DANILO CHANNIE TAN ALIAS TAN SUY CHAN, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

The Solicitor General seeks a review of the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, in this naturalization case, declaring that
petitioner Daniio Channie Tan, alias Tan Suy Chan, is a
citizen of the Philippines and, accordingly, dismissing his petition
for naturalization as such citizen.

Considering that petitioner has not appealed from said decision, the
only question for determination before us is whether or not the lower
court has erred in declaring that petitioner is a citizen of the
Philippines. Upon a review, of the record, we are satisfied that the
answer should be in the affirmative, for the following reasons:

1. Under
   our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial
   declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice
   exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a
   given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission
   violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law,
   for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of
   the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon,
   and make a pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise, such a
   pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action
   or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that
   plaintiff or petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate child,
   although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary premise to
   justify a given relief available only to one enjoying said status. At
   times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as
   naturalization, by judicial decree. But, there is no similar
   legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to
   declare that a given person is part of our citizenry.

2. The
   petition for naturalization in this ease, and the declaration of
   intention filed by petitioner herein, state that he is a citizen of
   Nationalist China and that he wants to become a citizen of the
   Philippines. Moreover, in the former he prays to be “admitted” as such
   citizen. In other words, the question whether or not petitioner is a
   citizen of the Philippines has never been put in issue in this case. As
   a consequence, when the lower court declared him to be such citizen, it
   went beyond the issues raised by the pleading’s, and, accordingly,
   acted in a manner so irregular as to, in effect, exceed its
   jurisdiction. We have not overlooked the decision in Palanca vs.
   Republic (80 Phil., 578; 45 Off. Gaz., Supp., p. 204) in which Palanca
   was declared a citizen of the Philippines in the proceedings for his
   naturalization. However, through appropriate pleading’s, the petitioner
   in that case had averred that he possessed such status, thus putting
   the, same in issue.

3. The evidence on
   record does not justify the finding above mentioned. Petitioner tried
   to prove that he is the legitimate child of Hee Acusar; that he
   (petitioner) was born in Amoy, China, on June 25, 1927; that he is
   married to Ong Witty, born in Bangkok, Siam, and a resident of
   Hongkong; that he has two (2) legitimate children, both residing in
   Hongkong, namely: Tan Khing Khing, born in Amoy, China, on August 12,
   1948, and Tan Phing Phing, born in Hongkong; that he came to the
   Philippines in 1935 and resided in the municipality of Bogo, province
   of Cebu; that his father, Hee Acusar, likewise, had his business and
   resided in said municipality; that the latter’s father, Calixto Acusar,
   and his second wife, Anastaeia Amoco resided, also in the same
   municipality; and that Hee Acusar and Calixto Acusar are citizens of
   the Philippines.

Upon the other hand, petitioner testified that he is a Chinese
citizen. It appears also that, as far back as 1946, he registered
himself as such Chinese citizen in our Immigration Office, which issued
to him the corresponding Alien Certificate Registration, stating that
he is a citizen of China; that he renewed this certificate in 1951;
that he paid the annual fees due from aliens and has an Immigrant
Certificate of Residence, in which his nationality is said to be
Chinese; and that identical statement is made in the certificate,
Exhibit S, and in his income tax return for 1956, Exhibit Y, both
introduced by him in evidence. Again, petitioner’s certificate of
baptism, Exhibit AA, which states that the same took place on, June 25,
1957, names his father as Tan Sim.

Although petitioner testified that Tan Sim is the same Hee Acusar,
this evidence is unworthy of credence for his (petitioner’s) Exhibit W
shows that as early as October 20, 1877, when Calixto Acuzar, the
alleged father of Hee Acusar, was baptized, said Calixto Acusar and his
father Crisanto Acusar, used these Christian names and surnames.
Considering the customs and practices prevailing in the Philippines, it
is inconceivable that the son of Calixto Acusar and grandson of
Crisanto Acusar would have used, fifty (50) years later, the Chinese
name Tan Sim. Again, Hee Acusar stated in the special power of
attorney, Exhibit FF, that petitioner herein is a “Chinese citizen”,
which, as adverted to above, tallies with the petition for
naturalization, the declaration of intention and the testimony of
petitioner herein. Lastly, petitioner has not even attempted to explain
why he has never used the surname “Acusar”, despite the fact that he allegedly is a descendant of at least three (3) generations of Acusars.

It is clear to us that his evidence to, the effect that he is a citizen of the Philippines, can not be relied upon.

Evidently, his failure to bring his children to the Philippines and
enroll them in local schools as required in our Naturalization Law, and
our decisions holding that such omission bars the naturalization of the
father, even if the omission were sought to be justified by the alleged
impossibility to get the children, out of China (Hao Lian Chu vs.
Republic, 87 Phil., 668; 48 Off. Gaz., 1780; Lim Lian Hong vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-3576, Dec. 28, 1950; Tan Hi vs. Republic, 88 Phil., 117; Ang Yee Koe Sengkee vs. Republic, 30 Phil., 594; Bangon Du vs. Republic, 92 Phil, 519; Yap Chin vs. Republic, 93 Phil., 215; Quin Hu Chay vs. Republic, 94 Phil., 736; Kin vs.
Republic, G. R. No. L-6894, April 27, 1955), are responsible for his
efforts to establish in the lower court that he is already a citizen of
our Republic, despite the allegations to the contrary in his petition
for naturalization and in his declaration of intention.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, insofar
only as it declares that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines,
with costs against said petitioner. It is so ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L. and Barrera, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Endencia, JJ., on leave.