OCA CIRCULAR NO. 75-2004, May 27, 2004

For the information and guidance of all concerned, quoted
hereunder is the Resolution of the Second Division of this Court dated
February 3, 2004 in Administrative Case No. 5602 entitled “Hilda D.
Tabas vs. Atty. Bonifacio B. Mangibin”, to wit:

“In a verified complaint^[1]
for disbarment filed with this Court on January 30, 2002, complainant
Hilda D. Tabas sought the disbarment of respondent, atty. Bonifacio B.
Mangibin for allegedly having committed forgery.

Complainant avers that on March 5, 2001, a certain
Anastada Galvan from Sta. Monica, Bauang, La Union, mortgaged to her a
piece of real property to secure a P48,000.00 loan. The deed of mortgage
of real property^[2] was duly
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province of
La Union and annotated in the tax declaration of the property^[3].

On October 17, 2001, however, a certain Lilia Castellejos,
falsely representing herself as complainant, appeared before respondent
and asked him to prepare a discharge of the said mortgage and to
notarize it afterwards.^[4]

After having prepared the questioned discharge of real estate mortgage,^[5]
and without asking Lilia Castellejos for anything other than a
Community Tax Certificate (CTC), respondent notarized the said deed.
Subsequently, the mortgagee, Anastacia Galvan, mortgaged the subject
property again this time with the Rural Bank of Naguilian (LU), Inc.^[6]

Complainant further avers that after she learned of the’
cancellation, she promptly informed respondent that her signature in the
“Discharge of Real Estate Mortage” was a forgery. However, respondent
did nothing to help her and even threatened to file a counter suit
against her should she file a case against him.^[7]

In his answer,^[8]
respondent admits that the discharge of real estate mortgage is a
forgery, but denies liability for the falsification under a claim of
good faith.^[9] Respondent
avers that he did not know Lilia Castellejos’ fraudulent intent. He also
submits that he cannot be faulted for simply relying on the CTC bearing
complainant’s name, which Lilia Castillejos presented to him. He argues
that it is beyond the “realm of his duty” and scope of work to
investigate the identity of persons appearing before him and cites that
as a matter of routine, he normally requires only the CTCs of persons
appearing before him.^[10]
Respondent also asserts that he does not have any available means of
ascertaining the real identities of persons appearing before him.^[11]

On August 7, 2002,^[12] the Court referred the instant case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.

Subsequently, the IBP required complainant to file her reply by order issued on October 14, 2002.^[13] In her reply dated November 7, 2002,^[14]
complainant argues that respondent’s averment that he id not discover
that Lilia Castillejos falsely represented herself could only mean that
respondent knowingly participated in the falsification^[15].

On December 14, 2002, the IBP issued Resolution No. XV-2002-627,^[16]
which adopted and approved the recommendation of the investigating
Commissioner, warning ‘ respondent to be more careful in the preparation
of legal documents so that similar incidents may be avoided in the
future.

Following the submission of the IBP Resolution with the Court, the Court
required the Office of the Bar Confidant to submit its comment on the
IBP Resolution on March 19, 2003.^[17]
In her comment, Bar Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina Layusa found
respondent liable for gross negligence in the discharge of his duties as
a notary public and recommended that the Court impose upon respondent a
graver penalty of suspension of one (1) year^[18] from the practice of law.

The issue for our resolution now is whether respondent is liable
for violating the Notarial Law for which his commission as notary
public should be revoked and he should be suspended also from the
practice of law.

Time and again, the Court has emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act.^[19]
It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It converts a
private document into a public one, making it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity.^[20]
A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must
be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument.

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care
the basic requirement sin the performance of their duties. Otherwise,
the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments
would be undermined. A notary public should not notarize a document
unless the person who signed the same is the very same person who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and truth of matters stated in the document. The purpose of this
requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of
the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the
document is the party’s free act and deed.^[21]

The circumstances in this case indubitably show that respondent
did not take even ordinary precautions required in the premises. In the
acknowledgment portion of the document, there is a phrase “Before me…
persona Sly appeared Hilda A.” Tabas… known to me and to me known to
be the same person who executed the foregoing document.^[22]
Respondent thereby attested that he knows Hilda A. Tabas, whose name
appeared in the acknowledgment, and that she personally appeared before
him. Indeed, it was his duty to ascertain the identity of the person
appearing before him and to make sure that she is indeed Hilda A. Tabas.
Considering the case with which CTCs may be- obtained and the legal
effect that notarization brings to the deed of discharge of real estate
mortgage that he himself prepared, respondent should have requested
other forms of identification or asked questions to ascertain her
identity.

Respondent’s conduct showed serious lack of due care in the
performance of his duties as a notary- public. Because of his
carelessness, respondent failed to notice the glaring difference in the
signature of mortagee in the deed of real estate mortgage from her
purported signature in the questioned discharge of real estate mortgage.

It was respondent who prepared the questioned discharge of real
estate mortgage, which he subsequently notarized. Hence he had adequate
opportunity to verify the identity of Lilia Castillejos. Not only did he
have to interview her regarding her personal circumstances, but also he
had to interview her regarding the background of the deed of real
estate mortgage to be cancelled. Apparently, respondent merely took the
work of Lilia Castillejos that she was Hilda Tabas and did not realize
the need to require her to present other forms of identification. Such
neglect is inexcusable.

Further, by notarizing the Discharge of Real Estate Mortgage
without ascertaining the identity of the signatory, respondent lawyer
acted with reckless discharge of his professional duties and
responsibilities. He caused grave injury to the complainant. He also
undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents. Hence, he
breached Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
requires lawyers to promote respect for the law and legal processes as
well as to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.

WHEREFORE, for violation of the Notary Law and
the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Ally. Bonifacio B.
Mangibin’s notarial commission, is REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from (he reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two (2) years.

Respondent is SUSPENDED fro the practice of law
also for a period of one (1) year, effective immediately. He is
DIRECTED to report to this Court his receipt of this Decision to enable
the Court to determine when his suspension shall have taken effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines , and all courts all
over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to
the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.”

The Decision was served upon respondent on March 9, 2004.

__27__May 2004.

 ^[2] Id., at 1,5

 ^[3] Id., at 1,6

 ^[4] Id., at 1-2

 ^[5] Id., at 7.

 ^[6] Id., at 3.

 ^[7] Id., at 2.

 ^[8] Id., at 14-19.

 ^[9] Id., at 17-18.

 ^[10] Ibid.

 ^[11] Id., at 16-18.

 ^[12] Id., at 22.

 ^[13] Id., at 23.

 ^[14]  Id., at 24-25.

 ^[15] Id., at 24.

 ^[16] Id., at 28.

 ^[17] Id., at 38.

 ^[18] Id., at 41-44-A.

 ^[19]
Joson v. Baltazar, AC. No. 575, 14 February 1991, 194 SCRA 114, 119.

 ^[20]

Nadayag v. Grageda, AC. No. 3232, 27 September 1994., 237 SCRA202, 206.

 ^[21] Aquino v,
Manese, AC. No. 4953, 3 April 2003, p. 6, See Coronado v. Fciongco, AC.
No. 2611, 15 November 2000,344 SCRA 565,5 68-569.

 ^[22] Rollo, p. 7.