G.R. No. L-20388. January 30, 1971
TOMAS C. AGUADOR, SANTIAGO L. ABELO, AQUILINO A. BACUS, ROSENDO T. DAGOHOY, PAULINO A. SABIJON, ULDARICO D. BONGABONG, SIMEON C. BADIANG, PEDRO T. ADLAON, PEDRO T. PUDE, BIENVE…
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental dated August 25, 1962, finding the
herein appellants guilty of contempt of
court for non-compliance with the court’s decision rendered in civil
case 1865 for mandamus which directed and ordered them to appropriate the
necessary amount available from the municipal treasury of Oroquieta
for the payment of salary differentials due to the herein appellees.
On February 20, 1956
the appellees filed a petition for mandamus in the
court below against the municipal treasurer, the then incumbent municipal mayor
and members of the municipal council of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental, for payment of salary differentials
allegedly due them, as employees
of the municipal government, under the terms of their respective appointments. The main cause of complaint of the appellees in that case was
that, while the municipal council of Oroquieta, on
December 29, 1955 passed two
resolutions, numbered 125 and 126, authorizing the appropriation and
payment to them of salary differentials on
account of the enactment of the Minimum Wage Law (R. A. 602 which
fixed the minimum wage of
industrial workers and government employees at 4.00 per day), the said
council, on January 14, 1956, revoked the said resolutions, allegedly because the latter were
passed merely to benefit a few officials and employees of the municipality,
there were not enough funds to pay the said salary differentials, and the
Minimum Wage Law is not obligatory upon the government and public
corporations.
The petitioners (the herein appellees)
and the respondents in the mandamus petition subsequently submitted to the
court an “Agreed Statement of Facts,” on the basis of which the court
below rendered its decision dated January 30, 1957, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered the respondents Malcolm S. Enerio
[Municipal Mayor] Anacleto A. Bandala
[Vice-Mayor], Yunilo Taghap,
Felicisimo S. Solito, Constancio Ira, Francisco German, Felicisimo Jonson,
Lorenzo Arado, Santiago Hayo,
Juan Caliso, as Members of the Municipal Council of Oroquieta, are hereby ordered to appropriate necessary
amounts to pay the salary differentials for the petitioners and also for the
payment of their entire salaries from month to month, subject naturally to the
availability of funds after all statutory and subsisting contractual
obligations shall have been properly covered by adequate appropriations.”
The above decision became final and executory,
but as the municipal council failed to implement it, the appellees
filed a motion for execution of judgment on March 2, 1957,
pursuant to which a writ of execution was issued on March 9, 1957 and duly served on the
respondents. Evidently, the council
still failed to comply with the lower court’s decision and writ of execution,
as on June 18, 1957 the appellees, through counsel, filed a motion for the
respondents to show cause
why they should not be dealt with in contempt of court. Acting on this motion, the court issued an
order requiring the respondents to appear before the said tribunal to show cause why they should not be held for contempt for their
failure to comply with its decision.
Nothing was done, however, on this motion as before the same could be
heard, the presiding judge of the court went on leave, and the temporary judge
on detail thought that the incident should be heard by the regular judge.
Then, on April 1, 1959, the appellees filed
with the court a “Motion to Implement Decision” of January 30, 1957
on the ground, among others, that the respondents in the mandamus case had not
yet complied with the writ of execution issued in connection with the court’s
decision in the case and that the council had, in the intervening period, made
new appropriations in violation of the said decision.
Acting on this motion, the court issued an order on April 4, 1959, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, finding the motion of the counsel for the
petitioners to be well founded, the Municipal Council of Oroquieta,
Misamis Occidental, composed of the Municipal Mayor,
Malcolm S. Enerio, Vice-Mayor Anacleto
Bandala, Councilors Yunilo Taghap, Felicisimo Jonson, Felicisimo S. Solito, Constancio Ira,
Francisco German, Lorenzo Arado, Santiago Hayo, Juan Caliso as members of
the said Municipal Council and Lucio N. Tan as
Municipal Treasurer are hereby ordered to appropriate in the fiscal year of
1959 to 1960 the total amount of P 7,575.20
and to appropriate similar amount every succeeding fiscal year thereafter until
the total liability and obligations of the Municipal Government in favor of the
herein plaintiffs shall have been liquidated in about five (5) years more or
less “
On May 13, 1959
the respondents in the mandamus case asked for a reconsideration of the court’s
order mainly on the ground that the municipality had no funds to appropriate to
comply with the order. While this motion was
pending consideration, however, the 1959 provincial and municipal elections
were held; in this election the herein appellants were elected, as follows: former vice-mayor Anacleto
A. Bandala was elected municipal mayor, Nicasio S. Macoy as vice-mayor,
and the following as councilors: Francisco A. German, Constancio M. Ira, Gaudencio Marimon, Teodorico R. Roa, Santos Ma. Delgado, Sofronio Udal,
Prudencio Paler and Jose Tan. With the exception of mayor Bandala and councilors German and Ira, all the others were
new members of the council and could not, therefore, be named respondents in
the mandamus petition filed by the appellees in the
court below.
Before the in-coming municipal officials assumed office, however,
the outgoing members of the council approved on December 17, 1959, a resolution (Resolution 204), in
which the council resolved
” . . . to
appropriate the amount of TWENTY SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY EIGHT AND
33/100 PESOS ( 26, 453. 33) from any fund not otherwise appropriated and expended to cover the entire claim of the
petitioners in Civil Case No. 1865, entitled ‘TOMAS AGUADOR, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS VERSUS MALCOLM S. ENERIO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS’ in accordance with
the decision of the Honorable Court dated January 30, 1957 in said case.”
On January 2, 1960 the appellants who, by then, had assumed the
helm of government at Oroquieta, approved another
resolution (Resolution 9) requesting the counsel of the appellees
to wait until July of the succeeding fiscal year for the council to appropriate
funds to pay the obligation in civil case 1865.
This resolution also stated, in its declaratory portion, that the
council had previously revoked Resolution 204 of the former council by another
resolution (Resolution 8).
Pursuant then to their promise, the members of the council
appropriated in the FY 1960-61 municipal budget the sum of P 7, 575. 20 which is
equivalent to the annual installment payment ordered by the court in its order
of April 4,
1959. This amount was thereafter paid to the appellees.
On June 20, 1962, however, the appellees
filed with the court a motion for contempt against the municipal treasurer of Oroquieta and the herein appellants on the ground, mainly, that while in the FY 1961-62
municipal budget of Oroquieta there was an appropriation item of P 7, 575.20 for the payment of the
salary differentials of the appellees, a notation had been placed underneath
said item which had the effect of modifying the decision and order of the
court. This notation reads as follows:
“(The Municipal
Treasurer should hold payment of
this particular obligation pending the receipt of the copies of the amended appointments of the claimants of this case from the
Commissioner of Civil Service decreasing their salaries as per plantilla in 1954-1955).”
On June 23, 1962
the court issued an order requiring the appellants to appear before it on June 30, 1962 and show cause why they
should not be dealt with for contempt of court for not complying with its
decision and orders. All the members of
the council, with the exception of
mayor Bandala
and councilor Roa, appeared before the said tribunal
on the scheduled date. At the hearing,
the appellants manifested in open court that they went there involuntarily,
that is, only in obedience to the subpoena issued by the court. They also questioned the validity of the appellees‘ motion for contempt, contending that the same
was a mere motion and not a contempt charge under the Rules of Court. The lower court, however, these arguments
notwithstanding, ordered the arraignment of the appellants on the contempt
motion of the appellees. The appellants pleaded not guilty.
On July 2, 1962 the appellants filed a motion for reconsideration
of the court’s assumption of jurisdiction on the appellees‘
motion for contempt, based on the following grounds: (a) the appellants who were new members of
the council were not parties to the original petition for mandamus and hence
not bound by the decision and orders promulgated therein; (b) they were not
furnished any copy of the motion for contempt; (c) the said motion does not
constitute a contempt charge; (d) the appearance of the appellants on June 30,
1962 was involuntary; (e) the appellants had no participation in the agreed
statement of facts entered into between the appellees
and the former members of the council which formed the basis of the lower
court’s decision and orders in the mandamus case; and (f) since the previous
members of the municipal council who were the parties in the mandamus case
retired by the expiration of their terms of office on December 31, 1959, with
the exception of Bandala, German and Ira, who were
re-elected, they could not be declared in contempt as they were not aware of
the antecedents of the case upon which the alleged contempt charge was
founded.
Aside from the above-mentioned motion, the appellants also filed
an answer to the motion for contempt of the appellees. The arguments advanced in their answer were
as follows: (a) apart from the fact that
they were strangers to the mandamus case, they could not comply with the
court’s decision in that case since the municipality of Oroquieta
had not been made a party to the
said petition for mandamus (citing the cases of Bacolod
City vs. Enriquez, L-9775, May 29,
1957; Angara vs. Gorospe,
L-9230, April 22, 1957; Cabanes vs.
Rodriguez, L-9799, May 31, 1957; Kho vs. Rodriguez, L9052, September 28, 1957; Bacolod
City vs. Rodriguez, L-8801, September 30, 1957); (b) due to the
non-inclusion of the municipality of Oroquieta in the
case, they were, therefore, in good faith in not complying with the court’s
orders; (c) the decision of the lower court being based solely on a stipulation
of facts, it did not become res judicata, but should be considered as a mere
administrative proceeding which could be set aside on grounds of fraud or
mistake; (d) certain written instruments were recently unearthed by the movants (the herein appellants) which showed that the
petitioners (the herein appellees) signed a pledge
dated April 14, 1954 wherein they promised to collect their salary
differentials only in case revenue collections for 1953-54 of the municipality
would exceed the revenue estimates based on the 1952-53 annual budget which
condition, as the appellants later attempted to show, was not met; and (e) the appellees were extended new appointments with reduced
salaries, that is, at the old rates.
On July 2, 1982,
however, the lower court issued an order declaring the notation appearing in
the municipal budget of Oroquieta as in violation of
its decision on the mandamus case. Consequently,
it ordered the municipal treasurer to ignore the said annotation and immediately
pay the salary differentials from the appropriation in the said budget to the appellees. The court
also held in abeyance any action on the contempt proceedings initiated by the appellees.
On July 5, 1962 the appellees filed
their opposition to the motion for reconsideration of the appellants of July 2,
1962, on the following grounds: (a) the
appellants had already pleaded to the contempt charge and, therefore, should be
deemed to have waived all objections thereto; (b) the appellants are the successors-in-interest of the members of
the council who were cited as parties to the mandamus petition and, hence, are
bound by the decision rendered therein; (c) the appellants are estopped from questioning
the court’s jurisdiction since they already voluntarily submitted themselves
to the court’s jurisdiction by partly
satisfying the appellees‘ claims; (d) copies of
the motion for contempt were furnished the provincial fiscal who had been
appearing as counsel for the respondents in the mandamus case; (e) the
municipal council was likewise served a copy of their motion which was received
by the municipal secretary; (f) on June 30, 1962, at the hearing of the
contempt charge, the appellants, with the exception of mayor Bandala and councilor Roa, were
furnished each a copy of said motion; and (g) the motion for contempt
constitutes a contempt charge, and all that the Rules of Court require is a
charge in writing which may therefore, take any form.
On July 6, 1962 some of the appellees
filed a “supplemental contempt charge” against vice-mayor Macoy, and councilors German, Marimon,
Udal, Delgado, Paler and Tan, averring that even as
the lower court in its order of July 2, 1962 declared the annotation in the FY
1961-62 municipal budget null and void, the accused officials, at their session
of July 2, 1962, approved a resolution (Resolution 233) reverting the amount of
P7,525.20 appropriated in the said budget to the general fund of the
municipality for use in defraying the cost of constructing a street and sewerage
system inside the municipal market.
Acting on the “supplemental contempt charge” of the appellees, the lower court on July 6, 1962, issued an order, directing the members of
the council of Oroquieta to restore or re-appropriate
the sum of P 7, 525.20 in the same budget within 48 hours from receipt of the
said order.
On July 7, 1962 the appellants filed an answer to the appellees‘ opposition to their motion for reconsideration,
in which they contended that: (a) the appellees promised to collect salary differentials only if
the estimated revenue receipts (of P102, 046.00) for FY 1953-54 were actually
collected per municipal council Resolution 83 dated August 31, 1953 (and
several other resolutions), which promise was expressly borne out by a pledge dated
April 14, 1954 signed by the appellees; (b) by virtue
of Resolution 84 dated August15, 1955, the claims of the appellees
against the municipality of Oroquieta had already
been totally discharged, for at the end of June 30, 1954 the sum of only P87,
480.23 was actually collected, and not the expected P102,046.00; the foregoing
documents, the appellants alleged, were not made known by the appellees in their petition for mandamus, thus misleading
the court which rendered decision based on the agreed statement of facts
between the parties; (c) some of the petitioners in the mandamus case were mere
temporary employees and hence their services were good for only three (3)
months under section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code, unless their
appointments were renewed for another three (3) months with the approval of the
Civil Service Commissioner, and consequently are not entitled to salary
differentials for a straight period of four (4) years as they claimed; (d)
according to section 691 of the Revised Administrative Code, persons employed in the government service contrary to
law or the civil service rules are not entitled to compensation; (e) the
appellants are not successors-in-office of the respondents in the mandamus
petition; and (f) the reason why they appropriated P 7,575.20 was their belief
that all the proceedings were valid and legal as they were not parties to the
mandamus case, but that since the discovery of the documents aforementioned,
they were of the view that the appellees‘ claims had
already been discharged.
On July 9, 1962 the appellants moved for a
reconsideration of the court’s order of
July 6, 1962, for the following reasons: (a) they were not furnished with any
copy of the supplemental contempt charge nor served notice of its date of
submission, so they could be heard by
the court; (b) the supplemental contempt charge, being criminal in nature and
an amendment of the appellees‘ motion for contempt,
cannot be heard ex parte nor submitted
to the court for resolution without the movants (the
herein appellants) being given their day in court; (c) they were not parties to
the mandamus case which was the basis of the supplemental contempt charge; and
(d) the said charge, being an amendment to the motion for contempt, cannot be
filed without leave of court for that would put them (the appellants) in double
jeopardy.
On the same day, that is, July
9, 1962, the lower court issued an order denying the motion for
reconsideration of the appellants of its order of July 6, 1962. The
lower court also declared that it will proceed with the contempt proceedings in
view of the appellants’ failure to comply with the order of July 6, 1962.
A petition for certiorari dated July 23, 1962 (C. R. L-20012
entitled “Municipality of Oroquieta vs.
Hon. Patricia Ceniza“) was subsequently filed by
the appellants, but we refused to give it due course on the ground that the
proper remedy is an appeal from whatever decision the lower court would render
in connection with the contempt charges against the appellants.
On July 31, 1962,
pursuant to its order of July 9, 1962,
the lower court issued a subpoena to the
appellants and the municipal treasurer of Oroquieta,
commanding them to appear before it on August
4, 1962.
On August 8, 1962
the appellants filed an answer to the supplemental contempt charge, reiterating
their previous arguments on the court’s jurisdiction over the contempt charges.
On August 11, 1962
the lower court, being of the opinion that the supplemental contempt charge
does not constitute an amendment to the appellees‘
motion for contempt, ordered the arraignment of the appellants who pleaded not
guilty to the said charge. The
appellants manifested in open court, however, that
their appearance at the said
proceedings was involuntary they were as under subpoena by the lower court.
On August 14, 1962
two of the respondents in the contempt proceedings, namely councilors Tan and
Ira, manifested their willingness to
comply with the lower court’s order of
July 6, 1962.
On August 22, 1962
eight (8) proposals for admission were submitted by the appellants to the appellees, hereunder summarized as follows:
1.
The judgment in civil case 1865
was dated January 30, 1957
and became final and executory on February 23, 1957;
2.
The respondents in the said civil
case were not the persons named in the contempt charges, with the exception of
mayor Anacleto Bandala and
councilors German and Ira;
3.
The first time the herein
appellants appeared before the lower court in the said civil case was on June 30, 1962, in obedience to the
court’s subpoena;
4.
The first time the appellants were
furnished a pleading in connection with the contempt case was on June 30, 1962 after they were
arraigned before the court on the motion for contempt filed by the appellees;
5.
The appellants were never served
summons, decision or writ of execution or any other pleading in the mandamus
case except the motion for contempt dated June 20, 1962 and subsequent
pleadings filed by the appellees;
6.
The municipality
of Oroquieta
was not made a party in the mandamus case;
7.
Of the appellees,
15 were temporary employees whose services were good for only three (3) months
pursuant to section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code; and
8.
The appellees
voluntarily signed a pledge under their oaths of office dated April 14, 1954 to abide by the letter
and spirit of Resolution 83, series of 1953.
On August 22, 1962
the appellees filed their answer to the above
proposals. This answer, together with
the declarations made in open court during the consideration of the above
proposals for admission, discloses the following: The appellees
admitted proposals 1, 2, and 3, with the qualification, with respect to
proposal 3, that the council was furnished a copy of the motion for contempt
officially through the provincial fiscal and the municipal secretary, and, that
in fact, vice-mayor Macoy even argued in court during
the hearing on the motion for contempt; proposal 4 was admitted with the
qualification indicated as to proposal 3; proposal 5 was admitted with the qualification
that the appellants had complied with the January 30, 1957 decision as
implemented by the lower court’s order dated April 4, 1959 when they approved,
on January 2, 1960, Resolution 9 requesting the plaintiffs (the herein appellees) in civil case 1865, through their counsel, to
wait until July of 1961 for the municipal council to appropriate the amount
from any available funds of the municipality to cover up the differentials
owing to the appellees, followed by Resolution 42 on
January 29, 1960, appropriating the sum of P7,575. 20 in the FY 1960-61
municipal budget of Oroquieta for payment to the appellees, which was actually paid to them; proposal 6 was
rejected on the ground that under the rulings of the Supreme Court in Teves vs. Court of Appeals, L-14776, May 30, 1960,
and other cases, a municipality may be considered bound by a court’s decision
in a mandamus case although not explicitly made a party-respondent; proposals
7 and 8 were likewise rejected on the grounds that to admit them would amount to a re-opening of the mandamus
case, and that even if the alleged waiver were admitted in evidence during the
trial in the mandamus case, the same would have been denied admission for being
null and void as contrary to section 20
of the Minimum Wage Law.
Due to the refusal of the appellees to
admit some of the proposals offered by the appellants, the latter, at the
hearing that followed on the contempt charges, attempted to introduce in
evidence, both documentary and oral testimony, that would prove the facts
denied by the appellees, but this attempt was foiled
by the appellees whose objections were sustained by
the lower court basically on the ground that the said evidences would only
serve to revive the mandamus case the judgment in which has long become final
and executory.
On August 25, 1962
the court rendered its decision on the contempt charges. It found the appellants guilty of contempt of
court, and accordingly sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P25.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
They were further ordered confined in jail until they shall have complied
with the court’s decision and implemental order in the mandamus case. However, the effect of the judgment was
suspended as to the respondents therein who have filed or may file a written
manifestation declaring their willingness to comply with the court’s decision
and orders in the said mandamus case. Hence, this appeal.
Several assignments of error are made by the appellants in this
appeal.
I. The first states
that “The lower court erred in declaring appellants guilty of contempt of
court in a case where they were not parties and for allegedly disobeying a
decision already complied with.”
There are, obviously, two assertions made by the appellants in this
particular assignment of error. We
shall, however, discuss the second assertion first.
As disclosed in their brief, the appellants’ argument that the
lower court’s decision of January 30, 1957 has already been complied with, is
based upon the fact that as shown by the appellees‘
own evidence, the members of the municipal council of Oroquieta
(the respondents in the mandamus case) approved, on December 17, 1959,
Resolution 204, supra, which appropriated the sum of P 26, 548.33 from
any fund of the municipality not otherwise appropriated to cover the entire claim of the petitioners in said
mandamus case. Consequently, according
to the appellants, the only remaining action to be taken was the implementation
of this resolution. We do not think that
this conclusion can be sustained on the basis of the evidence of record. It must be noted that on January
2, 1960, only two
days after the appellants assumed office as members of the municipal council
of Oroquieta, they approved Resolution 9 requesting
the counsel of the appellees to wait until July for
the council to appropriate the amount necessary to satisfy the appellees‘ claim in the mandamus case. This resolution proves quite clearly that
Resolution 204 was revoked by Resolution 8, series of 1960, which was passed by
the appellants themselves. The
pertinent portion of Resolution 9 reads as follows:
“WHEREAS, that the honest purpose and intention of the
framers of Resolution No. 8, series of 1950, particularly the present Municipal
Council, in revoking said Resolution No.
204, series of 1959, is not to deny in complying with the order of the
Honorable Court dated January 30, 1957, but rather to request, the plaintiffs
of said civil case No. 1865, through its counsel Atty. Paulino
Conol, to defer said payment, and wait till July of
next fiscal year so the present municipal council will appropriate the amount from any funds available to
cover the said obligation in civil case No. 1865;”.
We cannot, therefore, in view of this
fact, sustain the appellants’ argument that the lower court’s decision had
already been complied with.
We now go to the first assertion of the appellants: that they cannot be adjudged guilty of contempt for
disobeying the court’s decision inasmuch as they were not parties in the
mandamus case and hence must be deemed unaware of its existence. In support of this position, the appellants
cite the following: (a) they became
members of the council only on January 1, 1960 whereas the lower court’s
decision in the mandamus case was rendered way back on January 30, 1957, while
the writ of execution to enforce this decision was issued on March 19, 1957
and the court’s so-called implemental order, on April 4, 1959, all prior to
their assumption of office; and (b) this Court’s statement in Ferrer vs. Rodriguez, et al.,[1]
to wit:
“As a general
rule, persons who are not parties to an action or proceedings are not subject
to the jurisdiction of a court trying a case, are not supposed to be aware of
the court’s order and cannot, therefore,
be declared guilty of contempt for violating its orders.
* * *
“Nevertheless, persons who are not parties in a proceeding may
be declared guilty of contempt for wilful violation
of an order issued in the case if said persons are guilty of conspiracy with
any of the parties in violating the court’s order.”
We cannot sustain the appellants’ argument. In the first place, it is impossible to
believe that the appellants could not have actual knowledge of the existence of
civil case 1865 and the decision and orders of the lower court relative
thereto, since as one of the appellants himself testified before the court
below – and his testimony, incidentally, was adopted in its entirety by the
other appellants – the matter of the appellees‘ claim
was an issue during their
political campaign in the 1959 elections, the appellants supporting the stand
that if the appellees‘ claims were true and valid,
they will have to pay the same. The same
witness, while denying any knowledge of the lower court’s decision in the
mandamus case, also testified, when asked this question: “What was the basis of the appropriation
if it was not the decision of this Court?”, that “That was the basis
of course but it was not on the strength of the decision that we appropriated
the amount.” The fact that this witness admitted that they appropriated
an amount (which is equivalent to the first installment payment ordered by the
lower court) to pay the appellees‘ claim, based on
what the court required, shows that the appellants were fully aware of the
court’s decision in the mandamus case.
In the second place, it must be observed that the appellants approved
Resolution 9 mentioned above only two days after they assumed office as the
elected officials of Oroquieta. And, in the third place, section 49 of Rule
39 of our Rules of Court (formerly section 44) provides that:
“The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court
or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
order, may be as follows:
* * *
“(b) In other cases the judgment
so ordered is, in respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same
thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.”
Being the successors in office of the outgone members of the municipal council of Oroquieta who were the respondents in civil case 1865, the
appellants also succeeded to the civil obligations imposed by statute or
judicial decision upon the members of the municipal council in their official
capacity. An elective officer does not
succeed merely to the rights and privileges attached to an elective office; he
also assumes, in contemplation of law, the obligations appurtenant hereto as
ordained by statutory rule or judicial pronouncement.[2]
We cannot consider Ferrer vs.
Rodriguez, cited by the appellants, as applicable to the case at bar. Not only were the facts in that case
different from those in the present case, but also, as we said there, the lack
of jurisdiction of a tribunal over persons not parties to an action or proceeding,
is only the general rule. We, in fact,
cited in that case one exception — conspiracy — but, obviously, we never
suggested or implied that this is the only exception.
II. We now turn to the appellants’ second assignment of
error. The appellants contend “That
assuming arguendo that appellants are bound by
the decision of the lower court, the said court erred in not admitting
evidences of appellants to prove circumstances of fraud under which said
decision was rendered and the non-availability or insufficiency of funds by
reason of which compliance cannot be made.
” There are likewise two parts to this
assignment of error.
At the trial of the contempt charges, the appellants attempted to
adduce evidence which would show that the appellees
signed on April 14, 1954 a pledge in which the latter promised “to abide
voluntarily with the spirit and purpose of Resolution No. 83, s. 1953 of the
Honorable Municipal Council of Oroquieta to the
extent of collecting only any amount of salary increase or difference that may
be due us proportional to the actual revenue collections made up to June 30,
1954 in excess of the ordinary revenue estimates based from the 1952-53 Annual
Budget.” The appellants also wanted to prove that the condition contained
in this pledge which would have entitled the appellees
to collect salary differentials did not happen as tax collections fell short of
the expected municipal income. Their
attempts to introduce these evidences were, however, foiled each time by the appellees who objected on the ground mainly that
their admission would amount to a re-opening of the mandamus case in which there was already a final
judgment.
It is our opinion that the lower court acted correctly on this
particular aspect of the case at bar.
The proper step that the appellants could have taken was either to file
a separate action attacking the validity of the lower courts decision or a
petition for relief on the ground of fraud, assuming arguendo that the evidence in
their hands would be sufficient for the purpose of re-opening the court’s
decision.[3]
Nevertheless, it is also our opinion that it would not have availed the
appellants any, were the alleged pledge signed by the appellees
and the other documents related thereto admitted in evidence. It must be observed that the alleged pledge
was signed on April 14, 1954. The appellees‘
claim for salary differentials was, however, based upon two resolutions
subsequently passed by the municipal council of Oroquieta
on December 29, 1955,
namely, Resolutions 125 and 126, supra. Thus,
the council itself, by its own action, rendered nugatory whatever binding effect
the said pledge could have produced against the interest of the appellees.
Admittedly, these two resolutions were subsequently revoked on January 14, 1956 by another council
resolution. But it was precisely the
validity of this latter resolution that was assailed by the appellees in the mandamus case, and which the lower court
by virtue of its decision in this case, in effect, rendered null and void. Hence, the situation is that those two
resolutions still stand. Moreover, one
of the principal reasons that brought about the passage of those two
resolutions was to enable the municipality
of Oroquieta
to comply with the Minimum Wage Law whose provisions fixing the minimum wage of
employees in both
the private and government sectors are mandatory and cannot be waived. Thus, section
2(b) of R.A. 602 provides:
“Employer includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer in relation to an employee and shall include the
government and government corporations.” On the other hand, section 20 of
the same law provides: “No worker or organization of workers may
voluntarily or otherwise, individually or collectively, waive any rights
established under this Act, and no agreement or contract, oral or written, to
accept a lower wage or less than any other benefit required under this Act
shall be valid.”
The appellants argue, however, that the lower court erred in refusing to admit proof of the
financial incapacity of the municipality
of Oroquieta
to pay the appellees.
We cannot sustain this argument on the basis of the recital of facts
contained in the record of this case. More than any other reason, what
impelled the appellees to file the contempt charges
against the appellants was the fact that while the latter included an
appropriation item in the FY 1961-62 budget for the payment of the second
installment on the claim of the appellees, the
appellants made a notation therein directing the municipal treasurer to
withhold payment of said amount until the respective appointments of the appellees were received.
From the evidence adduced in the court below, we gather that the
municipal council makes appropriations on the basis of the statements and
estimates of income and expenditures submitted by the municipal treasurer. Likewise, from the testimony of the
municipal treasurer of Oroquieta, we gather
that in the matter
of the above-mentioned appropriation in question, he certified to the council
the availability of funds, for the fiscal year involved, in the amount of P
7,575.20 as approved in the budget, but that the council later reverted said
appropriation to some other purpose. On
the face of this testimony of one of the appellants’ own witnesses, it is difficult
to fend off the truth of the verdict that the municipality had funds to meet
the claims of the appellees in FY 1961-62.
We also consider as untenable two other points subsumed by the
appellants in their discussion of their second assignment of error, namely, (a)
that inasmuch as more than five years have elapsed since the decision in the
mandamus case became final and executory, the
enforcement of said decision can no longer be had by a mere motion, but through
an independent action; and (b) that the lower court erred in refusing to
consider the appellants’ proof that the appellees
were extended subsequent appointments which carried reduced salary rates.
In connection with the appellants’ first contention, it must be
borne in mind that the case at bar pertains to a contempt proceeding which
arose from the fact that the appellants refused or failed to obey the command
of a judicial tribunal for the performance of certain specific acts. In other words, the objective of the
proceeding below is primarily that of holding the appellants punishable for
disobeying the court’s command, and, only secondarily, for the enforcement of
the rights and interests of the appellees. Hence, it is within the power of the lower court
to take cognizance of the contempt charges filed by the appellees.
With respect, in turn, to the argument that the court below
should have admitted evidence that the appellees were
extended subsequent appointments at reduced salary rates, it is our considered
opinion that it is now late in the day to raise this point. This particular issue should have been raised
in the mandamus case. Moreover, from the
decision of the lower court in civil case 1865, it appears that except for two
of the petitioners[4]
in that case, the salary due the rest of the petitioners therein was P120.00 a
month under their respective appointments.
This monthly salary, at the time the Minimum Wage Law took effect, was,
as practiced by the government, the minimum monthly salary that government employees
were supposed to receive per month.
Hence, even if the appellees were really
extended subsequent appointments at reduced salary rates, such a reduction
would have been void for being contrary to the provisions of the law.
III. We now proceed to the appellants’ third assignment of
error. The appellants maintain that
“The lower court erred in declaring the municipality
of Oroquieta
liable under the decision” in civil case 1865.
In Teves vs. Court of
Appeals,[5]
this Court was presented an issue similar to the one now raised by the
appellants, and we there held as follows:
“It is an elementary rule of procedure that cases must be
prosecuted for and against the real parties in interest, and in an action for
recovery of accrued salaries, the appropriation for which had already been
expended, the City that would have to provide the needed amount is certainly a
necessary party therein. (Angara vs. Gorospe, 101 Phil.
79; City of Bacolod vs. Enriquez, 101 Phil.
644; Cabanes vs. Rodriguez, L-9799, May 31,
1957; Cabo Kho vs.
Rodriguez, L-9032, September 28, 1957).
Petitioner Teves
cites, however, cases decided by this Court wherein back salaries were awarded
despite the fact that the city or municipality concerned were
not made parties to the action. (Uy vs. Rodriguez, 95 Phil.
493; Abella vs. Rodriguez, 95 Phil.
289; vs. Del Rosario, 94 Phil. 483; Covacha
vs. Amante, L-8358, May 25,
1956). The aforementioned
citations are not controlling in the case at bar, for in those instances, the
question of jurisdiction of the court to make the awards was not raised and
passed upon. Nor can we apply our ruling
in the cases of Mangubat vs. Osmeña (G. R. No. L-12837, April 30, 1959) and Baguio vs. Rodriguez, (G.
R. No. L-11078, May 29,
1959) that petition for mandamus and quo warranto
may be entertained and back salaries awarded notwithstanding the non-inclusion
of the city as a party, for the reason that in those cases, the action was
directed against the mayor, the treasurer, the auditor and the city
council — all represented by the city attorney. The inclusion in the petition of these
officials, specifically the city council that would pass the necessary
legislation covering the necessary appropriation, the city treasurer and the
city auditor who would release the funds, was considered substantial compliance
with the law. Differently, in the
instant case, the action was directed only against the City Mayor. There is no question that the said respondent
Mayor may, by a writ of mandamus, be compelled to reinstate petitioner Teves, but, certainly, back salaries cannot be awarded
without affording either the City itself or the City Council opportunity to be
heard and prepare its defense.”
The doctrine which we adhere to, therefore, as rounded out in the
above case, is that the express inclusion of a city or municipality in cases
involving a demand for payment of unpaid salaries is not mandatory. The thrust of this doctrine applies in full measure
to the instant case. Indeed, what really matters in cases of this nature is
whether the local government concerned could be justly said to have been given
and adequately afforded the opportunity to defend itself. Obviously, under our legal system, the right to act for and in behalf of
a city or municipality, unless the statute specifies otherwise, is vested in
its elected officials. In the case at
bar, the municipal mayor, the members of the municipal council and the
municipal treasurer were expressly made parties in the mandamus case and in the
contempt proceedings, and they were represented by the provincial fiscal in
both cases. We would be unjustly
misshaping the doctrine above enunciated and would render nugatory our
attempts lately to free rules of procedure from the fetters of inordinate
technicality, if, in the face of what transpired in this case, we would hold
that the municipality of Oroquieta was not
adequately represented in the mandamus
case instituted by the appellees in the court below.
IV. We now turn to the fourth and last assignment of error. The appellants contend that “The lower
court erred in declaring appellants guilty of contempt of court without due
process of law.”
As may be inferred from the brief submitted to this Court, the
appellants’ reference to lack of due process is anchored, apart from the
alleged objectionable features of the proceedings in the court below which were
mentioned in their first three assignments of error, upon the following
premises: (a) that copies of the motion
for contempt filed by the appellees were served only
upon the provincial fiscal and the municipal secretary of Oroquieta;
(b) that no copy of the supplemental charge for contempt was served upon the
fiscal or on any of the appellants prior to their arraignment; (c) that on June
23, 1960 the lower court issued without hearing or notice an order requiring
the appellants to appear before the said court on June 30, 1962 and show cause
why they should not be dealt with in contempt of court for failure to obey the
decision of January 30, 1957; and (d) that on June 30, 1962 the lower court
immediately arraigned the appellants before they could even be furnished a copy
of the motion for contempt, or apprised of the nature of the charges, or could
consult with a lawyer of their choice.
We are of the view that the appellants’ claim of denial of due
process is untenable.
With respect to the appellants’ first premise, while it may be
true that they were not furnished individually a copy of the motion for
contempt by the appellees prior to or at the time of
its filing with the court a quo, it must be borne in mind that
the said motion actually and substantially constituted a charge for contempt
for the reason that there is no particular form prescribed by the Rules of
Court in which a contempt charge shall be framed or described. There is also no
requirement in the Rules of Court that a copy of the contempt charge shall be
served on the respondents named therein when it is filed in court. All that section 3, Rule 71 (formerly Rule
64) requires on this matter is that a charge in writing be filed. The respondent in a contempt proceeding is,
of course, entitled to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
but this right is properly satisfied when the court, after the respondent appears before it, reads to
the respondent the complaint or furnishes him a copy thereof. Moreover, the municipal secretary, and the
provincial fiscal who under the law is the legal counsel of municipal officials
when the latter are sued in their official capacity, were both served with
copies of the motion for contempt prior to its hearing. The record also shows that one of the
appellants was present during the hearing of the contempt motion on June 23, 1962. Based on what he said below, it may be clearly
inferred that the members of the municipal council of Oroquieta
had been informed about the said motion.
Thus, he said: “This
representation have, upon previous agreement with the council, to be one among
those to consult with the Fiscal regarding this case, because it is the Fiscal,
according to law, who should represent the Municipal Government. Until the Fiscal is disqualified to do so, I
cannot make any say in this case.” Since there had been a previous
agreement among the members of the council to consult with the fiscal first
concerning the case, it is, therefore, difficult to accept that the municipal
secretary who received the copy of the said motion had not done his duty of
forwarding the said copy to the members of the council. Under section 5 of Rule 131 of our Rules of
Court, there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed. We believe that this has not
been sufficiently rebutted by the appellants.
Lastly, the uncontradicted evidence on record
shows that the appellants, after their arraignment in the court below, were
individually given a copy of the motion for contempt, against which the
appellants even filed an answer refuting the material allegations made by the appellees therein.
The appellants cannot thus be said to have been deprived of their right,
under section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, to be heard.
The foregoing discussion obviously answers the second argument
raised by the appellants to support their fourth assignment of error.
We shall then go to the appellants’ third assertion that the
lower court denied them due process by issuing without hearing or notice its
order of June 23, 1962 requiring then to appear before the said court on June
30, 1962 and show cause why they should not be dealt with for contempt for not
complying with the court’s January 30, 1957 decision on the mandamus case.
The appellants would apparently be correct were it demanded by
the fundamental rules established by existing conventions that the procedural
branch of justice be applied in the purest and most absolute sense ever
conceived by man. We all look forward to
the inevitable coming into being of such a state in our quest for true justice
and we have cause to envy those who will have the good luck in the future to
boast of such a state of achievement.
But by our standards of today which the public expects shall be
fulfilled; we
do not think that the court below is required to consult with the
appellants first before it issues a formal order for them to appear and show
cause why they should not be dealt with for contempt for failing to obey the
court’s decision. In the proceedings
below, the court a quo
had before it a complaint for contempt of court filed by the appellees against the appellants, and since the Rules of
Court, as a matter of due
process of law, expressly require that the accused in a contempt case be
afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself or counsel, it stands to reason
that the very least that it could have done was to hale the appellants before
it so that the court could hear their side in person or by counsel. It is not likely that the court below had
the intention of depriving the appellants this opportunity when it ordered them
to come to court and show cause. Indeed,
the case went subsequently to the trial stage after the appellants had filed
their answer. We cannot, therefore, sustain
the appellants’ position.
We now turn to the fourth and last point raised by the appellants
to support their stand that they were denied due process of law. The appellants claim that on June 30, 1962, the lower court
immediately arraigned them before they could be (a) furnished a copy of the
motion for contempt, or (b) apprised of the nature of the charges, or (c) could
consult with a lawyer of their choice.
We have already passed upon the first point of the appellants, and consequently,
we shall hereafter be concerned solely with the latter two.
The appellants’ use of the term “arraign” in their assignment
of error convinces us that the appellants have in mind the provision of section
1, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court on criminal procedure which states that
“The arraignment must be made by the judge or clerk, and shall consist in reading the complaint or
information to the defendant and delivering to him a copy thereof, including a
list of witnesses, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty as
charged. “They had, in fact, argued
before the lower court, when the latter ordered their “arraignment”
on the supplemental charge for contempt, that the admission of said
supplemental charge would put them in double jeopardy inasmuch as the same,
according to them, constitutes an amendment of the motion for contempt of the appellees which can no longer be made since they had
already entered their plea of not guilty to the contempt motion.
The term “arraignment” as understood in the aforementioned
section of our Rules of Criminal Procedure cannot, however, be applied in its
fullest sense to the case at bar since the appellants were not charged with
the commission of a crime, but simply with not complying with what the court
had ordered them to do, which was to pay and satisfy the claim of the appellees. Section 3
of Rule 71, of course, requires that a person charged with contempt be given
an opportunity to be heard, and, as we said earlier, it is part of the court’s
duty, as required by this provision of the rules, that the person charged be
informed of the charges against him.
While nothing would prevent a court in a contempt case such as the one
at bar to follow strictly the provisions of section 1, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, nevertheless, for
purposes of Rule 71 the court adequately
fulfills its duty either by reading the complaint to the respondent or
furnishing him with a copy of the contempt charges. We have examined the records of this case at
length and are satisfied that the requirement of section 3 of Rule 71 was
properly accomplished. The appellants,
moreover, admit that they were arraigned, and it strikes us as an
incomprehensible case of self-contradiction that while they admit they were
arraigned, they charge the lower court with not apprising them of the nature of
the charges for contempt filed by the appellees.
As to their argument that they were not given the chance to
consult with a lawyer of their choice, it must be observed that their
appearance on June 30, 1962 was ordered by the court below way back on June 23,
1962 by an order which specifically required theca “to show cause why they
should not be dealt with in contempt of court for not complying with the
decision of this Court dated January 30, 1957.” The appellants had,
therefore, sufficient time to procure a lawyer of their choice if they had so
desired. Moreover, the law makes it the
duty of the provincial fiscal to represent the officials of a municipality in
cases in which they are charged in their official capacity,
and, consequently, it cannot be said that they were deprived the services of
counsel. Furthermore, all the appellants
pleaded not guilty to the contempt charges.
It cannot, therefore, be rationally argued that there was any actual or
legal harm that was inflicted on them as a result of the arraignment. Lastly, in the hearings that subsequently followed,
the appellants never showed up with any lawyer of their own choice, but were
all represented by the provincial fiscal who was assisted by two of the
appellants who are attorneys-at-law.
The foregoing opinion notwithstanding, this Court is aware that
provincial and municipal elections in this country are held every four years,
and that on account of the passage of time since the instant appeal was brought
to us, it is quite possible that as we now render this decision, a new and
different set of elective officials administers the affairs of the municipal
government of Oroquieta.
ACCORDINGLY, we affirm the judgment of conviction of August 25, 1962 en toto. We are
constrained nevertheless to remand this case to the court a quo
in order that it may order the reception of evidence as to the present legal
capability of the appellants to fulfill what the said court ordered to be
done. The lower court is likewise
directed to order the inclusion of the incumbent new members of the municipal
council of Oroquieta, plus the municipal mayor and
the municipal treasurer, with due notice to the provincial fiscal, as
party-respondents, in order that the said officials may be adequately afforded
a reasonable opportunity to effectuate with deliberate speed the lower court’s
decision of January 30, 1957 in the mandamus case (civil case no. 1865). No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., reserve his
vote.
[1]
L-17507, August 6, 1962.
[2]
Cf. City of Cebu vs. Piccio, L-13012 and L-14876, December 31, 1960 citing 38 Am. Jur.
727, pp. 431-432 which states, inter alia,”…
In so far, at least, as public rights are involved, a successor in office is in
privity with his predecessor, and is hence bound by a
judgment against the latter. If the
latter has been enjoined from doing an act, his successor is equally enjoined,
and if, on the contrary, a judgment has been entered against a public officer
authorizing the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the performance of an
act, the duty of performance rests of his successor in office.”
[3]
See Ramos vs. Mañalac, L-2610, June 16, 1951; Ramos vs. Albano, L–5380,
March 25, 1953;
and Picson vs. Lapuz,
L-7198, October 30, 1954.
[4]
Lucio L. Catane was
given an appointment at a monthly salary of P180.00, while Buenaventura Bandala’s appointment was at 200.00 per month.
[5]
L-14776, May 30, 1960.
This ruling was expressly reiterated in Arcel vs.
Osmeña L-14956, February 27, 1961.
See also Discanso vs. Gatmaitan, L-12226, October 31, 1960 and City Cebu vs.
Piccio, L-13012 & L-14876, December 31, 1960.