ANTONIO MACADANGDANG, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND ELIZA­BETH MEJIAS, RESPONDENTS.

Macadangdang versus Mejias

The Case

This is a petition for review filed by Antonio Macadangdang against Elizabeth Mejias and the Court of Appeals, arising from an action for recognition and support. Elizabeth Mejias sued Antonio Macadangdang, claiming that he was the father of her son Rolando, who was born during her marriage to another man, Crispin Anahaw. The case matters because it tests the strength of the presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock, and it asks whether a wife may bring an action that would bastardize her own child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, a chance to be heard.

Procedural History

Elizabeth Mejias filed a complaint for recognition and support against Antonio Macadangdang with the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch Nine. Macadangdang answered, opposing the claim and praying for dismissal. After a pre-trial conference and an amended complaint filed by agreement of the parties, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint, invoking provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court.

Mejias appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning as errors the trial court's application of Articles 255 and 256 of the Civil Code and Section 4 of Rule 131, and its holding that she could not validly question the legitimacy of her son by a collateral attack without joining her legal husband as a party. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and declared the minor Rolando to be the illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang, ordering him to pay monthly support. The Court of Appeals denied the motions for reconsideration. Macadangdang then filed this petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Facts

Elizabeth Mejias was a married woman, her husband being Crispin Anahaw. Sometime in March 1967, she allegedly had intercourse with Antonio Macadangdang. She claims that because of this affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. On October 30, 1967, seven months after that encounter, she gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December 24, 1967.

In April 1972, Mejias filed a complaint for recognition and support against Macadangdang. The trial court dismissed the complaint, but the Court of Appeals reversed and declared Rolando the illegitimate son of Macadangdang, ordering monthly support of 350 pesos until the child reaches the age of majority.

On review, the Supreme Court examined the testimony of Mejias herself, given in the lower court, where she confirmed that she and her husband separated as a result of the incident with Macadangdang. The Court noted that her testimony was self-serving and uncorroborated, and that her husband was never impleaded. The Court also observed that the child was born a mere seven months after the first sexual contact, yet was a normal, full-term baby, and that there was no birth certificate, only oral declarations and a baptismal certificate prepared in the absence of the alleged father.

Issues

• Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw.
• Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.

Applicable Provisions

Article 255 of the Civil Code provides:

Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused: (1) By the impotence of the husband; (2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that access was not possible; (3) By the serious illness of the husband.

This provision establishes the conclusive presumption of legitimacy and limits the evidence that may rebut it to physical impossibility of access.

Article 256 of the Civil Code provides:

The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

This provision reinforces that the mother's declaration against legitimacy does not overcome the presumption.

Article 257 of the Civil Code provides:

Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth in article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purposes of this article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case.

This provision addresses the effect of the wife's adultery on the presumption, requiring highly improbable ethnic reasons to overcome it.

Section 4 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides:

Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy -- (a) Children born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused: [1] By the impotence of the husband; [2] By the fact that the husband and the wife were living separately, in such a way that access was not possible; [3] By the serious illness of the husband; (b) The child shall be presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (c) Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth above, the child is presumed legitimate, unless it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purpose of the rule, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case.

This rule mirrors the Civil Code provisions and governs the evidentiary presumption in judicial proceedings.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the child Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of Elizabeth Mejias and her husband Crispin Anahaw. The Court found that the child was born more than one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the marriage and before three hundred days following the alleged separation. Under Article 255, this creates a conclusive presumption of legitimacy. The only evidence that could rebut this presumption is physical impossibility of access by the husband within the first one hundred twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth. No such proof was presented. The Court noted that the respondent and her husband continued to live in the same province, and there was always the possibility of access. The Court also emphasized that the child was born seven months after the first sexual contact, yet was a normal, full-term baby, which indicated he was conceived as early as January 1967, before the alleged affair. The baptismal certificate was held to prove only the administration of the sacrament, not the veracity of the statements regarding relationship.

On the second issue, the Court held that only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. The right to repudiate or contest legitimacy belongs exclusively to the alleged father, who is the husband of the mother, and can be exercised only by him or his heirs, within a fixed time, and only in a direct suit brought for the purpose. The wife cannot institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard. The Court stressed that the law is not willing that the child be declared illegitimate to suit the whims and purposes of either parent.

Doctrine

The presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock is conclusive and may be rebutted only by proof of physical impossibility of access by the husband within the first one hundred twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused only by the impotence of the husband, by the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible, or by the serious illness of the husband. The wife's adultery, by itself, cannot destroy the presumption, because it is still possible that the child is that of the husband. Only the husband, as the legally presumed father, can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife, and he must do so in a direct suit brought for the purpose. The mother cannot assert the illegitimacy of her child born in wedlock to obtain some benefit for herself.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the decision of the trial court dismissing the action for recognition and support.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock is conclusive and may be rebutted only by physical impossibility of access by the husband within the first one hundred twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth. Examiners like to use this case to test the limits of the presumption of legitimacy and the rule that only the husband can contest a child's legitimacy.