ALTO SURETY & INS. CO., INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANGEL AL. CALUNTAD, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Alto Surety and Insurance versus Caluntad

The Case

This is a civil action in which Alto Surety and Insurance Company, the plaintiff, sued Angel Al. Caluntad, the defendant, in the City Court of Manila, and the defendant, after losing there, appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila. The case matters because it fixes a rule every reviewee must know: the Court of First Instance hearing an appeal from a municipal or city court may dismiss that appeal when the appellant himself sleeps on his case and fails to prosecute it for an unreasonable length of time, and the judgment of the inferior court is then revived and remanded for execution. It is a study in the difference between Rule 17, Section 3, which speaks of the plaintiff's failure to prosecute, and Rule 40, Section 9, which supplies the power to dismiss the appeal of a defendant-appellant.

Procedural History

The action began in the City Court of Manila, which rendered judgment against the defendant. The defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch One, where the case was docketed as Civil Case Number 51331. On the fourth of May, 1966, the Court of First Instance issued an order dismissing the appeal for having been pending for an unreasonable length of time, without pronouncement as to costs, and remanding the case to the City Court for execution of its judgment. The defendant moved for reconsideration, arguing that dismissal, not further delay, was what would work injustice to him and amount to a refusal to give him his day in court. The court denied the motion, observing that to accept the defendant's argument would let a defendant sleep and take no action on his appeal in order to avoid liability. From both orders the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied the appeal and sustained the orders of the Court of First Instance.

Facts

The defendant Angel Al. Caluntad lost before the City Court of Manila and, in 1962, appealed the adverse decision to the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch One. The appeal was docketed as Civil Case Number 51331.

Once the case was in the Court of First Instance, the defendant took no action on his appeal. The case sat there for four years, to the detriment of the plaintiff, Alto Surety and Insurance Company.

On the fourth of May, 1966, the Court of First Instance, on its own motion, ordered the appeal dismissed for having been pending for an unreasonable length of time, and remanded the case to the City Court for execution of its judgment. The defendant sought reconsideration, insisting that dismissal would deprive him of his day in court. The court refused, and the defendant brought the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the defendant's appeal for failure to prosecute it for an unreasonable length of time.
• Whether or not Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, on failure to prosecute, is the correct basis for dismissing the appeal of a defendant-appellant.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, on failure to prosecute, provides:

Section 3. Failure to prosecute. If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court.

The Court held this provision inapplicable because it speaks of the plaintiff's failure to prosecute, while here it was the defendant-appellant who was guilty of inaction.

Section 9 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, on the effect of appeals, provides:

Section 9. Effect of Appeals. A perfected appeal shall operate to vacate the judgment of the municipal or city court, and the action when duly docketed in the Court of First Instance shall stand for trial de novo upon its merits in accordance with the regular procedure in that court, as though the same had never been tried before and had been originally there commenced. If the appeal is withdrawn, or dismissed for failure to prosecute, the judgment shall be deemed revived and shall forthwith be remanded to the municipal or city court for execution.

This is the provision that actually sustains the dismissal, because its second sentence expressly empowers the appellate court to dismiss an appeal for the appellant's failure to prosecute, and to revive and remand the judgment below for execution.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Court of First Instance did not err in dismissing the appeal. The case had been pending in that court for four years without any action by the defendant-appellant, to the detriment of the plaintiff. The Court adopted the trial court's reasoning that to accept the defendant's argument would allow a defendant to sleep and take no action on his appeal in order to avoid liability, which is not the spirit of the law. The Court noted that in an earlier case a delay of one year and three months in prosecuting an appeal already warranted dismissal; here the delay was four years.

On the second issue, the Court held that Rule 17, Section 3 was not the proper basis, since it governs the plaintiff's failure to prosecute and not the inaction of a defendant-appellant. Nevertheless, the Court sustained the questioned orders on the basis of Rule 40, Section 9, whose second sentence reads:

If the appeal is withdrawn, or dismissed for failure to prosecute, the judgment shall be deemed revived and shall forthwith be remanded to the municipal or city court for execution.

The Court explained that the first sentence of that provision had not yet been modified by Republic Act Number 6031, which took effect on the fourth of August, 1969, so that the provision applied fully to this case. It added that the appellate court's power to dismiss an appeal for the appellant's failure to prosecute is amply supported by jurisprudence.

Doctrine

A defendant who appeals from a municipal or city court to the Court of First Instance must prosecute that appeal. If he fails to do so for an unreasonable length of time, the Court of First Instance may dismiss the appeal, and under Rule 40, Section 9, the judgment of the inferior court is deemed revived and is forthwith remanded to that court for execution. The power to dismiss rests on the second sentence of Rule 40, Section 9, not on Rule 17, Section 3, because the latter speaks only of the plaintiff's failure to prosecute his action. Delay in prosecuting one's own appeal is a dilatory tactic that the courts will not reward.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the defendant's appeal and sustained the orders of the Court of First Instance dismissing the appeal and remanding the case to the City Court for execution, assessing double costs against the appellant for a frivolous appeal.

Remember This

Memorize this line: it is Rule 40, Section 9, not Rule 17, Section 3, that lets the Court of First Instance dismiss the appeal of a sleeping defendant-appellant and revive the judgment below for execution. Examiners use this case to test whether you can match the correct rule to the correct party, and to test the effect of a dismissed appeal on the judgment of the inferior court.