AGUSTIN RAMOS, PETITIONER, VS. RAFAEL ALVAREZ, RESPONDENT.

Juan S. Aritao, a member of the Liberal party, was elected third member of
the Provincial Board of Negros Occidental in the general elections of November
13, 1951, but, before serving his full term, resigned his office when, on
September 11, 1953, he filed his certificate of candidacy for congressman. To
fill the vacancy left by Aritao, the then President of the Philippines,
Honorable Elpidio Quirino, acting on the authority of Section 21(6) of the
Revised Election Code and during the recess of the Congress, appointed Agustin
Ramos, a Liberal, and Ramos assumed office shortly thereafter. In due time
Ramos’ interim appointment was submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation; but before it could be confirmed, the new President of the
Philippines, Hon. Ramon Magsaysay, nominated Rafael Alvarez for the same office,
and the nomination was unanimously confirmed by the Commission in its session of
May 5, 1954, after that body had rejected Ramos’ appointment. Notified of the
conformation of his nomination and advised to qualify, Alvarez assumed office as
third member of the Provincial Board of Negros Occidental despite vigorous
opposition from Ramos, who thereafter filed the present petition in this Court
to have himself declared legally entitled to the office and to have Alvarez
ousted therefrom.

Petitioner contends (1) that he is still legally entitled to the office
because his appointment was not subject to the consent or disapproval of the
Commission on Appointments, and (2) that respondent has no title to the office
because his appointment is illegal, being in violation of section 21
(b) of the Revised Election Code for the reason that he has ceased to
be a member of the Liberal party and has not been recommended for appointment by
its president

Respondent, on his part, contends (1) that petitioner’s appointment was
subject to the consent of the Commission on Appointments so that, in accordance
with paragraph (4) of section 10, Article VII of the Constitution, it ceased to
be effective upon disapproval by that body; (2) that respondent was, at the time
of his appointment, a member of the Liberal party and was recommended for
appointment by the Liberal mayors and the chairman of the local committees of
the Liberal party of Negros Occidental and not opposed by the president,
national directory or provincial directory of the party or by anyone of its
members in the Commission; and (3) that, even assuming that respondent was not
recommended by the Liberal party, his appointment would nevertheless be valid,
because section 21(b) of the Revised Election Code is unconstitutional
in so far as it , makes such recommendation a prerequisite to a presidential
appointment, thereby depriving the Chief Executive of his right to choose his
appointees.

These opposing contentions raise issues of fact as well as of law. But we
find no need for delving into the factual issues, seeing that the case may be
adjudicated on the purely legal question of whether or not an appointment made
by the President of the Philippines under section 21 (b) of the Revised
Election Code is subject to the consent of the Commission on Appointments. If
not subject to such consent, the appointment would not cease to be effective
upon its disapproval by the Commission, with the result that petitioner would in
that case still have title to the office and the consequent right to have
respondent ousted therefrom. On the other hand, if the appointment is subject to
the consent of the Commission, then by express provision of the Constitution
(Art. VII, sec. 10, clause 4) it would cease to be effective upon its
disapproval by that body, and, in that case the petitioner, with himself no
longer entitled to the office, would have no right to insist on respondent’s
ouster

The aforementioned section 21(6) of the Revised Election Code, under which
petitioner was appointed, reads:

“(b) Whenever in any elective local office a vacancy occurs as a
result of the death, resignation, removal or cessation of the incumbent, the
President shall appoint thereto a suitable person belonging to the political
party of the officer whom he is to replace, upon the recommendation of said
party, save in the case of a mayor, which shall be filled by the
vice-mayor.”

Undoubtedly the position of third member of the Provincial Board is among the
offices which, in case of vacancy, the President may fill by appointment under
this provision. The only question is whether the appointment is among those
required by the Constitution to have the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.

The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:

“(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the. executive departments and bureaus,
officers of the Army from the rank of colonel of the Navy and Air forces from
the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment
of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments.” (Par. (3) of section 10, Article VII.)

Under this constitutional provision, there are four groups of officers that
the President shall appoint, namely:

First, the heads of executive departments and bureaus, officers of
the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and air forces from the rank of
captain or commander;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for in the Constitution;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
and

Fourth, inferior officers whose appointments the Congress has by law
vested in the President alone.

The Constitution is explicit that for officers of the first, second and third
groups the appointment made by the President shall be with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments. It is only in the case of the fourth group,
that is, of inferior officers whose appointment is by law vested “in the
President alone” that such consent is not required. Now, does the third
member of the provincial board belong to this fourth group?

We may, for the purposes of this question, assume that the third member of
the provincial board is an inferior officer whose appointment the Congress may
by law vest in the President alone. But the question still remains as to whether
the Congress has done just that, that is to say, whether the Congress has vested
the authority to appoint in the President alone. Examining the provision of
section 21(b) of the Revised Election Code, we find that while it says
that the President shall make the appointment, it does not say that the
appointment is not to be subject to the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, that is, that it is to be made by the President alone. Such being
the case, the President’s appointment must be deemed subject to the general
requirement that the same is to be with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. In other words, a person appointed by the President under section
21 (b) of the Revised Election Code would fall under the third group of
officers mentioned in paragraph (3) of section 10, Article VII of the
Constitution, namely “those whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to
appoint” and, therefore, subject to the requirement that the appointment shall
be with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Thus, in the United
States, under a constitutional provision similar to ours, the general rule is
that “when a statute does not specify how an officer is to be appointed, it must
be by the President by and with the consent of the Senate. Civil Service
Commission-Chief Examiner, 1886, 18 Op. Atty. Gen. (U. S.) 409. See also, Civil
Service Bill, 1883, 17 Op. Atty. Gen. (U. S.) 504; Appointment of Assistant
Secretary of State, 1853, 6 Op. Atty. Gen. (U. S.) 1” (U. S. C. A. Constitution,
Art. 1 to 7, p. 367).

Our attention has been drawn to a passage in Francisco’s Revised Election
Code, 1947 ed., p. 39, wherein, in giving the history of the enactment of this
particular provision of the Election Law, the author narrates that the provision
in its present form was the result of an amendment introduced by Senator
Imperial intended to do away “with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments” in the case of appointments to elective provincial offices so long
as the appointee belongs to the political party of the officer whom he is to
replace and is recommended by said party. But while that may have been the
intention of the proponent of the amendment in the Senate, the intention was not
given adequate expression in the text of the amendment, and we cannot assume
that his colleagues in the Senate or the members of the House of Representatives
approved the amendment with that same intention. As Sutherland says,

“Statements by individual members of the legislature as to the meaning of
provisions in a bill subsequently enacted into law, made during the general
debate on the bill on the floor of each legislative house following its
presentation by a standing committee, are generally held to be inadmissible as
an aid in construing the statute. Legislative debates are ‘expressive of the
views and motives of individual members, and are not a safe guide, and hence may
not be resorted to, in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the law-making
body.’ ‘* * * it is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was
put upon an act by the members of the legislative body that passed it by
resorting to the speeches of individual members thereof. Those who did not speak
may not have agreed with those who did, and those who spoke might differ from
each other * * *.'” (2 Sutherland Statutory Construction,
499-501.)

For one thing, the law is already clear as it is. It is devoid of any
ambiguity and gives no room for doubt. The doubt arises only from the attempt to
read into it something that is not there. The law in express terms authorizes
the President to make appointments to fill vacancies in certain elective local
offices under the conditions therein specified, but it does not say that the
authority to make such appointments is vested “in the President alone.” The
appointees, therefore, come squarely under that group of officers whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint, so that their appointment is
subject to the consent of the Commission on Appointments. To hold that a
statutory provision authorizing the President to appoint certain officers
ttierein specified may be construed as dispensing witht he consent of the
Commission of Appointments even when the provision does not expressly say that
the appointment is vested in the President alone, would practically
nullify or write off the constitutional requirement that the President shall,
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint “those whom he may
be authorized by law to appoint.”

In view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that petitioner’s appointment as
third member of the provincial board of Occidental Negros was subject to the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, so that his right to the office
ceased when his appointment was rejected by the Commission. Having no legal
title to the office, petitioner has no right to insist on respondent’s ouster.
For a public office is created by law and its usurpation or unlawful exercise is
t]he concern primarily of the State, so that the latter, as a rule, is the party
called upon to bring the action for such usurpation or unlawful exercise of an
office. And while a person claiming to be entitled to the public office usurped
or unlawfully exercised by another is by section 6 of Rule 68 of the Rules of
Court permitted to bring an action therefor in his own name, still the plaintiff
in such case will succeed only when he proves his right to the office in
dispute. (Austria vs. Amante, 45 Off. Gaz., No. 7, p. 2809; Nueno et
al. vs. Angeles, 42 Off. Gaz., No. 8, p. 1868; Acosta vs.
Flor, 5 Phil., 18.)

Wherefore, the writ prayed for is denied. With costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and
Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.