RAFAEL LABASANO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SO HAN SHUI, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal on pure questions of law from the decision dated
May 26, 1966 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, in its civil case 63258, awarding separation pay
and damages to the plain­tiff-appellee Rafael Labasano, to be paid by the defendant-appellant So Han Shui.^[1]

Prior to 1963 Labasano was an employee
of So for 16 years, receiving a daily wage of P8.55.

Sometime in 1963 Labasano was found to
be suffering from “congestive heart failure due to arteriosclerosis”
and was advised by physicians to take a complete rest for 3 to 5 years, and, if
pos­sible, to get himself hospitalized, as he could have a heart attack even
while resting or sleeping.  He was also
warned that a resumption of his job as a driver could gravely endanger his
life.  Labasano
was thus compelled to go on indefinite leave of absence.

On June 5, 1963
he filed with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission a claim against So, on the
basis of which he was awarded in 1965 the amount of P4,180.  For total and permanent disability, he was
paid the amount of P2,332.61 under the Social Security
Act.  In connection with his claim for
SSS benefits, So, writing sometime in 1964 to the SSS claims division, in reply
to a query about the em­ployment status of Labasano,
stated that the latter “has never been separated from the service although
he has not returned for work since he took a leave of absence due to sickness
and received from us on July 30, 1964, the last day of his SSS sickness
benefits.” So likewise stated in his reply that Labasano had not tendered his resig­nation and was not
guilty of any act which would justify his dismissal.

Sometime in 1964 Labasano expressed to
So his desire to resume work, but, as stated in the stipulation of facts
tendered by the parties in the court below, So “refused to act on
plaintiff’s request for reins­tatement unless he could present a medical
certificate is used by a Government physician or hospital stating that said
plaintiff was already cured of his aforesaid ailment.”

On May 22, 1964
the president of the labor union with which Labasano
was affiliated sent a letter informing So that inasmuch as the latter had
refused to give Labasano any separation pay on the
ground that his employment had not been terminated, Labasano
had decided to report for work.  To this
letter, the counsel of So made the following reply:

“Sir:

“In reply to your letter to my client Mr. So Han Shui, Proprietor & General Manager of the United
Commercial Press, dated May 22, 1964, about the alleged decision of the said
Rafael Laba­sano to return to his former job in the
United Commercial Press, I regret to inform you that said establishment can not
allow him to return because he is suffering from a very delicate and dangerous
ailment which can cause his sudden death, and should that happen, God forbid,
while working with the estab­lishment, the latter can be subjected to so much
inconveniences, trouble, and liability.

“The apprehension of Mr. So as stated above is well-founded
because according to Dr. Enrique Villarosa, Labasano’s Physician, Labasano is
suffering from Cardiac Asthma; and after he was sent by Dr. Villarosa
to Dr. Lourdes Zarsadias, a heart specialist, for
further diagnosis, the latter doctor diagnosed Labasano’s
ailment as Congestive Heart Failure due to Arteriosclerosis which, in the
laymen’s terms is the hardening of the arteries – a slow process that grows
with the age of the individual and that with this condition, he can have an
attack even while resting or sleeping. 
(Taken from the deci­sion rendered by the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission dated February 27, 1964, RO4-WC Case No. 2859, Rafael Labasano vs. United Com­mercial Press).

“Due to his above-mentioned delicate and dangerous ailment,
the aforesaid Dr. Villarosa has recommended his
continued confinement in­cluding convalescing or recuperation for a period of
3-5 years from April 26, 1963; and the Social Security System has considered
him as ‘totally and permanently disabled on April 27, 1963’ and because of
which, has already refunded/ paid to the United Commercial Press ‘the balance
of sickness benefits paid after date of disability in favor of Rafael Labasano.’

“In view of all the foregoing medical findings and other facts
and circumstances, Mr. So believes and feels that it is inhuman and risky to
allow Rafael Labasano to work again for the United
Commercial Press after the former has been found to be suffering from a
delicate and dangerous ailment, and declared to be ‘totally and permanently
disabled.'”

Labasano then filed suit with the City
Court of Manila for separation pay and other damages.  His claim was decided adversely against him;
on appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila, how­ever, he obtained a
judgment in his favor on May 26, 1966,
thus:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant
to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,778.40 plus P500.00
for and as attorney’s fees, and another P500.00 for exemplary damages, and
costs of the suit.”

In the appeal at bar, So maintains that (a) R.A. 1052, as amended
by R. A. 1787, otherwise known as the Termination Pay Law, was erroneously
applied by the trial court because Labasano’s
employment with him has not been terminated as there was a mere temporary cessa­tion
in the performance of his work due to his disability; (b) only P1,444.50 (not
P1,778.40) should have been awarded as separation pay as that is the amount
claimed in Labasano’s complaint; and (c) attorney’s
fees and exemplary damages should not have been awarded as So’s
refusal to pay Labasano is based upon a well-grounded
and honest belief that the latter is not entitled to such pay.

We affirm the judgment a quo for the reasons stated
below.

1. The reply of So’s counsel to the
union president, adverted to above, indubitably
demonstrates that insofar as So is concerned, re­sumption by Labasano of his work was an impossibility.  Thus, the first paragraph of the said reply
described So’s nagging
apprehension that Labasano was “suffering from a
very delicate and dangerous ailment which can cause his sudden death”
which, should it occur while Labasano was in So’s employ, could subject the latter “to so much
inconveniences, trouble, and liability.” This apprehension was, in fact,
stressed in the last paragraph of the said reply, thus:

“In view of all the foregoing medical findings and other facts
and circumstances, Mr. So believes and feels that it is inhuman and risky to
allow Rafael Labasano to work again for the United
Commercial Press after the former has been found to be suffering from a
delicate and dangerous ailment, and declared to be ‘totally and permanently
disabled.’”

For all practical purposes, therefore, Labasano was effectively laid off from work.

Still, even in the face of his demonstrated adamant refusal to
allow Labasano to resume work because of the latter’s
“total and per­manent disability,” So failed to comply with the law,
that is, not at any time has he served on Labasano a
categorical written formal notice of termination of employment, as required by
law, nor, in the alter­native, has he paid Labasano
severance benefits.

It is, of course, quite understandable, from an entirely business
viewpoint, that the physical condition of Labasano
which, according to medical findings, was beyond repair, could be expected to
give rise to no less than a rupture in employment relations between him and So;
his ailing condition, after all, directly defeated the very purpose for which
their relationship was established.  But,
conditions such as this were mainly what motivated the formulation of policies
aimed at afford­ing solicitous protection to the workingmen – policies in which
the hard social and economic realities embraced within such terms as
“social justice” and “social conscience” are accorded much
more relevance and greater emphasis than the mere hills and peaks in production
charts that result from maximum use of labor purely as a tool or element for
the production of goods or the provision of services.  Congress’ acute awareness that the employment
of capital entails a certain quantum of social responsibility toward those who
have less in life, was a powerful pressure-factor which made it omit an em­ployee’s
illness as one of the just causes for which an employee serving without any
definite term may be dismissed from employment without any written formal
notice.^[2]
As so aptly stated by this Court in Nadura
vs. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.:^[3]

“Even a cursory reading of the legal pro­vision under
consideration [section 1, R.A. 1052, as amended by R.A. 1787] is sufficient to
convince anyone that, as the trial court said, ‘illness cannot be included as
an analogous cause by any stretch of the imagination.'”

2. The contention that only P1,444.50,
and not P1,778.40, should have been awarded to Labasano,
is completely devoid of merit.  The only
possible relevant question relative to the said adjudication is whether the court a quo, in applying the law, made a wrong
computation of the total termination pay which Labasano
is legally entitled to receive on the basis of his daily salary of P8.55 and
the length of his service.  The
allegations and prayer in his complaint do not here control because the court
must inescapably adjudge that which the law ordains as Labasano’s
full entitlement.

Examining the decision a quo, we are of the view
that the court did not commit any error in its computation.  Thus:

“On the basis of P8.55 daily salary, the monthly wage of the plaintiff
would be P222.30, computed on the basis of 26 days, the average number of
working days in a month.  One-half of
P222.30 is P111.15 which should he multiplied by 16 years, the length of
service of the plaintiff with the defendant, or a total of P1,778.40……”

3. The award of attorney’s fees and exemplary damages should
likewise be affirmed.  The reasoning of
this Court in Nadura, supra, with
reference to the award there of these two items of damages applies squarely to
the case at bar.

This Court in that case, on the basis of facts essentially
similar to those here obtaining, said:

“The lower court declined to make an award of … attorney’s
fees in favor of Nadura on the ground that Benguet contested the latter’s claim in good faith. ….

“. . . . . Article 2208 of the new Civil Code provides…..        that attorney’s
fees may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable…..  Nadura is entitled
to recover attorney’s fees be­cause Benguet’s refusal
to pay him severance pay he was entitled to receive forced him to go to court
to enforce his right . . . . . .

“We also believe that Nadura is
entitled to exemplary or corrective damages which, as well known, are imposed
by way of example or correction for the public good.  These damages are required by public policy,
because wanton acts must be suppressed and discouraged.  From what we have said heretofore, the
conclusion is inevitable that Benguet had no plausi­ble
reason to resist Nadura’s claim for severance pay . .
. . .  It was in duty bound to give him
either one month’s notice in advance or pay the corresponding severance
pay.  Instead of complying with its
obligation in this respect, it resisted Nadura’s
claim and forced him to litigate these many years.  We are, therefore, of the opinion, and so hold,
that Benguet must pay exemplary damages.”

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is affirmed in
toto, at defendant-appellant’s cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., reserves his vote.

^[1]
The motion for reconsideration filed by So Han Shui
on June 28, 1966 was denied
on July 9, 1966.

^[2]
The just causes for the termination of employment are:

“a.  The closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or enterprise, unless the closing is for the purpose of defeating
the intention of this law;

“b.  Serious misconduct or wilful
disobedience by the employee of the orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work;

“c.  Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of
his duties;

“d.  Fraud or wilful
breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or
representative;

“e.  Commission of a crime or offense by the
employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his
family, or representative; and

“f.   Other causes analogous to any of the
foregoing.” (section 1, Rep. Act 1052, as amended
by Rep. Act 1787).

^[3] L-17780, Aug. 24, 1962, 5 SCRA 879 (per
Dizon, J.)