PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CATALINO MARANAN Y ABILLON, ALIAS TING, OR TINGA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Indicted for Murder before the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXV, at Caloocan City,
the accused Catalino Maranan
was found guilty as charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

The accused has appealed.

The prosecution has summarized its evidence as follows:

“At about 8:00 o’clock
in the evening of April 22, 1972,
Federico Lirio, Arthur Mangandel
and several others were playing ‘cara y cruz‘ somewhere at Bulacan Street, Caloocan City.  The appellant, Catalino
Maranan, disrupted the game by grabbing the coins
being used therein.  When Federico Lirio told him that they were not adversaries, the
appellant got mad and uttered bad words against the former.  Federico Lirio, who
was a jeepney driver, together with a fellow driver,
Rolando Alcantara, left and proceeded to A.
Mabini Street,
Caloocan City
to ply their route (pp. 7-10, tsn, April 14, 1977).

“Upon their return, at around 11:00
o’clock and 12:00 o’clock p.m.,
Rolando Alcantara was at the wheel of the jeepney of Federico Lirio.  At the front seat of the same jeepney was Federico Lirio,
seated between the driver and Alfonso Santos nicknamed ‘Jun’.  While the jeepney
was slowly cruising along 10th Avenue
in Caloocan
City, appellant, who was at the
corner of Bulacan Street,
near a drum, and from that distance of barely four (4) meters away from the
vehicle, aimed a .22 caliber gun at them and fired twice.  Alfonso Santos nicknamed ‘Jun’ was hit on the
forehead.  He fell from the vehicle.  Another passenger, Lorenzo Francisco,
nicknamed ‘Enchong‘, who was seated at the rear, was
also hit on the right knee (pp. 10-14, 16-20, & 30, tsn,
April 14, 1977; pp. 8-11, tsn, May 10, 1977).

“The gunshot wound inflicted upon Alfonso Santos proved
fatal.  He died as a result.  An autopsy conducted on the victim disclosed
that the cause of death was a gunshot wound on the right side of the forehead
which penetrated the frontal, parietal and temporal lobes of the brain’s right
hemisphere.  The slug was lodged at and recovered
from the subdural portion, parietal lobe of the right
side of the brain (Exh. ‘C’).  The victim also suffered a grazing wound at
the dorsal aspect of the hand, left side from the base of the middle finger to
the middle phalange.  (pp. 4, 6, 10-13,
& 18, tsn, July 19, 1977).”^[1]

The defense invokes alibi, with the accused giving his own
version of the incident as follows:  that
between the hours of eleven o’clock and twelve o’clock in the evening of April
21, 1972, he was driving a Lady Helen taxi as he was on night shift starting
from five o’clock in the afternoon of April 22, 1972 up to five o’clock in the
morning of April 23, 1972; that the gambling incident happened on April 21,
1972 and not on April 22, 1972; that when he arrived at the gambling place,
Federico Lirio was holding the coins used as “pangara“; that after he noticed that his friends were
losing the game in an unclean manner, he asked that the gambling be stopped
because he knew that Lirio was a hustler; that
shortly after, his friends grabbed their money from Lirio,
who got mad and uttered foul language against him, saying “Putang ina mo, bakit mo kami pinakikialaman“;
that Lirio tried to fight him, but he avoided trou­ble,
so, he went home right away; that around nine o’clock in the morning of April
23, 1972, while he was on his way home, he saw Lirio
again somewhere at 10th Avenue who uttered these words in the vernacular:  “If not for you, no one will be shot at;
you are a ‘sumbungero‘ “; that immediately after
the said incident, he went home to take a rest; that Lirio
did not mention to him the names of those who were allegedly shot at; that he
does not know the deceased Alfonso Santos nor the injured per­son, Lorenzo
Francisco; that he learned of their having been shot only on April 23, 1972
when he was about to report for work at Tandang Sora, Quezon City.  Appellant denied having fired at the jeepney where the victims were riding but declared that he
knows of no reason why the prosecution witnesses would implicate him in this
case.

On cross-examination, appellant admitted that Lirio
is smaller than he; that he knows Lirio as a jeepney driver, but does not know Lorenzo Francisco; that
he has no grudge against Lirio with whom he had quarrelled because he was able to stop the gambling and he
is not an aggressive person; that after April 22, 1972, he and his wife moved
their residence to Pasig where his brother lives;
that he learned on April 23, 1972 that he was being sought by the police, so,
he informed his brother about the incident in Caloocan
City involving him; that his brother advised him to present himself to the
police authorities so that the truth may be known but he did not obey such
advice; that he did not report to the police prior to his arrest because he was
afraid, as he would have to pass by the scene of the incident and was worried
about the threats against his life made by Lirio and
his companions who are tough guys in the place; that after April 23, 1972, he
continued to drive the Lady Helen taxi, taking no definite routes, but drove
around the Metro Manila area; that after May, 1972, he did not know that he was
the subject of a warrant of arrest for the alleged crime of murder, and that he
had no knowledge that a criminal complaint had been filed against him; and that
he was suddenly arrested in 1976 at his workplace at Tandang
Sora, Quezon City.^[2]

On December 29, 1977,
the trial Court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby
renders judgment, finding and declaring the defendant, Catalino
Maranan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder, as embodied in the information, without any mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance.

The imposable penalty is covered by Art. 247 of the Revised Penal
Code, which is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, to death.  Since there is no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, the medium penalty is imposed, which is reclusion perpetua.

The Court hereby sentences the accused, Catalino
Maranan, to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided for by law,
and to pay the costs; to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Alfonso Santos, in
the mount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Accused is fully credited during the time he has undergone
preventive imprisonment by reason of this case.

SO ORDERED.”^[3]

The records disclose that although the warrant for the arrest of
appellant was issued on July 6, 1972
it remained un­served and was instead referred to the
National Bureau of Investigation.  The
case was archived for some time and was reinstated after the accused was
arrested on October 25, 1976.

The defense attributes the following errors to the Trial Court.

“I

The Court a quo erred in convicting accused, Catalino Maranan, of the crime of
Murder by giving credence to the contradictory and irreconcilable testimonies
of the prosecution’s alleged eye witnesses.

“II

The Court a quo erred in appreciating and making the
circumstance of flight as basis in convicting accused-appellant despite the
absence of direct or corroborative evidence showing his guilt or participation
in the offense charged.”

We find no merit to either assignment.

The prosecution witnesses, Federico Lirio
and Lorenzo Francisco, both of whom were passengers of the jeepney
at the time of the shooting incident, positively identified appellant as the
assailant.  The categorical
identification by said two eyewitnesses was not successfully rebutted.  Lirio knew the
accused at least ten (10) years prior to the incident^[4],
while Francisco knew him well since he was a small boy because his eldest
sister used to hire appellant’s jeep.^[5]
It was also established that the scene of the crime was brightly illu­minated
as there was light from the electric post aside from the lights coming from the
gasoline station just on the oppo­site side of the road. ^[6]

Appellant was not without motive in consummating his criminal
design.  On the same date of the shooting
incident, appellant and Lirio had a heated
confrontation while the latter and friends of the accused were gambling when
appellant disrupted and stopped the game. 
Despite assertions on appellant’s part that he harbored no grudge
against Lirio after their quarrel, the circumstances
of the shooting incident belie his contention and bespeak of his motive in
firing at the jeepney in which Lirio
was riding.  Appellant fired at the
intended victim, Lirio, but hit, instead, two of his
co-passengers that resulted in the killing of Alfonso Santos and injury to
Lorenzo Francisco.

While, as in the case at bar, motive is unnecessary to prove
appellant’s guilt since the eyewitnesses positively identified appellant as the
assailant, yet, there is enough proof of such appellant’s motive, which tends
to corroborate the evidence establishing his guilt.^[7]

Appellant’s defense of alibi is unavailing.  His allegations that he was somewhere else at
the time of the commission of the crime as he was then driving a Lady Helen
taxi on night shift starting from five o’clock in the afternoon of April 22,
1972 up to five o’clock in the early morning of April 23, 1972, are mere
self-serving statements and bare assertions, uncorroborated by other competent
evidence.  Alibi cannot pre­vail against
positive identification by prosecution witnesses.^[8]

Significant, too, is the fact that appellant had not positively
shown that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of said
crime at the time of its commission.^[9]
Appellant’s admission that in driving his taxi he had no definite route, but
that he drove it within the Greater Manila area only, does not rule out the
physical possibility that appellant could have driven his cab to the scene of
the crime at or about the time of the shooting incident and there he waited for
his intended victim, Lirio.

Coming now to the alleged conflicting and irreconcilable
testimonies of Lirio and Francisco — Lirio testified that appellant was in a kneeling position
when the latter fired on them, while Francisco declared that appellant was
standing.  The defense then makes capital
of the fact that if the appellant were in a kneeling position when he pulled
the trigger of the gun, the trajectory of the bullet on the victim Alfonso
Santos could not have been downwards from the point of the entry at the
forehead.^[10]
This circumstance, however, was well-explained, by Dr. Orlando Salvador, the
NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied the victim’s cadaver, who stated that it
was difficult to ascertain the relative position of the victim when he was shot
considering the mobility of the head which was fatally hit.  We quote the pertinent portions of his
testimony:

“Q   Now,
this wound on the forehead, from the nature and description of this wound,
can you tell this Court what would be the position of the victim at the time he
was allegedly shot at?

A     Well,
the head being a movable portion of the body, it would be hard to pinpoint the
position.  Because of the mobility of the
head, it can be moved either side.  But
granting if the two (2) are facing each other, the head must be bowed a little.  If the victim is shorter or if they are of
the same height, it should be bowed or the gun should be a little bit lower or
if the gun is pointed, it should be bowed a little.

COURT:

Q    If the triggerman is in a
higher elevation?

A     Yes, your Honor.

FISCAL:  

Q    In a seated position …

COURT:

Q.   What
is the relative position of the assailant and the victim, were they facing each
other or what?

A     Well,
as I said, because of the mobility of the head, you cannot exactly pinpoint the
exact position.

Q    Even
the body of that matter, the body is movable also?

A     Well,
if the victim is sitting down like I do now and the assailant is on your side,
your Honor, I should have to position my face on your direction and little bit
stooping.

Q    In
that case, the Court gathers that more or less, they were facing each other?

A     Yes,
your Honor.

Q   
Because the head was facing the assailant?

A 
   Yes, your Honor, may be on the
side or just in front.

Q    Either
directly infront or the assailant is a little bit on
the side?

A     Yes,
sir.”^[11]

And, as aptly observed by the Solicitor
General, “the victim could have unintentionally moved his head or that he
tried to duck from the shot, both of which would explain the downward
trajectory of the bullet.”^[12]

Appellant also claims that Lirio’s head count of four (4) passengers inside the jeepney at the time of the shooting incident is contrary to
Francisco’s declaration that there were at least thirteen (13) passengers.  Likewise, appellant pointed out that Lirio estimated the relative distance of the accused from
the motor vehicle when the latter fired his gun upon the jeep to be about four
(4) meters away, as against Francisco’s estimate of approximately ten (10)
meters.  We find them, however, to be
only minor details that do not destroy the veracity and credibility of said
witnesses.  It simply shows that the
witnesses were not coached or rehearsed.

“Inconsistencies in witnesses’ testimony do not destroy the
credibility of the witnesses who positively identified the accused as
perpetrator of the crime.”^[13]

“Minor inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses who were
present at the time the killing of the deceased was being done will not
adversely affect their credibility.”^[14]

“Where there was inconsistency in the testimony of a witness
as to the number of gunshots fired by the accused, such inconsistency is a
minor matter not denoting intent of the witness to utter a falsehood.”^[15]

Basically, the crucial issue is one of credibility.  That issue must be resolved in the light of the
well-entrenched rule that where the issues raised hinge on the credibility of
witnesses, the factual findings of the trial Court deserve the highest respect
and weight by Appellate TribunaIs, considering that
said Court was in the best position to observe personally the demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying.^[16]

“x x x
This rule should not be overturned unless there is a showing that in making the
disputed factual finding, the trial court had overlooked or failed to consider
certain facts of weight and importance that could have materially affected the
conclusion reached in the case.  In the
instant case, there is no positive reason that would justify a reversal of the
judgment appealed from.”^[17]

In this case, it has not been successfully shown that the Trial
Court had overlooked certain facts of substance and value, that, if properly
considered, might affect the outcome of the case.

In respect of the second assignment of error, the defense
incorrectly alleges that the circumstance of appellant’s flight was the Trial
Court’s basis in convicting him.  That
was not so.  Flight was merely considered
by the Trial Court as an additional circumstance indicative of guilt.

By his own admission, appellant learned on April 23, 1972, or a
day after the shooting incident, that the police authorities were looking for
him.  Despite such knowledge and
notwithstanding the advice of his brother to report to the police to find out
why he was being sought by the authorities, he did not present himself nor
surrender to the police.  In fact,
appellant stated that he avoided passing by the crime scene because he was
allegedly worried about the threats made by Lirio and
his companions against his (appellant’s) life.^[18]
Instead, appellant transferred his residence to Pasig so that he could not be
arrested until four years later.

“While the flight of an accused person after the commission of an
offense creates no legal presumption of guilt, it is nevertheless a
circumstance which is admissible in evidence against him, and, if not explained
in a manner consistent with his innocence, is to be considered as tending to
show that he was the person who committed the deed”.^[19]

“Flight of accused after commission of the offense is a
circumstantial evidence indicating guilt, on the biblical adage that ‘. . . the
wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous
are as bold as the lion'”.^[20]

In sum, there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of appellant’s
guilt.  The crime is Murder, qualified by
treachery under Article 248 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.  Appellant had positioned himself at a
distance from moving vehicles and near a drum in such a way that there was no
danger nor risk to himself arising from any defense that the intended victim
might make.  Suddenly, without any
warning, he shot his target, Lirio, who was then
unarmed and had no chance of putting up a defense.  Neither could the two individuals, who were
hit, have put a defense against the attack. 
That the fatality was not the intended victim, Lirio,
as the gunshot directed at the latter killed instead, Alfonso Santos, does not
exonerate appellant from criminal liability. 
He is responsible for the consequences of his acts.

“As the appellant committed the act with intent to kill and
with treachery, the purely accidental circumstance that as a result of the
shots a person other than the one intended was killed, does not modify the
nature of the crime nor lessen his criminal responsibility, and he is
responsible for the consequences of his acts”.^[21]

“The qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly
considered even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the
defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the
two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack or become
aware of it”.^[22]

The penalty of reclusion perpetua,
meted out by the trial court is in accordance with law, there being no
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime.^[23]

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.

Costs against the accused, Catalino Maranan.

SO ORDERED.

Abad Santos*, Plana, Escolin, and Relova, JJ., concur.

^[1] Rollo, pp. 60-61.

^[2] T.s.n., August 4,
1977, pp. 5-32.

^[3] Rollo, pp. 11-12.

^[4] T.s.n., April 14,
1977, p. 15.

^[5] T.s.n., May 10,
1977, pp. 12-13.

^[6] T.s.n., April
14, 1977, p. 15.

^[7]
People vs. Bernat, 120 SCRA 919 (1983); People
vs. Pajenado, 69 SCRA 173 (1976); People vs.
Sales, 44 SCRA 489 (1972); People vs. Villalba,
17 SCRA 948 (1966).

^[8]People
vs. Lucero, 96 SCRA 694 (1980); People vs. Martinez,
96 SCRA 714, 715 (1980); People vs. Herila, 51
SCRA 31 (1973).

^[9]
People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 233 (1980); People vs. Beralde, 91 SCRA 128 (1979); People vs. Artieda, 90 SCRA 145-146 (1979); People vs. Dueno, 90 SCRA 24 (1979).

^[10]
p. 6, Appellant’s Brief.

^[11] T.s.n., July 19,
1977, pp. 14-16.

^[12] Rollo, p. 67.

^[13]
People vs. Celestino, 96 SCRA 489 (1980); see
also People vs. Estero, 91 SCRA 93 (1979).

^[14]
People vs. Llanto, 88 SCRA 9 (1979).

^[15]
People vs. Lanseta, 95 SCRA 167 (1980).

^[16]
People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 233 (1980); People vs. Garcia, 89
SCRA 440 (1979); People vs. Gargoles, 83 SCRA
282 (1978); People vs. Eguac, 80 SCRA 667
(1977); People vs. Ancheta, 60 SCRA 334
(1974); People vs. Boduso, 60 SCRA 61 (1974);
People vs. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 632 (1974); People vs. Carandang, 52 SCRA 259 (1973); People vs. Espejo, 36 SCRA 401 (1970).

^[17]
People vs. Monaga, 118 SCRA 468 (1982).

^[18] T.s.n., August 4,
1977, pp. 21-24.

^[19] U.S.
vs. Virrey, 37 Phil. 618 (1918).

^[20]
People vs. Molleda, 86 SCRA 672 (1978).

^[21] People
vs. Guevarra, 23 SCRA 72 (1968).

^[22]
People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307 (1950);
People vs. Tolentino, et al., 82 Phil. 808
(1949); People vs. Mamasalaya, et al., 92
Phil. 640 (1953); People vs. Gatbunton,
L-2435, 88 Phil. 784 (1950).

^[23] Article
248, in relation to Article 64(1), Revised Penal Code.

* Associate Justices Vicente Abad
Santos and Vicente Escolin were designated to sit in
the First Division vice Associate Justices Claudio Teehankee,
Chairman and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. who are on official leave.  (Per Special Order No. 251, dated September
23, 1983).