THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. TOMAS BAGASALA, JUANITO BAGASALA, ANICETO RONAN, SALVADOR RONAN AND ANICETO REX, DEFENDANTS, JUANITO BAGASALA, DEFENDANT-A…

The plea of appellant Juanita Bagasala
for the reversal of his conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide and
serious physical injuries is based on the insufficiency of the proof to
demonstrate his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the confession attributed to
him was allegedly obtained by means of torture and the infliction of body
injuries and there was not enough testimonial evidence to justify the finding
that he was liable for the crime committed. 
The information for the above offense was filed against five accused,
but only Tomas Bagasala and Juanita Bagasala were adjudged guilty.^[1]
An appeal was duly taken to this Court by both of them, but Tomas Bagasala having escaped from the provincial jail on March 24, 1966, his appeal was
dismissed.^[2] Juanito Bagasala is thus the sole
appellant.  As will hereafter be shown,
his contention that an extra-judicial confession was involuntary, having been
extorted by force, must be given credence. 
He is not, however, entitled to an acquittal, as the oral testimony
contrary to his assertion did clearly point him as one of the perpetrators of
the offense charged.  The conviction
cannot be reversed.

The tragic occurrence took place on June 10, 1961.  At
about 2:00 o’clock that morning, Macario Ongkit and his wife, Juliana
Reginaldo, were asleep in their house in Barrio Cadlan, Pili, Camarines
Sur.  They were awakened by the barking of their
dog.  Macario
stood up and armed himself with his bolo and an iron pipe.  Proceed­ing to the sala,
he saw five men entering his house through the doors leading to the veranda as
well as the kitchen.^[3]
In no time at all, one of them, recognized by him as appellant Juanito Bagasala, wrested the
iron pipe.  Another, Tomas Bagasala, in turn sought to take away from him his
bolo.  Iron pipe in hand, appellant was
heard by Ongkit demanding from his wife, Juliana Reginaldo, her key, prompting her to exclaim:  “Juanita, why are you doing this to
us?” This was followed by her plea for help, as she was beaten up with
such weapon.^[4]

Tomas Bagasala in turn succeeded in
relieving Ongkit of his bolo and to use it against,
the latter, wounding him on the back of his head and thus causing him to fall
to the floor.  It was not until almost
dawn that morning that he regained consciousness.  His son, Rafael, was then attending to his
wounds.  He was asked by his father to
report what happened to the authorities. 
Ongkit was then taken to the provincial
hospital in Naga
City so that he could receive
medical care.  He likewise testified that
of the raiding party of five, he could identify only appellant and Tomas Bagasala.  On the
occasion of such robbery, he suffered a loss of one sack of rice valued at ten
pesos.^[5]

With the incident being reported to the Philippine Constabulary
at Naga City
on the same morning, two sergeants^[6]
and two corporals^[7]
were directed to investigate the occurrence. 
Upon their arrival, what greeted them at the scene of the crime at 10:00 o’clock that morning were the lifeless
body of the wife, Juliana Reginaldo, lying flat on
the floor, the iron pipe and the bolo stained with blood.^[8]
They were told by the son, Rafael Ongkit, that his
father was in the provincial hospital in Naga City.  Proceeding to said place, Ongkit
pointed to appellant and Tomas Bagasala with three
other persons who were responsible for the killing and the robbery.^[9]
Acting on this information, they brought the two to the hospital where they
were readily identified by Ongkit as the
perpetrators.^[10]
The death of the wife, according to the doctor who performed the autopsy, was
due to the “acute internal and secondary hemorrhage, because of the
multiple wounds on the head and fracture of the skull.”^[11]

The oral testimony of Macario Ongkit, in the opinion of the lower court, was
“corroborated and strengthened by the [extra-judicial statement] under
oath” of appellant Juanito Bagasala
wherein it was admitted that he was among the group of five persons who went to
the house of the Ongkit spouses precisely for the
purpose of taking away the palay stored therein.12 There
was thus a rejection of the claim made that such confession was
involuntary.  The defense of alibi put up
by appellant was rejected in view of the positive identification.  Hence his conviction for the crime of robbery
with homicide and serious physical injuries, being sentenced to pay the heirs
of Juliana Reginaldo the amount of P5,000.00 and to
pay Macario Ongkit the
amount of P10.00 representing the value of the palay.

If the conviction of appellant were predicated solely on the
confession, he would be entitled to acquittal, his attack on its voluntary
character having support in the evidence of record.  There is, however, sufficient basis for the
finding of guilt as the testimonial evidence is sufficiently weighty and the defense
of alibi utterly unconvincing.

1.      The Constitution in its Bill of Rights explicitly guarantees:  “No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself.”13 There is thus a safe­guard against
the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts.  It does not bar, as Justice Tuason pointed out,
the conviction of an accused “on a voluntary extrajudicial statement * *
*.”14 Certainly, however, where the confession is
involuntary, being due to maltreatment or induced by fear or intimidation,
there is a violation of this constitutional provision.  Any form of coercion whether physical,
mental, or emotional thus stamps it with in­admissibility.  What is essential for its validity is that it
proceeds from the free will of the person confessing.

This is the prevailing principle even prior to the Constitution.  Both under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 as well as a statute enacted in 1903, there
is the requirement that a confession to be received as evidence must be shown
to be freely and voluntarily made and not the result of violence, intimidation,
threat, menace, or promise or offer of reward or leniency.15
Why it should be thus was explained in an early leading case:  “Involuntary confessions are rejected by
all courts — by some on the ground that a confession so obtained is unreliable;
and by some on the grounds of humanitarian principles which abhor all forms of
torture or unfairness toward the accused in criminal proceedings.  But either theory arrives at the same goal.  Such a confession is not legal evidence and
must be rejected.  If the accused
satisfactorily shows that it was made involuntarily, the confession stands
discredited in the eyes of the law and is as a thing which never existed.”16
Such a thought finds expression in an even earlier decision, United
States v. Navarro,17promulgated
in 1904.  Thus:  “The provision, that no one is bound to
criminate himself is older than the Government of the United
States. 
At an early day it became a part of the common law of England.  It was established on the grounds of public
policy and humanity — of policy because if the party were required to testify,
it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit the crime
of perjury, and of humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of
confessions by duress.”18

It is no surprise then that where there was ample basis in a
habeas corpus proceeding for petitioner’s contention as to the signature on his
confessions in the eight cases where he did plead guilty being due to his
desire to avoid any further torture or maltreatment, this Court, through
Justice Perfecto reached this conclusion: 
“The facts proved by petitioner convince us that the sentences
rendered in the eight cases in question are null and void and should not be
given an effect.”19 As a result, the release from
confinement of petitioner was ordered. 
Then, too, in line with this controlling doctrine, there is this
relevant excerpt from an opinion of Justice Labrador:  “We cannot close our ears to the stories
of maltreatment used to extort the confession in question.  Courts are not unaware that some officers of
the law resort to illegal and reprehensible tactics to extort confessions, and
had had occasions to express condemnation of such tactics.”20

It is unfortunate that the lower court failed to abide by the
authoritative doctrines that ban the use of involuntary confessions in
accordance with the constitutional provision against self-incrimination which,
in the language of Justice Sanchez, should be “mandatory”, being
“a valuable and substantive right”.21 Appellant testified that on June 10, 1961, while he was being
investigated at the constabulary barracks, he was boxed repeatedly in different
parts of the body, at one time made to lie down after being blind-folded and
then Water poured on his face.22 He repeated that before signing
the confession on June 13, 1961,
he was like­wise subjected to physical maltreatment, having been boxed many
times on the breast and stomach.23 His testimony received
confirmation from a competent and netural source, Dr.
Pedro Villafuerte, the city health officer of Naga, who examined appellant on June 27, 1961 in the
provincial jail of Camarines Sur
seventeen days after his being apprehended and taken to the constabulary
barracks.  When asked what he found on
the person of appellant, this was his answer: 
“He has five lesions here. 
Tenderness of the stomach on the left; elongated scar, lower third of
the left forearm; healing wound, circular in shape on the elbow, left side;
sensation of deafness and easily nervous.”24 When questioned as to what could
have caused the tenderness, he replied as follows:  “That is trauma.  The elongated scar on the lower third might
have been produced by a stick; the healing wound circular in form, he might
have fallen on a hard object and the sensation of deafness, if you try to hit
the two ears with the palm, there is compression of the ear drum, so that the
hearing is inter­fered with.  But this
will be temporary in nature.  Easily
nervous, because of fear.  I examined him
in jail.”25

The above testimony notwithstanding, the lower court could still
look upon such confession as free of any infirmity.  Clearly, that was error, as pointed out by
appellant.  The constant course of
decisions of this honorable Tribunal, true to the meaning of the
self-incrimination clause, forbids the admission of any confession obtained
under such circumstances.  It would be to
render nugatory a valuable constitutional right if judges of the courts of
first instance display less than full sensitivity to its command.  A conviction resting on such proof, and such
proof alone, certainly cannot be allowed to stand.

It is likewise timely to impress anew on police officials that
the imperative requirements of truth and of humanity condemn the utilization of
force and violence to extract confessions from unwilling victims.  Crime must be punished and the guilty must
not be allowed to escape.  A desirable
end cannot, however, be attained by unconstitutional means.  There should be less than full respect for
the law if in the process of enforcing it lawless methods are employed.  Once again, then, this Court is called upon
to manifest in the strongest language possible its abhorrence for the
employment of force to compel a person to sign a statement acknowledging guilt.  A decent regard for the dignity that attaches
to every human being as such will be satisfied with nothing less.

2.      Nonetheless, a reversal is not called for.  There is sufficient competent and credible
evidence of record pointing unerringly to the guilt of appellant.  His brief, in two other errors assigned,
would impute the perpetration of the deed “to someone else,”26 By that cryptic statement, reference is made to the testimony of his
own thirteen-year-old daughter.  Soledad Bagasala, who did, on the witness stand, declare that on
the morning of June 9, 1969 there was a quarrel between the Ongkit
spouses presumably due to the wife having applied to work as a maid in the
household of a certain family in Naga.27 She even went so far as to state that she saw the deceased hitting,
with a piece of pipe, the head of her husband, Macario
Ongkit, who retaliated by using the bolo on her.28 Certainly, it is understandable why the
lower court could not be expected that such an assertion, coming from the
daughter, could disprove what was testified to by Macario
Ongkit as to the fatal beating inflicted on his wife
by appellant on the occasion of a robbery.

Nor could appellant’s responsibility for the gory occurrence be
wiped away by the simple disclaimer that he was, during the night of June 9,
1961, asleep in his house, leaving the place only the next morning to harvest
palay.29
His defense of alibi was sought to be bolstered by still another member of the
family, his wife, who affirmed that on the evening of June 9, 1961 appellant was sleeping in their
house, but likewise admitted that the residence of the Ongkit
spouses was only about fifty meters away.30 The lower court did not accept
such a version.  It is understandable
why.  His identification coming from a
neighbor was easily believable.  Such an
alibi which did not preclude appellant’s having taken the time to go with his
other co-accused to a house only fifty meters away during the course of the
evening, was not calculated to impress any court of justice with its truth.  As was stressed in Justice Castro’s opinion
in People v. Alcantara:31 “The appellant’s main defense
in exculpation is alibi.  It must be
stressed at the outset that alibi is one of the weakest defenses that can be
resorted to by an accused, especially if there is direct testimony of an
eyewitness duly corroborated by that of another, not only because it is
inherently weak and unreliable but also because of the ease of fabricating
evidence of alibi and the difficulty of checking or rebutting it.32
People v. Estrada33 was cited in support of such a
view.  Thus:  “No jurisprudence in criminal cases is
more settled than the rule that alibi is the weakest of all defenses and that
the same should be rejected when the identity of the accused has been sufficiently
and positively established by eyewitnesses to the crime.  Such should be the rule, for as a defense,
alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to disprove.  And for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to
prove that defendant was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he
must, likewise, demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time.34 Only last January, such a view was
reiterated by the Chief Justice in People v. Provo35
in these words:  “Needless to say,
as one of the weakest defenses available in criminal cases, the alibi set up by
appellant herein cannot offset the testimony of Benita Mayuyu,
who positively identified him as one of those who seized Matignas
Serrano, at Pisok, in the evening of October 9, 1958*
* *.”36
In the light of the fore­going, the guilt of the accused having been
demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt, the inadmissibility of the confession
extorted from appellant could not justify a reversal of his conviction.37

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of December 28, 1965
finding Juanito Bagasala
guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
is affirmed, with the modification that the amount of indemnity to the heirs of
the deceased Juliana Reginaldo should be in the sum
of P12,000.00.  Costs against appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

 Ruiz Castro, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., no part.

^[1] Of the three other co-accused, the case
against Salvador Ronan was dismissed by the lower court for lack of
evidence.  Aniceto
Ronan was acquitted.  The fifth accused, Arsenio Rex, was never appre­hended.

^[2]
The resolution of this Court of August 24, 1966 reads as follows:  “It appearing from the report of the
Provincial Warden of Camarines Sur
that defendant-appellant Tomas Bagasala escaped from
the provincial jail on March 24, 1966, the appeal in case L-26182 (People v.
Tomas Bagasala, et al.) as to Tomas Bagasala, is hereby [dismissed].”

^[3] Testimony of Macario
Ongkit, T. s. n. , session of April 10, 1962, pp. 41-42.

^[4] Ibid,
pp. 43-45.

^[5] Ibid,
pp. 45-47.

^[6]
Sergeants Quiaño and Turiano.

^[7]
Corporals Julian Saldo and Ricardo P. Intia.

^[8]
Testimony of Ricardo P. Intia, T. s. n., session of April 10, 1962, pp. 13-15.

^[9] Ibid,
p. 15.

^[10] Ibid,
pp. 15-18.

^[11] Ibid, testimony of Dr. T. J. Santy, provincial
health officer of Camarines Sur,
p. 5.

13 Art. III, Sec. 1, par, 18.

14 People v. Carillo,
77 Phil. 572, 576 (1946).

15 Cf. Sec. 4, Act. 619 (1903) and United
States v. Baluyut,
1 Phil. 451 (1902); United States
v. Lozada, 4 Phil. 226 (1905); United
States v. Mercado, 6 Phil. 332
(1906); People v. Turtal, 74 Phil. 667 (1944).

16 United States
v. De los Santos,
24 Phil. 329, 359 (1913).  See also
People v. Panopio, 75 Phil. 767 (1946).

17 3 Phil. 143.

18 Ibid, p. 152.

19 Camasura v.
Provost Marshal, 78 Phil. 131, 137 (1947).

20 People v. Obenia,
91 Phil. 292, 301 (1952).

21 Chavez v. Court of Appeals, L-29169, Aug. 19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663, 679.

22 T.s.n., session of Jan. 23, 1963, p. 10.

23 Ibid, session of March 11, 1963, p. 101.

24 Ibid, p. 78.

25 Ibid.

26 Brief for
the Appellant, p. 12.

27 T.s.n., session
of March 11, 1963,
pp. 105-106.

28 Ibid, p. 107.

29 T.s.n., session of January 23, 1963, p. 8.

30 T.s.n., session
of June 4, 1963,
p. 114.

31 L-26867, June 30,
1970, 33 SCRA 812.

32 Ibid, p. 824.

33 L-26103, Jan. 17,
1968, 22 SCRA 111.

34 Ibid, p. 127.

35 L-28347, Jan. 20,
1971, 37 SCRA 19.

36 Ibid, pp. 34-35. Cf. People v. Estacio, 106 Phil. 981 (1960).

37 The fourth error raised was the alleged violation
of the double jeopardy clause, another complaint for the same offense having
been dismissed after appellant was arraigned. 
The filing of the two cases was the result of a mistake committed by a
constabulary sergeant.  What was done by
the court was precisely to assure that appellant be tried only under one of
them, the other constituting, under the circum­stances, a superfluity.  This assignment of error is thus not to be
taken seriously.