THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. DAVID DICHUPA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

David Dichupa was charged in two separate informa- tions with two offenses of estafa committed under section 315, subsection 1 (b)
of the Revised Penal Code (Cases Nos. 7680 and 7681). In one he was
charged with having committed the offense during the period from
January, 1955 to December, 1955, in the municipality of Pavia, province
of Iloilo, while he was president and warehouseman of the Pavia
Farmers’ Cooperative Marketing Association, whereas in the other he was
charged with the same offense for having committed similar acts in the
same capacity during the period from January, 1956, to July, 1956, in
the same municipality and province.

After his arraignment in the two cases wherein he pleaded not
guilty, Dichupa, thru counsel, filed a motion to quash the two
informations on the following grounds: (1) that the acts described in
said informations constitute but one offense; (2) that the acts
described therein are also included in 45 informations filed against
him for violation of section 54 of the Warehouse Receipt Law; and (3)
that the prosecution has adopted two contradictory theories in filing
the two criminal cases aforesaid and the 45 informations for violation
of section 54 of the Warehouse Receipt Law.

Notwithstanding the opposition of the government, the lower court
upheld the motion dismissing the two cases upon the ground that the
acts alleged in the two informations constitute only one offense
committed within “one continuous period” which should have been
consolidated in only one information especially as they are committed
against the same offended party, and on the further ground that the
said acts appear to be contradictory to the alleged violations involved
in the 45 informations for violation of section 54 of the Warehouse
Receipt Law. The government has appealed.

One of the grounds on which the lower court dismissed the two
informations charging the offense of estafa is that it “is convinced
that the series of acts allegedly committed by the accused constitute
only one offense committed within one continuous period, that is, from
January, 1955 to July, 1956, in the same municipality of Pavia in his
same capacity as President and Warehouseman of the Pavia Farmer’s
Cooperative and Marketing Association (Pavia Facoma) involving portions
of palay deposited and encumbered with the ACCFA for commodity loans,
affecting the same offended party and of the same criminal intent to
defraud the same offended party. In short, the Court believes that the
two informations should have been consolidated in only one information
against the accused but involving the total value mentioned in both
informations.” And in reaching this conclusion, the court invoked the
case of U.S. vs. Paraiso, 5 Phil., 154.

The Paraiso case is not in point. It is to be noted that in the
Paraiso case one single information was filed charging the accused with
the crime of falsification of public document by reciting therein
various charges or modes of committing said falsification. To this
defect the accused did not object. On appeal, however, one of the
issues he raised was that the information charged multiplicity of
crimes which may subject him to different penalties which however was
brushed aside in view of his failure to object to such defect in the
lower court. In other words, what was objectionable in the Paraiso case
was that a single information was filed alleging various acts
constituting different crimes of falsification which cannot be done
except where the law prescribes a single penalty for them, or when the
accused does not opportunely move to quash the information.

The instant case involves different facts and issues. Here two
different informations were filed which, according to the trial court,
do not allege acts constituting two different crimes of estafa on the
ground that they were committed “within one continuous period” for
which reason they should have been consolidated in only one
information. In the Paraiso case the issue raised was just the
contrary: acts which constitute different crimes were embodied in only
one single information and not spread out in separate informations as
in the present case.

The question, however, that needs to be determined in the present
case is: Do the acts alleged in the two informations constitute a
single crime of estafa because they were committed “within one
continuous period” as found by the lower court? Our answer is in the
negative for the simple reason that said acts were committed on two
different occasions such that it cannot be said that they were
committed by the accused with only one criminal intent. Thus, the acts
alleged in Criminal Case No. 7681 refer to those committed during the
period from January, 1955 to December, 1955, whereas the acts alleged
in Criminal Case No. 7680 refer to those committed during the period
from January, 1956 to July 7, 1956, and considering that they involved
the disposal of cavans of palay deposited in the warehouse of the Pavia
facoma, it cannot be pretended that when the accused disposed of such
palay in January, 1955 he already had the criminal intent of disposing what was to be deposited
in January, 1956 to July, 1956. The two periods are so far apart that
they reject the theory of “within one continuous period” invoked by the
lower court.

Our authority for this assertion is the case of People vs. Cid, 66
Phil., 354. Here the accused was charged under four informations
alleging several acts of falsification and malversation. The
malversation alleged in the first information took place in May, 1936
and to conceal the same the accused falsified his payroll and cash book
on October 3, 1936. The malversation alleged in the second information
took place in July, 1936 and to conceal it he falsified his payroll and
voucher No. 365 in October, 1936. The malversation alleged in the third
information took place in June, 1936 and to conceal it he falsified
voucher No. 364. And the malversation in the fourth information took
place in August, 1936 and to conceal it he falsified certain official
documents and vouchers. He objected to the filing of several
informations alleging that “as the four charges imputed against him are
so closely related to one another the acts constituting the same should
be considered as continuous one, or that the crime committed by him was
a continuous one, and therefore said charges should be ordered
consolidated into only one charge.” In overruling this contention, this
Court made the following pronouncement:

“By reading the four informations inserted above, it
clearly appears that the alleged acts of falsification and malversation
imputed to the accused-appellant were committed by him, being municipal
treasurer and bonded official of the municipality of Batac of the
Province of IIocos Norte, on entirely distinct occasions. * * * It may
therefore be said that the malversations as well as the falsifications
imputed to the accused in the four cases under consideration were not
the result of only one purpose or of only one resolution to embezzle
and falsify, but of four or as many abstractions or misappropriations
had of the funds entrusted to his care, and of as many falsifications
also committed to conceal each of said acts. There is nothing of record
to justify the inference that the intention of the appellant when he
committed the malversation in May, 1936, was the same intention which
impelled him to commit the other malversations in June, July and
August. On the contrary, the allegations of each of the four
informations above-stated warrant the conclusion that when the
appellant committed the first malversation he did not yet have the
intention to commit the other malversations. He did not commit them
successively but at intervals of one month, after he had found out that
there was no remedy for the bad act committed by him, having expected
perhaps that he could remedy it. As may be seen, he was mistaken in his
calculations. For these reasons, the accused-appellant is guilty of
four malversations and of four falsifications because the latter were
not a necessary means for the commission of the former, but were
committed only to conceal them.”

The lower court, therefore, erred in ordering the dismissal of the
two informations on the gound that the acts therein alleged only
constitute one single crime of estafa upon the theory that they were
committed “within one continuous period.” Even then, the lower court
should not have ordered the dismissal of the two informations but
merely the consolidation of the acts charged in one single information.

With regard to the other finding of the lower court that the two
informations for estafa allege statements that are contradictory to
those appearing in the 45 informations for violation of section 54 of
the Warehouse Receipt Law, suffice it to state that such finding is
premature for the reason that the particular articles or merchandise
which are covered by the informations concerned are not specified. This
is rather an evidentiary matter which may be threshed out when the
trial on the merits is held.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. The cases are remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. No costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, and De Leon, JJ., concur.