PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ROBERTO BOYLES AND PIO MONTES, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

PER CURIAM:

On January 27, 1959, Roberto Boyles and Pio Montes were charged in the Court
of First Instance of Davao with the crime of robbery with homicide, the
information reciting three (3) aggravating circumstances, to wit: “1. superior
strength, 2. dwelling, and 3. nighttime, the accused having purposely sought it
to facilitate its commission.”

Subsequently, on March 11, 1959, the information was amended to include a
fourth aggravating circumstance, namely, “the fact of two prior convictions of
both accused.”

Upon arraignment, both defendants, duly represented by counsel de
oficio, Atty. Marcial Tupas, pleaded guilty to the charge.-

“ATTY. TUPAS:
The accused are willing to enter a plea of guilty and they
are ready to be arraigned.

“COURT:
Arraign the accused.

“INTERPRETER:
Reading the information to the accused.

“ACCUSED PIO MONTES:
I understand the information read to me and
I
PLEAD GUILTY.

“ACCUSED ROBERTO BOYLES:
I understand the information read to me and
I
PLEAD GUILTY.

“COURT:
To the accused Pio Montes:

“Q. Do you understand the nature of your plea?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. You
insist on pleading guilty?
“A. Yes, Your Honor, because I am at fault.
To
the accused Roberto Boyles:
“Q. Do you understand the nature of your
plea?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. You insist on pleading guilty?
“A. Yes,
sir.
“Q. You understand the charge against you?
“A. Yes, sir.

“COURT:
Ask the same question to Pio Montes.

“INTERPRETER:
Asking the accused Pio Montes.

“PIO MONTES:
“A. Yes, sir. (pp. 2-3, t.s.n.)

Taking into account the gravity of the offense charged and the lawful penalty
that may be imposed therefor, the trial judge directed the prosecution to go to
trial notwithstanding the plea.

“COURT:
The Court would like the prosecution to present witnesses to prove
the aggravating circumstances because the discretion as to the imposition of the
proper penalty is with the Court, and the Court would liketo see to it that the
proper penalty is meted the accused.”

“FISCAL DELGRA:
Yes, Your Honor, we can present witnesses.

“ATTY. TUPAS:
Since the accused had already pleaded guilty there is no
need to present evidence.

“COURT:
Under the Rules of Court the Court has discretion to let the
prosecution present evidence for the purpose of satisfying the Court that the
accused is really guilty of the offense, especially like this case when it is a
capital offense, (pp. 3-4, t.s.n.)

In compliance with the foregoing direction, the prosecution went to trial and
established the following facts:

Early in the morning of November 28, 1959, at about3:00 o’clock, the spouses
Eminiano Bayo and Brigida Misona of Barrio Monte Carlo, Asuncion, Davao, were
awakened by the barking of dogs about their premises. Eminiano Bayo went down to
investigate what the commotion was all about and soon returned to sleep when he
saw that the dogs were just barking at some wild pigs foraging for root crops in
their yard.

Because of the incident, however, the couple were unable to sleep anymore. At
about 5:00 o’clock that same morning, while his wife was breast-feeding one of
their children, Eminiano Bayo decided to start the day and went down the house
to prepare their breakfast. As he opened the door, however, he was surprised to
see a man, later identified as Felizardo Soria, menacingly standing and all set
to attack him, and, just as quickly as he could yell a warning to his wife that
there was an intruder in their abode, the man broke through their door, grabbed
and wrested with Bayo. On seeing the scuffle, Brigida ran to the rescue of her
husband. She tried to break the stranger away from Bayo, but before she could be
of any effective help, the man (Soria) shouted for his companions, the herein
two appellants, who came rushing to the house. Pio Montes was armed with a
knife, Roberto Boyles with a gun. Promptly, they joined the fray, and with their
quarry thus greatly outnumbered, Pio Montes stabbed Eminiano Bayo in the back.

In panic, fear and terror, Brigida blindly sought the window and jumped, the
fall spraining her waist and breaking her legs. Immediately, the stranger who
first confronted her husband ran down the house, grabbed and dragged her back
upstairs where then the group demanded money from her. She opened a trunk and
got the empty tin can of Klim milk in which she and her husband kept their
savings of about P100.00 and handed over the contents to Pio Montes.

The three, however, did not content themselves with the money-loot.
Exhibiting one of the ugliest and most revolting criminal perversity this Court
has ever been made to pass judgment on, the trio forcibly brought Brigida near
where her dead husband lay bathed in blood, and, completely insensitive to the
painful, terrified anguish of the just-widowed mother, they forced her to lie
beside the corpse and there took turns raping her. After everyone had quenched
his lustful thirst, they tied her hands behind her back and left.

As soon as her attackers had departed, Brigida worked to free herself from
the ropes. She then woke her 6-year old son and sent him out to ask for help
from their neighbors.

Upon their arrests, both appellants readily confessed to the crime. Their
sworn statements were first taken by the Davao Police authorities and later
subscribed and sworn to before an Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Davao. There is
no question whatsoever as to the validity and voluntary execution of the said
documents. They were translated into their dialects and both appellants admit
they executed them upon their own free will and with full awareness of their
contents and consequences.

The third man in the group, Felizardo Soria, was still at large when this
case was filed.

As both accused have pleaded guilty, only one issue is addressed to this
Court for review, and that is, the legality of imposing the capital punishment
on them.

Counsel for the appellants insists that the proceedings in the lower court
have established only two aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
crime, i.e., dwelling and habituality, which are in turn, however, offset by the
two mitigating circumstances borne out by the records of this case, namely, plea
of guilty and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrongs Consequently, it is
urged that the death penalty may not be legally meted pursuant to Article 63,
paragraph 2 of the RevisedPenal Code, in relation to paragraph 4 of the same
Article.

“Art. 63. Rules for application of indivisible penalties. — x x x In all
cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

1. * * *

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

3. * * *

4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission
of the act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in
consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the
penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such
compensation.”

We regret to disagree with the position and theory advanced by the
appellants.

To begin with, the appellants are now bound to accept the existence of four
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime imputed against them
because they have pleaded guilty to the information in which said four
circumstances were expressly alleged. The jurisprudence is firmly settled that
while a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time, it constitutes an
admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the
aggravating circumstances alleged, such as nocturnity, use of superior force,
dwelling, etc. (People vs. Egido, 90 Phil., 762; People vs.
Santos and Vicente, L-105 Phil., 40; People vs. Agaton Salazar, 106
Phil., 221, all cited in Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, p. 265, 1961
ed.) It matters not that the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of
guilty covers both the crime as well as its attendant circumstances qualifying
and/or aggravating the crime (People vs. Marcial Ama y Perez, 111
Phil., 882; People vs. Roger Perete y Manlapas, 111 Phil, 943).

Although the foregoing jurisprudence covers the whole scope of appellants’
appeal, We shall discuss more extensively the various points raised in their
brief in recognition of the seriousness of the penalty imposed and because one
aspect of this case needs further clarification.

The lower court appreciated nocturnity against the appellants solely on the
basis of the fact on record that the crime was committed at about 5:00 o’clock
in the morning. This particular finding can stand correction. By and of itself,
nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. It becomes so only when it is
especially sought by the offender and taken advantage of by him to facilitate
the commission of the crime to insure his immunity from capture (People
vs. Alcala, 46 Phil. 739; People vs. Matbagon, 60 Phil. 887;
People vs. Pardo, 79 Phil. 658). Stated differently, in default of any
showing or evidence that the peculiar advantages of nighttime was purposely and
deliberately sought by the accused, the fact that the offense was committed at
night will not suffice to sustain nocturnidad. It must concur with the
intent or design of the offender to capitalize on the intrinsic impunity
afforded by the darkness of night.

In the case presently on appeal, We note that other than the time of the
crime, nothing else whatsoever suggests the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime. Not one of the prosecution evidence, oral or documentary, makes the
slightest indication that the protection of night’s darkness was deliberately
availed of by the appellants. In view of this deficiency in the case for the
Government, We are constrained to disallow the said circumstance even as,
technically, it may have been accepted by them when they pleaded guilty on
arraignment.

The appellants also question the lower court’s finding that they employed
superior strength in the commission of the crime. They claim that the evidence
on record show otherwise.

We do not think so. In the first place, there is the uncontradicted testimony
of the wife of the victim, an eyewitness to the attack, that the herein two
accused jumped on the victim as he was wrestling with Felizardo Soria and that
it was while they had him thus outnumbered that Pio Montes delivered the fatal
blow. Secondly, the signed confessions of the appellants substantially tally
with and confirm the above testimony of the wife. The records do show that had
not the appellants herein seized upon their greater number and greater power to
overwhelm the deceased, the latter might have defended himself more
successfully. His aggressors were armed, and he was un-armed and only by
himself. The number of the aggressors here point to the aggravating circumstance
of superior force (U. S. vs. Bañagale, 24 Phil. 60; People vs.
Eustaquio Caroz et al., 68 Phil. 521).

Finally, the point is raised that “aside from the plea of guilty of the
accused, the trial court should have also considered the mitigating circumstance
of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.” The argument
is that the accused planned only to rob they never meant to kill.

The obvious fallacy of the above argument lies in the failure to understand
the true nature of the aforementioned mitigating circumstance. Article 13,
paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code addresses itself to the intention of the
offender at the particular moment when he executes or ”commits the criminal
act; not to his intention during the ‘planning stage. Therefore, when, as in the
case under review the original plan was only to rob, but which plan, on account
of the resistance offered by the victim, was compounded into the more serious
crime of robbery with homicide, the plea of lack of intention to commit so grave
a wrong cannot be rightly granted. It is utterly of no moment that the herein
accused set out only to rob. Their refutable fact remains that when they ganged
up on their victim, they employed deadly weapons and inflicted on him mortal
wounds in his neck. At that precise moment, they did intend to kill their
victim, and that was the moment to which Article 13, paragraph 3 of the Revised
Penal Code refers.

While intent to kill is purely a mental process, it may be inferred from the
weapon used, the extent of the injuries sustained by the offended party and the
circumstances of the aggression (People vs. Parana, 64 Phil. 331) as
well as the fact that the accused performed all the acts that should have
resulted in death (People vs. Mercado, 51 Phil. 99). In the case at
bar, the weapon used, the force of the blow, the spot where the blow was
directed rand landed, and the cold-blood in which it was inflicted, all tend to
negative any notion that the plan was anything less than to finish their
intended victim (People vs. Orongan, 58 Phil. 426). Hence, the charge
that the extenuating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
as that committed was unjustly denied the appellants is completely unfounded.

In summary then, the crime committed was robbery with homicide, aggravated by
three (3) circumstances, namely, dwelling, use of superior force and
habituality. Only one mitigating circumstance, voluntary plea of guilt, is
legally assessible in appellants’ favor. There is absolutely neither basis nor
justice for this Court to extend unto them the extenuating circumstance of lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong, the records of this case having
conclusively demonstrated the contrary. It may be said, though, that even if We
were to credit the last mentioned circumstance in favor of she herein accused,
they still would have to be meted the death penalty since the aggravating
circumstances would still be one more than the mitigating circumstances — a
condition which under our penal system makes mandatory the imposition of the
greater penalty, death.

Our attention is called to the fact that the trial court sentenced the
appellants to pay, jointly and severally, an indemnity of only P3,000.00, As
recommended by the Solicitor General’s office, this amount should be increased
to P6,000.00 in line with the doctrine first laid down in the case of People
vs. Amansec, G.R. No. L-927, March 11, 1948.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, and, with the sole modification adverted to in
the last paragraph, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against
the appellants.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.