AQUILINA R. ARANETA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition to
review the decision of the then Court of Appeals, now
Intermediate Appellate Court, finding the accused appellant guilty of the crime
of bribery.  The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment of conviction, We hereby
find the defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bribery under
the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code; and there being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, We hereby impose upon her the
penalty of imprisonment consisting of four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days
and a fine of P100.00.  The defendant
shall also suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification from
holding office.  With
costs.”

Atty. Aquilina
Araneta was charged with violation of Section 3,
Subsection B of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the “Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act” in an information which reads:

“That on or about the 26th day of August, 1971, in the City of
Cabanatuan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then employed as
Hearing Officer in the Department of Labor, with station at Cabanatuan
City, and therefore, a public officer, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously demand and receive for herself the amount of One
Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency, from one Mrs. Gertrudes
M. Yoyongco, as a
condition and/or consideration for her to act on the claim for
compensation benefits filed by the said Mrs. Gertrudes
M. Yoyongco pertaining to the death of her husband,
which claim was then pending in the office wherein the above-named accused was
employed and in which, under the law, she has the official capacity to
intervene.”

The evidence for the
prosecution is summarized by the respondent appellate court in its decision as
follows:

“Complainant Gertrudes M. Yoyongco is the widow of Antonio Yoyongco,
an employee of the National Irrigation Administration assigned as instrument
man at the Upper Pampanga River Project.  Upon the death of her husband on April 27, 1971, she ap­proached the
appellant, a hearing officer of the Workmen’s Compensation Unit at Cabanatuan City,
to inquire about the procedure for filing a claim for death compensation.  Learning the requirements, she prepared the application forms and attach­ments
and filed them with the Workmen’s Compensation Unit at San Fernando, Pampanga.  (pp. 2-13, TSN, October 3, 1973).

“After a few days, the complainant went back to San
Fernando to verify the status of her claim.  She was informed that the death certificate
of her husband, their marriage contract and the birth certificates of their
children were needed.  She secured these documents and brought them to San
Fernando.  She
was told that her claim papers had been forwarded to Cabanatuan City,
particularly to the appellant, for consolidation of the require­ments.  So she went to see the appellant.  (pp. 13-18, TSN, October 3, 1973).

“When she saw the
appellant, the complainant was told that she had to pay P100.00 so that
her claim would be acted
upon.  The complainant told the appellant
that she had no money then, but if the
appellant would process her claim
she would give her the
P100.00 upon its approval.  The appellant
was adamant.  She would not agree to the
complainant’s pro­posal.  According to
her, on previous occasions certain claimants made similar promises but they
failed to live up to them.  (pp. 18-24,
TSN, October 3, 1973).

“The complainant went to her brother-in-law, Col. Yoyongco, erstwhile chief of the Criminal Investigation Service, Philippine Constabulary, to
inform him of the demand of the appellant. 
Col. Yoyongco gave the complainant two 50-peso
bills (Exhibits B and B-1) and instructed her to go to Col. David Laureaga, Provincial Commander of Nueva
Ecija, for help. 
(pp. 24­-25, TSN, October 3,
1973).

“After listening to the com­plainant, Col. Laureaga
instructed Lt. Carlito Carlos to entrap the
appellant.  The two 50-peso bills were
marked with the notations ‘CC-NE-1’ and ‘CC-NE-2’, photographed and dusted with
ultra-violet powder.  With this preparation,
Lt. Carlos, Sgt. Beleno, CIC Balcos
and the complainant proceeded to the office of the appellant.  When they arrived thereat, the appellant was
talking with three persons who had a hearing
before her.  They allowed the three persons to finish their business
with the appellant.  After the group had
left, the complainant and CIC Balcos who pretended to
be the complainant’s nephew approached the appellant.  Lt. Carlos and Sgt. Beleno
stationed themselves outside the room and observed events through a glass
window.  Aside from the appellant, the
complainant and CIC Balcos, there were three other
persons inside the office.  These were
Atty. Herminio Garcia, Renato
de Lara and Gregorio Ocampo.  The complainant again requested the appellant
to process her claim.  The appellant
countered by asking her if she already had the P100.00.  In answer, the complainant brought out the
two 50-peso bills from her bag and
handed them to the appellant.  As the
appellant took hold of the money, CIC Balcos grabbed
her hand and told her she was under arrest. 
Whereupon, Lt. Carlos and Sgt. Beleno
immediately entered the room and helped
in the arrest of the appellant.  (pp. 3-12, TSN, November 6, 1973).

“The appellant has brought to the PC headquarters where her
hands were examined with a special light for the presence of ultraviolet
powder.  The examination was witnessed by
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Talavera.  The result was positive.  (pp. 12-13, TSN, November 6, 1973).”

On the other hand, the
petitioner presented her own version of the facts:

“On her part, the
appellant testified that there was indeed an offer of P100.00 by the
complainant.  She declined the offer and
never touched the bills when they were laid on her table.  If she was found positive for ultra-violet
powder, it was because CIC Balcos rubbed the bills on
her hand and dress.  He did it four times
— once at her office, once at the Milky way Restaurant and twice at the PC
Headquarters.  (Decision, Court of
Appeals, Annex “A”, p. 5)

“When the complainant
went to the office of the appellant in Cabanatuan
City, she demanded the release of the decision of her case, but appellant told
her that she cannot do so for the reason that she is only a hearing officer to
receive evidence about the claim for
compensation due to the death of her husband, and the real office to decide the
case is that Workmen’s Compensation Branch in San Fernando, Pampanga.  The complainant went to her brother-in-law,
Col. Yoyongco, Chief of the Criminal Investigation
Service, Philippine Constabulary, Cabanatuan City to inform him of the demand of the appellant
for P100.00. Col. Yoyongco gave com­plainant two fifty (P50.00) peso bills.  After listening to the
complainant, Col. Laureaga instructed Lt. Carlito Carlos to entrap appellant by the use of fifty
(P50.00) peso bills which were marked with the notation ‘CC-NE-1’ and
‘CC-NE-2’, photographed and dusted with ultra violent powder, the two
fifty-peso bills.  After this preparation
Lt. Carlos, Sgt. Beleno and the complainant proceeded to the office of the complainant.  When they arrived in the place the
complainant was talking to the 3 persons who had then a hearing before
her.  After the appellant finished the
hearing the complainant and the CIC Balgos who
pretended to be the complainant’s nephew approached the appellant.  Then the complainant again
requested the appellant to process her claim by this time the complainant took
the 2 fifty-peso bills from her bag and gave to the appellant but the appellant
pushed the money, and CIC Balgos grabbed her hand and
told her appellant was under arrest.  The
appellant was brought to the headquarters where her hands were examined with
special light for the presence of ultra-violet powder.  The examination was
witnessed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cabanatuan
City and the result was positive.  (TSN,
pp. 12-13, November 6, 1973)

On the other hand, Renato de Lara, a
witness for the appellant testified that he was in the office of the appellant
at the time the incident took place and he saw the amount of P100.00 being
offered by the complainant to the appellant but the latter refused to accept
the money.  When appellant refused, CIC Balgos took it, rubbed it on the hand of the appellant and
announced that he was arresting her.

“Appellant further testify (sic) that
complainant offered P100.00 to her to expedite the preparation of the decision
of her claim and said complainant put two fifty
peso bills in her table after which she was arrested and investigated and a
complaint was filed against her for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.”

After trial, the lower
court convicted the peti­tioner as charged. 
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Atty. Aquilina R. Araneta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information and hereby sentences
her to suffer imprisonment for ONE (1) YEAR, with perpetual disqualification
from public office, and to pay the costs. 
The P100.00 consisting of two fifty-peso
bills which were marked as Exhibits ‘B’ and ‘B-1’ are hereby ordered returned
to Mrs. Gertrudes Yoyongco
who owns them.”

As indicated earlier, the
respondent appellate court modified the decision of the lower court and
convicted the petitioner instead of the crime of bribery under the second
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.

The petitioner now
assigns the following errors:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER ON THE
BASIS OF ENTRAPMENT EVIDENCE DEVISED BY MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY
IN CABANATUAN CITY.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER OF BRIBERY
WHERE SUCH CRIME WAS NOT CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION FILED BY THE FISCAL AGAINST THE PETITIONER.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER FOR THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

Relative to the first error, the petitioner submits that the
criminal intent originated in the mind of
the entrapping person and for which reason, no convicted can be
conviction had against her.

This argument has no
merit.

The petitioner confuses
entrapment with insti­gation.  We agree
with the submission of the Solicitor General that:

xxx                xxx                   xxx

“x x x
There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the
apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime.  There is instigation when the accused was
induced to commit the crime (People v. Galicia,
[CA], 40 OG 4476). 
The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the
criminal intent.  In entrapment, the mens rea originates
from the mind of the criminal.  The idea
and the resolve to commit the crime comes from
him.  In instigation, the law officer
conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.

“The legal effects of entrapment and instigation are also
different.  As already stated, entrapment
does not exempt the criminal from liability. 
Instigation does.”

Even more emphatic on
this point is People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng
(56 Phil. 44) where this Court ruled
that the mere fact that the Chief of Customs Secret Service pretended to agree
to a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the customs house, in
order to assure the seizure of the said
opium and the arrest of its
importers is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the latter.  In that case, this Court quoted with approval
16 Corpus Juris, p. 88, Sec. 57, which states that:

“ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION.? While it has been said that the
practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting
criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as
distinguished, from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes
been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to
the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely
placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the ‘decoy solicitation’
of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its
commission.  Especially is this true in that class of cases’ where the
offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. 
Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the
offense was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the
detective.  x x
x“

Anent the second
assignment of error, the petitioner argues that she was denied due process of
law because she was not charged with bribery in the information but for a crime
falling under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Again, this argument is
erroneous.  The contention of the
petitioner was squarely answered in United States v. Panlilio (28 Phil. 608) where this Court held that
the fact that the information in its preamble charged a violation of Act No.
1760 does not prevent us from finding the accused guilty of a violation of an
article of the Penal Code.  To the same
effect is our ruling in United States v. Guzman
(25 Phil. 22) where the
appellant was convicted of the crime of estafa in the lower court, but on appeal, he was instead con­victed of the crime
of embezzlement of public funds as defined and penalized by Act No. 1740.

As long as the
information clearly recites all the elements of the crime of bribery and the
facts proved during the trial show is having been committed beyond reasonable
doubt, an error in the designation of the crime’s name is not a denial of due
process.

In United States v. Paua (6 Phil. 740), this Court held that:

“The foregoing facts, duly established as they were by the
testimony of credible witnesses who heard and saw everything that occurred,
show beyond peradventure of doubt that the crime of attempted bribery, as
defined in article 387, in connection with article 383 of the Penal Code, has been committed, it being
immaterial whether it is alleged in the complaint that section 315 of Act No.
355 of the Philippine Commission
was violated by the defendant, as the
same recites facts and circumstances sufficient to constitute the crime of
bribery at defined and punished in the aforesaid articles of the Penal
Code.”

Our review of this
decision shows that the crime for which the petitioner was convicted has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.  The decision of the
respondent court is AFFIRMED without costs.

Considering however, that
this case has been pending since 1971, that the amount involved is only P100.00
and that the defendant-appellant is a mother of four, it is recommended that
the petitioner either be granted executive clemency or be given the privilege
of probation if she is qualified.

Let a copy of this decision
be furnished the Ministry of Justice for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.

Feria, (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay, and Paras, JJ., concur.