ENGRACIA CANTORNE, COMPLAINANT, vs. EUGENIANO DUCUSIN, RESPONDENT.

This disbarment proceeding was instituted at the instance of Engracia
Cantorne, who originally filed her charges in the office of the City Fiscal of
Manila. This officer, on November 24, 1926, forwarded to the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court the complainant’s written statement alleged to be corroborated
by the affidavit of Valentina Dajuela and the statement of Attorney Fernando C.
Villarosa, the latter being at that time a law clerk in said office.

After the respondent attorney had filed his answer the Attorney-General, to
whom the matter was referred for investigation and recommendation, conducted the
required investigation and upon receiving the evidence presented by both parties
finally submitted his report, dated March 21, 1932. To this the respondent filed
his answer. The matter was heard in bane on July 23,1932 and submitted
thereafter for decision.

The Attorney-General after reviewing exhaustively the whole evidence of
record found the following facts proven:

“(1) While he was counsel for the accused Petrona Basmayor in the criminal
case filed against her by Engracia Cantorne, he made said Cantorne believe that
he could act for her in fixing up her case in such a way that his client
Basmayor would pay her P25 for the shawl she had lost; (2) that he frustrated
the administration of justice by instructing Cantorne hot to appear in the
hearing of the case in which she was the complainant evidently for the purpose
of having the case against his client dismissed on the ground of non-appearance
of the offended party; and (3) by making the complainant believe that he was
doing everything to help her in her case while he was also serving as lawyer of
the accused whose interests were entirely opposed to those of the complainant,
and on account of such assurances of his aid, the complainant out of gratitude
spent money in entertaining him several times in her house.”

There can be no doubt that the aforementioned facts constitute malpractice
and that same ought to be severely condemned and the respondent corrected by
disciplinary action. As the evidence clearly shows the respondent attorney not
only represented both parties (complaining witness and defendant) in that
criminal action, but also obstructed and tried to frustrate the administration
of justice in concealing the former when said cause was called for trial and in
urging that the information be dismissed for lack of evidence for the
prosecution.

In re Hamilton, 24 Phil., 100, 110, this court said:

“After a very careful examination of the whole record we have regretfully
reached the conclusion that the facts before us show a flagrant and willful
violation on the part of defendant of his professional obligations, and a
reckless disregard of the fundamental ethics of his
profession.’

In re Soriano, record No. 550, this court held:

“An attorney-at-law is in this jurisdiction as elsewhere, an officer of the
court, with an obligation to the courts and the public no less significant than
his obligation to his clients. An attempt to obstruct, pervert, or impede the
administration of justice, or to evade the fair operation of the law, is a
ground for suspension or disbarment.’

While the doctrine laid down in the above mentioned cases is clearly
applicable to the facts under consideration, still we believe that the
respondent herein deserves more severe disciplinary measure, for the evidence
shows conclusively that he violated his obligations to the court and to his
client and furthermore obstructed the administration of justice thus
disregarding the fundamental ethics of his profession.

Therefore, Attorney Eugeniano Ducusin is hereby suspended from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years and it is so ordered.1

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad
Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Butte, JJ., concur.