GABRIEL BAGUIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT, FOR HERSELF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, DOMINADOR, LEA, AND TEONIFE, ALL SURNAMED JALAGAT; …

The specific legal question raised in this appeal from an order
of dismissal by the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental, presided by the Hon. Benjamin K. Gorospe,
one which has not as yet been the subject of a definitive ruling, is whether or
not on a motion to dismiss on the ground of res
judicata that the cause of action is barred by
a prior judgment, a lower court may take judicial notice of such previous case
decided by him resulting in the prior judgment relied upon.  Judge Gorospe
answered in the affirmative.  So do
we.  An affirmance
is thus called for.

The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to
real property filed by plaintiff, now appellant, Gabriel Baguio,
on February 14, 1966.  There was on March 7, 1966 a motion to dismiss filed by defendants, now
appellees, on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by a prior judgment.  This was the
argument advanced:  “The instant
complaint or case, besides being clearly unfounded and malicious, is identical
to or the same as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and
against Melecio alias Mening
Jalagat, now deceased and whose legal heirs and
successors in interest are the very defendants in the instant complaint or
Civil Case No. 2639.  Said Civil Case No.
1574 was filed on October 7, 1958 for ‘Recovery of Possession and Ownership of
Real Estate’ and entitled Gabriel Baguio, plaintiff,
versus Melecio alias Mening
Jalagat, defendant, involving practically the same
property and practically the same parties as defendants are the widow and the
children, respectively, thus the legal or forced heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat.  That the said Case No. 1574, which is
identical to or is the same case as the instant one, has already been duly and
finally terminated as could be clear from [an] order of this Honorable Court
[dated December 6, 1965].”^[1] There was
an opposition on the part of plaintiff made on March 26, 1966 on the ground that for prior judgment or res judicata to
suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the
complaint.  It was then alleged that
there was nothing in the complaint from which such a conclusion may be
inferred.  Then, on September 26, 1966,
came the order complained of worded thus: 
“Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the
defendants under date of March 4, 1966, anchored on the ground that plaintiff’s
cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, which this Court finds to be
well-founded as it has already dismissed plaintiff’s complaint in Civil Case
No. 1574 against Melecio Jalagat
alias Mening Jalagat,
defendants’ predecessor in interest from whom they have derived their rights,
in an order dated December 6, 1965, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 17 of the new
Rules of Court, which case involved the same parcel of land as the one in the
instant case, as prayed for, Civil Case No. 2639 should be as it is hereby
[dismissed].  The Court’s previous
dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574 has the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits and consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded in abatement of any
subsequent action against the same parties over the same issues and the same
subject-matter by the same plaintiff. 
[So ordered].”^[2]
Hence this appeal.

The order of dismissal, as noted at the outset, must be
sustained.  It is in accordance with law.

1.  The sole error assigned
is that a bar by prior judgment cannot be raised in a motion to dismiss when
such ground does not appear on the face of the complaint.  What immediately calls attention in the
rather sketchy and inconclusive discussion in the six-page brief of appellant
is that there was no denial as to the truth of the statement made by Judge Gorospe that there was a previous dismissal of the same
plaintiff’s complaint against the predecessor-in-interest of defendants, who as
expressly admitted by appellant was the deceased husband of one of them and
father of the rest.  There was no denial
either of the property involved being the same and of the finality of the decision
in the previous case which would show that appellant’s claim was devoid of any
support in law.  It would be therefore
futile for the court to continue with the case as there had been such a prior
judgment certainly binding on appellant. 
What then was there for the lower court to do?  Was there any sense in its being engaged in
what was essentially a fruitless endeavor as the outcome was predictable?

Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach
if the Rules of Court would sanction such a proceeding distinguished by nothing
but its futility.  It ought to be clear
even to appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly could
take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was
previously pending and thereafter decided by it.  That was all that was done by the lower court
in decreeing the dismissal.  Certainly
such an order is not contrary to law.  A
citation from the comments of former Chief Justice Moran is relevant.  Thus: 
“Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to
determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a
previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration.”^[3]

2.  There is another equally
compelling consideration.  Appellant
undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy which under the law then in force could be
availed of.  It would have served the
cause of justice better, not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on
his part and the vexation to which appellees were subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter.  Then the valuable time of this Tribunal would
not have been frittered away on a useless and hopeless appeal.  It has ever been the guiding principle from
Alonso v. Villamor,^[4]
a 1910 decision, that a litigant should not be allowed to worship at the altar
of technicality.  That is not to dispense
justice according to law.  Parties, and
much more so their counsel, should ever keep such an imperative of our legal
system in mind.^[5]

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of September 26, 1966 is hereby affirmed.  With costs against plaintiff.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs with
J. Teehankee in his
separate opinion.

Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

^[1]
Record on Appeal, pp. 6-7.

^[2]
Ibid, p. 13.

^[3]
5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1970 ed., p. 50.

^[4]
16 Phil. 315.

^[5]
Cf. Aguinaldo
v. Aguinaldo, L-30362, November
26, 1970, 36 SCRA
137, 141.

Clean

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