DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE MATEO CANONOY JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, AND PEDRO CLAVANO, R…

The failure of respondent Judge, the Honorable Mateo Canonoy, to defer to the controlling doctrine that the
one-year period within which to file an ejectment
case is to be counted from the last demand, supplies the basis for this special
civil action for certiorari.  On its
face, then, its merit is rather apparent. 
We find for petitioners Development Bank of the Philippines
and the University of San
Carlos.

Right at the outset, after the allegation as to parties, the
petition filed on August 22, 1968 makes mention of a decision of respondent
Judge of April 24, 1968^[1] ordering defendant in such case, now
respondent Pedro Clavano, to remove his house and
vacate the premises, the plaintiffs being now petitioners Develop­ment Bank of
the Philippines and the University of San Carlos.^[2]  In such decision, it was noted that the five
lots in question were owned by the Development Bank of the Philippines,
thereafter made the subject of a conditional sale to the University
of San Carlos, which required
defendant Clavano to vacate the premises, a demand
not heeded by him.  Such a refusal, as
set forth in the decision, was predicated on the alleged illegality of such
sale as the University of San Carlos is run by foreigners, defendant, moreover,
having since 1945 occupied that place on which he did thereafter build a
residential and commercial house of strong materials, with its original owner,
the Philippine Railway, having promised through its manager to sell him such
land.  Respondent Judge, after a thorough
study of the facts and the law, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff, now
petitioner University of San Carlos, had the right to possession, but allowed
the defendant one more year, to expire until April 30, 1969, for the removal of
his house and the improvements on the premises, with plaintiff being authorized
to do so in the event of his failure to comply with this portion of the
decision, at the same time requiring him to pay monthly rentals of P24.00 from
April 30, 1960 with legal interest until the delivery of the premises.^[3]

Assertion was then made in the petition as to respondent Clavano filing a motion for reconsideration on May 24, 1968, where­in the question
of jurisdiction was raised on the plea that more than one year had elapsed from
the time of the demand.^[4]
The plea for reconsideration was successful, as, on June 25, 1968, respondent Judge, in a resolution
now challenged in this petition, yielded assent.^[5]
Thus:  “The cause of action accrued
in July, 1960, that is, after 30 days from June 10, 1960, when defendant was notified by the plaintiff
University to vacate the premises
and [remove] his building. * * * (Under the terms of the lease contract, the
lessee is entitled to 30-day notice of termination.)  So, when the original complaint was filed on
November 19, 1962 snore than one year had already elapsed; consequently, the
lower [court] did not have jurisdiction over the present case of unlawful detainer.  Con­sequently
also, on appeal this Court as an appellate Court could not [assume] power in
excess of the jurisdiction of the lower court.”^[6]
In the dispositive portion of such resolution,
respondent Judge granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case
without prejudice, reserving to plaintiffs, however, the right to file the
proper action in a competent court. 
There was an urgent motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiffs, now
petitioners, on July 25, 1968,
but it was denied on August 6, 1968.  Hence, this petition.

The decisive facts are, therein set forth thus: “a) That on November 19, 1962, Civil Case No.
R-8996 was filed in the Municipal Court of Cebu
against 62 defendants, and respondent Pedro Clavano
was one of the defendants who moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction and misjoinder of parties; b) That
on March 25, 1963, the Municipal Court of Cebu, denied
the motion to dismiss, and instead ordered that:  ‘However, the Court orders the plaintiff to
split the complaint, that is, one complaint against one defendant, in order
that the issues between the plaintiffs and one particular defendant, who has a
separate and different defense from the others can be fairly tried.  The present complaint shall be maintained but
against the first named defendant only. 
In the meantime, the hearing of the case is held pending until
compliance by the plaintiffs with this Court’s Order.” * * *; c) That on June 22, 1964, after
various motions and pursuant to the Order of May 8, 1964, issued by the
Municipal Court of Cebu, Civil Case No. 10354,
against respondent Pedro Clavano, was filed. * * *;
d) That the Municipal Court, after denying respondent Pedro Clavano’s
motion to dismiss and its subsequent motion to suspend hearing, tried the case
on its merits and judgment was rendered on June 30, 1966, in favor of
petitioners but granting to respondent Pedro Clavano,
the right to recover P10,000.00 for the improvement and to remain in possession
of the land until fully paid with right to buy the land should petitioner
University of San Carlos fail to pay respondent, Pedro Clavano,
within 90 days the amount of P10,000.00; e) That petitioners not being
satisfied with the decision, appealed the judgment to the Court of First
Instance; f) That in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
where the case was elevated on appeal, no motion to dismiss was filed and the
case was tried on the merits.  The
question of ownership as well as who had a better right to the property were
considered and pertinent oral as well as documentary evidence were submitted by
respondent Pedro Clavano; g) That on April 24, 1968,
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, after a lawful
and due hearing and trial, rendered its decision in favor of petitioners and
ordering defendant to vacate the premises, ruling that respondent is not a builder in good faith; h) That the Resolution
of the Respondent Judge, Hon. Mateo Canonoy setting
aside its Decision, is predicated on the proposition that the cause of action
accrued on June 10, 1960, when petitioners made its first demand for respondent
Pedro Clavano to vacate and not on May 14, 1962 when
the second demand was made.”^[7] In the answer filed on October
7, 1968, there was
no denial that in the second letter of demand of May 14, 1962, respondent Clavano
was required to vacate the premises within thirty days from its receipt and to
pay the rentals in arrears.^[8]

On the above decisive
undisputed fact that the filing of the action for ejectment
was within the one-year period after the second letter of demand of May 14,
1962, the challenged order of reconsideration of respondent Judge of June 25,
1968 as well as the later order of August 6, 1968, wherein respondent Judge
maintained his stand, cannot be sustained. 
In Sy Oh v. Garcia,^[9] we reaffirmed in categorical language the
controlling principle that “the one-year period is to be counted from the
last letter of demand.”  Reference
was there made to a 1967 decision, Calubayan v. Pascual,^[10] wherein the same doctrine was given
expression.  Thus:  “Even assuming, for the sake of
argument, that the various notifications for defendant to see the plaintiffs
could be construed as demands upon the defendant to vacate, the length of time
that defendant detained the premises is to be reckoned with from the date of
the last demand.”^[11] The year before, in Racaza
v. Susana Realty, Inc.,^[12] it was held: 
“Moreover, even if the action were based on non-payment of rent,
the one-year period should be reckoned [with] from the second notice, on the
theory that respondent has the right to waive his action based on the first
demand and to let the lessee remain in the premises.”^[13] As a matter of fact, it was expressly set forth in the Sy Oh opinion: 
“Such a view has
been steadfastly adhered to by us ever since the 1913 opinion of Lucido v. Vita. 
What would have been
objectionable would have been a departure therefrom
by the lower courts.”^[14]

Respondent Judge, in his order of August 6, 1968, apparently was misled by a 1966
decision, Desbarats v. Segarra,^[15]
where the one-year period for filing the ejectment
suit was computed from the first letter of demand as there was an absence of
tolerance or waiver on the part of the landlord.  The reliance is misplaced.  Such a ruling does not call for application
here on the facts as disclosed.  Rather,
what is to be emphasized in the opinion in Desbarats
by Justice Barrera is the following excerpt: 
“For, although it is true that the lessee was required to pay the
rentals or vacate the premises by letter of March 11, 1955, which should make
the lessee’s possession unlawful from that time, the lessor
has also the privilege to waive the right to bring the proper action, or to
allow the lessee to continue in his occupation, thereby legalizing the
same.  Thus, in one case, where despite
the lessee’s failure to pay the rent after the first demand, the lessor did not choose to bring an action in court, but
‘suffered the lessees to continue occupying the lands for nearly two years’,
the lessor’s inaction was construed as waiver of his
right to file the case, and his tolerance of the lessees’ possession of the
property, consi­dered to have legalized the said otherwise unlawful
possession.  Consequently, the cause of
action for illegal detainer was therein declared to
have accrued only when the second demand for rents and for surrender of
possession was not complied with.”^[16]

Nor should it be lost sight of that if an attempted distinction
were made, the Court in the Desbarats ease, had to do
so as otherwise the accion publiciana
filed by the landlord for the recovery of possession could be deemed
objectionable.  What emerges clearly,
then, is the reluctance on the part of this Court to justify a wilfull refusal on the part of a person no longer entitled
to possession to continue the same.  This
is the fundamental assumption ignored by respondent Judge.  Hence, the propriety of this petition for certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted,
the resolution of June 25, 1968
granting respondent Clavano’s motion to
reconsideration as well as the order of August
6, 1968 denying the motion of petitioners to
set aside the reconsideration are held void and declared to be without any
legal force or effect.  The decision of April 24, 1968 by respondent Judge is
thus reinstated and affirmed.  With costs
against respondent Clavano.

Reyes, Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., on official leave.

^[1]
Civil Case No. R-10354 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IlI.

^[2]
Petition, paragraph III.

^[3]
Annex A, Petition.

^[4]
Petition, paragraph IV.

^[5]
Ibid, paragraph V.

^[6]
Resolution of June 25, 1968,
Annex C, Petition.

^[7]
Petition, paragraph VIII.

^[8]
Answer, paragraph IV.

^[9]
L-29328, June 30, 1969, 28
SCRA 735.

^[10]
L-22645, Sept. 18, 1967, 21
SCRA 146.

^[11]
Ibid, p. 149.

^[12]
L-20330, Dec. 22, 1966, 18
SCRA 1172.

^[13]
Ibid, p. 1177.

^[14]
L-29328, June 30, 1969, 28
SCRA 735, 738. Lucido v. Vita is reported in
25 Phil. 414 (1913). Cf. Canaynay v. Sarmiento, 79 Phil. 36 (1947) and Zobel
v. Abreu, 98 Phil. 343 (1956).

^[15]
L-21875, Sept. 27, 1966, 18
SCRA 116.

^[16]
Ibid., p. 120.