JEAN L. ARNAULT, PETITIONER, VS. POTENCIANO PECSON, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, RESPONDENT.

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
assailing alleged refusal by the Court of First Instance of Manila to
grant the petitioner ample opportunity to prepare his defense in
criminal case No. 12821 of that court, in which he is charged with
Income tax evasion. In his prayer the petitioner asks that Judge
Pecson, the respondent judge, be commanded to allow him to go out of
Bilibid Prison under guard to look for and confer with his witnesses,
but from the allegations in the body of the application and annexes
thereto, it appears that the motions submitted to and denied by the
court were that the accused be allowed to take papers from his office
in the Trade and Commerce Building on Calle J. Luna, Manila. We will
regard the last as the relief which the petitioner seeks in these
proceedings.

The pleadings show that the petitioner is under prosecution by an
information filed by the City Fiscal on May 31, 1950, for a violation
of the National Internal Revenue Code, in that, it is alleged) in
certain translations he received for one Ernest H. Burt a total net
profit of P1,480,000, the income tax on which, amounting to P1,089,270,
the accused had the duty under law to pay but did willfully and
unlawfully fail, neglect and refuse, despite repeated demands, to do.

The accused, who is in confinement in Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa
for contempt of the Senate, filed on July 6, 1950, through his
attorney, a motion with the lower court to order the Director of
Prisons to permit him under guard to get papers pertinent to his case
from his office in the Trade and Commerce Building on J. Luna Street,
Manila.

On the same date, Judge Pecson denied that motion on the ground
that, since the accused was imprisoned by order of the Senate, “it
would be improper to grant said motion because it would be an
encroachment on the prerogatives of the Senate.”

Undaunted, the accused, under date of July 27, reiterated his
motion, citing the fact that one Aurelio Alvero and one Andres Camasura
as defendants in other criminal cases had been allowed to leave Bilibid
Prison under guard to prepare their defenses. He added that all the
papers he needed for his defense were in his office and in his house
and that no one else but he had access to them.

On July 28, Judge Pecson, “considering the motion well founded,”
“authorized (the Director of Prisons) to allow the accused to go to his
office and residence under guards on July 29, 1950 from 9 a.m. to 11:30
a.m. at the most for the purpose of getting all the necessary papers
which he needs for his defense.”

On July 29, the accused protested that two hours and a half was not
enough to enable him to take advantage of the court’s liberality and
stated that he had to have at least half a day.

On July 31, the court set the last motion for August 2, at 8:30
a.m., with the warning that after hearing thereof the trial of the case
on the merits would proceed immediately.

It is alleged in the application for certiorari and mandamus that
on August 2 the court, after taking up the motion of July 29,
manifested willingness to grant the same but changed its mind when the
City Fiscal objected unless certain conditions were imposed. These
conditions, according to the petition, were: (1) that the petitioner
first reveal the nature and contents of the documents which he wanted
to get as well as the exact parts of his office and his house in which
the documents were being kept and the persons who, besides the
petitioner, had access to said documents; (2) that the defendant tell
the court whether he could not entrust the key or keys to the containers
of the documents to a person of his confidence; (3) that the guards to
accompany the accused be Instructed not to allow him to destroy any of
his documents because the City Fiscal intended to get a search warrant
for their seizure; (4) that the accused make a list and give the
description of the documents which he should have removed from his
office or house.

Petitioner’s counsel objected to these conditions telling the court
that they were equivalent to a revelation of the evidence for the
defense and to forcing the defendant to testify against himself.

One of the most vital and precious rights accorded accused by the
Constitution is due process, which includes a fair and impartial trial
and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense. While the
Constitution and the law of the land do not specify what this
opportunity is to consist of, beyond stating that accused shall have
not less than two days to prepare for trial (section 7, Rule 114), it
is by necessary implication within the court’s sound discretion in
exceptional cases to allow him, besides time, adequate freedom of
action, if the courts are to give form and substance to this guaranty.
Other judges conscious of this principle have allowed prisoners with
proper safeguards to leave the prison walls with the object of securing
evidence, without in so doing exceeding the bounds of their authority,
of propriety, or legal procedure. She respondent Judge himself in his
order of July 28 considered the petitioner’s motion meritorious and
would allow him two hours and a half. Leave to go under guard outside
the prison or the courtroom would not, as feared, set a dangerous
precedent, for the matter is always subject to the control and
discretion of the court to be judged according to its merits.

In the nature of things, no hard and fast rule can be laid down as
to what is reasonable time or reasonable opportunity. Each case must be
determined by its peculiar circumstances. What are the facts in this
connection? And are they such that a denial of defendant’s request
would constitute an abuse of discretion justifying intervention by the
Supreme Court?

On this feature of the case it appears that the accused was
already in jail for contempt of the Senate when the present? criminal
action was started. Having been committed to prison for another cause
which has only an indirect bearing go- the instant prosecution, and not
foreseeing in all probability the turn which his imprisonment for
contempt would take, it is justifiable to assume that the defendant did
not bother, and had no time, to arrange his evidence and put himself in
readiness for this prosecution which, as just stated, was posterior to
his commitment to prison. From the character of the indictment and of
the transactions involved, there is also reasonable ground to believe
that much if not chief of defendant’s evidence is documentary, not
merely testimonial which could be assembled with a mere postponement of
the trial; and remembering the volume and diversity of his business
dealings, there is added ground to suppose that the defendant possesses
numerous and mixed records and documents pertaining to diverse matters
and kept in separate files. Lastly, the accused stated in his motion
that he alone has access to these papers, documents and records, as
assertion; which has not been contradicted and sounds plausible enough.

In the light of these circumstances, which are only the salient
ones, it would seem that the defendant has made a sufficient showing to
merit a favorable action on his request as a measure of necessity for
an adequate preparation for trial. More than that, since His Honor had
already deigned to grant the accused two and a half hours in one of his
orders, this made it so much easier, without endangering the interest
of the public, to give him another two hours and a half for which he
vigorously pleaded. The refusal to give this additional time, which
would not make much, if any, difference to the prosecution, smacks of a
market place haggling if not mockery, in that, as the defendant’s
counsel pointed out, two hours and a half was barely enough to cover
the route of travel to and from the accused’s home and his office, what
with the heavy traffics in Pasay where his home is located and in the
Manila commercial districts.

The point made that as the petitioner is imprisoned by virtue of an
order of the Philippine Senate his request for “temporary release” from
confinement should be addressed to that body, shows at once its
inconsistency with the court’s order of July 29. As previously seen, by
that order the court would grant the petitioner two hours and a half.
The fact that this concession was made “only in the interest of
justice,” as the court puts it, or “only as a privilege to the
accused,” as the Fiscal says, would not erase the inconsistency. Nor
would the strings which the prosecution would attach to the permission
make it any the less disrespectful to the legislative department or
violative of the checks and balance system. If on the other land by
invoking the interest of justice the court would prevent the permission
from being a subversion of the Senate’s order, then the granting of,
say, six hours instead of two and a half in the interest of justice and
as a privilege to the accused would clothe the permission with the
color of legality.

In reality, however, permission to the defendant to go to his
office or home for the purpose indicated would not infringe on the
Senate’s order of commitment. Such permission is not a release from
prison, as the lower court mistakenly assumes; not any more than to
bring the defendant to court for trial from Bilibid Prison would be. In
their legal and factual connotations, bringing the defendant to court
for trial and allowing him to go to his office to get evidence are the
same, the same if account is taken of the fact that the latter is part
and parcel of the same trial and essential to the defense which has
been forced upon the accused by the filing of the accusation. Only
hairsplitting technicalities can find any dissimilarity between the two
things. It can not be argued without resorting to unreasoning legal
niceties that to take a prisoner to Manila, to Zamboanga for that
matter, to face trial is not an encroachment on the Senate’s
prerogatives but that to allow him under guard a few hours to procure
evidence from his home or office is an interference with those
prerogatives.

Having shown that the two hypotheses are the same, the logical
result of the court’s theory would be that a prisoner of the Senate
charged with a criminal offense could not be tried without the Senate’s
authorization, unless the trial were held in Bilibid Prison, which is
outside the court’s jurisdiction. Carried to its ultimate conclusion,
the theory would mean that a citizen committed to Jail by the Senate or
the House of Representatives could not be prosecuted in any court of
justice unless the corresponding legislative body was willing.
(Authority to give permission carries with it authority to refuse. It
should further follow that prosecution for a criminal offense of a
prisoner of one of the Houses of Congress would have to wait until the
expiration of his sentence if the Senate or House should object. Even
if we take for granted that the Senate or the House would always yield
to the request, the incongruities would not entirely be eliminated. It
should be remembered that unless convoked to a special session, the
Congress meets only 100 continuous days a year, so that for eight
months during congressional recess there would be no Senate or House to
go to for permission. It is a fact, which may have been Ignored or
overlooked, that such permission if within the congressional power to
give or withhold could be granted only by either House acting as a
body, arid that the Senate President, the Speaker or any legislative
committee would have no power to act in the premises for their
respective chambers.

One other incongruity that can readily be seen would be that, while
the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives themselves are
not privileged from arrest and prosecution except in limited cases and
during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress and in going to
and returning from the same (Section 15, Article VI of the
Constitution), the Congress or. either of its component parts could
paralyze the machinery of justice and timely stop for a longer
period the prosecution of others for graver offenses.

These anomalous consequences will not be possible if we do not lose
sight of the truth that the separation of powers is not rigid and
absolute but abstract and general, intended for practical purposes and
adapted to common sense. There is no such thing as complete and
definite designation by the Constitution of all the particular powers
that appertain to each of the several departments. The constitutional
structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of governmental
functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent necessities of
governmental co-ordination. The power itself to punish for contempt
which the Senate exercised in sending Arnault to by nature belongs to
the judiciary but has been upheld as a power incidental to or inherent
in a deliberative body necessary to its existence and due functioning»
The rule is thus expressed in Corpus Juris Secundum:

“Although the absolute separation of the powers.of
government is the theory of American constitutional government, it has
never been entirely true in practice, and is no longer an accepted
canon among political scientists. The courts recognize that the
separation of the powers is far from complete, and that the line of
demarkation between them is often indefinite, and it has been held not
the purpose of the constitution to make a total separation of these
three powers, but that the division of powers is abstract and general,
and intended for practical purposes, and a constitutional provision
prohibiting the exercise by one department of another’s powers does not
include all governmental functions or powers. Hence, in practice the
departments are not required to be kept entirely distinct without any
connection with, or dependence on, each other, and each of the three
departments normally exercises powers which are not strictly within its
province, and while it is not possible wholly to avoid conflict between
them, one department should not so act as to embarrass another in the
discharge of respective functions, and the constitution-should be
expounded to blend the departments no more than it affirmatively
requires.” (16 C. J. S., 293, 294.)

So any action not amounting to a release of a prisoner committed by
the Senate to prison, taken by the executive and the judiciary
departments with respect to such prisoner in the legitimate discharge
of their respective functions, is not impairment of the doctrine of the
distribution of governmental powers« The fact that a person is a
prisoner of the.Senate or of the House does not, under the principle
cited, exclude other departments during his incarceration from trying
or investigating him in matters pertaining to their spheres, in much
the same way that a prisoner by judgment of a court of justice is not
placed beyond the reach of the legislature and the executive to summon
for examination and to allow in relation to the investigation to go
anywhere under guard to get such evidence as the investigator or the
prisoner might deem important.

In the face of the facts here shown to prevail, we are of the
opinion that the respondent Judge committed an abuse of discretion and
prejudicial error in not granting the defendant’s motions. By this
refusal the defendant would be denied his fundamental right to a fair
and impartial hearing which the Constitution assures him. Where a
request by a defendant charged with crime for a chance to make his
defense is reasonable and made in good faith and not for delay, it is
good policy to veer towards the liberal side avoiding refinements of
argument that may serve only to hide the substance of the issue. It is
even of greater importance to the cause of justice for courts to
deviate from the sterotyped technical rules of practice and lose a few
hours than to run the risk of depriving accused of the requisite
opportunity to present his side of the controversy.

Upon the foregoing consideration, the respondent Judge is ordered
to grant the petitioner for the purpose hereinbefore stated not less
than six hours to visit his home in Pasay City and/or his office on J.
Luna Street, Manila, with guards to see, but not more than to see, that
the prisoner does not escape or commit any act forbidden by law and the
prison rules.

The petitioner’s prayer to annul the proceedings heretofore had in
the court below is denied, any irregularity committed in those
proceedings prejudicial to the rights of the defendant being proper
subject for review on appeal in case of conviction.

There will be no special finding as to costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

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MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

In principle I concur in the majority opinion that the petitioner
Jean L. Arnault be given an opportunity to prepare for his defense in
criminal case No, 12821 in the Court of First Instance of Manila. But I
dissent insofar as this Court grants him the privilege to visit his
home in Pasay City and/or his office in Manila under guard, presumably,
to examine his papers and obtain those needed at the trial, without
previous consultation with or advice to the Philippine Senate, thereby
completely ignoring that legislative body and disregarding its
jurisdiction and control over the petitioner.

We should not lose sight of the fact that as the case now stands,
the petitioner is not a prisoner of the Court of First.Instance of
Manila by reason of the information filed against him and his
subsequent technical arrest. According to the petition he has already
filed the corresponding bond of P3,000 recommended by the prosecution
and approved by the trial court. Under that bond, he should therefore
have been released, at least technically in criminal case No; 12821, If
he continues in New Bilibid Prisons under custody, it is by reason
of1the commitment made by the Senate for contempt. In other words, he
is a prisoner of the Senate, apart of the Legislative Department and
not of the Judicial Department, and in dealing with petitioner in the
present certiorari, prohibition and mandamus proceedings, we are
dealing with him as such prisoner of the Senate.

The Senate may not prevent his leaving prison to go to the Court of
First Instance for arraignment or for trial. The reason is that
according to the information in criminal case No. 12821, he has
committed an offense against the State and the Sovereign, of which the
Senate is but a part and a mere instrumentality. Consequently, the
People have a superior right to release him from confinement in prison,
temporarily, to go to Court and answer the charge of committing a crime
against said people and be tried for the same. But in granting the
petition herein and ordering the respondent Judge to allow him to visit
his house and his office for not less than six hours, we are doing
something much more than bringing him from prison to the court and
back, something which involves judicial discretion. In allowing him to
go to his house and his office even under guard, we are exercising
jurisdiction and judicial discretion over a prisoner of the Senate, a
part of the legislative body, a co-equal, coordinate and independent
branch of the Government, as regards his conduct, movements and actions
outside of and not strictly necessary to the routine of his going from
prison directly to the trial court and back, for arraignment and trial.
Under the circumstances, the respondent Judge partly shared the idea
motivating this partly dissenting opinion when in his order of July 6,
1950 denying the petition of defendant Arnault, he said:

“It appearing that the accused is confined at the
New Bilibid Prisons by the Senate, and insofar as this case is
concerned he is bonded, it would be improper to grant the motion,
because it would be an encroachment on the prerogatives of the Senate;
hence, the motion is denied.”

I believe that before taking any action in the present case we
should consult the Senate or the Senate Committee in charge of the
investigation of Arnault, at the same time manifesting our opinion that
petitioner should fee given an opportunity to prepare for trial by
allowing him to examine his private papers. The least we could do as a
matter of courtesy to the Senate is to advise that body that we are
granting the petition, and that the Senate or the Committee in charge
of the investigation of Arnault may send a representative or
representatives to accompany him together with his guards when he goes
to his house and/or his office to examine his papers, to see to it that
nothing is done by him or on his behalf that may in any way interfere
with, frustrate or adversely affect the Investigation still being
conducted by the Senate.

It is pertinent here to recall that as already stated, Arnault is
being held in New Bilibid Prisons under custody as a prisoner of the
Senate under a commitment whose validity this Tribunal has just
recently upheld in a petition for habeas corpus in G.R. No. L-3820. If
Arnault had been committed to prison by the Senate for a definite
period of imprisonment, say six months, a year or more, and the Senate
investigation of him had been terminated, the case might assume a
different aspect. In such a case, he would be in Bilibid only
undergoing punishment for an offense committed against one of the
houses of the Philippine Legislature. As long as he is under custody
and under guard to prevent his escape from confinement and restraint of
liberty, the purposes of the Senate in punishing him with imprisonment
will be served and accomplished.

The present confinement of Arnault, however, is a little bit if not
quite different. The Senate, and its committee is not yet thru with
him. He is still under investigation. The committee may call him
tomorrow and continue investigating him and asking him questions. He is
confined not only as a mere measure of punishment but he is being
deprived of liberty for an indefinite term, the length and termination
of which lies entirely in his own hands. He may go out tomorrow a free
man if he answers certain questions of the Senate or its Committee and
reveals the identity of the man to whom he had supposedly given the
P440,000. It is therefore clear that aside from the punishment that he
is suffering by his confinement in prison, strong pressure is being
brought to bear upon him to do something which is still within his
power to do or to perform in exchange for his liberty and freedom from
the rigors and hardships and the unpleasant atmosphere of prison life.
Any absence from prison, especially going to his office and to his
home, meeting his loved ones and friends, renewing old and intimate
associations, even for a few hours and seeing, once again old and
familiar scenes, serve to materially relax that pressure which the
Senate is bringing to bear upon him, all calculated to persuade and
induce him to comply with the Senate’s lawful desire.

But this is not all. Under the custody of prison guards alone whose
sole duty and concern is to see to it that he does not escape, things
may happen which may not exactly be conducive to the purposes of the
Senate in its present and continuing investigation. Without intending
any refraction on the petitioner but merely dealing in possibilities
and in what people, even honest person may do to defend and protect
themselves and their interests, in visiting his home and his office,
the petitioner without any supervision might destroy or conceal papers,
documents and memoranda which may be useful to the Senate in its
investigation and which it may thru lawful process have taken and
brought before it in connection with its investigation. Arnault might
during that visit do things which he could not otherwise do in prison
or during his trip or trips from prison to court and back, things that
may in one way or another thwart, frustrate or otherwise adversely
affect the investigation being conducted by the Senate Committee.

And yet this Court thru the majority decision is, not only relaxing
the pressure being put by the Senate upon its contumacious prisoner,
pressure designed to break down his resistance but is also opening wide
the door to all the possibilities I have partly enumerated, dealing
with the prisoner as if he were its own or of the judiciary which he is
not, and completely ignoring a co-equal and coordinate branch of the
Government which made him a prisoner and whose prisoner he continues to
be, without even giving notice to said branch of the Government so that
it may take and suggest precautions and safeguards designed to keep its
investigation from being frustrated or nullified. That is why in my
opinion, the Senate should be consulted and its voice heard because
after all, we are dealing with its prisoner. At least, we should accord
the Senate or the Senate Committee in charge of the investigation an
opportunity to have a representative or representatives accompany the
prisoner and be present when he visits his office and his home and
examine his papers, so as to properly protect the interest of the
Senate in the investigation.

Moreover, in peremptorily and, shall I say, arbitrarily granting
the permission to the petitioner, without first seeking the views of
the Senate whose prisoner he is, we are treading on dangerous ground.
If we can now grant him a minimum of six hours to visit his home and
office, we could just as properly grant him twelve hours, or a whole
day or more if he really needed it. If we can permit him to visit his
office in Manila and his home in Pasay outside of Manila, we could just
as well let him go to a nearby province or even farther away, if his
office or his house happens to be in that place. It is hard to limit
the scope of this judicial discretion now being exercised. During all
that period of time and so far removed from the eyes of the Court, many
things and events, unforeseen and unexpected may happen unknown to us
and the Senate. And all the time, we are closing bur eyes to the fact
that the man we are giving permission to and otherwise dealing with is
not our prisoner or of the Courts, but a prisoner of the Senate,
committed to jail, to stay there until he decides to do something
required of him by the Senate who by the way, is still investigating
him. And yet we decline to consult said Senate or even advise it of
what we are doing or propose to do. That our attitude and. position are
not entirely proper and tenable, to me is not difficult to see and
realize.

It has been intimated that my proposal would mean subservience to
the Senate, I beg to differ from that view. Courtesy to a co-equal,
coordinate and independent branch of the Government and respect for and
acknowledgment of its jurisdiction is not subservience. It is only
giving to that branch of the Government its due. It is by intruding
into and encroaching upon the province and jurisdiction of a coordinate
branch of the Government that we invite and provoke mutual disrespect
and discourtesy. On the other hand, respect and courtesy make for
mutuality of the proper feeling and attitude, and for harmony.

For instance, if this high Tribunal had committed a person to
prison for contempt, to stay there indefinitely until he complied with
an order, I at least, if not this Court would certainly view with
disfavor and disappointment any act on the part of the Executive or the
Legislative department dealing with that prisoner in such a way that it
may interfere with or frustrate the purpose of this Court in making the
commitment, without consultation with or advice to us, and completely
ignoring our prerogatives and judicial authority.

In conclusion, while I agree with the majority that petitioner should
be allowed a reasonable time and opportunity to visit his home- and his
office and examine his papers in order to prepare for trial, I believe
that before taking action on this matter, the Senate or its Committee
in charge of the investigation should be consulted and its views and
suggestions considered; or at least as a matter of courtesy, said body
should be advised of the action being taken by this court in the
present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus so as to give
such Senate or Committee ample opportunity to send a representative in
order to protect its interests.

---

BENGZON, J., dissenting:

I dissent on three main grounds: (a) because the decision fails to render unto the Senate what is the Senate’s; (b) because it refuses to recognize that constitutional rights of convicts are necessarily curtailed; and (c) because petitioner has another adequate remedy.

I. Jean L. Arnault is confined in prison by an order of the Senate
for having refused to answer, without cause, a question propounded to
him during a properly conducted Congressional investigation. He must be
there until he shall have answered that question.. Any order permitting
him to leave the prison walls to visit his home or office, in effect
frustrates the purposes for which he is kept under confinement. It may
amount to an unwarranted encroachment upon the prerogatives of the
Upper Branch of Congress as Mr. Justice Montemayor explains at length.

The only instance in which a prisoner held for contempt of a
legislative body was allowed to be taken “to testify in court under
official custody” occurred in 1870 in the case of Patrick Woods. That
was by virtue of a resolution of the House of Representatives expressly permitting the trip.^[1]

So jealous is the Congress to preserve its control over the
prisoner held for contempt that it even declared “no Member (of
Congress) had the right to converse with the prisoner at the bar while
in custody.”^[2]

Therefore the most that could be said to petitioner Arnault is that
he should seek permission from the Senate or the corresponding
committee to perform the acts he would like to perform through court
intervention.

The courtesy which our courts should accord to the restrictions
imposed on Arnault by the Senate may be compared to the respect which,
in the name of duality of jurisdiction, the State courts in the United
States accord to incarceration decrees by the Federal courts or
vice-versa. What is the practice there? Consent of the imprisoning
authority is required.

“* * * A federal prisoner may be taken into a state
court for trial with the consent of the United States’ attorney
general, given in his discretion, fairly exercised, provided such
removal does not prevent enforcement of the federal sentence or
endanger the prisoner. Conversely, a state prisoner may, with the
state’s consent, be taken into a federal court for trial.” (18 C. J.
S., p. 110.)

II. Supposing that Jean L. Arnault may be tried of this criminal
offense during his confinement by Senate order, I must admit that he
may be removed from jail and brought to court to defend himself. But,
when invoking his constitutional right to defense, he demands the
privilege to visit other places than the court premises, I certainly
draw the line.

No law grants him specifically the right which he invokes: i. e.,
the right to examine papers in his office to get those he may deem
convenient.^[3]

An effort is made to spell this right out of the “due process”
clause “which includes a fair and impartial trial and reasonable
opportunity for preparation of defense.” But this Court has practically
interpreted the requirements of such “due process” by the rules quoted
in the footnotes and in none of them do we find recognition of the
prisoner’s privilege to go out of jail to hunt for witnesses or other
documentary evidence. Furthermore—and this is important—we are not
dealing here with a mere “accused” person. The petitioner is an accused
person who is a convict of another offense. A convict’s
constitutional rights are necessarily curtailed. For instance, as a
person he has constitutional right to the pursuit of happiness, and yet
as a convict he may not demand the privilege to visit his wife or girl
friend even under guard.

This decision may be a dangerous precedent. Murderers in jail may
invoke the same right hoping for chances to escape or only to annoy the
government that provides escort and expenses. Probably, the answer will
be interposed that the grant is a matter of discretion. Yet once an
opening is made, it will be difficult to stem the rush of similar
petitions. And the courts’ mettle will be sorely tried.

Arnault is in jail as a convict of Senate contempt. He should not
leave the prison walls unless it is absolutely necessary. He is brought
to court, because it is absolutely necessary. Now, is it necessary
for him personally to go to his office? No, because his friends or
relatives or attorneys may do that for him under his instructions. They
may even bring to him all his office papers for examination.

III. Our action now seems to be inconsistent with our decision in Arnault vs. Nazareno, et al.^[*]
In that case we practically told Arnault “You have to stay in jail
until you answer the question”. Now, when he has to answer the question
to be able to visit his office, or be at some disadvantage in defending
his income tax evasion, we melt and let him leave Muntinglupa, without
answering the question. We even overlook the consistent doctrine that
these special remedies are granted only when the applicant has no other adequate remedy; and Arnault, I repeat, has an adequate remedy,
even two adequate remedies: (first) examine the papers by a friend or
relative or bring the papers to prison; and (second) answer the
Senate’s question, and then repair to his office at pleasure. If he
refuses to answer the question, he deprives himself of the
advantage or privilege which he asks. The courts are not to blame. They
are not expected to abet his refusal to answer the Senate’s inquiry.

---

^[1] Hinds’ Precedents, Sec. 1627, Vol. 2.

^[2] Hinds’ Precedents, supra, Sec. 1626.

^[3] His legal rights as an
accused person have not been denied: two days to prepare for trial, and
the rights enumerated in sec. 1, Rule 111. The right to visit his
office and inspect his papers is not vouchsafed to him.

^[*] Supra, p. 29.