BEATRIZ PATERNO, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. JACOBA T. PATERNO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

This is an appeal from the order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court dismissing its Civil Case No. 01124, for want of jurisdiction.

After their complaint in Civil Case No. 33467 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila^[1]
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, because the principal question involved
therein was the paternity of the late Dr. Jose P. Paterno,
the minors Beatriz and Bernardo Paterno, represented
by their mother, Feliza Orijuela,
commenced a proceeding, on
April 18, 1958, in the juvenile and Domestic Re­lations Court (Civ. Case No. 01124) against Jacoba
T. Paterno and Luis, Vicente, Tomas, Susana and Maria
Lucia, all surname Paterno, the surviving widow and
legitimate children of the said de­ceased.

Plaintiffs minors alleged in their complaint, inter alia, that they are two of the three children
of Jose P. Paterno (who died in­testate on April 17,
1956) begotten out of wedlock with Feliza Orijuela, conceived and born at the time when the deceased was cohabiting with
the latter; that they were in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status
of children of the deceased, shown by his direct and overt acts and those of his family; that on June 26,
1956, after the demise of Jose P. Paterno, the
defendants, in evident bad faith and in fraud of plaintiffs, as compulsory heirs, executed
a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing among themselves the estate of the
deceased consisting of real and personal properties; that on account of the
unlawful and malicious deprivation by defendants, of their rightful share in
the decedent’s estate, plain­tiffs have incurred actual
expenses amounting to P20,000.00; and that, as illegitimate children of the
deceased Dr. Paterno, they are entitled to support and maintenance for
their education and well-­being.  It was,
therefore, prayed the court that (1) their mother Feliza
Orijuela be appointed guardian ad litem; (2) they be declared illegitimate
(adulterous) children of the deceased Dr. Jose P. Pa­terno;
(3) defendants be compelled to recognize them as compulsory heirs of the
deceased; (4) the “Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate” entered into
by the defendants be declared null and void; (5) their share and participation
in the estate be determined, and defendants be compelled to deliver the same to
them; (6) defendants be sentenced, jointly and severally, to pay them actual damages
in the sum of P20,000.00, exemplary
damages for P10,000.00, and moral damages in such amount as the court may fix,
and costs.  They also asked for support pendente lite, for
not less than P2,000.00 a month.

It appears from the records that upon defendants’ filing their
answer, the Honorable N. Almeda-Lopez started
reception of plain­tiffs’ evidence. 
However, on January 11, 1964, prior to a scheduled continuation of the
hearing, the Honorable Judge C. Juliano-Agrava, who
was appointed to the Court, required the parties to show cause why the case should not be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  On April 4, 1964, and after both parties had
submitted their respective memoranda, the court finally ordered the dismissal
of the case, for the reason that where an illegitimate child seeks to participate in
the estate of the deceased putative father, the action becomes essentially one
for recovery of plaintiff’s supposed share in the estate and the question of
paternity becomes merely an incident thereto. 
As the main issue falls
within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, the incidental question of
paternity should also be resolved there, if the splitting of causes of action is to be avoided.  This is the order now subject of the present
appeal.

The parties are agreed that the issue of paternity is within the
competence of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court to entertain.  It cannot be denied either that cases falling
within the jurisdiction of the said special court are specifically enumerated and claims for
participation in the estate of a deceased putative parent, and for damages are
not included therein.^[2]  However, it is also specifically provided in
Republic Act 1401, that should any Matter ordinarily cognizable by the Juvenile
and Domestic Re­lations Court arise as an incident in any case, in the ordinary
courts, such incidental matter is to be resolved in that main case.  The issue to be determined here, therefore,
is which of plaintiffs’ claims (filiation or
participation) constitutes the main cause and which is merely an incident
thereto.

In declaring itself without jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the case, the trial court ruled that the main action here is that for
participation in the estate of the deceased, the issue of paternity becoming
merely an incident thereto; thus, all the issues should be passed upon by the
probate or the ordinary court.

The inherent defect in this conclusion is that it practically
assumes that plaintiffs have a right to share in the estate of the supposed father.  Hence, the giving of more weight and
importance to the claim against the estate. 
But that should not be so.  It
must be remembered that for an illegitimate child not natural to be entitled to
the successional rights mentioned in Articles 287 and
887 of the Civil Code, there must be admission or recognition of his paternity.^[3]  However, in this case, there was no allegation in the appellants’ complaint that they were voluntarily
acknowledged or recognized by the deceased as his illegitimate children.  Instead, it was therein alleged that they
were in continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children of the
late Dr. Paterno, which is a ground for compulsory recognition under Article 283 of the Civil Code.  In fact, plaintiffs prayed the court to compel
the defendants-legitimate heirs of the decedent to recognize their status as
illeg­itimate (adulterous) children of Dr. Paterno.  Clearly, before the claim to participate in
the estate may be prosecuted, plaintiffs’ right to succeed’ must first be established.  Differently stated, plaintiffs’ main action
is that for recognition of their status as illegitimate children of the
deceased, upon which the right to share in the hereditary estate of the
putative father would rest.

On the other hand, we cannot sustain appellants’ contention that
the matters of partition of the estate of the deceased and their claim for
damages may be entertained by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, in the
exercise of “such incidental powers as are generally possessed by courts
of first instance.” (Sec. 1, Rep. Act , 1401).

It must be realized that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court is a court of special jurisdiction, established as an exper­imental or
pilot-project in the City of Manila, to determine how a tribunal specializing
in cases and proceedings affecting children” and domestic relations
can contribute in the drive to curb juvenile delinquency.^[4]
The intent of the lawmakers to confer on such court only limited jurisdiction
is indubitable.  In fact, as originally
drafted?paragraph (f) of Section
1 of the bill which became Republic Act 1401 reads, “actions involving the
conjugal partnership.” It was, however, amended to read “actions for
the separation of property of the spouses”, precisely so as not to deprive
the regular courts of jurisdiction over testate proceedings.^[5]  The discussion in Congress on this point is enlightening —

“MR. ENVERGA.  I have in
mind that this matter also refers to the estate of the decedent, because the
terminology is too general, conjugal partnership, and whenever there is
conjugal partnership property involved, it is my belief that, according to this
bill, the case should be presented in the juvenile delinquency court.  Is that correct?

“MR. FRANCISCO.  I am
grateful to the gentleman from Quezon for his
question, because it would clarify the matter. 
The purpose is not to include settlement of the estate of the deceased.  We are clarifying this for purposes of
interpretation later.  That is why I am
grate­ful to the gentleman for his question, because I believe that the purpose
of the Committee and the spirit of the bill is to give jurisdiction to this
court over questions affecting conjugal partnership between husbands and wives
who are alive.  This would not affect the
settle­ment of the estate of deceased persons.”^[6]

In granting to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
“such incidental powers generally possessed by the court of first
instance”, the law, therefore, could not have intended to confer on this
special tribunal jurisdiction over all, subject matter cognizable by the
ordinary court
of first instance.  The term
“incidental powers” must refer to – the authority to issue such
orders or writs and take such measures as might be necessary to carry out the
functions of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

The above conclusion will, not constitute a violation of the rule
against splitting of cause of action. 
The prohibition provided in the Rules of Court is against the institution of more
than one suit for a single cause of action.  (Sec.
3; Rule
2, Revised Rules of Court).  But, as alleged in the complaint, the
bases for plaintiffs’ various claims would not be the same.  By the creation of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, with its exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving paternity
and acknowledgment, recognition of children and recovery of hereditary shares
can no longer be properly joined as causes of action, since each lies within
the jurisdiction of a different tribunal.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from, insofar as it affects the issue of paternity,
is hereby set aside, and the case is returned to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court for determination of that particular issue.  Costs against the defen­dants-appellees.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, and
Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.

^[1]
wherein plaintiffs-minors sought to be declared illegitimate children and,
therefore, heirs of the deceased
Jose P. Paterno, entitled to participate in the
decedent’s estate.

^[2]
“SEC 38-A. —The Juvenile and Domes tic Relations Court.–         xxx       xxx       xxx

“Provisions of the Judiciary
Act to the contrary not­withstanding, the court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases after the effectivity of this Act:

“(a) Criminal cases cognizable by
the Municipal Court and the Court of First Instance of Manila wherein the ac­cused is under sixteen years of age at the time of the trial;

“(b) Cases involving custody,
guardianship, adoption, paternity and acknowledgment;

“(c) Annulment of marriages,
legal separation of spouses, and action for support;

“(d) Proceedings brought under
the provisions of articles one hundred sixteen, two hundred twenty-five, two
hundred fifty-two and three hundred thirty-two of the Civil Code;

“(e) Petitions for the declaration
of absence and for the change of name;

“(f) Actions for the
separation of property of spouses;

“(g) Proceedings affecting a
dependent or neglected child, as hereinafter defined.

“The court shall likewise have
such incidental powers as are generally possessed by courts of first instance.

“If any question involving any
of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case pending in the
ordinary courts, said incident shall be determined in the main case.”
(Rep. Act 1401)

^[3]
Noble vs. Noble, G. R. No. L-17742, Dec. 17, 1966; Paulino vs.
Paulino, G. R. No. L-15091, Dec. 28, 1961.

^[4]
Explanatory Note to House Bill. No. 2650, which became Republic Act 1401.

^[5]
House Congressional Record, Vol. II, No. 65, May 5, 1955, pp. 2388-2389.

^[6]
Ibid., p. 2379.