PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. RICARDO FELICIANO, RESPONDENT.

Pangasinan Transportation versus Feliciano

The Case

This is a petition brought by the Pangasinan Transportation Company, Incorporated against Ricardo Feliciano, a textile merchant who sought and obtained authority to run motor vehicles for hire. The action asks the Supreme Court to review and revoke a decision of the Public Service Commission granting Feliciano a certificate of public convenience to operate four auto-trucks for passengers and freight on the line from Moncada to Tarlac via Gerona and back. The case matters because it fixes the standard of review in public service cases: the findings of fact of the Commission, after weighing conflicting evidence, are binding on the Supreme Court and will not be disturbed unless they appear not to be reasonably supported by evidence. It is a compact lesson on the deference owed to the administrative body that hears the witnesses and weighs the proof.

Procedural History

On the tenth of March, 1958, Ricardo Feliciano applied to the Public Service Commission for a certificate of public convenience to operate seven units on the Moncada to Tarlac line via Gerona. Jose M. Villarama, the Pangasinan Transportation Company, and the Estate of Florencio Buan each filed objections. At the hearing, only the Pangasinan Transportation Company introduced evidence in support of its objection, and the Estate of Florencio Buan adopted that evidence as its own, while Jose M. Villarama did not appear. After hearing, the Public Service Commission rendered a decision granting the certificate, but for four units only. The Pangasinan Transportation Company then filed this petition with the Supreme Court to review and revoke that decision, assigning three errors. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Padilla, affirmed the decision of the Commission.

Facts

Ricardo Feliciano was a textile merchant who travelled to different towns on fixed days of the week: Tarlac on Sundays, Gerona on Tuesdays, Moncada on Thursdays and Saturdays, and Paniqui on Mondays, Fridays, and sometimes Wednesdays. He had been travelling since 1952, and in the course of his travels he occasionally used the buses of the Pangasinan Transportation Company and sometimes the pick-ups of Policarpio Gutierrez. He applied to the Public Service Commission for authority to operate seven units on the Moncada to Tarlac line via Gerona.

The Pangasinan Transportation Company opposed, claiming that its service, together with that of the other operators, was more than satisfactory; that granting the application would result in ruinous competition; and that as a pre-war and present operator with fully rehabilitated units it was entitled to protection. It presented evidence that many pick-ups and buses operated along the proposed line, that these vehicles were usually only half full, that a passenger waited at most about fifteen minutes for a bus or pick-up, and that the applicant had paid only a total of 454 pesos and 9 centavos in percentage taxes from January 1957 to March 1958, which it said showed his units were not full every day.

Against this, the applicant and his witnesses testified that the buses of the Pangasinan Transportation Company were invariably full and mostly express trips, that the buses of the Philippine Rabbit and the Binalonan Liner came from the north and were likewise mostly express, and that they seldom picked up passengers along the way, especially those carrying cargo or baggage for short distances. A textile vendor testified that before a passenger could get a ride in Paniqui he had to wait for two hours, and that the pick-ups operating were usually full of passengers. Weighing this conflicting evidence, the Commission found that public convenience would be promoted by granting the certificate for four units, and it granted the same under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended.

Issues

• Whether or not the Public Service Commission erred in not holding that, the application being merely one for an increase of the respondent's trips on a line where he was already operating, his percentage tax payment did not warrant the proposed increase.
• Whether or not the Public Service Commission erred in granting the respondent a certificate of public convenience notwithstanding the insufficiency of the evidence to reasonably support the grant.
• Whether or not the Public Service Commission erred in not holding that the approval of the application would cause ruinous competition among the petitioner, the respondent, and the other present operators on the line, to the detriment of public necessity and convenience.

Applicable Provisions

Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended, is the provision under which the Commission granted the certificate, and the decision invokes it in these words:

In pursuance to the provisions of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended, the certificate of public convenience herein applied for is granted to the applicant.

The grant thus rests on the statutory authority of the Commission to issue certificates of public convenience upon a finding that public convenience is promoted, and the case turns on whether that finding is supported by evidence.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court did not disturb the Commission's treatment of the percentage tax payment, because the Commission had weighed that evidence together with the testimony of the applicant's witnesses and the other proof, and its conclusion rested on the whole record rather than on the tax payment alone.

On the second issue, the Court held that the findings and conclusions of fact of the Public Service Commission, after weighing the conflicting evidence adduced by the parties in public service cases, are binding on the Supreme Court and will not be disturbed unless they appear not to be reasonably supported by evidence. The Court stated the rule in these words:

It is a settled rule that the findings and conclusions of fact by the Public Service Commission after weighing the conflicting evidence adduced by the parties in public service cases are binding on the Supreme Court and will not be disturbed unless they appear not to be reasonably supported by evidence.

On the third issue, the Court applied its earlier ruling in Raymundo Transportation Company versus Cervo, quoting it with approval:

Whether public necessity and convenience warrant the putting up of additional service on the part of the appellee, is a question of fact which the Public Service Commission has found in the affirmative. This finding, being supported by sufficient evidence, should not be disturbed.

Because the Commission's finding that public convenience would be promoted by the grant was supported by sufficient evidence, the claim of ruinous competition did not prevail, and the decision appealed from was affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

Doctrine

First, the findings and conclusions of fact of the Public Service Commission, after it has weighed conflicting evidence in a public service case, are binding on the Supreme Court and will not be disturbed unless they appear not to be reasonably supported by evidence. Second, whether public necessity and convenience warrant the putting up of additional service is a question of fact for the Commission, and its affirmative finding, when supported by sufficient evidence, must be respected. These rules are tied to Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended, under which the certificate is granted upon a finding that public convenience is promoted; the Court reviews whether that finding has evidentiary support, not whether it would have reached the same conclusion. A bar answer should state the rule as one of deference: the Court does not substitute its judgment on questions of fact for that of the Commission.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Public Service Commission granting Ricardo Feliciano the certificate of public convenience for four units, with costs against the Pangasinan Transportation Company.

Remember This

The line to memorize is that the findings of fact of the Public Service Commission, after weighing conflicting evidence, are binding on the Supreme Court and will not be disturbed unless not reasonably supported by evidence. Examiners use this case to test the standard of review of administrative findings of fact and the treatment of ruinous competition as a question of fact for the Commission.