IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF ANDRES SINGSON TO BE ADMITTED OR TO BE DECLARED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, ANDRES SINGSON, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPI…

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of La Union
dated July 15, 1963 setting
aside and declaring null and void its previous decision declaring petitioner a
citizen of the Philippines
in Naturalization Case No. 30.

Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization on October 12, 1959, with an
alternative prayer that he permitted to present evidence of his Philippine
citizenship and declared a Filipino citizen accordingly.  After due publication and hearing, there
being no opposition from either the office of the Solicitor General or the
Provincial Fiscal, the lower court received the evidence for the
petitioner.  On August 9, 1960 it
rendered its decision holding that inasmuch as petitioner was already a
Filipino citizen as borne out by the evidence presented, there was no need to
give due course to his petition for naturalization since it would serve no
useful purpose for him.  Accordingly, the
lower court granted petitioner’s alternative prayer and declared him a citizen
of the Philippines.

The above-mentioned conclusion was arrived at after the lower
court found that:

“From the evidence adduced, it appears that the petitioner has
from the time he became of the age of discretion been considering himself a
Filipino citizen as shown in his residence certificates, stating therein his
citizenship as a Filipino.  He did not
register himself as an alien in the Bureau of Immigration.  When he reached the age of majority, he
started exercising the right of suffrage and in 1941 made his declaration of
intention to elect Filipino citizenship. 
He explained that if he filed this petition he only did so because he
wanted to secure a categorical declaration about his citizenship in order to
avoid further molestations by some agencies or persons, who according to him,
constantly pestered him about his status.

“The evidence further conclusively shows that said petitioner
was born in the Philippines
with a Filipino mother and a Chinese father who were not legally married during
their cohabitation up to the time of their death.  These are not contradicted by any evidence
presented in this case, because as a matter of fact no opposition whatsoever
has been registered by the government through either the office of the
Solicitor General or the office of the Provincial Fiscal of La Union.  In the case of Leon Retunil
Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic of
the Philippines
(49 O.G. 492, February 1953), the Supreme Court ruled:

‘When the evidence in applicant’s possession proves in his opinion
that he has already the status of a Filipino citizen as would make it
unnecessary to press further his petition for naturalization, he may be
declared a Filipino citizen in the same proceedings.  There is nothing in the law which would prohibit
this alternative procedure.  This course
has been followed in a number of cases (Palanca vs.
Republic, L-301, April 7, 1948; Santos Go vs. Government, 52 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952).'”

The State did not appeal from the aforequoted
decision.  However, after the lapse of
more than two years, or on December
17, 1962, the Solicitor General filed a petition to set aside the
decision and to declare the same null and void on the following grounds:

“(a)  At the time of the hearing of his petition,
the herein petitioner had not always deported himself to be a Filipino citizen
and in fact he had registered himself with the Bureau of Immigration as a
Chinese and was thereby issued on August 29, 1950, his Alien Certificate of
Registration No. A-105940 at San Fernando,
La Union; and

“(b)  That whatever rights petitioner has to
Philippine citizenship by virtue of his alleged ‘illegitimate birth’ of a
Filipino mother, granting the same to be true, he had already forfeited when he
expressly renounced his rights and privileges as a Filipino citizen, as
contained in his affidavit executed on October 19, 1948 and wherein he
expressly considered himself to be a citizen of China.”

Petitioner opposed, and the Solicitor General replied co the
opposition.  After petitioner’s
counter-reply the case was set for hearing. 
At the hearing the parties did not present evidence but submitted a
“stipulation of facts”, which was actually nothing more than an
enumeration of the pleadings submitted and the proceedings which transpired in
relation to this case.  Paragraph 7
thereof particularly raised as a legal issue the proposition that “the
Government cannot reopen this case or attack the decision collaterally in this
same proceeding inasmuch as the decision rendered herein did not confer
Philippine citizenship upon petitioner, but merely confirmed his Philippine
citizenship, x x x“

On July 15, 1963
the lower court issued an order declaring the decision rendered on August 9, 1960, which found petitioner
to be a Filipino citizen, void and of no force and effect.  This order is based principally on an
affidavit (Annex “A”) dated October
19, 1948, allegedly executed by petitioner.  In said affidavit petitioner appears to have
expressly renounced all his rights and privileges as a Filipino citizen in the
event that he should be considered as such by virtue of his having been born
out of wedlock of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother.

The question before us is whether or not the lower court erred in
setting aside its previous order declaring petitioner a citizen of the Philippines.  Appellant contends that inasmuch as the
original decision did not confer Philip­pine citizenship upon him but
merely confirmed such citizenship, the doctrine of res
judicata and laches
prevents the Government from attacking collaterally the questioned decision
more than two (2) years after its rendition. 
On the other hand, appellee argues
that although the petition for naturalization granted petitioner’s alternative
prayer that he be declared a citizen, that fact alone did not operate to
convert the case into a petition for declaratory relief nor did the judgment
place appellant beyond the reach of legal remedies available under the
Naturalization Law.

The order declaring petitioner a citizen in the naturalization
proceeding was obviously predicated on two (2) grounds, namely:  (1) that the evidence presented by him in
support of his claim that he is a Filipino citizen is true and reliable; and
(2) that the court a quo believed at the time it rendered its
decision (August 9, 1960) that it could properly declare petitioner a citizen
in the same proceeding should the evidence presented so warrant, apparently
relying on the ruling in Sy Quimsuan
vs. Republic (92 Phil. 675), which was favorably cited in a later case (Sen et al. vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955), as follows:

“We find no error on the part of the lower court in allowing
(petitioner) to present proof regarding his Philippine citizenship in
(naturalization) proceedings when, in his opinion, the evidence in his possession
proves that he has already that status as would make it unnecessary to press
further his petition for naturalization. 
There is nothing in the law which would prohibit this alternative
procedure.  In fact, this course has been
followed in a number of cases wherein the very evidence presented to
substantiate the petition for naturalization rendered the latter unnecessary
and the court proceeded to dismiss the case after pronouncement that
petitioner is already a Philippine citizen. 
Such a pronouncement a inevitable if we have to
sanction the petition for dismissal and it is unfair and unjust to quash the
proceedings if the claim for Philippine citizenship is not substantiated.”

At the time the lower court rendered its decision of August 9, 1960, declaring petitioner a
citizen of the Philippines,
the ruling in the Sy Quimsuan
and Sen cases was no longer
controlling.  The lower court thus
premised that decision on jurisprudence which had already been modified,
particularly by the case of Suy Chan vs. Republic (G.
R. No. 14159, April 18, 1960), which held:

“1.  Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding
for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual.  Courts of justice exist for the settlement of
justiciable controversies, which imply a given right,
legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative
of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of
right.  As an incident only of the
adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass
upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status.  Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond
judicial power.  x x
x At times, the law permits the acquisition of a
given status, such as naturalization, by judicial decree.  But, there is no similar legislation
authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given
person is part of our citizenry.”

The above ruling was reiterated in the case of Yu Chin vs.
Republic (G. R. No. L-15775, April 29,
1961), where this Court declared:

“The above holding, being the correct exposition and
interpretation of the law involved, overrules our holdings in Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic, G. R. No. L- 6868, April 30, 1955, and other previous
cases, to the effect that the court can make a declaration that an applicant
for naturalization is a Filipino citizen in the same naturalization proceedings
if the evidence so warrants.” The Suy Chan
ruling was also quoted with approval in Santiago
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-14653, January 31, 1963)

It would seem therefore that the decision of August 9 was the
result of an erroneous appreciation of the applicable jurisprudence at the
time.  Even so, however, the error did
not necessarily render the decision void, and the same would acquire force and
effect unless reversed on appeal or set aside on other recognized grounds, such
as fraud in its procurement.

One such ground is that relied upon by the Solicitor General
here, namely, the fact that in 1948 petitioner executed an affidavit which
reads as follows:

“That I am duly registered under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 162732-V, issued at San Fernando,
La Union on May 30, 1947;

“That in the year 1927, I was admitted or landed here in the Philippines
and was issued LCR No. 76410-45575 issued at Manila
on December 16, 1927;

“That even if I was admitted as a son of P.I. citizen, I have
always exercised my rights as a citizen or subject of China for the reason that
I was already at the age of majority when I first arrived in this country and
that I have always registered under the Immigration Act of 1940;

“That if I am considered as a Filipino citizen as shown in my
LRC Co., I hereby renounce all right and privileges accorded to a Filipino
Citizen and therefore consider myself now as a citizen or subject of
China.”

The contents of the aforesaid affidavit were not revealed by appellee in his petition and his failure to do so led the
court to declare him a citizen.  If appellee had really executed the said affidavit there can
be no doubt that the court a quo correctly set aside its previous
decision.  But appellee
has raised the genuineness and due execution of the affidavit as an issue, and
in fact denied the same, as well as the truth of its contents, in his
opposition to the Solicitor General’s principal motion below.

The stipulation of facts, upon which the parties agreed to submit
the case for resolution, does not show any admission by appellee
of the genuineness and due execution of the affidavit in question.  All that was stipulated on in this respect is
that when the Solicitor General filed his petition to set aside the decision of
August 9, the affidavit was attached thereto as an annex.  When the court a quo set aside
its original decision without affording appellee a
chance to present evidence to rebut the Republic’s allegation of fraudulent
representation by him, it virtually deprived him of his day in court.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, and the
case remanded to the court below for further proceedings in connection with the
motion of the Solicitor General to set aside and annul the decision declaring
petitioner a Filipino citizen.  No
pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Dizon, J., in the result.