MIGUEL R. CORNEJO, AS ATTORNEY FOR ACADIA ACACIO ET AL., PETITIONER, VS. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, RESPONDENT.

In Civil Case No. 483 of the court of first instance of Rizal, entitled
Carino, et al. vs. Acacio, et al.,” Attorney Miguel R. Cornejo was
(allegedly) asked by the defendants Acacio to act as their counsel; but for his
convenience he requested his companion, Atty. Palacol, to handle it. The latter
entered his appearance and acted accordingly. On May 21, 1948, during the
hearing of the case, Cornejo was presented as a witness. Practically all the
questions were objected to by opposing counsel, and the judge, the respondent
Bienvenido A. Tan, sustained almost all objections. Whereupon Attorney Cornejo
left the witness stand and approached the attorneys1 table asking that his
appearance for the defendants be noted. It was apparent he wanted to say as
counsel what he had been prevented from saying as witness. The respondent judge
told him he could not thus appear, there being already one lawyer and no
substitution of counsel had been accomplished in accordance with the rules.

A few days later, Attorney Cornejo submitted a memorandum in which he said,
among other things, that the judge had unduly favored the plaintiffs, to the
extent of advising Atty. Palacol “to fix the case because his position was
hopeless”, and that the memorandum was filed as a protest against the “unjust
hostile, vindictive and dangerous attitude of the judge”. The memorandum further
stated that copies thereof had been sent to the Secretary of Justice, the
Supreme Court, and the Office of the President of the Senate.

In an order dated May 26, 1948, the respondent judge, rejecting the
accusation of partiality, stated that in accordance with his usual practice he
had told Atty. Palacol to see if the matter could be settled amicably. Then he
required Atty. Cornejo to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt
on four counts, namely, for appearing in court without being a party or attorney
in the case, for using offensive language, for misbehavior in the presence of
the court and for publishing his memorandum before it was submitted and decided
by the court.

Answering the order, Atty. Cornejo expressed doubts that he would be treated
impartially because the charges of contempt had been made by the judge himself,
and reiterated his accusation that the judge had unduly anticipated his opinion
on the case in favor of plaintiffs, “demonstrating his over-anxiety to dispatch
the case” “indirectly aiding counsel for the plaintiffs” “insulting and
humiliating the undersigned attorney while on the witness stand, etc.”. Then he
went on to explain away or rebut the charges made.

Immediately thereafter Atty. Cornejo repaired to this Court asking for
judgment ordering the respondent judge to admit his appearance as counsel for
the defendants in Civil Case No. 483, to refrain from rendering his decision in
said case until he shall have allowed the petitioner as counsel for defendants
to present further evidence, and to stop all action on the proceeding for
contempt of court.

On June 7, 1948, we required the respondent to answer the amended petition
within ten days. We also resolved that upon the filing of a bond by petitioner
in the amount of P200 a writ of preliminary injunction will be issued. Such writ
was actually issued on June 15, 1948.

It appears, however, that on June 5, 1948, the respondent judge decided Civil
Case No. 483. And on June 4, 1948, he declared Atty. Cornejo guilty of contempt
and sentenced him to pay a fine of P100 or in case of insolvency, to suffer
imprisonment for ten days. It also appears that on the same day Atty. Cornejo
interposed an appeal, which was denied by the respondent, on the ground that
there is no appeal in the matter of direct contempts.

In view of these developments and of others to be indicated later on, the
petitioner now asks: (1) that the respondent be required to admit and recognize
his appearance as counsel in Civil Case No. 483, and that the decision in that
litigation be set aside on the ground that defendants were deprived of their
right to present further evidence through the petitioner as counsel, and (2)
that the judgment for contempt be reviewed and revoked.

On the first point it further appears that, as the injunction order proved
too late, Atty. Palacol submitted on June 23, 1943 a “petition to set aside
judgment or proceeding” seeking relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and
that upon denial thereof he appealed on July 12, 1948 to the Court of Appeals.
Wherefore, it is reasonable to expect that this question will be decided by the
Court of Appeals upon a review of the main controversy. Upon this ground, and
partly because petitioner failed to implead the opposing parties in the said
Civil Case No. 483, this portion of the petition may not be granted in these
proceedings.

On the second point, it is settled that no appeal lies from an order of a
superior court declaring a person in direct contempt thereof .^[1] Now, was the submission of the memorandum
a direct contempt? The respondent held it was (1) because Cornejo was not an
attorney in the case; (2) because it used offensive language against the court;
and (3) because it was published before it was submitted and decided by the
court. Copy of the memorandum is part of the record before us. It contains the
following paragraph:

“It is further respectfully prayed that this memorandum be taken for a
protest against what he believes to be unjust, hostile, vindictive and dangerous
attitude or conduct of the presiding Judge, Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, of this
Honorable Court in a democratic government where laws shall reign supreme unless
the same Judge wants to sabotage the present administration of the President who
is seeking the restoration of public peace and order and the faith of the people
in our Government”.

That is indeed strong language. It is insulting and contemptuous.^[2] The judge may have erred in some of his
rulings; but mistakes never justify offensive language. As was said in Salcedo
vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil., 729:

“It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and
rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is
capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by
resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which
the dignity of the courts require. The reason for this is that respect of the
courts guarantees the stability of their institution.”

And the last paragraph informing the judge that copies of the memorandum had
been furnished “the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, etc.”, could rightly be
interpreted as an attempt to intimidate the court in the exercise of its
judicial functions.

Omitting reference to the other points, enough has been stated to show that
there was no clear abuse of the respondent’s powers in declaring Atty. Cornejo
to be in direct contempt. Petition denied. No costs.

Moran, C.J.,
Ozaeta, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.

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^[1] Sec. 2, Rule 64, Rules of Court;
People vs. Abaya, 43 Phil., 247; Carag vs. Warden of the Jail
of Cagayan, 53 Phil., 85.

^[2] Lualhati vs. Albert, 57
Phil., 86; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil., 724.