LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. MANUEL DUMYUNG, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, AND THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, Branch I, dismissing the three complaints for
annulment of titles in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 entitled
“Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Manuel Dumyung, et al., Defendants, Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company, Intervenor” for
being without merit.^[1]

The Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Director of Lands, commenced in the Court of First Instance
of Baguio City Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070
for annulment of Free Patents Nos. V-152242,
V-155050 and V-152243, and
of the corresponding Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-210 and P-209, on the ground of
misrepresentation and false data and informations furnished by the defendants, Manuel Dumyung, Fortunato Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan, respectively. 
The lands embraced in the patents and titles are identified as Lots 1, 2
and 3 of survey plan Psu-181763
containing a total area of 58.4169 hectares, more or less, and situated in the
Municipal District of Mankayan, Sub-province
of Benguet,
Mountain Province.  The Register of Deeds of Baguio
City was made a formal party defendant.

The complaints in Civil
Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 are all dated September 22, 1961.^[2]

The defendants filed
their respective answers.^[3]

The Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company, petitioner herein, filed motions for intervention dated February 5, 1962 in the three (3) civil cases^[4]
which were granted.^[5]

The complaints in intervention alleged that a portion of the
titled lands in question is within the intervenor’s
ordinary timber license No. 140-’62 dated July 7, 1961 expiring and up for
renewal on June 30, 1962 and another portion
of said lands is embraced in its mineral claims.^[6]

The defendants in the three (3) civil cases filed an amended
joint answer with counterclaim to the complaint in intervention.^[7]
The said amended joint answer
was admitted in an order dated September 10, 1972.^[8]

Before the hearing on the merits of the three (3) civil cases,
the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of
Lands, filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio
City three (3) criminal cases for falsification of public documents, docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 2358, 2359 and 2360, against the defendants Manuel Dumyung,
Fortunato Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan, private
respondents herein, for allegedly making untrue statements in their
applications for free patents over the lands in question.  The proceedings on the three (3) civil cases
were suspended pending the outcome of the criminal cases.

After the presentation of
evidence by the prosecution in the three (3) criminal cases, the defense filed
a motion to dismiss the same on the ground that the accused had complied with
all the legal requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were duly
issued by the Director of Lands and that they are not guilty of the alleged
falsification of public documents.

In an order dated December
6, 1967, the trial court sustained the theory of the defense and
dismissed the three (3) criminal cases,
with costs de officio, for insufficiency of evidence to sustain
the conviction of the three (3) accused.^[9]

Thereupon, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss dated October
12, 1968 in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 on the following grounds:  (1) extinction of the penal action carries
with it the extinction of the civil action when the extinction proceeds from a
declaration that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist; (2)
the decision of the trial court acquitting the defendants of the crime charged
renders these civil cases moot and academic; (3) the trial court has no
jurisdiction to order
cancellation of the patents issued by the Director of Lands; (4) the certificates of title in question can no
longer be assailed; and (5) the intervenor Lepanto has no legal interest in the subject matter in
litigation.^[10]

The Court of First Instance of Baguio,
Branch I, dismissed the three (3) civil cases because:

“After a careful examination and deliberation of the MOTION TO
DISMISS, these civil cases filed by the defendants as well as the two
OPPOSITIONS TO MOTION TO DISMISS filed by both plaintiff and intervenor Lepanto Consolidated
Mining Company and the records of all the three civil cases, it clearly shows
that upon the issuance of said Free Patents on November 26, 1960, the same were
duly registered with the office of the
Register of Deeds of Baguio and Benguet,
pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 122 of Act 496, as amended, and consequently,
these properties became the private properties of the defendants, under the
operation of Sec. 38 of said Act; hence, these titles enjoy the same privileges
and safeguards as Torrens titles (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, G.R. No. L-12485, July 31,
1964).  It is therefore clear that OCT Nos. P-208,
P-209 and P-210 belonging to the defendants are now indefeasible and this Court
has no power to disturb such indefeasibility of said titles, let alone cancel
the same.

The records of this case further disclose that the defendants are
ignorant natives of Benguet
Province and are members of the
so-called Cultural Minorities of Mountain Province, who are the same persons
accused in the dismissed criminal cases, based on the same grounds.  It should be noted that these cases fall
squarely under Sec. 3 of Rule III of the New Rules of Court.”^[11]

The plaintiff, Republic
of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, and
the intervenor, Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company, filed separate motions for reconsideration of the
order dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070.^[12] Both motions for reconsideration were denied
by the trial court.^[13] Thereupon, the intervenor,
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, filed the
instant petition.

The petitioner assigns the following errors:

“I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE ‘INDEFEASIBLE’ SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY WERE
ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE REGISTRATION OF THE FREE PATENTS OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.

“II

THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3872.

“III

THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE CRIMINAL
CASES FOR FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BARRED THE CIVIL ACTIONS FOR ANNULMENT
OF THE FREE PATENTS AND CANCELLATION OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OF
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.”^[14]

Timber and mineral lands
are not alienable or disposable.  The
pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provide:

“Sec. 2.  The provisions
of this Act shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but timber and
mineral lands shall be governed by special laws and nothing in this Act
provided shall be understood or construed to change or modify the
administration and disposition of the lands commonly called ‘friar lands’ and those
which, being privately owned, have reverted to or become the property of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, which administration and disposition shall be
governed by the laws at present in force or which may hereafter be
enacted.”

“Sec. 6.  The President,
upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall
from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into –

(a)     Alienable or
disposable,

(b)     Timber, and

(c)     Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer
such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their administration
and disposition.”

The principal factual
issue raised by the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the
Director of Lands, and the intervenor, petitioner
herein, is that the lands covered by the patents and certificates of title are
timber lands and mineral lands and, therefore, not alienable.  Without receiving evidence, the trial court
dismissed the three (3) cases on the ground that upon the issuance of the free
patents on November 26, 1960, said patents were duly registered in the Office
of the Registry of Deeds of Baguio pursuant to
Section 122 of Act 496, as amended, and said properties became the private
properties of the defendants under the operation of Section 38 of the
Land Registration Act.  The trial court
concluded that these titles enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as the torrens title, and Original Certificates of Title Nos.
P-208, P-209 and P-210 of the defendants are now indefeasible.

In its order denying the
motion for reconsideration, the trial court said:

“On the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Director of Lands to dispose of the properties since they are within the forest
zone, the court finds Republic Act No. 3872, to clear this point.  Section 1, amending Section 44 of the Land
Act in its second paragraph states:

‘A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously
occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest,
a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall
be entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this
section:  PROVIDED, that at the time he
files his free patent application, he is not the owner of any real property
secured or disposable under this provision of the Public Land Law.’

The ‘preceding paragraph’ refers to the right of a person to have a
free patent issued to him, provided he is qualified, which in this case the
Director of Lands has the jurisdiction to dispose, whether the land be
disposable or not.  This provision of
law, certainly, applies to herein defendants. 
The reason for this law is explicit and could very well be seen from its
EXPLANATORY NOTE, which reads:

‘Because of the aggressiveness of our more enterprising Christian
brothers in Mindanao, Mountain Province, and other places inhabited by members of
the National Cultural Minorities, there has been an exodus of the poor and less
fortunate non-christians from their ancestral homes
during the last ten years to the fastnesses of the wilderness where they have
settled in peace on portions of agricultural lands, unfortunately, in most
cases, within the forest zones.  But this
is not the end of the tragedy of the national cultural minorities.  Because of the grant of pasture leases or
permits to the more agressive Christians, these
National Cultural Minorities who have settled in the forest zones for the last
ten years have been harassed and jailed or threatened with harassment and imprisonment.

The thesis behind the additional paragraph to Section 44 of the
Public Land Act is to give the national cultural minorities a fair chance to
acquire lands of the public domain.’ x x x.

It is for this reason – that is, to give
these national cultural minorities who were driven from their ancestral abodes,
a fair chance to acquire lands of the public domain -, that Republic Act 3872
was passed.  This is the new government
policy on liberalization of the free patent provisions of the Public Land Act
emphasizing more consideration to and sympathy on the members of the national
cultural minorities, which our courts of justice must uphold.”^[15]

The trial court assumed
without any factual basis that the private respondents are entitled to the
benefits of Republic Act 3872.  The
pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 3872 reads:

“SECTION 1.  A new
paragraph is hereby added to Section 44 of Commonwealth Act Numbered One
hundred forty-one, to read as follows:

“SEC. 44.  Any
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than
twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, nineteen hundred and twenty-six
or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself
or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public
lands subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate tax
thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this chapter,
to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not
to exceed twenty-four hectares.

“A member of the national cultural minorities who has
continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest,
a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall
be entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this
section:  Provided, That at the time he
files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real property
secured or disposable under this provision of the Public Land Law.”

There
is no evidence that the private
respondents are members of the National Cultural Minorities; that they have continuously occupied and cultivated either by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest the lands in question since July
4, 1955; and that they are not the
owner of any land secured or
disposable under the Public Land Act at the time they filed the free patent
applications.  These qualifications must
be established by evidence. 
Precisely, the intervenor, petitioner herein,
claims that it was in possession of the lands in question when the private
respondents applied for free patents thereon.

It was premature for the
trial court to rule on whether or not the titles based on the patents awarded
to the private respondents have become
indefeasible.  It is well settled that a
certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain
classified as forest or timber and mineral lands.  Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall
be cancelled.^[16] In Director of Lands vs. Abanzado^[17] this Court said:

“4.  To complete the picture, reference may be made
to the learned and scholarly opinion of Justice Sanchez in Director of Forestry
v. Muñoz, a 1968 decision.  After a review of Spanish legislation, he
summarized the present state of the law thus: 
‘If a Spanish title covering forest land is found to be invalid, that
land is public forest land, is part of the public domain, and cannot be appropriated.  Before private interests have intervened, the
government may decide for itself what portions of the public domain shall be
set aside and reserved as forest land. 
Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.’ Nor is this all.  He
reiterated the basic state objective on the matter in clear and penetrating
language:  ‘The view this Court takes of
the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed
with respect to forest lands.  Many have
written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, above the pressing
need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and
reforestation.  Not without
justification.  For, forests constitute a
vital segment of any country’s natural resources.  It is of common knowledge by now that absence
of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill
effects of serious proportions.  Without
the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of
their contents.  The fish
disappears.  Denuded areas become dust
bowls.  As waterfalls cease to function,
so will hydroelectric plants.  With the
rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results.  With erosion come the dreaded floods that
wreak havoc and destruction to property – crops, livestock, houses and highways
– not to mention precious human lives, x x x.'”

The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal cases
for falsification is not a bar to the civil cases to cancel their titles.  The only
issue in the criminal
cases for falsification was whether
there was evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the private respondents
had committed the acts of falsification alleged in the informations.  The factual issues of whether or not the lands in question are timber or mineral lands and whether or not
the private respondents are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act No. 3872
were not in issue in the criminal cases.

There is need to remand these cases to the trial court for the
reception of evidence on (1) whether or not the lands in question are timber
and mineral lands; and (2) whether the private respondents belong to the
cultural minorities and are qualified under Republic Act 3872 to be issued free
patents on said lands.

WHEREFORE, the order dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1968, 1969 and 1970 of the Court
of First Instance of Baguio City is hereby set aside
and said cases are remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Annex “L”, Rollo, pp. 104-106.

^[2]
Annex “A”, Rollo, pp. 20-23, Annex “A-1”, Rollo, pp. 24-27; and Annex “A-2”, Rollo, pp. 28-31.

^[3]
Annex “B”, Annex
“B-1” and Annex “B-2”, Rollo, pp. 32-47.

^[4]
Annex “C”, Annex “C-1” and Annex “C-2”, Rollo, pp. 48-54.

^[5]
Annex “D”, Rollo, pp. 55-56.

^[6]
Annex “E”, Annex “E-1” and Annex “E-2”, Rollo, pp. 57-65.

^[7]
Annex “F-1”, Rollo, pp. 68-72.

^[8]
Annex “F-2”, Rollo, p. 73.

^[9]
Rollo, p. 105.

^[10]
Annex “H”, Rollo, pp. 77-84.

^[11]
Rollo, pp. 105-106.

^[12]
Annexes “M” and “N”,
Rollo, pp. 107-117.

^[13]
Annex “O”, Rollo, pp.
118-120.

^[14]
Brief for Petitioner, pp. a-b.

^[15]
Annex “O”, Rollo, pp. 119-120.

^[16]
Ledesma vs. Municipality
of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769.

^[17]
65 SCRA 5.