NATIVIDAD CABACUG, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PLACIDO LAO AND SUPERLA REVELO, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

Plaintiff’s statutory right to repurchase two parcels of land obtained
through a free patent was sought to be frustrated by defendants raising the
extraneous plea that having at one time been the wife of a Chinese national,
thereafter deceased, and failing thereafter to regain Philippine citizenship,
she was not entitled to recover.  She had
no choice then but to go to court.  She
was successful, as the lower court could not very well close its eyes to a
stipulation of facts that on its face made quite evident the absence of any
legal justification for the refusal of defendants to allow such
repurchase.  Not satisfied with such
judgment, defendants appealed.  We
affirm.

The facts as stipulated follow: 
That the plaintiff, Natividad Cabacug, was born a Filipino citizen; that the plaintiff
was married to Te Ben Ting, a Chinese citizen, on January 26, 1944; that on October 19, 1946, the said Te Ben Ting died; that on March 16, 1957, Original Certificate
of Title No. P-1332, Free Patent No. V-67-921 was
issued to plaintiff covering two (2) parcels of land (the land in question)
with a total area of 62, 053 square meters, both situated at the Poblacion of Tudela, Misamis Occidental; that on September 13, 1962, the
above-mentioned two parcels of land with OCT No. P-1332, Free
Patent No. V-67921 were sold by the plaintiff to the defendants, Placido Lao and Superla Revelo, for the total sum of P13,500.00; that by virtue of
the sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-436 for the said two parcels of
land was issued in the name of the defendants; that the plaintiff on several
occasions offered to repurchase the above-mentioned two parcels of land from
the defendants, but the defendants continuously refused the offer so that on
August 11, 1965, the plaintiff deposited with the Clerk of Court, Court of
First Instance, City of Ozamiz the sum of P13,165.00
as the repurchase money and filed the present complaint for repurchase with
damages on September 22, 1965; that the plaintiff, at the time the stipulation
of facts was submitted, had not filed an affidavit of repatriation, although she
had been voting in the previous local and national elections; that in the
complaint and in the OCT No. P-1332, Free Patent No.
V-67921, the civil status of the plaintiff appears as single; that the
plaintiff was then living with a Chinese citizen named Felix Lao without having
been married to him and with whom she had four (4) children; that the two (2)
parcels of land in question, prior to the sale to the defendants, had been
planted with coconut trees, and the defendants had introduced improvements on the
land, but the extent, value and time when these improvements were made depended
on the evidence to be submitted.^[1]

On the above facts, there being a failure of defendants to
introduce evidence on their behalf, the lower court, on August 8, 1966, rendered
the decision in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants ordering them to reconvey the two parcels of land in question.  Defendants were furthermore required to pay
to plaintiff the sum of P533.00 every two months from the date of the filing of
the complaint representing the reasonable value of the produce of the land
until the same shall have been reconveyed.  A motion for reconsideration was filed by
defendants on August 27, 1966
which was denied on September 3, 1966.  Hence this appeal on September 20, 1966 directly to this Court. As set forth at the opening of this
opinion, the appeal is devoid of merit and the judgment must be affirmed.

1. The pivotal question determinative of this controversy is, as
made clear at the outset, the right to repurchase of plaintiff, which on the
face of the undisputed facts is quite evident were it not for the plea by
defendants that she had lost her Filipino citizenship by marrying a Chinese
national, who thereafter died, and she had not reacquired the same.  Such a marriage did occur on January 26, 1944.  She did lose then under our statute and
controlling decisions her Filipino citizenship having acquired by such marriage
her husband’s nationality.^[2]
Her husband died on October 19, 1946.  According to law, the marriage status having
terminated as of that date, she could have reacquired her Filipino nationality
by repatriation which could be effected “by merely taking the necessary
oath of allegiance to the [Republic] of the Philippines
and registration in the proper civil registry.”^[3]
At the time she acquired the free patent to the parcels of land on March 16, 1957, she had not taken
such steps.  Nonetheless, no such
question was raised by the government. 
On September 13, 1962,
when the sale of such land now in litigation was made to defendants, she
likewise had the same status.  Then, when
in accordance with the beneficent provision of the Public Land Act, she would
repurchase the same, defendants would seek to negate
such a clear legal right by the plea that she was not a Filipino.^[4]

It is said, and with reason, that a holder of a land acquired
under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of
registered property.  Not only does a
free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title,^[5]
but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the
right to repurchase within a period of five years.  This salutary provision of the law is not to
be set at naught by the far-fetched and implausible plea herein made that a
legal obstacle exists, one which if it could be raised at all could be set up
only by the government as the aggrieved party. 
It is not to be lost sight of either that considering the ease and
facility with which the repatriation of plaintiff in this case could be effected,
such a plea as that made by defendants even if not so clearly lacking in
persuasive force certainly cannot avail to defeat plaintiff’s claim.  The judgment therefore in her favor must be
affirmed.

2. There is another consideration that equally sustains the
conclusion reached.  Defendants’ norm of
conduct cannot be said to be in consonance with the requirements of good
faith.  That plaintiff was a widow of a
Chinese national as far back as 1946, sixteen years before the transaction, was
known to defendants when they purchased the property.  The suspicion could be legitimately entertained
that all the while, they harbored the sinister intention of rendering nugatory
a statutory right in favor of plaintiff. 
For the lower court then to lend its aid under the circumstances to
further this nefarious scheme is to cast a reflection on the law.  They should be the last to expect,
considering that what they did was marred by the absence of fair dealing so
indissolubly linked with the legal order, that an affirmative response to what
their hearts were set on would be forthcoming, So the
lower court acted, and its judgment is entitled to affirmance.

3. Thus three of the errors assigned, all of which had a bearing
on the legal right of plaintiff to repurchase the disputed parcels of land are
disposed of.  The other two errors being
factual in character need not be looked into. 
This Court, on appeals directly made to it, can pass only on questions
of law.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of August 8, 1966 is affirmed.  With costs against
defendants.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Ruiz Castro, J., concur in the result.

Dizon and
Makasiar, JJ., on official leave.

^[1]
Stipulation of Facts, Record on Appeal, pp. 20-22.

^[2]
According to Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(7), citizenship is lost
“in the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of
the law in force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality,”
(1936). Cf. Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23
Phil. 315 (1912); Paz Chua v. Secretary of Labor, 68 Phil. 649 (1939);
Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 249
(1947); Villahermosa v. Commissioner of
Immigration, 80 Phil. 541 (1948); Escoto v. Arcilla, 89 Phil. 199 (1951); Cu v. Republic, 89
Phil. 473 (1951); Talaroc v. Uy, 92 Phil. 52 (1952); Yee v. Director of Public
Schools, L-16924, April 29, 1963, 7 SCRA 832.

^[3]
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 2(2) and Section 4, Cf. Roa
v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315 (1912); Commonwealth v. Baldello, 67 Phil. 277 (1939); Villahermosa
v. Commissioner of Immigration, 80 Phil. 541 (1948); Pindangan
Agri­cultural Co., Inc. v. Ernest A. Schenkel,
83 Phil. 529 (1949); Guillermo v. Republic, L-16984, June 29, 1963, 8
SCRA 383.

^[4]
According to Commonwealth Act No. 141, Section 119:  “Every conveyance of land acquired under
the free patent or home­stead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five
years from the date of the conveyance.” (1936).

^[5]
Cf. Sumail v. Court of First Instance of Cotabato, 96 Phil. 946 (1955); Roco
v. Gimeda, 104 Phil. 1011 (1958); Ombe v. Diga, 108 Phil.
1136 (1960); Nelayan v. Nelayan,
109 Phil. 193 (1960); Panimdim v. Director of
Lands, L-19731, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 628; Director of Lands v. Court
of Appeals, L-17696, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 71; Villanueva v. Portigo, L-27002, Aug. 27, 1969, 29 SCRA 99.