JOSE L. LAXAMANA, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE T. BALTAZAR, RESPONDENT.

When in July 1952 the mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga, was
suspended, the vice-mayor Jose T. Baltazar, assumed office as mayor by virtue of
section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. However, the provincial
governor, acting under section 21 (a) of the Revised Election Code (R. A. 180),
with the consent of the provincial board appointed Jose L. Laxamana, as mayor of
Sexmoan, who immediately took the corresponding official oath.

Result: this quo warranto proceeding, based solely on the
petitioner’s proposition that the section first mentioned has been repealed by
the subsequent provision of the Revised Election Code.

If there was such repeal, this petition should be granted, and
Laxamana declared the lawful mayor of Sexmoan. Otherwise it must be denied.^[1]

The two statutory provisions read as follows:

“SEC. 2195.—Temporary disability of mayor.—Upon the occasion
of the absence, suspension, or other temporary disability of the Mayor, his
duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor, or if there be no Vice-Mayor, by
the councilor who at the last general election received the highest number of
votes.”

“SEC. 21 (a). Vacancy in elective provincial, city or municipal
office.—Whenever a temporary vacancy in any elective local office occurs, the
same shall be filled by appointment by the President if it is a provincial or
city office, and by the provincial governor, with the consent of the
provincial board, if it is a municipal office.” (E. A. 180, the Revised Election
Code.)

SEC. 21 (a)—The portion relating to municipal offices was taken
from section 2180 of the Revised Administrative Code, which partly provided:

“SEC. 2180. Vacancies in municipal office.—(a) In case of a
temporary vacancy in any municipal office, the same shall be filled by
appointment by the provincial governor, with the consent of the provincial
board.

(b) In case of a permanent vacancy in any municipal office, the
same shall be filled by appointment by the provincial board, except in case of a
municipal president, in which the permanent vacancy shall be filled by the
municipal vice-president” * * *

It will be seen that under this section, when the office of
municipal president (now mayor) became permanently vacant the vice-president
stepped into the office. The section omitted reference to temporary vacancy of
such office because section 2195 governed that contingency. In this regard
sections 2180 and 2195 supplemented each other. Paragraph (a) of section 2180
applied to municipal offices in general, other than that of the municipal
president.

Under the Revised Administrative Code,—specially the two
sections indicated—there was no doubt in Government circles that when the
municipal president was suspended from office, the vice-president took his
place.

“Temporary vacancy in office of municipal president.—Paragraph
(a) of this section (2180) should be construed to cover only municipal offices
other than the office of president. Section 2195 of the Administrative Code
should be applied in case of the absence, suspension, or other temporary
disability of the municipal president. (Op. Atty. Gen., Sept. 21, 1917; Ins.
And., Oct. 23, 1927.)” (Araneta, Administrative Code Vol. IV p. 2838)

“Municipal president cannot designate acting president.—There
is no provision of law expressly or implied authorizing the municipal president
to designate any person to act in his stead during his temporary absence or
disability. From the provision of section 2195 of 4his Code, it is clear that
the vice-president or, if there be no vice-president, the councilor who at the
last general election received the highest number of votes, should automatically
(without any formal designation) discharge the duties of the president.” (Op.
Ins. Aud., March 2, 1926.) (Araneta, Administrative Code Vol. IV, p. 2839).

Now, it is reasonable to assume that the. incorporation of the
above section 2180 into the Revised Election Law as section 21 (a) did not have
the effect of enlarging its scope,^[2] to supersede or repeal section 2195, what
with the presumption against implied repeals.^[3] “Where a statute has received a
contemporaneous and practical interpretation and the statute as interpreted is
reenacted, the practical interpretation is accorded greater weight than it
ordinarily receives, and is regarded as presumptively the correct interpretation
of the law. The rule here is based upon the theory that the legislature is
acquainted with the contemporaneous interpretation of a statute, especially when
made by an administrative body or executive officers charged with the duty of
administering or enforcing the law, and therefore impliedly adopts the
interpretation upon re-enactment.” (Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec.
5109.)

Indeed, even disregarding their origin, the allegedly
conflicting sections, could be interpreted in the light of the principle of
statutory construction that when a general and a particular provision are
inconsistent the latter is paramount to the former (Sec. 288, Act 190). In other
words, section 2195 referring particularly to vacancy in the office of mayor,
must prevail over the general terms of section 21 (a) as to vacancies of
municipal (local) offices. Otherwise stated, section 2195 may be deemed an
exception to or qualification of the latter.^[4] “Where one statute deals with a
subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a
more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any
conflict, the latter will prevail, regardless of whether it was passed prior to
the general statute.” (Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 5204.)

In a recent decision,^[5] we had occasion to pass on a similar
situation—repeal by subsequent general provision of a prior special
provision—and we said:

“It is we!l settled that a special and local statute, providing
for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent
statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to
repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general act are broad
enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. * * * It is a canon of
statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not
expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the
special provisions, of such earlier statute.” (Steamboat Company vs. Collector,
18 Wall. [U. S.], 478; Cass County vs. Gillett, 100 U. S. 585; Minnesota vs.
Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 396.)

“Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the
later general—the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter
provided for in the special—the fact that one is speeial and the other is
general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining
an exception to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the
law of a particular case. (State vs. Stoll, 17 Wall. [U.S.], 425.)”

In fact even after the Revised Election Code was enacted, the
Department of the Interior and the office of Executive Secretary who are charged
with the supervision of provincial and municipal governments have “consistently
held that in case of the suspension or other temporary disability of the mayor,
the vice-mayor shall, by operation of law, assume the office of the mayor, and
if the vice-mayor is not available, the said office shall be discharge by the
first councilor.” (Annex 5 of the answer.)

Needless to say, the contemporaneous construction placed upon
the statute by the executive officers charged with its execution deserves great
weight in the courts.^[6]

Consequently it is our ruling that when the mayor of a
municipality is suspended, absent or temporarily unable, his duties should be
discharged by the vice-mayor in accordance with sec. 2195 of the Revised
Administrative Code.

This quo warranto petition is dismissed with costs. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo,
and Labrador, JJ., concur.

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[1] The alleged offer of appointment by the governor which Baltazar rejected is immaterial, because under section 2195 no appointment is needed.

[2] It was even restricted to elective municipal office.

[3] Sutherland, Statutory Construction 3rd Ed. sec. 2014 note 1.

[4] Sutherland, Statutory Construction 3rd Ed. Vol. 1, p. 486.

[5] Philippine Railway Co. vs. Collector of Int. Rev., 91 Phil., 35.

[6] Madrigal vs. Rafferty, 38 Phil., 414; Government vs. Mun. of Binalonan, 32 Phil., 634.