HON. CARLOS ABIERA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL AND THE SPOUSES MIGUEL DE LA CRUZ AND JOVITA DE LA CRUZ, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS…

Petition for review by certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 37153-R, setting aside the writ
of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch VI, in its Civil Case No. 293.

The facts of the case as
found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

“In Civil Case No. 7435 the herein petitioner as administratrix of the estate of Luis B. Puentevella
obtained a decision from Branch II, Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental rescinding a contract of sale entered
into by Luis B. Puentevella as vendor and Raul Javellana as vendee of 36 lots mentioned in the complaint
and declaring that the installments on account of said lots paid by Raul Javellana as well as the buildings and other improvements
constructed thereon be considered as rentals for the use and occupation of the
lots, ordering further that the defendants Raul Javellana
and Southern Negros College vacate the lots and
deliver possession thereof to the plaintiff.

“The decision having become final, a writ of execution was
issued and the Sheriff of Occidental Negros placed
the plaintiff in possession of the land. 
With respect to the buildings which as stated above were declared to be
the property of the plaintiff for having been considered as part of the rentals
of the lots, the acting Director of the Southern Negros
College which was occupying the building, informed the Sheriff that the
President of the School and his wife Mr. and Mrs. Jose Lopez were then in Hongkong.  It is
implied from the return of the Sheriff that the buildings and the equipment of
the school were not delivered to the plaintiff.

“In view of the fact that the decision above referred to
provided for the payment of additional rentals at the rate of P500.00 a month
from February, 1957 until the premises shall have been delivered to the
plaintiff, plus P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs, the Sheriff, pursuant
to the same writ of execution, levied upon the books, equipment and supplies
found in the premises and presumably belonging to the defendant Southern Negros College, for the satisfaction of the amounts
mentioned in the decision.

“On December 20, 1965
a certain Mr. Aniceto Lacson
filed a third-party claim with the Sheriff alleging that he was the owner of
the building and school equipment including the books and supplies, for having
allegedly purchased them from Mr. and Mrs. Jose Lopez.  On December
28, 1965 another
third-party claim was filed over the same school buildings, equipment, books and supplies.  In this second third-party claim, the
claimant is Jovita De la Cruz who like Mr. Lacson,
alleges that she acquired the same properties from Mr. and Mrs. Jose Lopez also
by purchase.

“On January 3, 1966 Jovita De la
Cruz and her husband Miguel De la Cruz filed a complaint before Branch VI of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and
alleging that they are the owners of the buildings occupied by the Southern Negros College as well as the equipment, books, and
supplies found therein, and that the same were levied upon by the Sheriff to
satisfy a judgment rendered by Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental of which said plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. De
la Cruz are not parties and, therefore, not binding on them, obtained from the
Presiding Judge of Branch VI of the same court Honorable Carlos Abiera a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Angelina
E. Puentevella and her co-defendants Sheriff and
deputy sheriffs of the Province of Negros Occidental
‘to refrain from taking possession of the buildings and other properties
mentioned in the depository receipt marked as Exhibit A and the lots wherein
they are situated; and from going on with the sale of the properties; and from
preventing the students, instructors and other personnel of the school from
entering the school premises and to remove the barricades from the main gate of
the school premises, (until further orders) from this court.”

In due course respondent Puentevella
filed a petition for certiorari or mandamus with the Court of
Appeals, with a prayer “that an ex-parte writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the Hon. Carlos Abiera
from enforcing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by him in Civil Case
No. 293 of the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental and from further issuing any
other writ or process which would in any manner affect the enforcement of the
judgment rendered by Branch II of the same Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 7435; that, after
hearing, judgment be declared making the writ of preliminary injunction prayed
for in this case permanent.” In its decision dated May 18, 1966 the Court of Appeals granted the petition
and set aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court in
Civil Case No. 293. The spouses De la Cruz moved to reconsider but the motion
was denied in a resolution dated June 27, 1966, the same resolution the Court
of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining “respondent
Judge from further enforcing the injunction issued by him in Civil Case No.
293.”

Not satisfied with the said decision as well as with the order
denying their motion for reconsideration, the spouses De la Cruz filed the
instant petition for review.  On motion
of petitioners We issued, on October
21, 1966, a restraining order to stop the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental from proceeding with the auction sale in
Civil Case No. 7435; and on April 5,
1967 We issued a
writ of preliminary injunction for the same purpose, upon a bond of P2,500.00.

The lone issue presented for resolution is whether or not Branch
VI of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental acted with authority in enjoining the Provincial Sheriff from
proceeding with the execution sale of properties levied upon by him pursuant to
a final judgment rendered by Branch II but claimed by the petitioners herein,
the De la Cruz spouses, in the
action filed by them in the
court which issued the injunction.

The decision of the Court
of Appeals now sought to be reviewed relies upon the case of Hacbang et al. vs. Clementino
Diez, 8 SCRA 103 (May 30, 1963), where this Court
acted and applied the doctrine earlier laid down in Cabigao
vs. Del Rosario and Lim, 44 Phil. 192, and subsequently reiterated in
several other cases, that “no court has power to interfere by injunction
with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction * * *”

The doctrine as thus formulated is well settled, and has been
adhered to consistently whenever justified by the facts in order to avoid
conflict of power between different courts of coordinate jurisdiction and to
bring about a harmonious and smooth functioning of their proceedings.  For the doctrine to apply, however, the
injunction issued by one court must interfere with the judgment or decree
issued by another court of equal or coordinate jurisdiction, and the relief
sought by such injunction must be one which could be granted by the court which
rendered the judgment or issued the decree.

In the case at bar, there is no question that the action filed by
the De la Cruz spouses wherein they claim ownership of the properties levied
upon by the provincial sheriff is sanctioned by Section 17 of Rule 39, which
provides:

“If property levied on be claimed by any other person than the
judgment debtor or his agent, and such person make an affidavit of his title
thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right
or title, and serve the same upon the officer making the levy, and a copy
thereof upon the judgment creditor, the officer shall not be bound to keep the
property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the officer,
indemnify the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than
the value of the property levied on.  In
case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the
Court issuing the writ of execution.

“The officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or
keeping of the property, to any third party claimant unless a claim is made by
the latter and unless an action for damages is brought by him against the
officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the
bond.  But nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third
person from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action.  ” * * * ” (Italics
supplied).

It may be inferred from the foregoing provision that the right of
a person who claims to be the owner of property levied upon on execution to
file a third-party claim with the sheriff is not exclusive, and that he may
file an action to vindicate his claim even if the judgment creditor files an
indemnity bond in favor of the sheriff to answer for any damages that may be
suffered by the third-party claimant.  By
“action,” as stated in this Rule, what is meant is a separate and
independent action, such as was resorted to by the third-party claimants in
this case.  So it has been held in Manila
Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos, 88 Phil. 94, where this Court,
through Justice Pedro Tuason, resolved a question
similar to the one now before us.  There
an order of attachment was issued by the Court in a civil suit for libel filed
by Antonio Quirino against the editor, the managing
editor and a reporter of the Daily Record. 
By virtue of the writ the sheriff levied upon certain properties found
in the premises of the publication.  The
Herald Publishing Company, alleging ownership of the properties thus attached,
filed a third-party claim with the sheriff and subsequently an action to enjoin
the attachment.  This action fell to
another branch of the Court of First Instance, which issued the preliminary
injunction against the sheriff.

This Court said, in
relation to the point which is of relevance here:

“The objection that at once suggests itself to entertaining in
Case No. 12263 the motion to discharge the preliminary attachment levied in
Case No 115391 is that by so doing one judge would interfere with another
judge’s actuations.  The objection is
superficial and will not bear analysis.

It has been seen that a separate action by the third party who
claims to be the owner of the property attached is appropriate.  If this is
so, it must be admitted that the judge trying such action may render judgment
ordering the sheriff or whoever has in possession the attached property to
deliver it to the plaintiff-claimant or desist from seizing it.  It follows further that the court may make an
interlocutory order, upon the filing of such bond as may be necessary, to
release the property pending final adjudication of the title.  Jurisdiction over an action includes
jurisdiction over an interlocutory matter incidental to the cause and deemed
necessary to preserve the subject matter of the suit or protect the parties’
interests.  This is self-evident.

The fault with the respondents’ argument is that it assumes that
the Sheriff is holding the property in question by order of the court handling
the case for libel.  In reality this is
true only to a limited extent.  That
court did not direct the Sheriff to attach the particular property in dispute.  The order was for the Sheriff to attach Borres‘, Padilla’s and Pastor’s property.  He was not supposed to touch any property
other than that of these defendants’, and if he did, he acted beyond the limits
of his authority and upon his personal responsibility.

It is true of course that property in custody of the law can not be
interfered with without the permission of the proper court, and property
legally attached is property in custodia legis.  But for the reason just
stated, this rule is confined to cases where the property belongs to the
defendant or one in which the defendant has proprietary interest.  When the Sheriff acting beyond the bounds of
his office seizes a stranger’s property, the rule does not apply and
interference with his custody is not interference with another court’s order of
attachment.

It may be argued that
the third-party claim may be unfounded; but so may it be meritorious, for that
matter.  Speculations are however beside
the point.  The title is the very issue in the case for the recovery of
property or the dissolution of the attachment, and pending final decision, the
court may enter any interlocutory order calculated to preserve the property in
litigation and protect the parties’ rights and interest.  * * *.”

The rationale of the decision in the Herald Publishing Company case is peculiarly applicable to the
one before Us, and removes it from the general doctrine enunciated in the
decisions cited by the respondents and quoted earlier herein.

1.     
Under Section 17 of Rule 39 a third person who
claims property levied upon on execution may vindicate such claim by action.  Obviously a judgment rendered in his favor,
that is, declaring him to be the owner of the property, would not constitute
interference with the powers or processes of the court which rendered the
judgment to enforce which the execution
was levied.  If that be so – and
it is so because the property, being that of a stranger, is not subject to levy
– then an interlocutory order such as injunction, upon a claim and prima facie
showing of ownership by the claimant, cannot be considered as such interference
either.

2.     
To adopt the statement in the Herald Publishing Company decision and apply it here,
Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, in Case No. 7435, did not direct the sheriff to levy upon the
particular properties in dispute.  The
order was for him to levy upon properties of the judgment debtor, without
specifying them.

3.     
The issue presented by herein private
respondents in Civil Case No. 293 before respondent Judge was one of ownership,
which could not have been presented to and resolved by the other court in Civil
Case No. 7435.  In other words, that court could not
grant the relief
sought by the injunction, and consequently neither its judgment nor the
enforcement thereof was interfered with. 
Execution could still proceed with respect to the judgment debtor’s
properties.

4.     
The case of Cabigao vs.
Del Rosario and Lim, supra, is not in point. 
In that case a writ of execution was issued by one court (second branch,
Manila) to enforce its judgment for
a sum of money.  After the defendant’s
property was levied upon he filed a petition in another court (first branch),
praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the sheriff
from carrying out the execution on the ground that there was another action
pending between the same parties in the Supreme Court and in which action the
defendant had been given a judgment by the Court of First Instance for a much
larger amount than that for which the execution was issued.  Under these facts, it is quite clear that the
preliminary injunction issued by Branch I was improper, and constituted undue
interference with a decree of Branch II, where the same relief could have been
sought.

5.     
The case of Hacbang vs. Hon. Clementino Diez et al. is not in
point either.  There judgment was rendered
by the Court of First Instance of Leyte against the Leyte Autobus Co., Inc. in Civil Case No. 2045.  A writ of execution was issued, and a
passenger bus was levied upon by the provincial sheriff.  The respondent, Leyte
Autobus Co., Inc., claiming that it was the owner of the bus and that it was
not the defendant in Civil Case No. 2045, although it bore the same name, filed
a third-party claim.  The Leyte court denied the claim
and directed that the sale of the bus be carried out, on the
ground that the said respondent was the very same company that was the
defendant against whom the judgment had been rendered.  Subsequently the respondent filed another
action in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
reproducing substantially the allegations in its third-party claim, and prayed
that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the sale of the
passenger bus which had been levied upon. 
The injunction was issued as prayed for and the sheriff came to Us on certiorari and prohibition.

This Court, through Justice Roberto Concepcion,
now Chief Justice, granted the petition and annulled the said writ, applying
the doctrine laid down in Cabigao vs. Del
Rosario, supra, and citing in its decision still another case, namely,
National Power Corporation vs. Hon. Jesus de Veyra,
3 SCRA 646 (Dec. 22, 1961).

It is clear that in the Hacbang case
the injunction issued by the Cebu court constituted
an interference with the processes of the Leyte
court, since the latter had already denied the third-party claim filed before
it by the respondent company, held that the latter was the very defendant
against whom judgment has been rendered, and directed the sale of the specific
property claimed by it.

6. The National Power Corporation case presented a more or less
similar situation.  As stated in the
decision penned by Chief Justice Bengzon, “the
question raised is whether or not property which has been levied upon in a
garnishment proceeding by one court (in Manila) may be subject to the
jurisdiction of another court (in Baguio) in an
independent suit impugning the legality of said garnishment – the property
garnished allegedly being exempt from execution.” This Court held:
“The reason advanced by the respondent court of Baguio
City that it should grant relief when ‘there is apparently an illegal
service of the writ’ *
* * may not be upheld, there being a better procedure to follow, i.e., a resort
to the Manila Court, wherein the remedy may be obtained, it being the court
under whose authority the illegal levy had been made.  Needless to say, an effective ordering of
legal relationships in civil society is possible only when each court is
granted exclusive jurisdiction over the property brought to it.  To allow coordinate courts to interfere with
each other’s judgments or decrees by injunction would obviously lead to
confusion and might seriously hinder the proper administration of
justice.”

As may be noted, the statement of the doctrine relied upon by the
respondents in the present case must be taken in context, that is, in the particular factual setting wherein it is applied.  The facts of this case do not lend themselves
to its application.

7. Respondents assail the injunction issued by Judge Carlos Abiera on the ground that, irrespective of the question as
to his authority, the facts and circumstances of the case do not justify its
issuance.  This is, however, a factual
matter which we cannot here review, involving as it does evidence adduced
before the trial court, and which should have been, if at all, raised in the
Court of Appeals.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and set aside, and the authority of respondent Judge Carlos Abiera to issue the writ of preliminary injunction which he
did in Civil Case No. 293 is upheld, without prejudice to whatever further
action he may take in respect thereof, as may be justified by the facts and
circumstances.  No pronouncement as to
costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Acting C. J., Zaldivar,
Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar,
and Antonio, JJ.,
concur.

Castro, J., did not take
part.

Concepcion, Jr., C.J., on official leave.