FILOMENA SALAS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FLORA QUINGA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This direct appeal was interposed by Flora Quinga
against an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (in its Civil Case No.
1138), dated June 26, 1962, requiring her to restore to Filomena Salas the products of a parcel of land that had
been delivered to her pending appeal against a judgment of the same court in
favor of Quinga but which was later reversed by final
judgment of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 10288-R. The reversal was
subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court in case G. R. No. L-14961.

Originally, the appellee, Filomena. Salas, had filed
in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an action against Flora Quinga, in the latter’s capacity as Administratrix of the estate of Ceferino Datoon. The complaint
averred plaintiff’s ownership of a parcel of land (Lot 7711 of the Pototan Cadastre), covered by T.C.T. No. 11841, allegedly
mortgaged by Salas to the late Datoon (in the form of
a sale a retro) in order to secure n debt to the latter, and sought reconveyance thereof upon payment of the P100.00 balance of
the indebtedness, which plaintiff consigned in court. Defendant pleaded in
answer that Salas had conveyed title to Datoon; that
the latter had been in possession of the land since 1934, as owner, thereof; and
that plaintiff’s possession was that of a mere tenant of defendant administratrix. The latter also counterclaimed for the
landlord’s share of the produce of the lot, at the rate of 20 bultos worth P500.00 per annum. At defendant’s instance a
receiver was appointed by the court.

After trial, the Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint, and ordered
the plaintiff and/or the receiver to deliver possession to the defendant Quinga. It also sentenced Filomena
Salas to pay damages at the rate of P400.00 per agricultural year until that of
1948-1949; P300.00 for the ensuing, year 1949-1950; and P240.00 for the year
after that. Salas appealed the judgment, but upon motion the defendant Quinga, in 1951, obtained execution pending appeal (Rec.
App., p. 45), and the land was turned over to her.

In 1958, the Court of Appeals, as noted at the start of this opinion,
reversed the judgment of the Court of First Instance of lloilo, and ordered Flora Quinga
to execute a deed of reconveyance of the disputed lot
to plaintiff Filomena Salas, upon withdrawal of the
P100 previously consigned in court by the latter; and declared that—

“immediately after the execution of said deed, it is
the duty of the appellee and/or receiver to turn over
the material possession of the lot in question to the plaintiff appellant, to
whom shall also be delivered all the funds which the receiver may have in his
hands less his compensation.”

Quinga resorted to the Supreme Court, but in 1961
the latter affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The decision became
final, and the records were remanded to the court of origin. The corresponding
writ of execution having been issued at the behest of Salas, the Sheriff
delivered possession of the lot to the prevailing Party; and after various
incidents and pleadings Flora Quinga finally executed
the deed of reconveyance, as ordered, in favor of
Salas on March 24, 1962.
However, Quinga resisted the order to turn over the
products of the land, claiming that the decision of the Court of Appals had made no mention thereof. The Court of First
Instance, on June 26, 1962,
overruled her objections, and on July
17, 1962 denied her motion to reconsider. Thereupon, Flora Quinga appealed once more to the Supreme Court, reiterating
her arguments in the court below.

We find no merit in the appeal.

The appellant Quinga having obtained in 1951 a writ
of execution pending appeal, and thus taken possession of the land in dispute,
she thereby replaced the receiver for all legal purposes in the collection of
its produce. In equity and justice, therefore, the decree of the Court of
Appeals to deliver to the winning party (appellee
Filomena Salas) the material possession of the land as
well as “all the funds which the receiver may have in his hands” applies to her
(Quinga) as well, as if she were the receiver
proper.

The Court of Appeals had no need of specifying in the judgment of reversal
that there should be restitution of the land and of its products. Such
restoration is expressly provided for in Rule 39, section 5, of the Rules of
Court:

“Sec. 5. Effect of reversal of executed
judgment.—Where the judgment executed is reversed
totally or partially on appeal, the trial court, on motion, after the case is
remanded to it, may issue such orders of restitution as equity and justice may
warrant under the circumstances.”

and the rule should apply in the absence of any
contrary disposition in the final judgment of the appellate courts.

Under the aforesaid judgment, appellant Quinga
should have reconveyed the land to appellee Salas as soon as the latter tendered the balance of
the indebtedness. Had Quinga done so, Salas would have
remained in possession; she would not have been turned out in 1951, is she was,
by the premature execution; and she would have received the crops of the land
thereafter. It is but just, therefore, that Quinga
should be required to account for the products that she was able to receive in
the place of appellee Salas.

It is no defense that, prior to the finality of the
judgment of the appellate court, the land and its products had been already
distributed among the heirs of the late Ceferino Datoon. His administratrix,
appellant herein, personally knew of the claim of appellee Salas; she also knew, and was bound to know, that
the judgment of the Court of First Instance dismissing the complaint had been
appealed, and could be reversed. It was, therefore, incumbent upon her to
reserve the land and its products from distribution among the heirs of Datoon until final judgment was rendered, and she is
personally answerable for her failure to do so, apart from the obligation of the
heirs themselves not to profit from what is not theirs.

WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are affirmed, and the records
ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings consonant with
this decision. Costs against appellant Flora Quinga.

Bengzon, C. J., Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J. P. and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.