MARIA V. DIMAGIBA, PETITIONER, VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

We reverse the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
in RO4-WCC Case No. 12725, entitled “Maria V. Dimagiba, Claimant, versus
Central Bank of the Philippines, Respondent” awarding claimant the sum of
P6,000.00 as disability compensation bene­fits but, however, cutting the
reimbursement of medical expenses from P22,299.65 to P2,154.95, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in reviewing
and disturbing the decision rendered by the Acting Referee in said RO4-WCC Case
No. 12725 when said award had already become final and executory.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner was a former employee of the Central Bank of the
Philippines since September 26, 1955. 
She started as a Clerk in the Import Department, became a Supervising
Clerk assigned in the Loans and Credit Department on March 1, 1966, and finally
promoted to Senior Clerk with a salary of P4,980.00 per annum.  Sometime in 1964, while engaged in the active
pursuit of her employment, she developed an illness diagnosed by her attending
physician as “Diabetes Mellitus, Hypercholesternina, GBD.” As a
result of which, she was forced to go on sick leave every now and then and
submit to medical treatment, and upon the advise of her attending physician,
she had to tender her resignation from the government service on June 15,
1970.  Thereafter, she filed a claim for
disability compen­sation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act on October 7,
1970.  To this claim, respondent Bank
filed its controversion on October 12, 1970. 
After hearing and presentation of evidence by both parties, Acting
Referee Vivencio E. Escarcha of the Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of
Labor, Manila, rendered a decision on July 17, 1972 ordering respondent Bank to
pay disability compensation to petitioner in the total sum of P6,000.00 plus
reimbursement of medical expenses in the sum of P22,299.65.  The dispositive portion thereof is quoted as
follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering respondent Central Bank of the Philippines to pay, through this
Office, and in lump sum:

1.  Claimant the compensation for her total
permanent disability for labor in the sum of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS;
plus the reimbursement of the medical expenses she incurred in the sum of
TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY NINE and 65/100 (P22,299.65) PESOS;

2.  Her counsel, Atty. Ricardo Perez the
attorney’s fee of THREE HUNDRED (P300.00)
PESOS; and

3.  This Office the sum of SIXTY-ONE (P61.00)
PESOS as fees pursuant to Section 55 of the Act, as amended.

SO ORDERED.

Manila, Philippines, July 17, 1972″

Copy of the above decision of the Acting Referee was received by
the respondent Bank on August 7, 1972.

On August 21, 1972, respondent Bank filed by registered mail a
“Motion to Extend Time for Filing Petition for Review” praying for
ten (10) days from August 22, 1972 within which to file its petition for
review, for the reason that it had not been furnished with the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the proceedings of the case.  This motion was granted by the Acting Referee
in his order dated August 22, 1972, copy of which respondent claims was not
received by it.

On September 7, 1972, respondent Bank filed another motion for a
second extension of ten (10) days from
receipt of the copy of the transcript of stenographic notes, alleging:  “1. that respondent has previously filed
its motion to extend the filing of its petition for reconsideration in the
above-entitled case which, among other things, avers that the reason for the
motion is that the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings, has not
been made available to respondent.  This
situation persists and respondent has been informed by the stenographer that it
would take sometime for her to finish the transcription of her notes of the
hearings, which date she could not reasonably fix.”

Under date of October 13,
1972, respondent Bank filed its “Petition for Reconsideration” of the
decision of July 17, 1972.

On October 16, 1972, the
Acting Referee issued an order declaring the decision rendered by him to be
final and unappealable.  His order reads
thus:

” O R D E R

On September 7, 1972, respondent, through counsel, filed by
registered mail with this Office a Second Motion for Exten­sion of Time to file
its petition for review praying that it be granted another ten (10) days within
which to file its motion for reconsideration on the Decision issued by this
Office in the above-entitled case for the reason that the transcript of
stenographic notes of the hearing could not be available to its counsel.

Record shows that the Order of this Office dated August 22, 1972
granted the respondent a period of ten days from August 22, 1972 within which
to file its motion for reconsideration and/or petition for review on the
Decision issued by this Office in the above-entitled case which period lapsed on or about September 1,
1972.  In order that the second motion
for exten­sion of time for filing petition for review be validly considered by
this Office, the same should be filed within the extended period granted by
this Office to the respondent on its Order dated August 22, 1972 allowing
respondent a 10-day period within which to file its motion for reconsideration
or petition for review.  This second
motion, however, was filed as stated by registered mail on September 7, 1972 or
6 days period beyond the reglementary period within which respondent may file
its motion for reconsideration of a motion for another extension of time in
filing the said motion for reconsideration or petition for review.  For this reason, it is very apparent that the
second motion for extension of time filed by res­pondent with this Office was
filed out of time, hence, the same is hereby denied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered the second motion for extension of
time to file petition for review of counsel for the respondent is hereby denied
for having been filed out of time and the Decision of this Office in the
above-entitled case is now deemed final and unappealable.

SO ORDERED.

Manila, Philippines, October 16,
1972″

Thereupon, respondent
Bank filed a “Petition for Review of Order” on November 15, 1972
assailing the order of October 16, 1972, to which petitioner filed her
opposition on November 27, 1972 while respondent filed its reply to the
aforesaid opposition on Novem­ber 29, 1972. 
Thereafter, on March 26, 1974, the Acting Referee issued an order
denying respondent Bank’s petition for reconsideration of the order of October
16, 1972, as follows:

” O R D E R

Finding the grounds on the Petition for Reconsideration of the
Order of this Office dated October 16, 1972 denying the Second Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review by counsel for the respondent on
the ground that the same was filed out of time to be untenable,

WHEREFORE, said petition for review is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

Manila, Philippines, March 26,
1974″

From this order of the
Acting Referee noted above, respondent Bank filed with the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission a “Petition for Relief from Order and to Elevate
Records” on April 3, 1974.  On
February 5, 1975, petitioner filed an “Opposition and an Urgent
Motion” and on October 17, 1975, the Acting Referee issued an
Order elevating the entire records of the case to the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission.  Subsequently, on January 30,
1976, respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission, through Associate
Commissioner Eugenio I. Sagmit, Jr. and with the concurrence of Commissioner
Severo M. Pucan, rendered the decision now under review.  The dispositive portion thereof is
quoted hereunder:

“WHEREFORE, with the modification aforementioned, the Decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and respondent ordered to pay thru this
Commission:

1.  To the claimant, the total sum of EIGHT
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY FOUR PESOS AND 95/100 (P8,154.95) as disability
compensation and reimbursement of medical expenses;

2.  To Atty. Ricardo Perez, the sum of SIX HUNDRED
PESOS (P600.00) as attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 31 of the Act; and

3.  To this Commission, the sum of SIXTY SIX PESOS
(P66.00) as adminis­trative fee pursuant to Section 55 of the Act.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines, January 30,
1976″

Petitioner now seeks the review of the Commission’s decision on
the ground that the respondent Commission abused its authority in reviewing and
disturbing the decision rendered by the Acting Referee when the said award had
already become final and executory for the respondent’s failure to perfect an
appeal within the reglementary period.

The issue of finality of a decision of a Referee or a
Commissioner upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal by petition
for review or motion for reconsideration has been resolved by this Court.  In Hoc Huat Trading vs. Santos,
L-22863, July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 441,
this Court held that “decisions in workmen’s compensation cases, become,
by express statutory pres­cription, final and executory after fifteen (15) days
from notice thereof, ‘unless previously appealed;’ or a petition for review has
been filed within the same period.” Then just recently, in Ramos vs.
Republic, L-41949, February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 576, this Court held that “the expiration of the
reglementary period for reconsideration or review of an award deprives (the
Commission) of appellate jurisdiction to review or set aside the award by
virtue of its having become final and executory.”

In the instant case, the decision of the Acting Referee dated
July 17, 1972 having been received by the respondent Bank on August 7, 1972,
the same would have become final and
executory 15 days thereafter or on August 22, 1972.  However, after 14 days had already elapsed of
the 15 days period within which to appeal, respondent Bank, on August 21, 1972,
filed a “Motion to Extend Time to File Petition for Review,”
requesting an extension of 10 days from August 22, 1972 to file its petition
for review, evidently in pursuance to Section 3, Rule 15 of the defunct Rules
of the WCC.  The Acting Referee in his
order dated August 22, 1972 granted the 10 days extension counted from August
22, 1972 as prayed for by the respondent Bank, which would expire September 1,
1972.  When the respondent Bank filed on
September 7, 1972 its “Motion to Extend Time for Filing Petition for
Reconsideration” requesting another exten­sion of time for at least ten
(10) days to be counted from the date of receipt of the transcript of steno­graphic
notes, said motion was already late by 6 days counted from September 1,
1972.  Likewise, the petition for
reconsideration of the award filed October 13, 1972 was filed beyond the
reglementary period to appeal.

It is crystal clear that the decision or award of Acting Referee
Vivencio E. Escarcha had already become final and executory.  The order of the Acting Referee dated October
16, 1972 declaring his decision of July 17, 1972 as final and executory is
proper and correct.  His decision may no
longer be subject to review by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.  The Commission has not properly acquired
jurisdiction to review the decision rendered by the Acting Referee and to
disturb the findings therein made.

The respondent Bank contends that the grant or approval of its
first “Motion for Extension of Time to File the Petition for Review”
was not furnished to the respondent; that it was necessary to have the
transcription of stenographic notes in order to be able to state in the
petition for review or motion for reconsideration the specific details of the
issues found in the evidence on record as required by the Rules of the
Commission; and that its subsequent motion for a second extension of 10 days to
be counted from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes stopped the
running of the prescriptive period.

We find no merit to this contention of the respondent Bank.  The unavailability of the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken during the proceedings is no valid ground to excuse
the late filing of the Motion for Reconsideration or Petition for Review.

As petitioners correctly observed, respondent Bank was able to
file its petition for reconsideration on October 13, 1972 without benefit of
the transcript.  The unavailability of
the transcript is a poor excuse for gross
unpreparedness and lackadaisical concern of official duties as government
lawyers, a lame leg indeed to stand on for respondent’s
position.  To subject the period to
appeal of the decision or award to the availa­bility or completion of the
transcript of stenographic notes would render such period dependent on the
time, the whims and caprice of the stenographer at the hearing, which is
intolerable, if not repulsive.

The respondent
Commission, for its part, maintains that the 10-day period of extension granted
by the Acting Referee in his order dated August 22, 1972 should have commenced
to run from the time respondent Bank received a copy thereof.  Claiming that the order granting the 10-day
extension never left the desk of the Acting Referee as it was found attached to
the records after the petition for reconsideration of the decision was filed on
October 13, 1972, the Commission contends that in contemplation of law, the
period of finality which was stopped by the filing of the first motion for
extension of time within which to file peti­tion for review never commenced to
run against the Bank, hence the Acting Referee’s decision of July 17, 1972
never became final and executory.

This contention is bereft
of merit.  Respondent Bank having prayed
for a 10-day extension after August 22, 1972, it was its duty to prepare and
file its petition for review or file another motion for extension within the 10
days it had originally requested.  We
cannot accept the respondent Commission’s stand that the finality of the Acting
Referee’s decision had not commenced to run because, according to the
Commission, the Bank was not notified of the order granting the extension.  This would make the 15-day period of finality
flexible and elastic and would result in untold delay and
injustice to workmen claiming compensation for disabilities and injuries
compensable under the law.  Respondent
Bank has no right to assume that its motion would be granted; it was duty-bound
after filing its motion for extension to check with the Acting Referee and inquire as to the outcome
or disposition thereof so that if the same is denied, it could make the
necessary motions for extension or file the proper petition itself and thus
perfect his appeal within the remaining period. 
(King vs. Joe, L-23617, August 20, 1967, 20 SCRA 1117).

Respondent Bank seeks
reliance and relief on Rule 22, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission published and
circulated effec­tive March 8, 1973, to justify the decision of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission dated January 30, 1976 reviewing and revising the award
of the Acting Referee rendered almost 4 years back, which new rules were
adopted during the pendency of this case in the Commission.  Under the new rules, the respondent Bank
contends that all appeals from the Referee must go to the WCC; that its review
power is sufficiently broad as not to be questioned especially under the circumstances
of the case; and that the WCC has the jurisdiction to review the order of the
Acting Referee declaring his decision final and unappealable.

This stance of the respondent Bank is not meritorious for the
same rule relied upon, that is Rule 22, requires and lays down under Section 3
thereof the prescriptive period within which to avail of the petitions under
Section 1 and 2, and that is within 30 days after the petitioner learns
of the decision, award, or order on the merit or other proceedings sought to be
set aside and not more than 3 months after such decision or award was entered
or such proceedings were taken (paragraph 1, Sec. 3) or within 30 days
after petitioner learns of the order to be reviewed and not more than 3 months
after such order was entered (paragraph 2, Sec. 3).  In addition, a petition for relief under
Section 2 of Rule 22 should contain “a concise statement of facts
showing that the denied petition or motion was filed within the reglementary
period x x x” (Underscoring
supplied)

These periods have not been observed in the present case for
respondent Bank first learned of the decision dated July 17, 1972 of the Acting
Referee, which is the decision on the merits, on August 7, 1972 while said
respondent learned of the order dated October 16, 1972 on November 10, 1972.  Thus, when it filed the petition for relief on April 3, 1974, all the periods
prescribed in Section 3, Rule 22 have already expired.  Hence, respondent Bank cannot avail itself of
either Section 1, Petition for Relief from Judgment or Section 2, Petition
to Elevate Records for Relief from Order Issued under Rule 19.

We rule that the decision of the Acting Referee in RO4-WCC Case
No. 12725, entitled “Maria V. Dimagiba, Claimant, versus Central Bank of
the Philippines, Res­pondent,” is final and executory.  That “Diabetes Mellitus,
Hypercholesternina, GBD” which petitioner suffered and now claims
compensation, is a compensable
ailment, is conceded by the respondent Commission and not season­ably
controverted by the respondent Bank. 
While the award of medical expenses is claimed to be exorbitant,
respondent Bank, through counsel, has foreclosed its right to question the same
by neglecting to file the necessary petition for review or motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period which could have been done with
a little more fidelity to the lawyer’s oath and a little more sense of responsibility to public duty.

As We have ruled that the respondent Commission may not review
and revise the award of the Acting Referee which has become final and
executory, this Court, for the same reason, is likewise without autho­rity and
jurisdiction to disturb and modify the said award, including the medical
expenses granted to the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reversing and
setting aside the decision of the respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission
dated January 30, 1976 and reinstating the decision of the Acting Referee in
favor of the petitioner-claimant.  We
hereby order the respondent Central Bank of the Philippines to pay:

1.  Claimant the compensation for her total
permanent disability for labor in the sum of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS;
plus the reimbursement of the medical expenses she incurred in the sum of
TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY-NINE and 65/100 (P22,299.65) PESOS;

2.  Her counsel, Atty. Ricardo Perez the
attorney’s fees of SIX HUNDRED (P600.00) PESOS; and

3.  The sum of SIXTY-ONE (P61.00) PESOS as fees
pursuant to Section 55 of the Act, as amended.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Martin, and Fernandez, JJ., concur.