THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ALEX JUREIDINI, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Alex Jureidini was prosecuted for and convicted of theft in the Municipal
Court of Cebu and on appeal to the Court of First Instance was found guilty of
the same crime and was sentenced to one month and one day of imprisonment. From
this judgment he appealed to this Court.

The prosecution tried to establish the following facts:

In the morning of April 16, 1945, Private Ned Games, a guard of the warehouse
of the quartermaster depot, APO 716, at pier 2, Cebu City, saw on the carriage
of a parked bicycle a bag, exhibit A, containing the articles Exhibits A-1 to
A-7, belonging to the United States Army. Thereupon Private Games reported what
he had seen to Sergeant Merle G. Brown, calling his attention particularly to
the bag Exhibit A which contained cigarettes. Private Games was instructed by
Sergeant Brown to take the bicycle and its owner to the office as soon as the
latter showed up. Moments later the accused appeared, approached the bicycle
and, after tying his shoes over the bag exhibit A which was placed on the
carrier of the bicycle, tried to leave the premises. Upon being asked by Private
Games whether he was the owner of the bicycle, the appellant answered in the
affirmative; whereupon, following the order of his superior. Private Games took
the appellant together with the bicycle and the exhibits referred to above to
the quartermaster. Here the appellant admitted having placed the goods inside
the bag Exhibit A but without any intention of stealing them. Appellant was at
that time an employee of the said warehouse of the quartermaster depot of the
United States Army in Cebu.

Denying his guilt, the appellant adduced the following evidences That he was
the only son of Isidro Jureidini and one Eulalia, wealthy merchants of Cebu
before the outbreak of the war; that he studied in the Sambag Grammar School of
the City of Cebu, attended high school in the Silliman Institute and received
his college education in the Cebu Junior College; that he had never before been
accused of any crime in any court of justice and that lie is a young man of good
moral character; that at the time he was prosecuted for theft he was living with
his mother in such ease and comfort that he did not have to work for a living
but that being bored having nothing to do he worked, in the aforesaid
quartermaster of the United States Army as foreman; that while he was working
there so many robberies and thefts had taken place that the authorities of the
quartermaster took all precautionary measures to prevent further commissions of
such crimes by, among others, posting guards at the entrance and exit of the
premises, frisking every employee going out and placing a notice in the premises
warning that any person caught in the act of stealing goods from the
quartermaster would be shot; that in the afternoon of April 14, right after he
had begun working in the warehouse, he stumbled on a box, as a result of which,
he injured his feet, but despite the accident he continued working; that early
in the evening of said date he requested the watchman, Venancio Antonio, to
speed up the work in the warehouse which appeared to the former to be going on
very slowly, but that Venancio refused to cooperate; that he then told Venancio
that he was only wasting the money of the Americans, which provoked a quarrel
between the two; that in the morning of April 16 the appellant entered the
warehouse and waited there for about half an hour to get his rations, but
finding that there was nobody to attend him he went back to his bicycle
intending to go home, as his office hours had already ended; that on that
occasion he noticed that his bicycle had been removed from the place where he
had left it and found on its carrier a small box with lettering “PRUNES” and a
small tin can without any label; that a guard approached and told him to go to
the office; that upon arriving there he was shown by Sergeant Brown a big bag
and was told that it was found on the carrier of his bicycle; that a Corporal
Lovensky began typing something which was probably an affidavit to be subscribed
against him; that about an hour later Lieutenant James, head of the employees in
the quartermaster, arrived, and told him that he and several others had
committed the crimes of robbery and theft in the premises of the quartermaster;
that the bag exhibit A was placed by Venancio Antonio on the bicycle of the
accused after filling it up with some scattered chewing gums, chocolate bars and
other things that were found by him in the premises of the quartermaster; that
Venancio Antonio, not knowing what had become of the appellant because the
former left the quartermaster for not having been paid his salary, discovered
when he visited the accused that the latter was being prosecuted for theft due
to that bag which he had placed on the bicycle of the accused, and so willingly
testified before the court on this matter.

Appellant’s brief raises six errors supposedly committed by the trial court
which in our opinion may be reduced to the following proposition: Whether or not
the appellant was proved guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt.

In the course of the presentation of the evidence for the defense, Venancio
Antonio was introduced as a witness, who strongly corroborated appellant’s
testimony. He declared that he had a quarrel or fight with the appellant in the
evening of April 15, 1945, and that as a result thereof he wanted to get even
with him and decided to put the contents of the bag Exhibit A and the bag itself
on the carrier of appellant’s bicycle, unsuspecting that appellant would be
seriously affected by the deed and would result in his prosecution for theft.
This act of Venancio Antonio was probably conceived by him due to the prevailing
condition during that time in the warehouse in question wherein, in view of the
numerous robberies and thefts being committed, the people or employees who were
carrying any kind of bundle were examined and searched at the exit by the guard
purposely posted there to remedy the situation. This practice of the guard being
known to the accused (pp. 5O-51, 79, t. s. n.), it was most natural for him not
to take any package or bundle containing stolen goods from the quartermaster
warehouse, because it was logical for him to presume that he would be searched
at the gate when he went out, similarly to other people or employees who were
going out of the premises. If he were really aware of the fact that he had
committed said crime of theft and that he was carrying with him the corpus
delicti in the bag Exhibit A on the carrier of his bicycle, he would not
have attempted to go through that gate with that incriminating evidence against
him, knowing as he did that every person was searched as he went out. The
appellant, it stands to reason, would not have exposed himself to becoming a
sure victim of the stolen goods that he had in his possession. Under the
circumstances it is not hard to believe that, there having been an ill feeling
between the appellant and Venancio Antonio, it was very probable that the latter
might have planted it, as in fact he so testified before the trial court and
corroborated the accused on this point, which testimony was not in any way
rebutted by the prosecution although there were other persons present cited by
Venancio Antonio (pp. 35, 36, t. s. n.).

It is alleged that the testimony of Venancio Antonio and that of the
appellant suffer from some inconsistencies which render the testimony of the
former unbelievable and that said Venancio did not appear on the payroll of the
employees of the warehouse in question. The alleged inconsistencies are not
serious in nature. Moreover we should not expect the testimony of every person
to be identical and coinciding with each other. It is enough that the principal
points, covered by their testimonies are established although they do not
dovetail in all the details—which would even prove well-rehearsed and studied
declarations. The fact that many employees were not noted on the payroll was
also established in this case. And even the name of the appellant himself was
only written in ink in one of the payrolls, which goes to show that many of the
employees there were not regularly carried on the payroll.

Another circumstance which to our mind strengthens the position of the
appellant is that he was an intelligent person and a college student, and it
seems reasonable to expect that he would not be so stupid as to commit the crime
in the manner attributed to him by the prosecution.

One more significant circumstance that should not escape our attention is
that one lent testified that in the evening of April 16, as one of the guards of
the warehouse, he actually saw the appellant take away surreptitiously the
stolen goods and place them in the bag Exhibit A, and that he reported what he
had seen to Sergeant Brown, another witness for the prosecution. But if what he
testified was true, why is it that he was not presented as a witness for the
prosecution since the beginning in the municipal court where this case was
originally heard? And why is it that the trial judge, in his decision, did not
even mention the name of this witness the most pertinent facts declared by him
in the trial? Was it because he believed that the accused was being
“persecuted”?

Finally, when the appellant was told to go to the office by the guard,
believing that he was to get his rations, he met there Corporal Lovensky and was
shown by Sergeant Brown a big bag, bigger than that which was made an exhibit in
this case, and was informed that it was found on the carrier of his bicycle.
Corporal Lovensky then began typing something which was probably an affidavit to
be subscribed by the accused. That affidavit which is supposed to be one of the
strongest proofs against the accused does not appear to have been introduced in
this case — which leads us to another significant circumstance: Was the purpose
of preparing that affidavit to establish something that the accused committed
such and such acts but that the accused repudiated the same, or was that
affidavit prepared for the purpose of having it subscribed by the persons who
were supposed to have been present on that occasion of the discovery of the
corpus delicti but that the witnesses or individuals expected to
testify thereon refused to “persecute” the appellant herein?

In view of all the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the guilt of the
appellant has not been proved beyond peradventure of doubt. The judgment of
conviction is accordingly reversed and the appellant acquitted, with costs
de oficio. So ordered.

Moran, C. J., Parás, Feria, Pablo, and Briones JJ., concur.