JOHN THOMAS GONZALES, PETITIONER, VS. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), PRESIDING ADJUDICATOR IBRA D. OMAR, AL-HAJ REGION IV-B (MIMAROPA), DEPARTMENT OF …

Gonzales versus Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by John Thomas Gonzales against the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, its Presiding Adjudicator Ibra D. Omar, Al-Haj for Region Four-B, and the Land Bank of the Philippines. Gonzales asks the Supreme Court to annul three orders of the Board's adjudicator: the order denying his motion to intervene, the order denying his motion for reconsideration, and the order granting the Land Bank's motion for a writ of execution. The case matters because it fixes the limits of the right to intervene before a quasi-judicial body, and because it teaches when certiorari will lie against the denial of that right.

Procedural History

Before the adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, the Land Bank of the Philippines moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to recover a bloc of Meralco shares. Gonzales moved to intervene, and the adjudicator denied the motion on January 31, 2013. His motion for reconsideration was denied on March 19, 2013. On April 1, 2013, the adjudicator granted the Land Bank's motion for execution, reiterating the denial of intervention and observing that Gonzales's claim could be pursued in the regular courts, where he in fact had a pending case in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio. Gonzales then went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the adjudicator.

Facts

Gonzales owned two million Meralco shares, which he purchased by way of cross-trade at the Philippine Stock Exchange on December 15, 2008. Those shares stood in the books of Meralco in the name of Josefina S. Lubrica. They formed part of a bloc of Meralco shares originally owned by the Land Bank of the Philippines but acquired by Lubrica at a sheriff's execution sale.

On November 21, 2012, the Land Bank filed a motion for a writ of execution before the adjudicator, seeking to recover the bloc of shares standing in Lubrica's name. Part of that bloc, however, were the two million shares Gonzales had bought through the exchange.

On December 11, 2012, Gonzales moved to intervene, insisting that a sweeping execution would severely prejudice him as a holder for value and in good faith who had bought readily tradable shares through his broker. He claimed to be a complete stranger to the case between the Land Bank and Lubrica. The adjudicator denied intervention, denied reconsideration, and then ordered execution, prompting this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the adjudicator, acting for the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Gonzales's motion to intervene.
• Whether or not intervention may be allowed after the judgment in the principal case has become final and executory.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule Nine of the DARAB Rules provides:

Section 3. Intervention. The filing of a motion for intervention shall be discouraged. Such motion shall be entertained only upon a clear showing by the would-be intervenor that he has a substantial right or interest in the case that cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding.

This is the rule the adjudicator applied, and its two requisites decide the case.

Section 2 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, as discussed in the decision, governs intervention in ordinary proceedings and does not permit it after judgment has become final.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that no grave abuse of discretion attended the denial. For intervention to be entertained, two requisites must concur: the would-be intervenor must show a substantial right or interest in the case, and that this interest cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding. The absence of even one requisite warrants denial. Assuming Gonzales's interest would be prejudiced by execution, he failed to show that it could not be protected elsewhere. He had filed a case for specific performance with damages and injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio touching the same subject matter. Although that case was dismissed without prejudice, it showed that a forum was available where he could ventilate his cause of action. The right to intervene is not absolute; the statutory conditions must be shown.

On the second issue, the Court held that intervention could no longer be allowed because the decision in the principal case had long become final and executory. The Court quoted its own ruling with approval:

Certainly, intervention can no longer be allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment. Intervention is merely collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal action, and not an independent proceeding; it is an interlocutory proceeding dependent on or subsidiary to the case between the original parties. Where the main action ceases to exist, there is no pending proceeding wherein the intervention may be based.

The Court added that the discretion to allow intervention, once exercised, cannot be reviewed by certiorari nor controlled by mandamus, save where the discretion has been exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Here the denial was well supported by facts and law.

Doctrine

First, under Section 3 of Rule Nine of the DARAB Rules, intervention requires a clear showing of a substantial right or interest that cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding; both requisites must concur, and the absence of one defeats the motion. Second, intervention is merely collateral, accessory, or ancillary to the principal action, so it cannot be allowed once the judgment in that action has become final and executory. Third, the denial of a motion to intervene is an exercise of discretion that certiorari will not disturb absent grave abuse of discretion, meaning an arbitrary or capricious exercise of that discretion.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari was denied, and the three assailed orders of the adjudicator were affirmed.

Remember This

Memorize this line: intervention is merely collateral or accessory to the principal action, so it dies when the main case ends in final judgment. Examiners use this case to test the two requisites of intervention under the DARAB Rules and the narrow scope of certiorari over discretionary denials of intervention.