G.R. Nos. L-27463, 27503 & 27504. May 16, 1969
NATIONAL WATERWORKS & SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, VS. NWSA CONSOLIDATED UNION, JESUS CENTENO, ET AL., AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.
DIZON, J.:
Appeal on purely questions of law taken by the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, hereinafter referred to as NAWASA, from the
order issued on February 20, 1967 by the Court of Industrial Relations,
referred to hereinafter as CIR, for the former to deposit the amount of
P99,332.21 representing overtime, night time, Sunday, holiday and basic time
salaries, within thirty days (Annex D attached to the Petition for Review), and
from the CIR’s resolution, en banc dated March 13,
1967 (attached to the petition for review as Annex F) denying NAWASA’s motion for reconsideration, both issued in Cases
Nos. 19-IPA, 19-IPA(1) and 19-IPA(2).
It appears that on January 16, 1961 the CIR issued in the
abovementioned cases an order awarding additional compensation to Engineer
Jesus Centeno and 12 others – referred to in the
record as Intervenors – for work rendered in excess
of eight hours a day, as well as for work rendered at night time, etc., the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“In view thereof, we are of the opinion and so hold, that the
respondent Company shall pay to the intervenors who
have not been paid the additional compensation of 25% of their basic salary for
services rendered in excess of the regular eight (8) hours a day, from February
6, 1956 onward, the same, benefit effective on the same date, based on the
written authorizations of the General Manager of the NAWASA x x x.”
In relation to their claims for additional compensation for work
rendered on Sundays and legal holidays before and after the effectivity of Republic Act 1880 and also on Saturdays
after the effectivity of said law, the CIR said the
following:
“The intervenors, in their
memorandum, wanted to include the claim for additional compensation for
services rendered on Sundays and legal holidays before and after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 1880 and also on Saturdays
after the effectivity of the said law, contending
that Saturday becomes an off-day or day of rest. This particular claim is not covered by the
present petition, which only seeks payment of additional payment for night
work and overtime pay. The records show
that the respondent company interposed its timely objection to the evidence
tending to establish such claim. The intervenors did not file any amended petition covering the
claim for extra premium for work performed on Saturdays, Sundays end legal
holidays, contrary to their announcement made in open court. And neither was it touched by the respondent
company during the presentation of its evidence.
“We are, therefore, of the opinion that it will be improper
and illegal to take cognizance of and consider in this case such claim of the intervenors x x x.”
To implement its provisions, the same order directed the Chief
Examiner of the CIR to make the necessary computation to determine said
additional compensation in accordance with its findings, as follows:
“x x x to
proceed to the office of the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority to
examine the payrolls and other pertinent records and to make the necessary
computation for additional compensation for work on Sundays and legal
holidays, distress pay, wage differentials night compensation and overtime
pay of the employees and laborers concerned in accordance with the findings of
the Court.” (Underlines Supplied)
In connection with the portion of the order of January 16, 1961
quoted in the immediately preceding paragraph, We have noticed that the
petition for review under consideration has, on page three thereof and after
the words “for work”, deliberately omitted the following words
“on Sundays end legal holidays, distress pay, wage differentials”,
presumably to bolster petitioner’s claim that, in the body of the order
itself, the CIR had expressed the opinion that it was improper and illegal to
take cognizance of, and consider the claim of the intervenors
for additional compensation for services rendered on Sundays and legal
holidays before and after the effectivity of RA 1880
and also on Saturdays after the effectivity of said
law in the proceedings then before it.
It appears further that in National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority, Petitioner vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions and others (G. R. No.
L-18938) in which the CIR’s order of January 16, 1961 was directly
involved, We said, inter alia, the following:
“Acting on a certification of the President of the
Philippines, the Court of Industrial Relations conducted a hearing on December
5, 1957 on the controversy then existing between petitioner and respondent
unions which the latter embodied in a ‘Manifesto’ dated December 5, 1957,
namely: implementation of the 40-Hour
Week Law (Republic Act No. 1880); alleged violations of the collective bargaining
agreement dated December 28, 1956 concerning ‘distress pay’; minimum wage of
P5.25; promotional appointments and filling of vacancies of newly created
positions; additional compensation for night work; wage increases to some
laborers and employees; and strike duration pay. In addition, respondent unions raised the
issue of whether the 25% additional compensation for Sunday work should be
included in computing the daily wage and whether, in determining the daily wage
of a monthly salaried employee, the salary should be divided by 30 days.
“On December 13, 1957, petitioner and respondent unions,
conformably to a suggestion of the Court of Industrial Relations, submitted a.
joint stipulation of facts on the issues concerning the 40-Hour Week Law,
‘distress pay,’ minimum wage of P5.25, filling of vacancies, night
compensation, and salary adjustments, reserving the right to present evidence
on matters not covered therein. On December 4, 1957, respondent intervenors filed a petition in intervention on the issue
for additional compensation for night work.
Later, however, they amended their petition by including a new demand for
overtime pay in favor of Jesus Centeno, Cesar
Cabrera, Feliciano Duiguan, Cecilio
Remotigue, and other employees receiving P4,200.00
per annum or more.
“On February 5, 1958, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
claim for overtime pay alleging that respondent Court of Industrial Relations
was without jurisdiction to pass upon the same because, as mere intervenors, the latter cannot raise new issues not
litigated in the principal case, the same not being, the lis
mota therein involved. To this motion the intervenors
filed an opposition. Thereafter, respondent
court issued an order allowing the issue to be litigated. Petitioner’s motion to reconsider having been
denied, it filed its answer to the petition for intervention. Finally, on January 16, 1961, respondent court rendered its decision
stating substantially as follows:
“The NAWASA is an agency not performing governmental
functions and, therefore, is liable to pay additional compensation for work
on Sundays and legal holidays conformably to Commonwealth Act No. 444,
known as the Eight-Hour Labor Law, even if said days should be within the
staggered five-work days authorized by the President; the intervenors do not fall within the category of ‘managerial
employees’ as contemplated in Republic Act 2377 and so are not exempt from the
coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law; even those intervenors
attached to the General Auditing Office and the Bureau of Public Works come
within the purview of Commonwealth Act. No. 444; the computation followed by
NAWASA in computing overtime compensation is contrary to Commonwealth Act 444;
the undertime of a worker should not be set-off
against the worker in determining whether the latter has rendered service in
excess of eight hours for that day; in computing the daily wage of those
employed on daily basis, the additional 25% compensation for Sunday work should
be included; the computation used by the NAWASA for monthly salaried
employees, to wit, dividing the monthly basic pay by 30 is erroneous; the
minimum wage awarded by respondent court wayback on
November 25, 1950 in Case No. 359-V entitled MWD Workers Union v. Metropolitan
Water District, applies even to those who were employed long after the
promulgation of the award and even if the workers are hired only as temporary,
emergency and casual workers for a definite period and for a particular
project; the authority granted to NAWASA by the President to stagger the
working days of its workers should be limited exclusively to those specified
in the authorization and should not be extended to others who are not therein
specified; and under the collective bargaining agreement entered into between
the NAWASA and respondent unions on December 28, 1956, as well as under Resolution
No. 29, series of 1957 of the Grievance Committee, even those who work outside
the sewerage chambers should be paid 25% additional compensation as ‘distress
pay.’
“Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, NAWASA
filed the present petition for review raising merely questions of law.”
x x x x x x x x x x x x
“It is to be noted, however, that in the case at bar it has
been stipulated that prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 1880, providing
for the implementation of the 40-Hour Week Law, the Metropolitan Water
District had been paying 25% additional compensation for work on Sundays and
legal holidays to its employees and laborers by virtue of Resolution No. 47,
series of 1948, of its Board of Directors, which practice was continued by the
NAWASA when the latter took over the service. And in the collective latter took
bargaining agreement entered into between the NAWASA and respondent unions it
was agreed that all existing benefits enjoyed by the employees and laborers
prior to its effectivity shall remain in force and
shall form part of the agreement, among which certainly is the 25% additional
compensation for work on Sundays and legal holidays theretofore enjoyed by said
laborers and employees. It may,
therefore, be said that while under Commonwealth Act No. 444 a public utility
is not required to pay additional compensation to its employees and workers for
work done on Sundays end legal holidays, there is, however, no prohibition for
it to pay such additional compensation if it voluntarily agrees to do so. The NAWASA committed itself to pay this
additional compensation. It must
pay not because of compulsion of law but because of contractual obligation.”
x x x x x x x x x x x x
“In resume, this Court holds:
(1)
The NAWASA though a public
corporation, does not perform governmental functions. It performs proprietary functions, and
hence, it is covered by Commonwealth Act No. 444;
(2)
The NAWASA is a public
utility. Although pursuant to Section 4
of Commonwealth Act 444 it is not obliged to pay an additional sum of 25% to
its laborers for work done on Sundays and legal holidays, yet it must pay said
additional compensation by virtue of the contractual obligation it assumed
under the collective bargaining agreement;”
x x x x x x x x x x x x
“With the modification indicated in the above resume as
elaborated in this decision, we hereby affirm the decision of respondent court
in all other respects, without pronouncement as to costs.” (Underlines
supplied)
In further implementation of its order of January 16, 1961, as modified by Us in G. R.
L-18938, the CIR issued on October 5,
1964 an order holding in abeyance the writ of execution issued in
connection with the former until after a complete report upon the matter had
been submitted to it, saying the following in its dispositive
portion:
“Consequently, the Auditing Examiner who is assigned to these
cases is hereby directed to compute immediately all the money claims awarded by
the Court to the parties concerned, taking into consideration the decision
promulgated by the supreme Court on August
31, 1964, and forthwith submit his report to this Court for further
disposition.
“The Clerk of Court is directed to furnish copies of said
report of examiner to the parties concerned who are given twenty (20) days
counted from the receipt of a copy thereof, within which to file objections,
if any. Failure to file objections thereto
within the specified period above-mentioned, said report of examiner shall be
considered approved and final for further disposition of this Court.”
Pursuant to the above decision and orders the Chief Examiner of
the CIR submitted to the latter, from time to time, a series of partial
reports, the sixth of which dated March
26, 1966 – which is the one involved in the present appeal – covers
the claims of the thirteen Intervenors with a total
money value of P99,332.21. There is no
serious dispute as to the fact that the procedure and method of computation
followed by the Examiner in connection with this sixth partial report were the
same as those used and followed in connection with the five previous reports.
On April 19, 1966 the NAWASA filed a motion entitled “Motion
for Bill of Particulars” claiming therein that the sixth partial report
mentioned above did not specify the period covered by each claim, thus failing
to state the claims with sufficient definiteness to enable it to check the
correctness thereof, to prepare its pleadings and thereafter prepare for trial,
and prayed that the Court Examiner be directed to specify the period covered
by each claim and that, pending period of the desired information, the running
of the period for filing a responsive pleading be suspended.
On 25, 1966 the Intervenors, Jesus Centeno and 12 others, filed a reply to the motion referred
to above, pointing out that the information sought therein was specifically
indicated in Appendix 1 attached to the report itself, and prayed that the
suspension of the period for the filing of a responsive pleading be denied for
lack of merit.
On May 5, 1966,
said Intervenors filed a motion for the approval of
the sixth partial report and for an order requiring the deposit in court of the
amount of P99,332.21, in view of the fact that the period of twenty days for
the submission of objections thereto had already elapsed.
On June 3, 1966,
the NAWASA filed its objection to the report claiming: (1) that it was not
mathematically correct; (2) that it included Sunday and legal holiday differentials
to which Intervenors were not entitled; and (3) that
overtime services covered by the report were not sanctioned by written
authority.
On June 11, 1966 the Intervenors filed
a reply to NAWASA’S objection, praying that it be overruled having been filed
beyond the period fied by the Court, and prayed further
that the report be approved and considered final in accordance with the order
of October 5, 1964 and that the NAWASA be directed to deposit the total amount
of P99,322.21 with the CIR for its further disposition.
Finally, on February 20,
1967 the CIR issued at order approving the sixth partial report of
the Court Examiner and directing the NAWASA to deposit the amount of P99,332.21
with the Court within thirty (30) days from notice, for its further
disposition. This order was affirmed by
the Court en banc on March 13, 1967.
To sustain its appeal from the orders mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, petitioner now claims that the CIR erred (1) in not holding that the
filing of its “motion for bill of particulars” stayed the running of
the period for the filing of its objection to the sixth partial report of the
CIR Examiner; (2) in holding that petitioner’s objection to said report was
filed out of time, and lastly, (3) in depriving it of due process when, acting
en banc, it affirmed the order of February 20, 1967.
It is not disputed that petitioner was served with a copy of the
sixth partial report on April 4, 1966. It is, on the other hand, conceded that
petitioner had the right to object thereto and to be heard in connection
therewith. But in this connection it is
worth remembering that the litigation over intervenors‘
claim was one of very long standing and had previously reached this Court for
adjudication of the principles involved (G. R. L-18938). It is not strange, therefore, that after our
decision in the case just mentioned, the CIR, intent upon preventing any
further delay in the final disposition of intervenors‘
claim, issued on October 5, 1964 an order directing its Examiner to make the
necessary computations of the money claims awarded by the court; to furnish
copy of his report to the parties concerned, and gave the latter a period of
twenty (20) days counted from receipt of a copy thereof within which to file
objections against it, if any, and finally, warning the parties that failure to
file objections to the report within the specified in period, said report will
be considered approved and final for further disposition by the court.
The record discloses that notwithstanding the clear meaning and
intent of the order of October 5, 1964,
NAWASA, instead of filing its objections to the report a copy of which was
received by it on April 4, 1966,
took another step manifestly intended to delay the final disposition of the
claims, by filing a motion for a bill of particulars. This pleading was not only filed clearly in
violation of the order of the CIR of October 5, 1964 but was beyond doubt,
without merit, it appearing from the contents of the report and the document
thereto attached that the information NAWASA sought to obtain through a bill of
particulars was already there.
It is of course true that under Rule 12 of the Rules of Court a
party against whom a complaint has been filed is entitled to compel the
plaintiff to submit a bill of particulars in relation to such allegations of
the latter’s pleading as appear to be indefinite and uncertain, and that the
filing of the motion for the purpose suspends the running of the period for the
filing of the corresponding responsive pleading. Even under this rule, however, it is doubtful
whether the filing of a motion for a bill of particulars would automatically
suspend the running of the period for the filing of the required responsive
pleading if it appears, as it does in the present case, that it was filed
manifestly for delay and was entirely without merit. Be that as it may, it is settled that the
Rules of Court are not of strict application but merely suppletory
to the CIR’s own Rules of Procedure, and when, as in
the present case, by formal order the CIR had clearly given the direction for
the filing of objections to the report under question within a definite period
to prevent the parties from resorting to dilatory tactics, We do not believe
said court erred in disregarding a pleading violative
of its order end clearly intended to delay the proceedings in a case which had
started almost eight years before. We,
therefore, find no merit in the First assignment of error.
In view of our conclusion setforth
heretofore in connection with the first assignment of error, no lengthy discussion
need be made of the second error.
Petitioner having received a copy of the sixth partial report of the CIR
Examiner on April 4, 1966, and having filed its objection thereto only on June
3, 1966, it is obvious that the same was filed long after the expiration of the
twenty (20) day period given to it for the purpose in the CIR’s
order of October 5, 1964.
In the light of our views in relation to the first two
assignments of error, the third can not stand or prosper. If petitioner had no opportunity to prove the
grounds upon which it objected against the sixth partial report of the CIR
Examiner, that was entirely its own fault.
If instead of resorting to a clearly unfounded demand for the submission
of a bill of particulars it had filed its objection to said report within twenty
days after it had received a copy thereof, that would not have happened. Having failed to do so, the CIR was entirely
correct in proceeding to the approval of the questioned report – a step
strictly in accordance with the terms of its order of October 5, 1964.
Finally, in relation to the specific grounds upon which NAWASA
objected against the Examiner’s sixth partial report, the following should be
borne in mind:
(1)
Nowhere in its pleading nor in its
brief submitted in the present case did NAWASA attempt to prove its contention
that said report: “is not mathematically correct” in any particular
respect, nor did it in any manner give even an inkling of the evidence it had
to prove such assertion.
(2)
As to (a) the inclusion of Sunday
and legal holiday differentials to which, in NAWASA’s
opinion, the herein Intervenors were not entitled
and (b) the alleged lack of written authorization to render overtime work for
the period covered by the report, We only need to say that both questions were
squarely resolved by Us in National Waterworks Sewerage Authority, Petitioner,
vs. NWSA Consolidated Union, Jesus Centeno, et al.,
respondents, (G.R. L-26894-96) promulgated on February 28 of the present
year. The cases involved a similar
award in favor of other intervenors and against which
NAWASA had raised exactly the same grounds as the ones relied upon against the
award in favor of the present Intervenors. In disposing of them We said, among other
things:
“In National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority v. NWSA
Consolidated Unions,[1]
we made clear, beyond doubt that employees of such government owned and
controlled corporation, who intervened therein, were entitled to the benefits
not only of the Eight-Hour Labor Law[2]
but also to those arising from any contractual obligation that might have been
incurred by it. Subsequently, on May
12, 1965, the aforesaid labor union, acting for and in behalf of Aurelio B. Zurbano,[3]
Francisco P. Domingo[4]
and Rufo R. Fabregas,[5]
filed a motion alleging that such individuals were similarly situated as they
rendered work in excess of the regular eight-hour period, including nighttime,
having performed overtime services as well on Sundays and legal holidays and
therefore entitled to a similar award in accordance with the aforesaid decision. The National Waterworks & Sewerage
authority, hereinafter referred to as the Nawasa,
was duly heard. After which, on August 10, 1966, such a claim for
financial benefits was granted in the respective amounts of P29,640.81 for Zurbano, P9,212.78 for Domingo and P22,711.24 for Fabregas, the order being issued by the Hon. Joaquin M.
Salvador, Associate Judge of respondent Court of Industrial Relations. This order was subsequently affirmed by
respondent Court en banc in a resolution dated September 22, 1966, denying a motion
for reconsideration. Dissatisfied with
such turn of events, this petition for review was filed by the Nawasa. We sustain
respondent Court.”
x x x x x x x x x x x x
“As noted at the outset, we sustain respondent Court. Our August
31, 1964 decision in the main Nawasa suit
is decisive of the case at hand. It
furnishes the law of the case.”
x x x x x x x x x x x x
“How did petitioner propose to discharge it? It would assign
as errors allegedly committed the holding of respondent Court that it had jurisdiction
over the claim of Domingo; the award to Zurbano,
Domingo and Fabregas of the aforesaid additional
compensation for work rendered during Sundays and legal holidays on the ground
that previously respondent Court did deny such a claim and that no amount
should have been granted for work rendered in excess of eight hours a day as
there was no written authorization by petitioners general manager; and the
failure to sustain its plea of prescription of whatever claim could have been made
by the aforesaid individuals. We are
satisfied that an the above facts as found by the Court of Industrial Relations
and the law as previously declared by us, such errors alleged cannot be
accorded acceptance.”
x x x x x x x x x x x x
“2. The second assigned error is equally without
merit. It is there alleged that respondent
Court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
when it awarded to Zurbano, Domingo and Febregas additional compensation for work rendered during
Sundays and legal holidays considering that such a demand was denied by it in
the main case.
“In support of such an alleged error, petitioner cited in its
brief this portion of the order of January 16, 1961 of respondent Court: ‘The intervenors, in their Memorandum, wanted to include the
claim for additional compensation for services rendered on Sundays and legal
holidays before and after the e effectivity of R. A.
No. 1880 and also on Saturdays after the effectivity
of the said law, contending that Saturday becomes an off-day or day of
rest. This particular claim is not
covered by the present petition, which only seeks payment of additional payment
for night work and overtime pay. The
records show that the respondent Company interposed its timely objection to the
evidence tending to establish such claim.
The intervenors did not file any amended
petition covering the claim for extra premium for work performed on Saturdays,
Sundays and legal holidays, contrary to their announcement made in open court. And neither was it touched by the respondent
Company during the presentation of its evidence.’6 Its very own brief, however, two
pages later, duly took note of this excerpt from the aforesaid order thus: ‘It
is, therefore, our resolution that respondent NWSA should pay its employees and
laborers concerned additional compensation equivalent to 25% of their basic saleries or wages for work an Sundays and legal holidays
even if the same should fall within the staggered five working days effective
on the date their working days were staggered.’7
“Respondents, in their brief, could thus correctly conclude:
‘The awardees are not solely the petitioners in the said cases, but all ‘the
employees and laborers concerned’ of the NWSA.
Obviously, a member of the NWSA Consolidated Unions, who has not
rendered work on Sundays and legal holidays, is not concerned with the benefit
in question. The Industrial Court did
not impose any limitation affecting the qualification of the intended
recipients of the award, except that they should be employees, or laborers, of
the NWSA, and must be concerned with the benefit in question, i.e., that they
rendered services on Sundays and legal holidays. Indeed, the intervenors
were very much concerned about the afore-stated benefit because they did
actually perform said services; so much so, that they demanded it during the
hearing and likewise in their memorandum.’8
“Whatever doubt could conceivably exist should be erased if
heed be paid to what was explicitly set forth by us in our opinion in the main
case. As we stated there: ‘It is to be
noted, however, that in the case at bar it has been stipulated that prior to
the enactment of Republic Act No. 1880, providing for the implementation of the
40-Hour Week Law, the Metropolitan Water District had been paying 25%
additional compensation far work on Sundays and legal holidays to its
employees and laborers by virtue of Resolution No. 47, series of 1948, of its
Board of Directors, which practice was continued by the [Nawasa]
when the latter took over the service.
And in the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the [Nawasa] and respondent unions it was agreed that all
existing benefits enjoyed by the employees and laborers prior to its effectivity shall remain in force and shall form part of
the agreement, among which certainly is the 25% additional compensation for
work on Sundays and legal holidays theretofore enjoyed by said laborers and
employees. It may, therefore, be said
that while under Commonwealth Act No. 444 public utility is not required to
pay additional compensation to its employees and workers for work done on
Sundays and legal holidays, there is, however, no prohibition for it to pay
such additional compensation if it voluntarily agrees to do so. The [Nawasa]
committed itself to pay this additional compensation. It must pay not because of compulsion of law
but because of contractual obligation.’9
“It would be to defy rather to defer to the above decision,
which is the law of the case, if petitioner is to be indulged in its
unwarranted assertion that the award of additional compensation for work
rendered during Sundays and legal holidays was done with grave abuse of
discretion.”
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed,
with costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., (Acting C.J.), Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Ruiz Castro, J., on official leave.
[1]
L-18938, August 31, 1964.
[2]
Commonwealth Act No. 444 as amended by Republic Act No. 2377.
[3]
L-26894.
[4]
L-26895.
[5]
L-26896.
6
Brief for Petitioner, pp. 14-15.
7
Ibid, p. 17.
8
Brief for Respondents, p. 11.
9
National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority v. NWSA Consolidated
Unions, L-18938, August 31, 1964.