THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. SYLVIA ABONITALLA DE RAVIDAS, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Defendant-appellee, Sylvia Abonitalla de Ravidas, was
charged on July 8, 1961 with
grave oral defamation in Criminal Case No. 6621 of the Municipal Court of the
City of Cagayan de Oro upon a sworn complaint signed
by the offended party, Generosa Cariaga.  After the accused had pleaded not guilty, the
case went to trial and both prosecution and defense presented their respective
evidence.  The lower court thereafter
rendered judgment on June 30, 1962
ordering the dismissal of the case “for lack of personality on the part of
the complainant Generosa Cariaga
to sign the complaint.”^[1]

Hence, this appeal by the City Attorney of Cagayan de Oro City through the
Solicitor-General on behalf of the State.

The lower Court ordered the dismissal of the case citing Article
7, section 24, paragraph (f) of Republic Act No. 521 (the City Charter),
providing that the City Attorney shall “investigate all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors, and violation of laws and city ordinances and prepare the
necessary information or make the necessary complaints against the person
accused.  “It deduced therefrom “that it is mandatory on the part of the
City Attorney to prepare the necessary information for all violations of laws
and city ordinances that can be prosecuted de oficio
or prepare the necessary complaint for those offenses that cannot be prosecuted
otherwise.”^[2]
It therefore held that since the crime imputed by the accused to the
complainant, which imputation gave rise to the filing of the complaint for
grave oral defamation, is not one of those private crimes that cannot be
prosecuted de oficio as provided for in
the last paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the charge could
not be prosecuted, except by an information signed by the City Attorney or his
Assistants and that the complainant had no legal personality to stand before
the Court on the complaint signed by her.

The record shows that upon the filing of the complaint, the lower
Court issued the warrant for the arrest of the accused, fixing bail at P1, 000.
00, which was posted by the accused; and that at no time during the arraignment
or the ensuing trial, which was prosecuted by an assistant of the City
Attorney, did the accused ever raise any objection to the sufficiency or
legality of the com­plaint against her. 
Any such technical objection should have there­fore been deemed waived
and the lower Court should have rendered judgment on the merits instead of motu propio dismissing
the case, on the ground of lack of personality on the part of the complainant
to sign the complaint.^[3]

As may be gleaned from the lower court’s decision, it dis­missed
the case, in order to be consistent with an identical ruling it had made in an
earlier case also for Grave Oral Defamation, namely, Criminal Case No. 6612,
entitled “People vs. Damaso Atienza“,
wherein its order of dismissal, founded on the same ground of a complainant’s
lack of personality to sign the complaint, had likewise been appealed to this
Court.  The appeal in that case was
docketed as Case G. R. No. L-19857 of the Court and was resolved by the Court
last year.^[4]
In setting aside the dismissal order of the lower Court in that case, this
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Makalintal
pointed out that neither the charter of Ca­gayan de Oro City nor the last paragraph of Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code prohibits or restricts the commencement of an action for
defamation imputing a public crime or one which may be prosecuted de oficio upon a written complaint of the offended
party.  This Court thus ruled:

“x x x The
provision of the charter of the City of Cagayan de Oro aforecited
is not restrictive in character.  While
it imposes upon the City attorney the duty to investigate offenses and to sign
the corresponding informations or complaints, it does
not say that the victim of the offense may not himself file a complaint.  The law of more immediate relevancy is
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: ‘No criminal action for
defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio shall be brought
except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended
party.  ‘ As construed by the lower
court, invoking People vs. Martinez, L-50, April 30, 1946, the foregoing provision
setsup a prohibition against the prosecution of a
charge of defamation upon complaint by the offended party when the defamation
consists of the imputation of a crime which
may be prosecuted de oficio.  The decision in People vs. Martinez does not support this
conclusion.  It simply underlines the
indispensability of such a complaint when the crime imputed cannot be prosecuted
de oficio such as adultery, concubinage, rape, seduction, abduc­tion, or acts of
lasciviousness.  x x
x“^[5]

This Court’s ruling in that case is fully applicable to the
present case and is decisive of the same legal issue presented in both
cases.  It need only be added that the
written complaint for grave oral defamation filed by the offended party and its
prosecution by the City Attorney’s office fully conform with the procedure
provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,^[6]
particularly Section 1, which provides for the commencement of all criminal
actions either by complaint or information in the name of the People of the
Philippines and Section 4, which provides that “(A)ll
criminal actions either commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the fiscal.”

We therefore hold that the lower court should have proceeded to
render its decision on the merits, instead of dismissing the complaint of the
offended party.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is
hereby set aside, and the case is remanded for further proceedings in
accordance herewith.  With
costs against defendant-appellee.

Reyes, J.B.L., Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Fernando, and Barredo,
JJ., concur.

Capistrano, J., did not take
part.

Concepcion, C.J., voted for the setting aside of the judgment appealed from
and the remand of the case for further proceedings in accordance with the
decision.

Castro, J., is on leave from
the Court.

^[1]
Record, p. 99.

^[2]
Record, p. 98.

^[3]
People vs. Damaso Atienza, L-19857, Oct. 26, 1968;
Garcia Valdez vs. Dir. of Prisons, 38 Phil. 596.

^[4]
See footnote 3.

^[5]
Emphasis supplied.

^[6]
Formerly Rule 196 of the old Rules.