URSULA FRANCISCO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JULIAN RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This is the second time that this case is brought before Us on appeal.

The antecedent facts are not disputed and are stated in Our decision dated May 21, 1956, in G. R. No. L-8263, as follows:

Plaintiff was born a Mora with the name of ‘Silipot’
who was baptized as a Christian at the age of thirty-five. She was an
illiterate. She applied in Sales Application No. 15774 for the purchase
of Lot No. 595, Cadastral No. 102, situated in barrio Buna wan, Davao
City, and thereafter cultivated it, planting thereon abaca, coconuts,
cacao, lanzones, nanca and durian, and declared it for purposes of
taxation in 1932. Its assessed value at that time was P4,280.

“On
August 10, 1935, her sales application was rejected because she had
permitted herself to be a dummy, though she continued in the possession
of the property. On September 2, 1935, she filed a motion for
reconsideration by means of an affidavit signed and subscribed before
her lawyer, defendant Julian A. Rodriguez. A year, afterwards, or on
April 27, 1936, this lawyer sent a letter to the Bureau of Lands at
Davao, enclosing an affidavit of Ursula Francisco, stating that the
aliens had already left the place, and on August 12, 1939, or two years
later, the same lawyer again sent a letter to the Bureau of Lands, this
time at Manila, urging that ‘in view of the fact that this case is now
pending for nearly three years, may I ask now that action be
expendited?’ There was no reply to this letter, but in June, 1940,
Ursula Francisco, being in need of money because of the impending
foreclosure of another parcel of land and of the recent death of her
son-in-law, husband of Casiana, and because of the expenses needed by
her grandson Jose who was in Manila, approached her lawyer Rodriguez
asking him for a loan of P1,000.00 and while Julian did not consent at
first, he finally agreed, though insisting on an absolute conveyance of
the property, less four hectares which should be segregated for the
vendor. To this end the land was surveyed for subdivision in May, 1940,
and the following month a document was executed on June 10, 1940
conveying 29 hectares of the land to Rodriguez for the sum of P2,000,
which was thumb-marked by Ursula who received the first payment of
P500.00.

“It appears however that Ursula was of the belief that the document she signed was one of anti-chresis,
and when she discovered that the document she thumb-marked was a deed
of absolute sale, she filed an action in the Court of First Instance of
Davao against the now defendant Rodriguez and her daughter Monina
seeking the annulment of said document (Civil Case No. 9-R), and
although the document, marked Exhibit D-1, was declared null and void,
she lost the case because the land in question was then not considered
her property but of the Government. On October 30, 1947, or two months
after the decision in said case was rendered, the Bureau of Lands
reinstated Ursula’s application, but Rodriguez asked for
reconsideration on the ground that he was the owner of 29 hectares. His
motion was denied by order of the Bureau of Lands on June 17, 1948. A
supplemental motion filed by Rodriguez was also denied on November 18,
1948, though upon the latter’s application, the Bureau of Lands stayed
on December 4, 1948, the execution of the reinstatement. Finally, on
February 17, 1949, the Secretary of Agriculture remanded the case to
the Bureau of Lands for a formal investigation, which had not yet been
completed at the time the present case was decided in the lower court.
In view of this state of affairs, on August 27, 1948, Ursula Francisco
instituted this action which was decided by the trial court as stated
in the early part of this decision.

On the basis of the above facts, the trial court, on April 28, 1949,
rendered a decision declaring both plaintiff Ursula Francisco and
defendants, herein appellants, not entitled to the possession of the
land in litigation and leaving the disposition of said land to the
officials of the Department of Agriculture.

On Appeal, this Court affirmed the said decision, making the following pronouncements:

“* * * there is no doubt that the deed of conveyance
executed by plaintiff in favor of defendant on June 10, 1940 is null
and void not only because the rights of plaintiff under her sales
application had been cancelled by the Bureau of Lands in the belief
that she permitted herself to be a dummy of the Japanese but especially
because the conveyance was made without the previous approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture as required by law (Section 29, Commonwealth
Act No. 141). * * * It is therefore clear that the conveyance is null
and void and produced as a consequence the reversion of the property
with all the rights thereto to the State.

* * * * * * *

“There is however a redeeming feature that may throw
light on the present controversy. We know that the sales application of
plaintiff has been reinstated by the Bureau of Lands but the effect of
which were stayed upon petition of defendant. And because of this
conflict, the Secretary of Agriculture has ordered a formal
investigation apparently in an effort to determine once and for all the
rights and equities of the parties. Unfortunately, the investigation
has not yet been completed when this case was initiated and from a
recent correspondence received by this Court from the Bureau of Lands
the same is still pending, awaiting the outcome of the present case.
Considering that under the provisions of sections 3, 4 and 5 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 the Director of Lands, subject to the control
of the Secretary of Agriculture, is given direct executive control of
any disposition of lands of the public domain and his decisions as to
questions of fact, if approved, are deemed conclusive upon this Court,
we believe that this matter may well be left to whatever action may be
taken by said officials with regard to the land in litigation. This is
especially so because the root cause from which emanates the nullity of
the transaction hinges merely on the lack of approval of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Viewing the controversy in this
light, we are of the opinion that the trial court did not err when it
concluded that ‘Plaintiff must wait until the Department of Agriculture
finally brings down the hammer. If she wants auxiliary relief, that
Department shall grant it.’ “

Believing that the aforequoted decision of this Court restored them to their status ante litem motam,
both parties filed with Us separate motions for reconsideration with a
view of obtaining possession of the property in litigation and the
fruits thereof pendente lite. The motions were denied, and
after the record of the case had been returned to the lower court, the
parties there again attempted to get possession of the property by
filing the corresponding motions. The trial court, however, denied
their motions on the ground that it is either the Secretary of
Agriculture or the Director of Lands who should ask for possession of
the property.

In the meantime, or on October 22, 1956, the investigation mentioned
in the decision of this Court being conducted by the Bureau of Lands in
connection with the property in litigation having been finally
accomplished, decision was rendered by the Secretary of Agriculture,
dispositive part of which reads:

“In view hereof, the instant appeal by Julian
Rodriguez and Monina Rodriguez is hereby dismissed; their claims to the
portion of 29.3298 hectares involved herein and its improvements,
denied; and whatever rights or interests appellee Ursula Francisco may
have in said lands and improvements, declared vacant; and steps leading
to its sale, including the improvements, in a public bidding shall
forthwith be taken.”

The Office of the President has affirmed this decision in toto.

Pursuant thereto, the Director of Lands, on December 8, 1958, filed
in the trial court a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 268, praying
that the receiver (who was appointed at the outset of the case before
it was brought to Us on appeal for the first time) be required to give
an accounting and that thereafter the receivership be dissolved.

The motion was granted and the receiver was ordered to deposit any
cash in his possession with the Philippine National Bank and submit his
report for its approval. In compliance with this last mentioned order,
the said receiver submitted his statement of accounts and on September
12, 1958, his final accounts were approved.

On October 12, 1958, defendants filed a motion asking for possession
of property and discharge of receiver, and on October 28, 1958, said
defendants, together with plaintiff, filed a joint motion praying that
the proceeds of the property be delivered to and divided between them
equally. In denying these two motions, the trial court, on November 14,
1958 ordered—

” * * * the receiver to turn over the property and
deliver to the Bureau of Lands all accountability of said receiver and
thereafter the receivership is considered dissolved. Upon submission
and approval of this Court of the accounts of the receiver from the
last date of the approved accounting up to the present time, this case
shall be considered closed.”

The defendants moved to have this order reconsidered but having been
denied, they interposed the present appeal with the following
assignment of errors:

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE LAND IN
LITIGATION IS ALREADY REVERTED TO THE STATE, AND AS SUCH, THE PROPERTY
MUST BE TURNED OVER TO THE GOVERNMENT.

“THE LOWER COURT ERRED
IN DECLARING THAT THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY THE STATE
CARRIES WITH IT THE RIGHT TO POSSESS.

“THE LOWER COURT ERRED
IN NOT DECLARING DEPENDANTS ENTITLED TO THE MATERIAL AND PHYSICAL
POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION AND IN NOT TERMINATING THE
RECEIVERSHIP IN THIS CASE.”

The appeal is without merit.

This Court in G. R. No. L-8263 has expressed in no uncertain terms
that the conveyance of the land in question from Ursula Francisco to
the Rodriguezes is “null and void and produced as a consequence the
reversion of the property with all rights thereto to the State.” This
pronouncement is well in accordance with the following wording of
Section 29 of Commonwealth Act 141:

“* * * Any sale and encumbrance made without the
previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be
null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling the acquisition
and reverting the property and all rights thereto to the State, and all
payments on the purchase price theretofore made to the Government shall
be forefeited. * * *”

The reversion referred to is self-operative and no separate action need be instituted by the Government for that purpose.

The parties, however, insist on a formal action for reversion,
citing Section 101 of the Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act 141), which
provides that “all actions for the reversion to the Government of lands
of the public domain or improvements thereof shall be instituted by the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper
courts, in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.” But the
aforequoted section does not apply here. The same may be invoked only
when title has already vested in the individual, e.g., when a patent or
a certificate of title has already been issued. As already stated, no
new separate action is necessary for the reversion of the property in
question and futile for the parties to ask for possession of the same.

Neither may the parties claim for the proceeds of the property
during the pendency of this case because “all rights in and interest
to, and the improvements and crops upon, land for which an
application has been denied or cancelled or a patent or grant refused,
or a contract or concession rescinded or annulled, shall be forfeited
to the Government” (Section 98, Public Land Law).

It is, however, contended that the property as well as the fruit thereof pendente lite
cannot be delivered to the Director of Lands, because he is not a party
to the case. We do not think the contention is tenable. One of the
purposes for which a receivership is established is to preserve the
property during the pendency of the litigation or to dispose of it
according to the judgment when the judgment is finally rendered or
otherwise to carry the judgment into effect. This Court has already
made the pronouncement in G. R. No. L-8263 that the land in question
reverted to the State, and directed the officials of the Department of
Agriculture to take whatever action is necessary with regard to said
land. In accordance therewith, the Director of Lands filed a motion to
intervene in the proceedings and the same was granted by the lower
court. It cannot be argued, therefore, that the Director of Lands is
not a party to this case.

Of course, We have taken note that the intervention by the Director
of Lands was not strictly in accordance with Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court. But the motion was not so filed as to have unduly delayed the
disposition of the case and substantially impaired the rights of the
original parties. On the other hand, the circumstances obtaining in the
proceedings pointed to the advisibility, even necessity, of having the
intervenor take part therein. An examination of the record shows that
this case has been pending since 1948 and that the parties have
patently no rights whatsoever to the land in question. To require a
strict compliance with the Rules would only further delay the
proceedings and subject both parties as well as the government to
additional unnecessary expense. Technicality, when it deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and
chief enemy, deserves scant consideration. (Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315)

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.