PABLO TEVES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. PERPETUO A. SINDIONG, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Pablo Teves, — for the purpose of having himself declared legally entitled
to the office of Justice of the Peace of the Municipality of Luzurriaga (now
Valencia), Negros Oriental, and placed in possession thereof, and at the same
time of having the defendant Perpetuo A. Sindiong, the incumbent, declared not
entitled to the said office, and so ousted therefrom.— instituted the present
quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Oriental
Negros. After due hearing, the trial court found and held that the plaintiff,
Pablo was not entitled to the said office of Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga,
and that he had no cause of action against the defendant Perpetuo A. Sindiong,
and so it dismissed the case, with costs against the plaintiff, Teves has now
brought the case here on appeal.

The following facts are not disputed On December 19, 1914, Pablo Teves was
appointed Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga, Negros Oriental. He qualified for
and assumed said office on January 14, 1915, and had since discharged the duties
of said office up to the outbreak of the Pacific war in December 1941 . Negros
Oriental, or part thereof, was subsequently occupied by the Japanese army. The
plaintiff followed and stayed with the guerrillas in the free area and continued
to discharge his duties as Justice of the Peace of that part of Luzurriaga not
occupied by the invaders. However, sometime in October 1943, the plaintiff was
arrested by a Japanese patrol and was later taken down to Dumaguete, capital of
Negroa Oriental, and there kept a virtual prisoner. Docause of plaintiff’s
absence from the free area of Luzurriaga whore a free government had been
organized and maintained by tho guerrilla forces, the Deputy Governor of said
government appointed Atty. Mauro Edrlal as Justice of the Peace of said
municipality of Luzurriaga. Edrial qualified for the position and performed the
duties thereof from July 8, 1944 to January 4, 1945. In October Pablo Steves
managed to escape from his confinement in Dumaguete, wont to the free area of
Luzurriaga, and asked the Deputy Governor under the guerrilla Government to
restore to him his post of Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga. He was advised
that before he could be reinstated he should secure a clearance certificate from
the guerrilla military authorities to prove his loyalty to the Filipino cause.
Plaintiff secured the necessary clearance, and, on January 4, 1945 he was
appointed Justice of the Peace of the municipalities of Luzurriaga and Bacong,
6th Administrative District, by Deputy Governor Margarito Teves, which
appointment was approved by Alfredo Montelibano, Governor of the Islands of
Negros and Siquijor. Plaintiff Teves resumed, or rather qualified for said
office and discharged the duties thereof.

On May 1, 1945, Teves was again appointed acting Justice of the
Peace of Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, by special agent Jose M. Aldeguer of the
Department of the interior, by virtue of the authority vested in that Dopartment
by the President of the Commonwealth of tha Philippines, said appointment
bearing the approval of tha Commanding Officer of PCAU 24. On the same day, the
plaintiff qualified for and assumed said office. Then, on December 26, 1945
Teves was again appointed by President of the Philippines Sergio Osmeña, as
ad interim Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga, Negros Oriental. Teves
again qualified for and assumed said office. However, when his appointment was
submitted to the Commission on Appointments, it was not confirmed. Despite this
non-confirmation, plaintiff Teves continued in office.

In the meantime, and presumably because of this non-confirmation of Teves’
appointment, the President of the Philippines nominated the defendant Perpetuo
A. Sindiong Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga and said nomination was confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments on September 3, 1946. Sindiong took the
corresponding oath on September 14, 1946, and then advised the plaintiff of his
appointment and demanded of him the surrender of the office. Plaintiff refused
to comply with this demand, insisting that he was the legitimate Justice of the
Peace of Luzurriaga. On being apprised of the situation, the Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Negros Oriental issued a summary order dated September 23,
1946, directing plaintiff Pablo Teves to make delivery within ten days of the
office of Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga, together with the documents and
records pertaining thereto to the defendant Perpetuo A. Sindiong, under penalty
of contempt. To avoid unpleasant consenquence , Teves surrendered the office and
its records to Sindiong on October 7, I946, and a week later, or on October 14,
he commenced the present action in the Court below.

The trial court held that there is no parity between the present case and
that of Tavora vs. Gavina et al (79 Phil., 421) cited by the plaintiff
in support of his contention, for the reason that in the Tavora case the
petitioner therein, who was appointed Justice of the Peace of San Farnando, La
Union, before the war and continued to act as such until the outbreak1624 of the
last war, did not accept any new position, which acceptance may be regarded as
an abandonment of his old post. On the other hand, it applied and relied upon
the case of Zandueta vs. Da la Costa et al. (66 Phil., 615), wherein
this Court held that when a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of
a Court of First Instance of a Judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid
appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same branch of tho
same Court of First Instance in addition to another court of the same category,
both of which belong to a new judicial district formed by the addition of
another Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of
the functions of his new office and draws the salary corresponding thereto, he
abandons his old position and cannot claim to have any right to reoccupy it when
his new appointment was turned down by the Commission on Appointments. According
to the lower court, in accepting first the position of Justice of the Peace of
Luzurriaga and Bacong, and afterwards, the position of Justice of the Peace of
Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, the plaintiff had abandoned his old office of
Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga alone.

Considering the circumstances under which the appellant herein accepted the
two positions.— first as Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga and Bacong and later
as Justice of the Peaco of Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin,—we disagree with the
view or conclusion of the trial court. There is no question that under the
doctrine laid down in the case of Tavora vs. Gavina et al. supra., by
virtue of Art. VIII, section 9, of the Philippine Constitution, — which provides
that “members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold
office during good behaviour, until they reach the age of seventy years, or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office,”— a Justice of the
Peace appointed and qualified before the war, but who ceased to discharge duties
as such at the outbreak thereof, may, after liberation or after the war, resume
and continue in his office until he either reaches the age limit, becomes
incapacitated, resigns from office, is properly removed therefrom, or abandons
the same. The appellant herein is still below the age of seventy, and none of
the other factors or elements justifying loss of, or separation from, his office
as Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga, exists with the possible exception of
that of abandonment.

If the acts of acceptance In this case, particularly plaintiff’s acceptance
of tho two new appointments to the position first as Justice of the Peace of
Luzurriaga and Bacong, and then of Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, had taken place
during normal conditions, there might be force and reason in the position
maintained by the lower court regarding abandonment. If, during normal times, as
a result of a judicial reorganization pursuant to a provision of law, the
position of Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga had been abolished, and in its
place the office of Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga and Bacong had been
established, and again under another legal reorganization the second position
was again abolished and in its place a new district or circuit had bean
established comprising the municipalities of Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, and
that the plaintiff, without pressure or necessity, or considerations of
Government expediency duo to war, had successful accepted said two now positions
or districts, we might agree that he had lost right; and title to the old post
of Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga by abandonment. However, the conditions
obtaining at the time were far from normal. It seems that tho town proper of
Luzurriaga was occupied by the Japanese forces. Instead of rendering service to,
or cooperating with, those military occupants and continuing to serve as Justice
of the Peaca of the town proper under them, Teves joined the guerrillas in the
mountains and continual to exercise his Judicial functions and administer
justice in the free area of Luzurriaga unddr the aegis of the government
maintained by the Pilipino forces, until he was arrested by the Japanese
soldiers and confined in Dumagueta. He escaped from confinement and again joined
the guerrillas. Later, for some reason not known to us, at least not appearing
in the record, but possibly because of the limited area occupied by the
guerrillas and for purposes of expediency, the municipalities of Luzurriaga and
Bacong were joined so as to comprise one single judicial district or circuit;
and this district was given to Teves due to his desire and willingness to
continue serving the guerrilla Government in his judicial capacity. But it is
extremely doubtful whether, in accepting this post, Teves acted with complete
freedom of choice. Normally, one would prefer to serve as Justice of the Peace
of only one town like Luzurriaga, if under complete peace and order in the
poblacion rather than for two towns with perhaps a bit more pay and a
little wider territorial jurisdiction, but in the mountains, under abnormal
conditions and subject to be continually harassed or oven captured and summarily
punished by the superior Japanese occupation forces. Said fear was not imaginary
or fanciful, as proven by the fact that, while serving as Justice of the Peace
in this area, Teves had previously been captured by the Japanese forces and
confined in Dumaguete. Abandonment of an office by reason of the acceptance of
another, in order to be effective and binding, should spring from and be
accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice, either to keep the old office
or renounce it for another. Teves, — and for it he could not well be blamed, —
did not wish to continue staying with, and performing his judicial duties under
the Japanese Government and administration. He preferred to be with the
resistance movement; but, in continuing to serve his people in a judicial
capacity, In the free area, he could not well dictate his terms or his wishes to
the guerrilla authorities, such as insisting that his judicial district
comprising only one municipality, that of Luzurriaga, be preserved. Conditions
and reasons of expediency, possibly military, perhaps called for the merging of
the towns of Luzurriaga and Bacong into a now judicial circuit or district. This
district, Teves accepted, because he felt he could not keep his old office under
the Japanese.

Coming to the second appointment extended to him on May 1, 195. The record
shows that the conditions in Negros Oriental at the time were not yet normal.
True, some areas, and perhaps the greater portion of Negros Oriental, were
already occupied by the American liberation forces. But there was still fighting
between said forces and Japanese troops entrenched in the mountains. For
purposes of debt moratorium, Proclamation No. 9 of President Osmeña (41 Off
Gaz., 205) declared Negros Oriental free from enemy occupation as of May 30,
1945. The lower court in its decision said that when Negros Oriental was
liberated, plaintiff Teves was discharging his duties of Justice of the Peace of
the three municipalities of Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin. This goes to show that
when the plaintiff accepted his second appointment on May 1, 1945 Negros
Oriental where these three municipalities were located had not yet been
liberated. And to further show that at that time normalcy had not yet returned,
the appointment extended to plaintiff as Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga,
Bacong and Dauin, was made not by the President of the Philippines but by an
agent of tha Department of the Interior and under the approval of the PCAU
(Philippine Civil Affairs Unit), a body which was administering civil affairs
for the Army. And it was not a permanent appointment either, but merely as
acting Justice of the peace. And it is significant that these two
appointments, — the first by tho guerrilla Government, and the second, by the
Department of the Interior, — were not ad interim appointments subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, as regular appointments
should have been.

All these circumstances and considerations forcibly bring out the fact that
the formation of a judicial circuit including Luzurriaga, — first, the grouping
of the municipalities of Luzurriaga and Bacong, and later the merger of the
three towns of Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, into a circuit, — was a makeshift
arrangement, a mere temporary expedient, far from being permanent in nature, but
merely designed to meet and solve the exigencies of the administration of
justice in those areas in the best manner possible under said abnormal
conditions. And the best proof that all that arrangement and setup was temporary
in nature, is the fact that in December 1945 when conditions were much better,
and were fast becoming normal, the old judicial arrangement or setup was
restored,-namely, the office of Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga alone. And it
is significant to note that the person who was appointed to this post was none
other than the original pre-war incumbent, the plaintiff herein.

The law and the doctrines governing abandonment of an office may not and
should not be too strictly applied to cases occurring during war, especially in
those areas occupied partly or entirely by the enemy. How many public officials,
upon the outbreak of or during the war, loft their offices in the cities,
particularly Manila, and returned to their native towns, but who were not’ hold
as having abandoned said official, and were recalled to them after liberation.
In that case of Tavora vs. Gavina et al., already cited, Tavora who had
been appointed Justice of the Peace of San Fernando, La Union, and had been
discharging his judicial functions as such, ceased to perform his duties at the
outbreak of the war. True, he was later appointed to the same post by the
Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission and he served under said
appointment, but, in July 1944 he ceased to act in said office and did not
resume his duties until April 1945. Under normal conditions, such act or conduct
may clearly be regarded as an abandonment and vacation of his office, a
voluntary relinquishment thru nonuser (46 C.J. 980-1). And yet, it was not even
insinuated that Tavora had abandoned his office for failure and for ceasing to
discharge his functions and for nonuser.

Considering all the circumstances surrounding this case, we believe and hold
that in accepting the post of Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga and Bacong and
later the office of Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, the
appellant herein did not abandon his post of Justice of the Peace of
Luzurriaga.

But one might contend that plaintiff’s acceptance of the ad interim
appointment by President Osmeña in December 1945 of his old post of Justice of
the Peace of Luzurriaga, was a waiver of his right and title to the old post and
showed his willingness to abide by the implications and consequences of that new
ad interim appointment. In the first place, in view of our conclusion
that the appellant did not abandon his old post, we are of the opinion and so
declare that he has the right to hold the same, not under the new ad
interim appointment in December 1945, but by virtue of his original
appointment in 1914. One cannot properly be appointed to the same post that he
is already holding under a valid appointment. Incidentally, it may even possibly
be maintained, and not without reason, that the last appointment for the post of
Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga in December 1945) was invalid for the
additional reason that the President could not extend an appointment to one who,
under a new appointment, is not duly qualified. Plaintiff herein is not a member
of the Bar, although, having been appointed before the approval of the
Constitution of the Philippines and of Commonwealth Act No. 101 which lastly
amended Sec. 2 07 of the Revised Administrative Code in October 28, 1936, which
require membership in the Bar as a qualification for the position of Justice of
the Peace, he was not bound by this legal requisite as far as his appointment in
1914 is concerned. However, a new appointment like that appointment extended to
him in December 1945 for the post of Justice of the Peace would come under this
requirement,— that is to say, that no person who is not a lawyer may be
appointed to the office of Justice of the Peace after the approval of the
Philippine Constitution and of Commonwealth Act No, 101 amending section 207 of
the Revised Administrative Coda. In this connection, we might cite the ruling
found in Corpus Juris, which reads:

“Where a duly elected officer subsequently accepts an appointment to the same
office under an Invalid statute, there is no abandonment, but rather an
attempted fortification of his possession of the office.” (46 C.J.,
981)

One other consideration. It was held by this Court in the case of Garces
vs. Bello et al. (80 Phil., 153), and Singson vs. Quintillan et al. (80
Phil., 245), the facts of which are similar to those in the present case, that
an appointment to the post of Justice of the Peace extended to one who had a
right to it because of a previous prewar appointment under which he had
qualified and discharged his duties, may be regarded as a mere restitution or
restoration of the position which belonged to him 5 and that the new appointment
can add nothing to or diminish his right to the office conferred by his original
appointment. It may well be said that the appointment extended to the plaintiff
in December 1945 was a mere restitution of the office which belonged to him but
which he failed to hold because of and during the war.

In conclusion, we find and hold that the appellant here had not abandoned his
post of Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga, Negros Oriental, because of his
acceptance and discharge of the duties of the position first of Justice of the
Peace of Luzurriaga and Bacong, and later, of Justice of the Peace of
Luzurriaga, Bacong and Dauin, under abnormal conditions due to the last war,
which new position successively occupied were temporary in nature and intended
as a mere temporary expedient; and that his last appointment in December 1945,
to his original office of Justice of the Peace of Luzurriaga, mag unnecessary if
not invalid, and his acceptance of the same would not in any way affect his
right to hold said office under his original appointment in 1914.

Reversing the decision appealed from, the plaintiff- appellant Pablo Teves is
hereby declared to be legally entitled to the office of Justice of the Peace of
Luzurriaga (now Valencia), Negros Oriental, and the defendant-appellee Perpetuo
A. Dindiong is hereby ordered to deliver said office and all the records
appertaining thereto to said plaintiff-appellant. No pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.

Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Perfecto, Pablo, and Tuason,
JJ., concur.
Feria and Briones, JJ., concur in the
result.