With regard to the merits of the ease, we find no bask for the
insinuation that respondent Secretary was merely coerced into reversing
the decision of the Director of Lands because of the indiscriminate
threats hurled by appellant’s counsel in the written appeal he has
submitted to the office of said Secretary, not only because the same is
unfair and his highly presumptuous, but because his decision was based
strictly on the merits of the evidence presented. The best refutation
of said innuendo is the following portion of the decision which is
self-explanatory:

“As an undeniable evidence of the official
recognition of appellant’s possession over Lot No, 10, it is of record
that his predecessor in interest, Marina Aguirre was the only actual
occupant of Lot 10 (Lot 1535) as listed in the official census of all
occupants of late within the Nuestra Sefiora de Guia Estate in 1947 and
again on April 12, 1949 Lucero de Guzman, the predecessor in interest
of said Marina Aguirre was officially recognized as the actual occupant
of Lot 10 when he was required to pay rentals for his occupation
therefore from 1947 to 1949. All of the foregoing facts operate as
governmental recognition of the constructive possession of Lot 10 by
Lucero de Guzman to the exclusion of all other subsequent claimants
therefor. Lucero de Guzman on his part, has been filling Lot No. 10
since it was transferred to him by Marina Aguirre so much so that from
a marshy and muddy pond said lot had been transformed into a habitable
residential lot; and as a natural spontaneous manifestation and
incidence of his exercise of dominion therefor, when Apolinario Valerio
began constructing a house over Lot No. 10 in 1950 he immediately took
steps to prevent, the intrusion by reporting the matter to the
authorities concerned. Under the foregoing circumstances, there can
be no question that Lucero de Guzman is the legitimate and bona fide
occupant of Lot No. 10 and that he has taken all the necessary legal
steps to establish and protect his possession thereof.

“We
now come to the second allegation of the herein appellant, in which he
claims to be the prior occupant of the lot in question. The records
show that in the census of 1947 made by the defunct Rural Progress
Administration Marina Aguirre, predecessor in m terest of Lucero de
Guzman was listed as already occupying the lot in question. On the
other hand, the claim of the appellee that he is entitled to 3 priority
right over the lot in question for the reasoa that he had purchased a
house belonging to one Benedicts Saria Topacio over a supposed house
standing on a portion thereof is not sustained by the evidence of
record. He claims that the alleged deed’. of sale executed between him
and the said Benedicta Saria Topacio over the said house was done in a
private document that the copies thereof which were in possession of
both Valerio and Topacio were lost. This is contrary to the natural
course of things, for It is very inconceivable that the vendor and the
vendee would not have kept securely a copy of the said deed of sale,
knowing as they do that, the said document is necessary to establish
their right to the land in question. To render the pretended sale more
doubtful is the fact that there is no official record to show that
Benedicta Saria Topacio the predecessor in interest of Apolinario
Valerio had ever been sa occupant of the lot in dispute or any lot for
that matter in the entire Nuestra Señora, de Guia Estate. If it is
really true as contended by the appellee that his predecessor in
interest had really a house on the said lot in 1947, the name of said
JSenedieta Saria Topacio would have been included in the list of
occupants of a lot in the Nuestra Señora de Guia Estate. The records
fail to show that, during the census of occupants of the Nuestra Señora
de Guia Estate In 1947, the name of Benedicta Saria Topacio had been
included In the list thereof. Neither is there any record to show
that Apolinario Valerio has even had anything to do with Lot No. 10
prior to November 16, 1949 when he was allowed to pay rentals therefor
by the defunct Rural Progress Administration. From the foregoing
facts and from the preponderance of evidence adduced during the
investigation of this case, it is safely concluded that Lucero de
Guzman is the prior occupant of Lot No. 10 and the recent occupation of
Apolinario Valerio on the same lot was only made in September 1950 when
the herein appellant, Lucero de Guzman, filed his protest against
Valerias illegal construction of a house thereon.

“Moreover,
altho it is admitted that Apolinario Valerio is the actual occupant of
a portion of the lot in question yet his occupation thereof cannot be
considered as having been done in good faith for the reason that when
he entered the land in 1950 he knew already that Lucero de Guzman had
been paying rentals therefor and already lntroduced some filtings
thereon. As a matter of fact, and as already stated elsewhere in this
decision, when Valerio constructed his house in 1950 in the said lot,
De Guzman filed his objection thereto by reporting the matter to the
Mayor of the City of Manila, who in turn directed the Manila Police
Department to stop the said illegal construction and that when members
of the Manila Police Department went to the premises to execute the
order of the Mayor, Valerio tried to hide as he did hide from them to
avoid service of execution from the said force. Under the above
facts, this office believes and so holds that Apolinario Valerio cannot
be considered as a bona fide occupant under the provision of Section 1
of Commonwealth Act No. 539.” (Italics supplied)

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. No costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Pascual vs. Commissioner of Customs, G. R. No. L-12219 April 25, 1962