RAMON P. FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. EDUARDO ROMUALDEZ, AS SECRE­TARY OF FINANCE; ABELARDO SUBIDO, AS COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE; JACINTO GAVINO, AS COMMISSIONER OF CUS­TOMS; …

Fernandez versus Romualdez

The Case

This is Fernandez versus Romualdez, a special civil action for quo warranto and mandamus with preliminary injunction, brought directly before the Supreme Court by Ramon P. Fernandez against the Secretary of Finance, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Commissioner of Customs, and the officers who took over his post. Fernandez had been appointed Collector of Customs of the Port of Jose Panganiban in Camarines Norte, and he refused to step down when his appointment was terminated. The case matters because it draws the line between a probationary appointment and a temporary one, and it settles a rule every civil service examinee must know: a temporary appointment is terminable at any time, and the holder acquires no vested right to the office.

Procedural History

Fernandez filed the present action directly in the Supreme Court on June 6, 1966, seeking quo warranto and mandamus with preliminary injunction. He impleaded the Secretary of Finance, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Commissioner of Customs, Alfredo de la Fuente, and Deputy Collector Job P. Guinto. The respondents filed their answer on July 15, 1966. After hearing, the case was submitted for decision on December 8, 1966, and the Supreme Court rendered its decision on April 3, 1968. There were no intermediate courts below; this was an original action in the Supreme Court.

Facts

On June 5, 1962, Ramon P. Fernandez was appointed Collector of Customs of the Port of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte. On its face, the appointment was marked "Probationary," and it stated that it was good for a period of six months only from assumption to duty. The Civil Service Commissioner approved it as indicated on its face. Fernandez assumed duty on June 18, 1962, so his probationary period would end on December 18, 1962.

On December 12, 1962, Fernandez wrote the Commissioner of Customs, noting that his probationary period of six months would end on the eighteenth of that month, and that as of that date he had no permanent appointment although he had been verbally instructed by the Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Administration to continue on the job. On January 10, 1963, Acting Secretary of Finance Rodrigo D. Perez, Junior extended another appointment to Fernandez for the same position, effective December 19, 1962. That appointment was expressly stated to be temporary in nature and without prejudice to the final outcome of the administrative case against Democrito R. Septimo, the former incumbent of the position. Fernandez continued occupying the position.

On April 2, 1966, Commissioner of Customs Gavino informed Fernandez at a conference that his appointment was terminated, and this was reiterated in a formal written notice on April 19, 1966. On May 17, 1966, Commissioner Gavino issued a personnel order directing Alfredo de la Fuente, Collector of the Port of Aparri, to assume the post of Acting Collector of Customs of the Port of Jose Panganiban effective immediately but not to exceed thirty days. The order was transmitted to Fernandez on May 19, 1966, with a directive to turn over his money and property accountabilities to De la Fuente. De la Fuente assumed the position on May 24, 1966, but Fernandez refused to relinquish it and instructed his personnel not to recognize De la Fuente as Collector. The next day, Fernandez telegrammed the Commissioner of Customs questioning the detail. He then filed this action, alleging that De la Fuente's detail was designed merely to enable Deputy Collector Guinto to assume the position after Fernandez was ousted.

Issues

• Whether or not Fernandez's appointment as Collector of Customs was legally terminated.
• Whether or not Fernandez, holding a temporary appointment, had a vested right to continue in office that entitled him to quo warranto and mandamus.

Applicable Provisions

The decision turns on the character of the appointment as stated on its face. The first appointment provided:

This appointment is good for a period of six months only from assumption to duty.

This language fixed the probationary term and showed that the appointment carried no permanence beyond six months.

The second appointment provided:

temporary in nature and without prejudice to the final outcome of the administrative case against Mr. Democrito R. Septimo, former incumbent of the position.

This language established that Fernandez held the office only temporarily, pending the resolution of the case against the former incumbent.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Fernandez's appointment was legally terminated. The first appointment was termed probationary and was good only for six months from assumption of duty, or until December 18, 1962, and it was approved as such by the Commissioner of Civil Service. The second appointment was merely temporary, effective December 19, 1962, and Fernandez continued to perform his duties under it. The Court therefore found no question that on April 19, 1966, when Fernandez was notified that his appointment was terminated, he was holding merely a temporary appointment, which is terminable at any time.

On the second issue, because the appointment was temporary and terminable at any time, Fernandez had no vested right to the office and could not compel recognition through quo warranto and mandamus. The Court denied the petition.

Doctrine

A probationary appointment is good only for the period stated on its face, here six months from assumption to duty, and it does not ripen into a permanent appointment by the mere lapse of time or continued service. A temporary appointment is terminable at any time, and the holder acquires no vested right to the office. Consequently, the occupant of a temporary position cannot successfully demand reinstatement or recognition through quo warranto and mandamus, because the appointing authority may terminate the appointment whenever it sees fit. The controlling consideration is the nature of the appointment as approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service, not the length of service rendered.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition for quo warranto and mandamus, with costs, in favor of the respondents.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: a temporary appointment is terminable at any time, and the holder has no vested right to the office. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between probationary and temporary appointments in the civil service and to ask whether mandamus lies to compel recognition of a temporary appointee.