FELIX FABELLA AND ERNESTO FIGUEROA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEES, VS. THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, VICENTE D. ALOBOG, AND ALTO SURETY AND INSURANCE CO., INC., DEFENDANTS; VICENTE…

This
is an action for damages instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal arising from the attachment of a movie house together with all
equipments, machineries, and furniture found therein, the ownership of
which is disputed.

Defendant Vicente Alobog filed a motion
to dismiss and when the same was denied for lack of merit, he filed an
answer wherein he denied specifically all the material allegations of
the complaint and set up some affirmative and special defenses and a
counterclaim.

Plaintiffs answered the counterclaim stating
merely that they deny “generally and specifically each and every
allegation contained in each and every paragraph” of said counterclaim.
Thereafter, defendant Vicente Alobog, considering that plaintiffs’
answer to his counterclaim failed to tender an issue, filed a motion
praying that judgment be rendered in his favor and against plaintiffs,
asking at the same time that he be allowed to present evidence as to
the amount of damages he is claiming in his answer.

This
motion was set for hearing, but as defendant or his counsel failed to
appear, counsel for plaintiffs informed the court that he was agreeable
that a judgment on the pleadings be rendered as prayed for in the
motion of defendant. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment granting
practically the relief prayed for in the complaint. From this decision
defendant has appealed.

The case was originally taken to the
Court of Appeals, but when the case was called for hearing appellant’s
counsel admitted that he was merely raising questions of law, to which
appellees’ counsel agreed, as in fact the latter alleged in his brief
that said court has no jurisdiction over the case and that it should be
forwarded to the Supreme Court. Thereupon, the case was certified to
this Court.

The motion which the lower court considered as
one for judgment on the pleadings and which served as basis of its
decision reads as follows:

“Comes now defendant Vicente Alobog, by and through his undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court most respectfully shows:

1. That the defendant Vicente D. Alobog in answer to the plaintiffs’
   complaint on file denying the allegations contained therein, except
   paragraph 1 and in a way paragraphs 3, 5, 6, and 13, for the truth of
   the matter are as stated in the affirmative and special defenses, and
   by way of counterclaim reproduces all the allegations of his ‘answer’,
   ‘affirmative defense’, and ‘special defense’, and incorporated therein
   as part of said counterclaim in the amount of P12,000 for damages
   suffered by said defendant.

2. That the aforementioned plaintiffs in answer to the said counterclaim
   of said defendant Vicente D. Alobog, said answer dated September 6,
   1950, failed to tender an issue, and in stead in law admit the material
   allegations of the said ‘answer’, ‘affirmative defense’, ‘special
   defense’, and ‘counterclaim’ of defendant Vicente D. Alobog, for the
   said answer of plaintiffs state: ‘That plaintiffs deny generally
   and specifically each and every allegation contained in each and every
   paragraph of the defendant’s counterclaim.’

That the herein moving party is thus entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

That the defendant Vicente D. Alobog is ready to present evidence as to
the amount of Damage suffered by him therein alleged.

Wherefore, premises considered, the undersigned pray for an order
giving judgment in favor of the defendant Vicente D. Alobog and against
the plaintiffs based on the pleadings on file; that the defendant
Vicente D. Alobog be allowed to present evidence as to the amount of
damage suffered by him as therein alleged; and further pray for such
other and further relief as the court may deem just with costs, against
the plaintiffs.”

What is the nature of a
judgment on the pleadings? This point is well defined in our Rules of
Court. Thus, in section 10, Rule 35, it is provided that “where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion
of that party, direct judgment on such pleading, except in actions for
annulment of marriage or divorce wherein the material facts alleged in
the complaint shall always be proved.” The rules contain no other
provision on the matter. Apparently, in this jurisdiction the rule
regarding judgment on the pleadings only applies where an answer fails
to tender an issue and plaintiff invokes the rule. The rule is silent
as to whether a similar relief may be asked by the defendant, although
under American jurisprudence, the rule applies to either party.
(Roxoline Petroleum Co. vs. Craig et al., 300 P. 620; 71 C. J. S., p. 863.)

Quite apart from the rule we have quoted above, and regardless of
whoever may invoke the benefit of its provisions, we have in this
jurisdiction quite a good number of cases illustrating the nature and
application of the rule. As an illustration and guidance, we may cite
the following restatement of the rulings found in different cases
decided by this court: When the defendant neither denies nor admits the
material allegations of the complaint, judgment on the pleadings is
proper (Alemany et al. vs. Sweeney, 3 Phil., 114). But where
the defendant’s answer tenders an issue, judgment on the pleadings
should not be rendered (Ongsin vs. Riarte^[*],
46 Off. Gaz. No. 1, p. 67). And when the defendant admits all
allegations of the complaint, the admission is a sufficient ground for
judgment. One who prays for judgment on the pleadings without offering
proof as to the truth of his own allegations, and without giving the
opposing party an opportunity to introduce evidence, must be understood
to admit the truth of all the material and relevant allegations of the
opposing party, and to rest his motion for judgment on those
allegations taken together with such of his own as are admitted in the
pleadings. [Bauermann vs. Casas, 10 Phil., 386; Evangelista vs. De la Rosa, 76 Phil., 115: Tanchico vs.
Ramos, 48 Off. Gaz. (1) 654.] It is apparent from these rulings that
judgment on the pleadings can only be rendered when the pleading of the
party against whom the motion is directed, be he plaintiff or
defendant, does not tender any issue, or admits all the material
allegations of the pleading of the movant. Otherwise, judgment on the
pleadings cannot be rendered.

If we consider the motion
filed by the defendant wherein he prayed that judgment be rendered on
the pleadings in the light of the foregoing rules, one cannot but reach
the conclusion that what was intended was merely to ask for judgment in
so far as the counterclaim contained in his answer is concerned in view
of the failure of the plaintiffs to traverse it as required by the
rules. This is reflected in the second paragraph of the motion wherein
defendant makes patent the fact that plaintiffs’ answer to his
counterclaim failed to tender an issue because it merely pleaded a
general denial. This is also reflected in the prayer wherein he asked
that judgment be rendered in his favor and against the plaintiffs and
that he be allowed to present evidence as to the amount of damages
claimed by him in his counterclaim. The motion could not have referred
to the material allegations of the complaint for the simple reason that
they were specifically denied in the answer and therefore the latter
has tendered an issue which could not be the subject of a judgment on
the pleadings. This is the only conclusion that can be drawn from a
careful analysis of the contents of the motion of defendant. A contrary
interpretation would be incongruous and contrary to its very purpose.
It is for these reasons that we believe that the lower court committed
an error in considering the aforesaid motion as an implied admission of
all the material allegations of the complaint and in rendering judgment
accordingly.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby
revoked, without pronouncement as to costs. The case is remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

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^[*] 81 Phil., 184.