SOLEDAD PLAN AS SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIR, ESTER A. MACADANGDANG AND FURTHER SUBSTITUTED BY THE LATTER’S HEIRS, NAMELY: CONCEPCION A. MACADANGDANG-JAVIER, OSWALDO A. MACADANGDANG,…
DICDICAN, J.:
“WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of the evidence presented by plaintiff as to the identity and her ownership of the property described in the amended complaint, the instant case is ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED.“[3]
As culled from the records, the antecedent facts are as follows:
In 1984, Soledad Plan filed a Complaint[4] against appellees Mayvelin Cabulagan and Sofronia Cabulagan in the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos, Norte. In the complaint, Soledad Plan claimed that, sometime in 1976, the appellees took possession of a land owned by her father named Ambrosio Plan, thus, she eventually demanded for appellees to vacate the said land and return the fruits thereof but they refused to do so. Soledad Plan thus prayed before the trial court for the recovery of the possession of the land and for payment of damages. She likewise prayed that she be declared the owner of the said land, described as follows:
“A parcel of land xxx xxx located at Nagtirigoan, Pinili, Ilocos Norte, with an xxx xxx area of 87,009 square meters, more or less, bounded on the North by Apolinario Cabulagan, on the East by Bernabe Aganus; on the South by Ignacio Echeverri; and on the West by Geronimo Rallang assessed at P7200. This parcel of land is designated at Lots Nos. 9715 and 9716 of the Pinili Cadastre and not covered by any certificate of title.”
Appellees Mayvelin Cabulagan[5] and Sofronia Cabulagan[6] filed their separate Answers, alleging that they did not know Soledad and Ambrosio Plan or the land in suit. Mayvelin Cabulagan further stated that, since 1945, she had been the absolute and exclusive owner of parcels of land located in the same barangay as that where the land that appellants were referring to be owned by them. However, her land had different boundaries and areas as compared to appellants’ land.
After the issues had been joined, the case was set for pre-trial. Pre-trial[7] was terminated on July 25, 1985 and trial ensued with Soledad Plan and Anastacio Dumlao testifying in court. On November 28, 1988, the appellees filed their demurrer to evidence which was denied[8] by the trial court on December 5, 1988. Thus, appellees presented their witnesses Simeona Oallares and Sofronia Cabulagan. Meanwhile, Soledad Plan died and was substituted by her heir, Ester Macadangdang.
Considering appellees’ allegations of lack of knowledge of the land in suit, ocular inspections were made. The first inspection was conducted by court-appointed Commissioners Florentino Dumlao, Simeona Oallares and Deputy Sheriff Antonio Pacupac who submitted their Commissioner’s Report[9] on June 6, 1985. A second inspection was conducted by court-appointed Commissioners Ester Macadangdang, Simeona Oallares and Deputy Sheriff Mangapit who submitted their Commissioner’s Report[10], dated July 1, 1986. On September 26, 1990, the parties again agreed for the constitution of another set of commissioners[11].
On January 23, 1991, the case was archived[12] because the appellants intended to institute a registration proceeding involving the land in dispute. The case was subsequently retrieved from the archives and Ester Macadangdang filed her First Amended Complaint[13], dated October 8, 1992, impleading additional persons who had allegedly entered the land in question, which was then described more definitely as follows:
“A tract of rural land located in Brgy. Nagtrigoan, Pinili, Ilocos Norte, with a total area of 169,073 sq. m., more or less, bounded on the North by Apolonio Cabulagan; on the East by Bernabe Aganus; on the South by Ignacio Echeverri; and on the West by Geronimo Rallang and is assessed at P7,200.00 under Tax Dec. No. 627109-A in the name of plaintiff. The greater Southwestern portion of this parcel of land was issued Decree No. 3086 in favor of Ambrosio Plan with Geronimo Rallang on December 26, 1908.”
The additional defendants were named as: Cresencio Lumbo, Jasmin Lumbo, Tomas Lumbo, Apolonio Lumbo, Filipino Lumbo, Basilio Lumbo, Romulo Lumbo, Esmeraldo Acosta, Menando Malubay, Emmanuel Barroga, Leona Magno, Jose Lumbo, Jacinto Nalundasan, Feliza Garcia, Maria Nalundasan, Moises Aganus, Glicerio Tungpalan, Benjamin Nalundasan, Teodoro Daduyo, Menando Malubay, Estanislao Acosta, Rodolfo Dumlao, Elpio Dumlao, Fernandico Dumlao, Estelita Barroga, Esmenio Barroga, Vidal Lumbo, Cornelio Elmadao, Rufino Lumbo, Mercedes Magdirila and Titi Abriol.
Summonses were served on the aforementioned defendants who later filed their respective Answers. As some of them had already reportedly died, the trial court ordered the substitution of those deceased defendants by their respective heirs. Appellees likewise filed their Answer[14] to the First Amended Complaint. Meanwhile, intervenors-appellees Perfecto Lumbo, Mildred Lumbo, Moises Aganus, Reynaldo Gajelonia and Anita Gajelonia filed their separate Motions for Intervention and Answers in Interventions.
On October 6, 1997, appellants submitted a survey plan[15] and a list of occupants of the property that they are claiming. In an Order[16] dated January 23, 1998, the case was dismissed by the trial court because of the substantial difference between the property claimed, which is 169,073 square meters, and the property shown in the survey plan, which is 218,041 square meters. Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration[17] of the said Order which was denied by the trial court on February 24, 1998[18]. On appeal, this Court rendered a Decision[19], dated May 9, 2002, setting aside the order of dismissal and remanding the case for further proceedings. In said Decision, this Court observed that a closer look at the original and amended complaints revealed that Ester Macadangdang did not substantially alter her cause of action or change the theory of the case. To require Ester Macadangdang to re-file the case and present anew her evidence would further delay the resolution of the case on the merits, given the circumstance that the case had already dragged on for almost two decades.
Thus, the parties continued to present their evidence before the court a quo. In essence, appellants asserted that Ambrosio Plan gave Alejandro Cabulagan the subject land for tilling in 1910 and, in turn, Alejandro Cabulagan gave the produce of the land to Ambrosio Plan, who eventually died in 1930. Ambrosio Plan had three heirs, namely, Florentina Plan, Jose Plan and Soledad Plan. When Ambrosio Plan died, Florentina Plan took care of the property because Soledad Plan stayed in Quezon City and Jose lived in the United States of America. Jose Plan died without an issue and Florentina Plan ceded her interest in the subject property to Soledad Plan before dying in 1983. Appellants asseverated that Alejandro Cabulagan gave Florentina Plan the produce of the land from the year 1939 until 1977.
Meanwhile, appellees insisted that Sofronia Cabulagan (who was 76 years of age when she testified in court on May 29, 1989) started to accompany her father Alejandro Cabulagan in going to the subject property when she was seven years of age. Alejandro Cabulagan possessed the land and reaped the fruits thereof. Sometime in 1941, Alejandro Cabulagan gave the land to his son, Francisco Cabulagan, as donation propter nuptias. In 1949, the land was declared in the name of Francisco Cabulagan’s daughter, Mayvelin Cabulagan, who continuously paid for the taxes due thereon since then.
As documentary evidence, appellants submitted, among others, a certified true copy of Tax Declaration No. 15058 in the name of Ambrosio Plan, issued on May 13, 1906; an official receipt of payment of realty taxes; Certification issued by the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Ilocos Norte dated August 28, 1991 which stated that Alejandro Cabulagan does not appear to be the declared owner of any real property for taxation purposes; certified true copy of Decree No. 3086 stating that Ambrosio Plan and Geronimo Rallang are the owners of a 76,883 square meter land situated in Sitio Natrigoan, Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte; Certification from the Office of the Assessor of Ilocos Norte dated March 7, 1991 stating that Tax Declaration No. 618299 is the latest assessment/revision of a parcel of land declared in the name of Ambrosio Plan; Certification issued on October 16, 1989 by the Records Management and Archives Office stating that no copy is on file with the said office of a Deed of Donation executed by Alejandro Cabulagan in favor of Francisco Cabulagan and Survey Plans prepared by geodetic engineer Ofelia C. Lacuesta. Appellees and some intervenors, on the other hand, submitted, among others, sketch plans, tax declarations, tax receipts and certificates of non-delinquency issued by the Treasurer of Pinili, Ilocos Norte.
Ester Macadangdang eventually died and was substituted by her heirs, namely: Concepcion Macadangdang Javier, Oswaldo Macadangdang, Enrique Macadangdang, Alfonzo Macadangdang, Carmelita Macadangdang Passe and Maria Hazel Macadangdang.[20]
On August 17, 2012, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and dismissed the case. The trial court noted that the appellees and the intervenors never asked to be declared as the owners of the properties that they are claiming. Upon their uniform allegation of lack of knowledge of the land in suit, they only asked that the case be dismissed. Agreeing with the appellees, the trial court dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence as to the identity and ownership of the property that the appellants were claiming. The trial court ruled that there was a disconnect between the property mentioned in appellants’ complaint and the documents of ownership presented. As there appeared to be no malice or ill-will on the part of appellants in filing the case however, no payment of damages may be claimed by appellees.
Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of the case, appellants now come to this Court via this instant appeal and assign the following errors for our resolution, to wit:
I.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND THAT APPELLANT ALLEGEDLY FAILED TO PROVE WITH PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE THE IDENTITY OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
II.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO RENDER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANT AS THE LEGITIMATE POSSESSOR AND OWNER OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY HER DURING THE TRIAL.
III.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES TO APPELLANT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 2199 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
The pivotal issue, therefore, is whether or not the court a quo erred in dismissing the complaint of appellants instead of rendering judgment in their favor as the legitimate owners and possessors of the subject property.
Appellants contend that the identity of the subject property and appellants’ possession and ownership thereof have been duly established. Appellees, on the other hand, believe that appellants failed to prove the identity of the land they are claiming as the documents presented by them showed different areas and boundaries. Appellees also argue that Alejandro Cabulagan could not have been giving the owner’s share of the harvest to appellants until 1977 because the death certificate of Alejandro Cabulagan shows that he died[21] on November 20, 1961.
After a careful and judicious scrutiny of the whole matter, together with the applicable laws and jurisprudence in the premises, we find the appeal filed in this case to be bereft of merit.
Article 434 of the Civil Code, governing actions to recover ownership of property, states as follows:
“In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim.”
Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that, to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed, and; second, his title thereto.[22]
In regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better right to the property must first fix the identity of the land that he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof.[23]
The assailed decision of the trial court is anchored principally on the failure of the appellant to identify clearly and unmistakably the property in question and partly on the weakness of the evidence presented by appellants as regards their claim of ownership. A portion of the Decision states, thus:
“The identity of the land in suit had become more dubious from the plaintiffs variation of the description of the property. While the original complaint referred to the land in suit as Lot Nos. 9715 and 9716 of the Pinili Cadastre, the aggregate area of which was said to be more or less 87,009 square meters, the first amended complaint expanded the land in suit. It gave the same boundaries but it did not mention the lot number and referred to its area to be more or less 169,073 square meters. It is to be noted in this connection that plaintiff did not even try to present Tax Declaration No. 627109-A which supposedly covered the parcel of land as stated in the first amended complaint. Thus, while plaintiff originally testified that the land in suit is that covered by Tax Declaration No. 618299 which has an area of 6.0025 hectares, she did not clarify and correlate that it is part of the property consisting of 87,009 square meters covered under Lot Nos. 9715 and 9716 as mentioned in the original complaint and the 169,073 square meters claimed in the first amended complaint.”[24]
We find no error in the trial court’s assessment and appreciation of evidence. When the records do not show that the land subject of the action for recovery has been exactly determined, such action cannot prosper.[25] In the midst of appellants’ submission of several documents, they failed to show unity in the description of the location, area and boundaries of the property that they are claiming.
Although it may be argued that, during her testimony on May 29, 1989[26], Sofronia Cabulagan stated that Ester Macadangdang pointed to a property of Mayvelin Cabulgan in a sketch plan, there is still no direct relation given by the appellants that Lot Nos. 9715 and 9716, as mentioned in the original complaint, are the same properties as described in the title that was supposedly awarded in Case No. 1732 (Spanish decision)[27] to Ambrosio Plan. The purported Tax Declaration 627109-A, mentioned in the first amended complaint, was likewise not linked to Case No. 1732 nor submitted in evidence. In fact, the Spanish decision, as translated, even described the property subject thereof as bounded on the north by a river and by the properties of Cleto Gapano and other persons, on the northeast by the properties of Bernabe Aganos and Nemesio Aganos, on the east by the property of Ignacio Echeverri, and on the south by the property of Abrocio Blanco and on the southwest by the properties of Tomas Blanc, Valnetina Barruga and Feliciano Garcia. Indisputably, these boundaries are very different from the boundaries given by appellants in their original complaint and in their first amended complaint, i.e., that their property is bounded on the North by Apolonio Cabulagan; on the East by Bernabe Aganus; on the South by Ignacio Echeverri; and on the West by Geronimo Rallang.
Appellants argue that the appellees failed to dispute the accuracy of survey plans presented as Exhibits “K”[28] and “L”[29] and, thus, the location as well as the metes and bounds of their property are deemed admitted by appellees. The appellees, however, maintain that there is no evidence showing that Exhibits “K” and “L” were based on, or prepared using, Tax Declaration No. 15058, Tax Declaration No. 618299, Tax Declaration No. 627109-A and the description in Case No. 1732. Further, said documents do not mention lot numbers and the appellants did not present the geodetic engineer who conducted the survey as a witness.
It appears that the appellees are correct. Hence, an examination of Exhibits “K” and “L” will show that these documents are not connected to the tax declarations presented or described by appellants or to Case No. 1732. Moreover, Ofelia C. Lacuesta, the geodetic engineer who conducted the survey, was likewise not presented as a witness for the appellants.
Aside from proving the identity of the property, under Article 434 of the Civil Code, the person who claims a better right thereto must also prove his title. This the appellants also failed to do. They did not even present a certified true copy of a title to the property that they are claiming. Appellants merely relied heavily on Case No. 1732 (Spanish decision) which granted a title to Ambrocio Plan and Geronimo Rallang over a property in Natrigoan and on a Certification[30] from the Land Registration Authority (LRA) that as per CLR Record No. 1732, Ilocos Norte, Decree No. 3086 was issued on October 26, 1908. These documents or pieces of evidence however failed to support appellants’ claim of ownership over the property in suit as they failed to prove that the land covered by these documents is the same land described in the complaint.
It bears to stress that, in an action to recover real property, the settled rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title, not on the weakness of the defendant’s title. This requirement is based on two (2) reasons: first, it is possible that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is the true owner of the property in dispute, and second, the burden of proof lies on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of an issue for he who relies upon the existence of a fact should be called upon to prove that fact.[31]
In another note, we likewise observe that appellants merely presented Decree 3086 without any corresponding certificate of title. On January 23, 1991, the case was archived by the court a quo because the appellants intended to institute a registration proceeding involving the land in dispute. When the case was retrieved from the archives, appellants never showed any certificate of title. The Certification from the LRA, dated April 28, 2009, only stated that Decree No. 3086 was issued on October 26, 1908. The LRA neither stated that a certificate of title was actually issued nor mentioned the number of any Original Certificate of Title. The Supreme Court, in Pascua vs. Republic of the Philippines[32] and in Republic of the Philippines vs. Catarroja[33] discussed how an LRA’s certification, confirming the issuance of a decree, does not sufficiently prove that a title had in fact been issued. If, in fact, a certificate of title was issued, a title number could have been mentioned by the LRA in a certificate. Since the LRA itself made no reference to any certificate of title, the conclusion is that none was issued.
Thus, even granting the scenario that appellants were successful in duly identifying the whole land that they are claiming as the same land as that claimed by appellees and intervenors, and subsequently proving that a Spanish Decree and tax declarations in their name or in their predecessor’s name pertain to it, the case may still be dismissed based on prescription and laches. Considering that appellants failed to show proof that they have a certificate of title to the land that they are claiming, ownership over the said property is susceptible to the application of prescription and laches.
Article 1141 of the Civil Code, in connection with Articles 1134 and 1137 thereof, respectively provide:
Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten years. In extraordinary prescription, ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years without need of title or of good faith.[34]
Undeniably, appellees, who are in possession of a land declared under Mayvelin Cabulagan’s name since 1949, had been paying the real property taxes on said property since 1950. Jurisprudence is clear that, although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.[35] In contrast to appellees, the appellants paid their real property taxes only in the year 1984, the same year that the complaint was filed before the court a quo. There is also no evidence that appellants partitioned or adjudicated Ambrosio Plan’s land after his death in 1930. There is no evidence that they possessed the property or that they reaped the fruits thereof until the year 1977, aside from their own self-serving allegations. Thus, from the year 1949, when the land being claimed by appellees was declared in the name of Mayvelin Cabulagan, until the filing of the complaint in 1984, more than thirty (30) years had elapsed. Real action over the property has therefore prescribed.
Laches has also set in. Where persons have neglected to assert their rights over a property in question for an unreasonably long period, they are estopped from questioning the validity of another person’s title to the property. Long inaction and passivity in asserting one’s rights over a disputed property precludes them from recovering said property.[36] The law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act. The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based on grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims. Unlike the statute of limitations, laches is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a stale right or claim to be enforced or asserted.[37]
Prescinding from the foregoing, appellants’ claim for damages under Article 2199 of the Civil Code cannot be countenanced. Actual or compensatory damages under the said provision of law is only granted when a party is entitled to an adequate compensation for pecuniary loss suffered by them as they have duly proved. The appellants not having proven their entitlement thereto, their claim for damages must likewise be denied.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and, consequently, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[*]Paredes, and [**]Corales, JJ., concur.
[*] Acting Senior Member per Office Order No. 461-14-ABR dated November 3, 2014.
[**] Acting Junior Member per Office Order No. 461-14-ABR dated November 3, 2014.
[1] Rollo, pp. 144-163
[2] Rollo, pp. 110-129
[3] Rollo, page 129
[4] Records (Part One) pp. 1-2
[5] Records (Part One) pp. 12-14
[6] Records (Part One) pp. 8-10
[7] Records (Part One) page 33
[8] Records (Part One) page 125
[9] Records (Part One) page 24
[10] Records (Part One) page 62
[11] Records (Part One) pp. 210-212
[12] Records (Part One) page 215
[13] Records (Part One) pp. 219-220
[14] Records (Part One) pp. 240-243
[15] Records (Part One) pp. 328-330
[16] Records (Part One) page 339
[17] Records (Part One) pp. 345-347
[18] Records (Part One) page 350
[19] Records (Part One) Court of Appeals Decision promulgated on May 9, 2002, penned by retired Supreme Court Justice Ruben T. Reyes, pp. 358-362
[20] Records (Part Three) pp. 915-921
[21] TSN, Sofronia Cabulagan, dated May 29, 1989, page 28.
[22] Hutchinson v. Buscas, 498 Phil. 257, 262 (2005).
[23] Vsd Realty & Development Corporation vs. Uniwide Sales, Inc. and Dolores Baello Tejada, GR. No. 170677, October 24, 2012.
[24] RTC decision, dated August 17, 2012, pp. 1-20; Rollo, page 126.
[25] Heirs of Anastacio Fabela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142546, August 9, 2001; 362 SCRA 531, 547.
[26] TSN, dated May 29, 1989, page 26.
[27] Records (Part Two) page 697 and 698-700
[28] Records (Part Two) page 706
[29] Records (Part Two) page 707
[30] Records (Part Two) page 702
[31] Hutchison v. Buscas, G.R. No. 158554, May 26, 2005.
[32] G.R. No. 162097, February 13, 2008
[33] G.R. No. 171774, February 12, 2010
[34] Tan vs Ramirez, G.R. No. 158929, August 3, 2010
[35] Imuan vs Cereno, G.R. No. 167995, September 11, 2009
[36] Po Lam vs. Court vs. Court of Appeals, 347 SCRA 86
[37] Marcelino vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94422. June 26, 1992