GENEROSO VILLANUEVA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. HECTOR G. MOYA AND PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

By this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, the Generoso Villanueva
Transportation Co., Inc. seeks to annul the decision of the Public Service
Commission in case 69-329 granting the respondent Hector G. Moya
a certificate of public con­venience to operate a 20-unit taxi service in Bacolod City and from that city to any point in the island
of Negros.  The
petitioner also prays for a trial de novo of the said case.

Deprivation of due process of law is asserted against the Com­mission,
in the sense that it rendered the decision in dispute without a hearing on the
petitioner’s motion to dismiss.  In
counterplea, it is claimed that the said motion does not show proof of service,
nor does it contain any notice of the time and place of hearing, and, there­fore,
is a mere scrap of paper (citing Manakil
and Tison vs. Revilla and Tuaño, 42 Phil.  81 (1921); Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa
vs. Municipality of Unisan, 44 Phil. 866 (1920); Tan vs. Dimayuga,
G.R. No. L-15241, July 31, 1962;
and PNB vs. Donasco, G.R. No. L-18638, February 28, 1963).

The record discloses that on January 13, 1969, Moya filed an
application with the Commission to operate a taxicab service in Bacolod City
and to any point in the island of Negros.  The appli­cation, with due notice, was set
for hearing on March 31, 1969.

At 8:00 o’clock in the morning of March 31, 1969, the peti­tioner
filed with the receiving section of the Commission a “Motion to
Dismiss” the application of Moya.  The petitioner therein alleged that the
applicant is a holder, by purchase, of a franchise to operate taxicabs in Bacolod City the express terms of which prohibit the holder
thereof from applying for additional units during the lifetime of such
franchise.  At the lower left-hand corner
of page 2 of the foregoing motion the following words appear:  “Copy furnished Atty. Jesus Torrecareon, for Applicant.” As already stated, the
motion does not contain any notice of the time and place of hearing.

At the initial hearing on the morning of March 31, 1969, before
Commissioner Josue L. Cadiao,
the counsel of the petitioner and the attorney of a certain Vicente Tanedo entered their respective appearances for two oppositors.  The
hearing was, however, post­poned, apparently upon motion of the oppositors, as may be gleaned from the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken on that date which reads as follows:

“We are asking for postponement and we are going to file our
opposition.

“COMMISSION:

“Case postponed until further assignment.  Counsel for oppositors are given five (5) days from today to
file their written opposition after which we shall set this case for
hearing.  Case delegated to Hearing
Officer.”

The counsel for the petitioner did not notify Commissioner Cadiao at the said hearing that he had filed a motion to
dismiss the application of Moya.  A copy of the said motion was, at that time,
not yet attached to the record of the case.

Neither the petitioner nor the counsel of Vicente Tanedo ever filed any written opposition to Moya’s application.

On August 25, 1969
Moya filed an ex parte
motion to set his application for hearing at the earliest possible time,
alleging the lack of any written opposition thereto.

The officer assigned to hear the case then set it for hearing on August 28, 1969 at 2:30 o’clock in the afternoon.  The petitioner was not notified of this
action.

On September 3, 1969
Commissioner Cadiao rendered the decision in dispute.

Obviously, by September
3, 1969, a copy of the petitioner’s motion to dismiss was already
attached to the record of the questioned application, as the said decision of
Commissioner Cadiao made specific reference thereto,
as follows:

“At this juncture, it should be noted that there is attached
to the records of this case a ‘Motion to Dismiss’ filed by Atty. Jose Ocampo dated March
31, 1969.  However, this
motion was received by this sala several days after
the initial hearing on March 31, 1969.  It should be observed that the said ‘Motion
to Dismiss’ does not show any proof of service to the adverse party, applicant
herein.  Neither did counsel
Atty. Ocampo mention this fact in open Court on said
date to give due notice to the applicant and to the Commission that oppositor intended to raise a prejudicial question.  In view of counsel for oppositor’s
non-compliance with the rudimentary rules of procedure embodied in Section 6,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court designed to protect the substantial rights of
party litigants, the Commission cannot take cognizance nor even consider the
aforemen­tioned ‘Motion to Dismiss.’ (This ruling follows the policy laid down
by the Supreme Court in the cases of Manakil and Tison vs. Revilla and Tuaño, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Unisan,
44 Phil. 866; and many others).  This
case is, therefore, deemed and declared uncontested.”

The Public Service Commission correctly ruled that the peti­tioner’s
motion to dismiss was but a mere scrap of paper, pursuant to the doctrine laid
down and reiterated by this Court in the cases cited in the Commission’s
decision.

The said motion admittedly contained, on its face, the
words:  “Copy furnished: Atty. Jesus
Torrecareon, for Applicant”; however, the
counsel of Moya denies that a copy of the said motion
was ever furnished him.  The petitioner,
on the other hand, has not proved that it had served a copy thereof on Moya’s counsel. 
Furthermore, the said motion does not contain any notice of the time or
place of hearing.  Nor did the petitioner
inform Commissioner Cadiao, at the initial hearing on
the application, of the fact of the filing of the said motion.  Had counsel for the petitioner called the commissioner’s
attention, the defect in the petitioner’s motion could probably have been
cured.  But, as the facts of this case
disclose, the petitioner preferred to sit down and wait until long after the
application of Moya was granted.

To make matters worse, the transcript of stenographic notes taken
on March 31, 1969 shows that a request for additional time within which to file
written oppositions was made by the counsels of the two oppositors
who entered their appearance on that day. 
While the counsel for the petitioner refuses to admit having ever made
that request, this denial is belied by the mentioned record of the
proceedings:  Commissioner Cadiao clearly addressed both counsels for oppositors in granting the said request for postpone­ment,
thereby showing unmistakably that both oppositors
moved for the postponement of the hearing to give them time to file their
written opposition.  Thus, Commissioner Cadiao’s order granting the said request reads:

“Case postponed until further assignment.  Counsel for oppositors are given five (5) days from today to
file their written oppositions after which we shall set this case for
hearing.  Case delegated to Hearing
Officer.”

It is well for advocates to understand and remember the clear and
uncomplicated rules concerning the filing, service and proof of motions and
other pleadings.  These rules, which are
meant to secure to every litigant the adjective phase of due process of law,
apply to proceedings before the Public Service Commission, in the absence of
different and valid statutory or administrative provisions pres­cribing the
ground rules for the investigation, hearing and adjudi­cation of cases before
it.  (Cf. Sambrano
vs. PSC, GR 45503, Sep­tember 20, 1938, 66 Phil. 193)

Of course, there have been instances where absence of strict
compliance with rules of procedure was not considered fatal to an erring
party’s cause.  In the matter of
defectively filed motions, for instance, we had occasion to so rule in a number
of cases.  Thus, in Sunga vs. Lacson (G.R.
No. L-26055, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 393), no notice of the motion to
dismiss was served by the defendant on the plaintiffs, but because the trial
court, upon learning of this fact, promptly re-set its hearing to another day
with due notice to all the parties, we held that this action of the court cured
what­ever defect there initially was so as to effectively bar the running of
any period.  In Sun Un
Giok vs. Matusa (G.R.
No. L-10304, May 31, 1957, 101 Phil. 727), although the motion to dismiss was
defective due to the movant’s failure to specify the
date when the motion was to be heard, this Court held that the said defect was
cured when the trial court notified the plaintiff that the motion would be
heard at some future date.  In De Rapisura vs. Rapadaz
(G.R. No. L-22594, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 798), the admission by the
other party of her receipt of the motion for reconsideration was held to have
cured the failure of the movant to attach to his
motion the requisite proof of service.

These cases show the attendance of certain circumstances which
were considered substantive enough to truncate the adverse literal application
of the pertinent rules violated.  No
similar or identical justifying circumstance, however, can be invoked in
relation to the present recourse. 
Consequently, the rules have to be applied however harsh the results may
be upon the erring party.

ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is dismissed, at
petitioner’s cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., took no part.