G.R. No. L-18527. June 29, 1963

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. PATRICIO C. CENIZA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL AND TEODORO DUMALAGAN, RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions June 29, 1963 PAREDES, J.:
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PAREDES, J.:


Sometime in 1951, respondent Teodoro Dumalagan, filed Registration
Case No. N-17, L.R.C. Record No. 4458, with the CFI of Misamis
Occidental, covering a parcel of land of 78.3080 hectares, and situated
in barrio Dampalan-Luzaran, Municipality of Lopez Jaena, same province.
The Director of Lands, on October 24, 1951, presented an opposition,
claiming that the land applied for is a portion of the public domain.
Trial was subsequently held. After the applicant had presented his
evidence, the Director of Lands, thru counsel, orally moved for the
dismissal of the application on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. Reservation to present evidence was not asked. Respondent
Judge denied the verbal motion to dismiss in an order dated March 23,
1961 (Annex B), and considered the case submitted for decision on the
merits.

Petitioner, as therein oppositor, moved for a reconsideration of the
above order and asked that it be allowed to present its evidence;
arguing that the absence of reservation on the part of petitioner’s
counsel, did not amount to a waiver of its right to do so. On May 17,
1961, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration, as not
well taken.

This Order and the one denying the motion for reconsideration, are
now before Us, on a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, with
Preliminary Injunction. Petitioner alleges that respondent Judge
committed grave abuse of discretion or a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; an unlawful
neglect to perform an act which the law specifically enjoined as a duty
resulting from his (respondent judge’s) office, and excluded him
(Director of Lands), from the enjoyment of a right to which he was
entitled— the duty to give party to a litigation, a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and his right to present his side; and that
there was no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. The petition also prayed for a preliminary
writ of injunction, to enjoin the respondent judge from rendering
judgment in the application of respondent Teodoro Dumalagan. This Court
gave due course to the petition and issued a preliminary writ of
injunction, as prayed for, on June 28, 1961.

At the time the present controversy was being ventilated, the rule
governing the subject-matter, which was a clarification of the
doctrines on earlier cases (Arroyo vs. Azur, 76 Phil. 495, April 13, 1946; Guido vs. Castelo, L-1613, May 24, 1948, 81 Phil. 81; Ocum et al. vs. Nunez, et al., 97 Phil., 762; Montelibano, et al. vs. Bacolod Murcia, etc., L-15092, Sept. 29, 1962), was—

“After the plaintiff has completed the presentation
of his evidence, the defendant without waiving his right to offer
evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff
had shown no right to relief. However, if the motion is granted and the
order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant losses his right
to present evidence in his behalf.”

This rule is now embodied in the Revised Rules of Court, section 1,
Rule 35, captioned Judgment and Demurrer to Evidence, which will take
effect on January 1, 1964. It is, therefore, evident that the
respondent court, in the case at bar, after denying the motion to
dismiss, for insufficiency of evidence, (demurrer to the evidence),
should have permitted the petitioner-defendant to present its own
evidence, notwithstanding its failure or omission to make a
reservation, to that effect;, more so, as in this particular case, when
the petitioner-defendant had asked to be given a day in court, in order
to defend the government’s title to a 78 hectare parcel of land.

IN VIEW HEREOF, the writ is granted; the orders complained of are SET ASIDE, and the respondent Court is directed to proceed with the
trial of the case, until its final termination. The preliminary
injunction earlier issued is made permanent. Without pronouncement as
to costs.

Padilla, Bautista, Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur