REPARATIONS COMMISSION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NORTHERN LINES, INC. AND FIELDMEN’S INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

This appeal, taken by the Northern Lines, Inc. and Fieldmen’s Insurance Co., Inc., from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Manila in Cases Nos. 50194 and 51542 thereof, which
were jointly tried and disposed of, has been certified to Us by the Court of
Appeals, questions purely of law having been raised in the appeal.

It appears that, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 1789, the Re­parations
Commission – hereinafter referred to as the Commission – had awarded two (2)
vessels to the Northern Lines, Inc., a corporation organized and existing under
the Philippine laws – hereinafter referred to as the Buyer – for use in the
inter island shipping.  According to the
schedules of payment agreed upon between the parties, complete delivery of one
of the vessels – the M/S Magsaysay, later named M/S
Don Salvador – took place on April 25, 1960, and that of the other – the M/S
Estancia, later named M/S Don Amando – on May 26,
1960.  These vessels were the object of
separate deeds of conditional purchase and sale of reparations goods, executed
by the Commission, as vendor, and the Buyer, as vendee, the first dated
September 12, 1960, and the second October
20, 1960.  In conjunction with
these contracts and in line with the provisions thereof, Surety Bonds Nos. 3825
and 4123 were executed, on April
25, 1960 and May 30, 1960, respectively, by the Buyer, as principal, and the Fieldmen’s
Insurance Co., as surety, in favor of the Commission, to guarantee the
faithful compliance by the Buyer of
its obligations under said contracts.  The Buyer undertook therein to pay for said
vessels the installments specified in a schedule of payments, appended to each
contract.  The schedule for the M/S Don
Salvador (ex-M/S Magsaysay) reads as follows:

“NAME OF END-USER        NORTHERN
LINES, INC.

“ADDRESS              480
Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila

“NATURE OF CAPITAL GOODS/SERVICES One (1) Vessel

‘M/S MAGSAYSAY’ divested of the cannery
plant

“DATE OF COMPLETE DELIVERY            April
25, 1960

“TOTAL F .O. B. COST       P1,
747,614 .22

“AMOUNT OF IST INSTALLMENT (10% OF F.O.B. COST)

P174,761,42

“DUE DATE OF IST INSTALLMENT April 25, 1962

“TERM: TEN (10)     EQUAL
YEARLY INSTALLMENTS

“RATE OF INTEREST: THREE PERCENT (3%) PER ANNUM

whereas that for M/S Don Amando (ex-M/S Estancia) was of the following tenor:

“NAME
OF END-USER               NORTHERN LINES,
INC.

“ADDRESS          480 P. Faura, Ermita, Manila

“NATURE OF CAPITAL GOODS/SERVICES One
vessel        

‘M/S Estancia’ Divested of
the Cannery Plant

“DATE OF COMPLETE DELIVERY May 26, 1960

“TOTAL F.O. B. COST    P1,747,614.22

“AMOUNT OF IST INSTALLMENT (10% OF
F.O.B. COST)

P174,761.42

“DUE DATE OF IST INSTALLMENT May 26, 1962

“TERM: Ten (10)              EQUAL YEARLY INSTALLMENTS

“RATE OF INTEREST: THREE PERCENT (3%)
PER ANNUM

On April 24, 1962, and May 26, 1962 – or one day before the
stated due date of the first installment for M/S Don Salvador (ex M/S Magsaysay), and on the stated due date of the first
installment as to M/S Don Amando (ex-M/S Estancia) –
the Buyer instituted Civil Cases Nos. 50194 (regarding M/S Don Salvador,
formerly Magsaysay) and 50488 (regarding M/S Don Amando, formerly Estancia) of the Court of First Instance
of Manila to secure, by way of declaratory relief, a declaration to the effect
that the first installments under the aforementioned contracts would be due and
demandable on April 25, 1963 and May 26, 1963, respectively.  Soon thereafter, or on September 10, 1962, the Commission commenced
Civil Case No.51542 of the same Court, against the Buyer and the Surety.  The Commission alleged – in two separate
causes of action set forth in the complaint therein – that, despite repeated
demands, the defendants (Buyer and Surety) had refused to pay the first
installments of P174,761.42 each, that had become due and demandable on April 25 and May 26, 1962, respectively.  Hence, it prayed that the Buyer and the Surety be sentenced to pay,
jointly and severally, to the Commission the aggregate sum of P349,522.84, with
interest thereon at the legal rate, in addition to attorney’s fees and the
costs.

In its answer to the complaint, the Buyer admitted some allegations
and denied other allegations thereof, and, by way of special defense, averred
that the Commission has no cause of action until Civil Cases Nos. 50488 and 50194
shall have been decided.  The Surety’s
answer contained similar admissions and denials, apart from adopting as its own
those made in the Buyer’s answer, and set up a cross-claim against the Buyer,
for reimbursement of whatever the Surety may have to pay to the Commission by
reason of its complaint, including interests, and for the sum of P10,541.68
“representing unpaid premiums and documentary stamps due on the two
bonds” above-mentioned, plus attorney’s fees and interests.

Subsequently, or on October 29, 1962, Branch XIII of the Court of
First Instance of Manila dismissed Case No. 50488 – involving the M/S Don Amando or Estancia – whereupon the Buyer appealed to this
Court, where the case was docketed as L-20725. The same was, however, dismissed
on July 2, 1963, for failure
of the Buyer, as appellant therein, to file its brief within the reglementary period. 
In due course thereafter, or on April 30, 1964, Branch VII of said Court
of First Instance rendered, in Cases Nos. 50194 – regarding M/S Don Salvador or
Magsaysay – and 51542 – the action filed by the
Commission – which had been jointly tried, a decision dismissing the petition
for a declaratory relief in Case No. 50194, with costs against the Buyer, as
petitioner therein, and: (a) sentencing the Buyer and the Surety, as defendants
in Case No. 51542, to pay jointly and severally, to the Commission, the sum of
P174,761.42, under each of the two (2) causes of action alleged in the
complaint, with interest thereon at the legal rate, from the date of the filing
of the complaint, until fully paid – although the liability of the Surety under
each cause of action was not to exceed P174,761.42 – and the sum of P1,000 as
attorney’s fees, apart from the costs; (b) ordering the Buyer to reimburse the
Surety “whatever amount it may pay to the Reparations Commission, with
interest at the rate of 12% per annum”; and (c) sentencing the Buyer to
pay the Surety the sum of P10,641.68, representing unpaid premiums and
documentary stamps, with interest thereon at the legal rate, and P300, by way
of attorney’s fees.  A reconsideration of
this decision having been denied, the Buyer and the Surety appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which later certified the appeal to this Court.

The Buyer alleges that the trial court erred: (1) in interpreting
the contracts in question in favor of the Commission, which drafted the same;
(2) in not interpreting said contracts “in such a manner as to prevent
inconsistency and absurdity”; (3) “in not taking into account the delay
in the use of the goods subject-matter of the contracts in question in
interpreting the latter”; (4) in not holding that the action filed by the
Commission (Case No. 51542) is “barred” by the actions for
declaratory judgment filed by the Buyer (Civil Cases Nos. 50194 and 50488); and
(5) in rendering judgment for the Commission and the Surety “on their main
claims, interests, attorney’s fees and costs.”

The Surety, in turn, contends that the trial court erred: (1) in
declaring that the first installments of the purchase price “became due on
April 25, 1962 and May 26, 1962, respectively”; (2) in holding the Surety
jointly and severally liable with the Buyer to pay to the Commission the two
first installments of said purchase price under FICI Surety Bonds No. 3825 and
4123; (3) in not holding the Commission liable to pay the Surety “nominal
damages, attorney’s fees and costs”; and (4) in not ordering the Buyer to
pay to the Surety “attorney’s fees equivalent to 20% of the amount which
the latter may pay” to the Commission by reason of the judgment in its
favor.

1. The main issue for determination in this appeal is that raised
in the Buyer’s first three (3) assignments of error and in the Surety’s first
assignment of error, namely: when did the first installment under the two (2)
contracts become due?

The Buyer states that “in both contracts two due
dates are given for the respective first installments.  In the case of M/S ‘Don Salvador,’ April 25, 1962, and April 25 1963; while in the case of
M/S ‘Don Amando,’ May 26, 1962, and May
26, 1963.  The question is,
which are the correct due dates intended by the parties? The
defendant-appellant” – the Buyer – “claims that they are the second
and later dates given, while the plaintiff-appellee”
– the Commission – “claims that they are the first and earlier dates.”
His Honor, the trial Judge, sustained the latter contention.

In support of its claim, the Buyer argues that there is an
ambiguity in said contracts, which should be resolved against the Commission,
“because it is the latter who caused the ambiguity”; that otherwise,
“there would result an inconsistency and absurdity,” because the
contracts provide for ten (10) equal yearly installments, but, under the theory
of the Commission, there would be two
(2) first unequal installments, one for P174, 761.42 and another for
P184, 386.34, and the latter would be followed by nine (9) yearly installments
each for P184,386.34, which, together with the first two (2), would aggregate
eleven (11) installments, instead of ten (10). 
This contention is manifestly untenable.

(a)     The major premise in
appellants’ process of reasoning is that the installments due on April 25, 1963, and May 26, 1963, are “first”
installments, although they are not so designated in the schedule
appended to each of the contracts between the parties.  Appellants, moreover, assume that the
“first” installment is included in the “ten (10) equal
yearly installments” mentioned sub­sequently to said
“first” installment.  In fact,
however, only one installment is labelled as
“first” in each one of said schedules, and that is the installment
due on “April 25, 1962” – as regards M/S Don Salvador or Magsaysay – and that due on “May 26, 1962” – as
regards M/S Don Amando or Estancia.  The schedules do not describe the
“ten (10) equal yearly installments” – following the one
characterized therein as “first” – as first, second, third, etc.
installments.  The words used in the
schedules are merely “No. of Installments” – meaning
“number,” not order or sequence, of installments – and the numerals
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 written before each one of said “ten (10)
equal yearly installments.” It is true that the one therein numbered
“1” is, in fact, the first, in the list of “ten (10)
equal yearly installments” following the “first,” to
accrue after the due date of said “first” installment.  Just the same, the parties have not so
described (as “first) – in the schedules forming part of their contracts –
the installments numbered “1” in the list contained in each.  More­over, considering that the words
“TERM: Ten (10) EQUAL YEARLY INSTALLMENTS,” appear after the
lines reading: “AMOUNT OF IST INSTALLMENT (10% OF F.O.B. COST) P174,
761.42” and “DUE DATE OF IST INSTALLMENT April 25, 1962” (or May
26, 1962), and that, subsequently to said “TERM: Ten (10) EQUAL
YEARLY INSTALLMENTS, ” there is a list of ten (10) equal yearly
installments, it is clear that the latter do not include the one
designated as “first” installment.

It is well settled that laws and contracts should be so construed
as to harmonize and give effect to the different provisions thereof. ^[1]
Upon the other hand, the interpretation insisted upon by the Buyer and the
Surety, would, not only create the “contradictions” or
“absurdities” they point out – and which, admittedly, should be
avoided – but, also, render meaningless and set at naught the provisions in said schedules to the
effect that the “amount of (the) 1st installment” is “P174,
761.42,” and that the “due date of 1st installment” would be
“April 25, 1962,.” as regards the M/S Don Salvador or Magsaysay, and “May 26, 1962,” as
regards the M/S Don Amando or Estancia.  In fact, the Buyer main­tains that these
provisions should be “treated as surplusage” and, hence, disregarded or
ignored.  Incidentally, this reveals the
inherent infirmity of the theory advanced by the Buyer and the Surety.

(b)     The pertinent part of
Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 1789, pursuant to which the vessels in question were
sold to the Buyer, reads:

“x x x
Capital goods x x
x disposed of to private parties as provided
for in subsection (a) of Section two hereof shall be sold on a cash or credit
basis, under rules and regulations as may be determined by the Commission.  Sales on a credit basis shall be payable in
installments: Provided, That the first installment shall be paid
within twenty-four months after complete delivery of the capital goods and
the balance within a period not exceeding ten years, x x x, plus the service fee provided
for in section ten hereof; Provided, further, That the unpaid balance
of the price thereof shall bear interest at the rate of not more than three
percent per annum.  x x x^[2]

It should be noted that, pursuant to the schedules attached to
the contracts with the Buyer, the “complete delivery” of the vessels
took place on April 25, and May 26, 1960, respectively, so that the 24
months fixed by law for the payment of the “first” installment expired
on April 25, 1962 and May 26, 1962, which are the very due dates stated in
the aforementioned schedules for the payment of the respective “1st”
installments.  What is more, in view of
said legal provision, the Commission had no authority to agree that the lst installment be paid on any later date, and the Buyer
must have been aware of this fact. 
Hence, the parties could not have intended the first installments to
become due on April 25 and May 26, 1963. 
It is, likewise, obvious – particularly when considered in relation to
the provision above quoted – that the “ten (10) equal yearly installments,” mentioned in the
schedules, refer to the “balance” of the price to be paid by the Buyer, after deducting the
“first” installment, so that, altogether, there would be
“eleven” installments, namely, the “first,” which would be
10% of F.O.B. cost of the vessel – as agreed
upon between the Governments of the Philippines
and
Japan – and “ten (10) equal yearly installments,” representing
the balance of the amount due to the
Commission from the Buyer, including the interest thereon.

(c)     The Buyer insists that the vessels were “delivered
late,” and that, consequently, it would be more in line with the spirit of
R.A. No. 1789 to declare that the “first” installments fell due on
April 25 and May 26, 1963 respectively. 
But, the Buyer seeks, not merely the postponement of the
first installment’s due date, but, also, exemption from the obligation
to pay its amount of P174, 761.42.  Be­sides,
the dates of “complete delivery” of the vessels are explicitly stated
in the schedules as being “April 25, 1960” and “May 26,
1960.” The Buyer would have surely refused to sign the schedules if said
entries therein were not true.  The
signature affixed thereon by the Buyer and the fact that April 25, and May 26,
1960 were made the basis for the date of maturity, not only of the
“first” installment, but, also, of the subsequent “ten (10)
equal yearly installments,” clearly show that both parties were agreed
that complete delivery of the vessels had been made on the dates set forth in
said schedules.

(d)     This is borne out by
the fact that FICI Surety Bonds Nos. 3825 and 4123 are each for the sum of P174,761.42. 
According to paragraph (5) of the Surety’s cross-claim, which
is admitted in the Buyer’s answer thereto, the
latter had agreed to pay the premiums and the cost of documentary stamps on
said bonds “for 2 years x x x from
April 25, 1960 and May 30, 1960, respectively.” There can thus be no doubt that the Buyer
and the Surety understood that the “first” installments would fall
due on April 25, and May 26, 1962, and that the amount of each of those
installment would be P174,761.42, not P184,386.34, which would be due
on April 25, and May 26, 1963 as appellants would have the Court
believe.

(e)     The Surety argues that
the “first” installment is the one marked No. 1, for P184, 386.34,
“which if paid in ten (10) equal yearly installments amounts to
P1,843,863.40, which is the equi­valent of the total contract price with
interest, of the reparations goods in question.” This is not true.  Precisely, it is only by including
the “first” installment of P174, 761.42, among the obli­gations of
the Buyer, and charging the stipulated 3% yearly interest on the balance of the cost price (of
P1,747,614.22) after such pay­ment, and
after the payment of each of the ten (10) equal yearly installments of P184,386.34, that the full amount
of said cost price, plus interest,
could be satisfied.  In other words, the
price agreed upon and the interest thereon would not be satisfied in full,
unless the “first” installment of P174,761.42 were paid in 1962, in
addition to the ten (10) installments of P184, 386.34 each falling due
yearly from 1963 to 1972.

2.       Appellants assail the
decision appealed from, upon the ground that the Commission had no cause of
action against them until the cases (Nos. 50194 and 50488) for a declaratory
relief shall have been decided, and that, consequently, the lower court erred
in dismissing Case No. 50194 instead of Case No. 51552.

As above pointed out, Case No. 50488 was dismissed by Branch XIII
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, on October 29, 1962, and the order of
dismissal became final and executory upon the
dismissal of the appeal in L-20725 of the Supreme Court, on July 2, 1963,
months before the rendition of the decision of Branch VII of the trial court,
which is the object of the present appeal, on April 30, 1964.  As regards Case No. 50194, which was
commenced on April 24, 1962,
the contract involved therein (with reference to the M/S Don Salvador or Magsaysay) was infringed by the Buyer when it failed to pay
the first installment due the next day, April
25, 1962.  The lower court
was, accordingly, justified in dismissing that case, inasmuch as an action for
declaratory relief may be entertained only “before breach or viola­tion”
of the law or contract to which it refers.3 The
purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of the parties under said law or contract, for their guidance in the enforcement thereof or
compliance therewith, not to settle issues arising from an alleged
breach thereof.4 Accordingly, after such alleged breach of
the law or contract, or once the aforementioned issue has arisen, an ordinary
action is the proper remedy.  Thus, in
Samson v. Andal,5 this Court said:

” x x x If there
has been a violation, declaratory relief cannot be granted, for the reason that
Sec. 2, Rule 666 relative to said remedy,
provides that ‘A contract or statute may be construed before there has been a breach thereof.’ After breach,
the regular remedy obtains.”7

What is more, Rule 64, Section 6, of the Rules of Court is clear and explicit about it.  It provides:

” x x x If
before the final termination of the case, a breach or violation of an
instrument or a statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance, should
take place, the action may thereupon be converted into an ordinary action, and
parties allowed to file such
pleadings as may be necessary or proper.”

Then, too, the facts of record strongly suggest that Cases Nos. 50194
and 50488 for declaratory relief were commenced in anticipation of an action
for breach of contract, said cases having been filed precisely on the eve of the due date of the
“first” installment, as to
M/S Don Salvador or Magsaysay, and on the very due
date of the first installment, as to M/S Don Amando
or Estancia.  The situation in the case
at bar is thus substantially identical to that
obtaining in Teodoro v. Mirasol,8 in which
the following language was used:

“In the case at bar, We are led to the belief that the present action in the Court
of First Instance was prompted by
a desire on plaintiff’s part to anticipate the action for unlawful detainer, the probability of which was apparent x x x
. x x plaintiff
took advantage of defendant’s delayed x
x x suit to file
this case in the Court of First Instance in anticipation of the action for
unlawful detainer, in order perhaps that he may claim
that the action in the Court of First Instance was prior to the unlawful detainer case, and, therefore,
should enjoy preference over the action filed in the Municipal Court.

“It is to be noted that the Rules do not require as a ground
for dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending action.  They provide that there is a pending
action, not a pending prior action. 
The fact that the unlawful detainer suit
was of a later date is no bar to the dismissal of the present action, x x x.

” x x x plaintiff’s action for
declaratory relief is improper; this action is meant only for those cases where
a contract is desired to be construed prior to its breach because of an impending controversy, that the parties thereto may be
informed of their rights thereunder.  In the case at bar, x x x there
has already been a breach x x x hence the action for a
declaratory judgment is no longer proper.

“xxx                              xxx                               xxx

“There is no longer any need for
the action, even if proper, because the matter could be threshed out in the
unlawful detainer suit that the defendant had
instituted in the municipal court.”19

Indeed, otherwise, an action for a declaratory relief could be
availed of to, in effect, suspend, during its pendency,
the force and operation of the contracts in question, and thereby achieve a
compulsory deferment or postponement of the maturity of the obligations therein
validly contracted and assumed. 
Obviously, the Court cannot give the stamp of its approval thereto.

3. The Surety maintains that, pursuant to the terms of its Bonds Nos. 3825
and 4123, the same expired on April 25 and May 26, 1961, respectively, so that it was no
longer liable under the Bonds when the “first” installments became
due on April 25 and May 26, 1962.

Suffice it to say that, not having been pleaded in the Surety’s
answer or otherwise raised in the lower court, such defense cannot be set up,
for the first time, in this appeal.10
Moreover, it is inconsistent with the cross-claim of the Surety, against the
Buyer, for the sum of P10,641.68, representing the premiums and the cost of
documentary stamps on said Bonds, for a period of two (2) years from April
25, 1960 and May 30, 1960, which premiums and documentary stamps could not
be due if the bonds were not in force during said period of two (2) years.

Again, in said bonds, the Buyer, as principal, and the Surety, as
such, firmly bound themselves unto the Reparations Commission, in the sum of
P174,761.42, pursuant to the contract between the Buyer and the Commission,
on condition that, if the Buyer
“shall well and truly keep, do and perform, each and every, all and
sin­gular, the matters and things in the contract set forth and specified to
be” by the Buyer “done and performed at the time and in the manner in
said contract specified, and shall pay over, make good and otherwise satisfy
the obligations required under the contract, then the said bond x x x shall be released upon payment of all the sums
due” to the Commission, “otherwise, said bond shall ipso facto be
forfeited in full in favor of” said Commission.

Thus, the intention of the parties was, clearly, to guarantee
compliance with the aforementioned obligations. 
The first of such obligations, in point of time, was the payment by the
Buyer of the “first” installments which were to become due on April
25 and May 26, 1962, that
is, one year or about a year after the alleged expiration of the
Bonds.  Were We to accept the theory of
the Surety, the result would be that it had never contracted any
obligation or assumed any liability in favor of the Commission, in consequence
of the execution of said bonds and that, for all intents and purposes, the con­tracts
under consideration were, accordingly, devoid of any guarantee.  Such result is manifestly contrary to the
intention of the parties.  And this
explains why the Surety has not set up said defense in its answer.

Referring to the stipulation in a bond to the effect that the
liability thereunder would expire on the date of
maturity of the principal obligation, this Court declared that said
stipulation in effect nullified the nature of said bond, and was, therefore
“unfair and unreasonable, ” as well as “a subtle way of making
money thru trickery and deception.”11 The
situation in the case at bar is even worse, since the Surety contends that its
bond expired about a year before the first installments had become due.

It may not be amiss to note that the rule of strict construction
of surety bonds “does not apply to the engagements of corporate sureties
engaged in the business of furnishing bonds for compensation, and who are,
furthermore, secured from all possible loss by adequate counterbonds.12

4. The Surety impugns the P300 awarded thereto by way of attorney’s
fees, upon the ground that the fee agreed upon with the Buyer is “20% of
the total amount due.” It is well settled, however, that courts of justice
have discretion to fix the amount of attorney’s fees,13 and We do not feel that such discretion has been
abused by His Honor, the trial Judge, considering that the Surety had mainly
relied upon the defenses set up by the Buyer, and that the ultimate liability of the Surety is principally dependent
upon the amount of the principal obligation that the Buyer may be unable to
satisfy.

The other assignments of error made by appellants herein are mere
corollaries to those already disposed of, and, hence, need no further
discussion.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants herein.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Mangila v. Lantin,
L-24735, Oct. 31, 1969; U.P. Board of Regents v. Auditor General,
L-19617, Oct. 31, 1969; Asturias
Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, L-19337, Sept. 30, 1969;
PNB v. Court of Appeals, L-27117, July 30, 1969; Nielson & Co., Inc. v.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., L-21601, Dec. 28,
1968; Rivera v. San Miguel Corp., L-26197, Aug. 30,
1968; People v. Doriquez, L-24444, L-24445,
July 29, 1968; Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Co. v. Securities &
Exchange Commission, L-23606, July 29, 1968; Andico v.
Judge Roan, L-26563, April 16, 1968; Le Hua Sia v. Hon. Reyes, L-21686, April 16, 1968; Bachrach
Trans. Co. , Inc. v. Rural Transit Employees Assn., L-21768, Aug. 23,
1966; Republic v. Reyes,
L-22550, May 19, 1966.

^[2]
Underscoring ours.

3 Rule 64, Sec. 1, Rules of Court.

4 Dy Poco v. Comm. of Immigration, L-22313, March 31, 1966.

5 89 Phil. 627, 628.

6 Of the old Rules, now Rule 64,
Sec. 1.

7 Underscoring ours.

8 99 Phil. 150, 153-154.

9 Underscoring ours.

10 Atlas Consolidated Mining
& Development Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-22439, May 29, 1970;
Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. v. Teodoro, L-29766,
Nov. 29, 1968; Gutierrez v. Court of Appeals, L-25972, Nov. 26, 1968; Yu Kimteng Construction Corp. v. Manila Railroad Co., L-17027,
March 3, 1967; Board of Assessment Appeals v. Manila Electric Co., L-15334, Jan.
31, 1964.

11 Ongsiako
v. World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., 104 Phil. 61, 64.

12 Republic v. Umali, L-23066, March
1, 1968; Pastoral v. Mutual Sec.. Ins. Corp., L-20469, August 31, 1965;
Atkins, Kroll v. Reyes, 105 Phil. 640, 644; Pacific Tobacco Corp. v. Lorenzana, 102 Phil. 234; Philippine Surety & Ins. Co. v.
Royal Oil Products, 102 Phil. 326.

13 San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v.
Magno, L-21879, Sept. 29, 1967; Insurance. Co. of North America v. Manila
Port Service, L-23124, Oct. 11, 1967; Balmes v. Suson, L-27235, May 22, 1969; Philippine Trust Co. v. Policarpio, L-22685, August 25, 1969; Nielson & Co. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., L-21601, December 28, 1968;
De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, L-27759, April 17, 1970.