JUANITA KAPUNAN, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. ALIPIO N. CASILAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition to review on certiorari a decision of the Court of Appeals
declaring the respondent Alipio N. Casilan owner of certain real property
described in the complaint and ordering petitioners to deliver possession
thereof to said respondent.

The facts are not disputed. The property in question, which is a commercial
lot^[1] located in Tacloban City, was on
October 2, 1935 donated by the spouses Ruperto Kapunan, Sr., and Iluminada
Fernandez de Kapunan to their daughter Concepcion K. Salcedo, who accepted the
donation in the same document. The deed of donation was acknowledged on the same
date by the donors and donee before Notary Public Mateo Canonoy, the donors’
son-in-law and the donee’s brother-in-law. The property, however, remained in
the possession of the donors.

On December 23, 1939, Concepcion K. Salcedo donated the same property to her
daughter Marita Antonia Salcedo, then a minor. In behalf of said minor,
Iluminada Fernandez Vda. de Kapunan, the donee’s grandmother and acting guardian
with whom the said donee was then living as her parents were estranged from each
other, accepted the donation. The acceptance was contained in the deed ot
donation itself, which was authenticated by the same Notary Public Mateo
Canonoy. “

On November 4, 1944, Concepcion Kapunan Salcedo and the respondent Alipio N.
Casilan executed a “Deed of Conditional Sale” wherein the former accepted the
letter’s offer to purchase the land in dispute, and received the sum of P2,000
as part of the purchase price, the balance of P4,500 to be paid within 3 years
therefrom. Notwithstanding the fact that the property in question was in the
possession of the petitioners and respondent Alipio N. Casilan knew that
Concepcion Kapunan Salcedo had previously donated the said property in favor of
her daughter Marita Antonia Salcedo, the said respondent on June 14, 1945
proceeded to buy the same and paid the balance of the purchase price on the
assurance given by the donor that the donation was not legal. The deed of sale
was annotated on July 27 of the same year in the Daily Book of the Register of
Deeds of Leyte, but not on the original certificate of title because of the
refusal of Iluminada Vda. de Kapunan to deliver the duplicate certificate of
title.

In due time, the respondent Casilan filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance of Leyte to compel Iluminada Vda. de Kapunan to surrender the transfer
certificate of title, but the petition was dismissed. In connection with this
petition, Concepcion K. Salcedo, on March 9, 1946, gave a deposition that she
had knowledge of the acceptance by her mother Iluminada Vda. de Kapunan of the
donation she made to her daughter Marita Antonia Salcedo.

To recover title and possession of the property in question, respondent
Casilan filed the present action in the Court of First Instance of Leyte against
Concepcion Kapunan de Salcedo, Iluminada Fernandez Vda. de Kapunan and Marita
Antonia Salcedo. Juanita, Trinidad, Ruperto, Jr., Emma, Lilia, Socorro and
Rosario, all surnamed Kapunan, intervened as alleged co-owners of the land in
dispute and as heirs of their late father Don Ruperto Kapunan, Sr. On March 31,
1950, after hearing, the trial court, Judge Hipolito Alo presiding, rendered
judgment declaring the plaintiff, herein respondent Casilan, to be the owner of
the property in question and ordering the defendants and intervenors to deliver
possession thereof to said plaintiff. The trial court also dismissed the
complaint in intervention. Acting, however, upon the motions for reconsideration
filed by the defendants and intervenors, the lower court, through Judge Jose S.
Rodriguez, in a resolution dated May 30, 1950, reconsidered its decision and
declared the sale of the property in question by Concepcion K. Salcedo in favor
of respondent Alipio N. Casilan null and void. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, that court reversed the decision and awarded the land in dispute to
AJipio N. Casilan. Hence, this petition for review.

It is petitioners’ contention that Notary Public Mateo Canonoy, who was
related to the parties in the donation within the fourth civil degree of
affinity, was, under Articles 22 and 28 of the Spanish Notarial Law, incompetent
and disqualified to authenticate the deed of donation executed by the Kapunan
spouses in favor of their daughter Concepcion Kapunan Salcedo. Said deed of
donation, according to petitioners, became a mere private instrument under
Article 1223 of the old Civil Code, so that under the ruling laid down in the
case of Barretto vs. Cabreza (33 Phil., 413), the donation was
inefficacious. The appellate court, however, in the decision complained of held
that the Spanish Notarial Law has been repealed with the enactment of Act No.
4.96. We find this ruling to be correct. In the case of Philippine Sugar Estate
vs. Poizart (48 Phil., 536), cited in Vda. de Estuart vs.
Garcia (Adm. Case No. 212, prom. February 15, 1957), this Court held that “The
old Spanish notarial law and system of conveyance was repealed in the
Philippines and another and different notarial law and system became the law of
the land with the enactment of Act No. 496.”

We do not, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that the donation in
favor of Marita Antonia Salcedo was null and void in that there was no
“constancia autentica” given to the donor Concepcion K. Salcedo that the
donation had been accepted. Article 633 of the Civil Code of 1889 provided
that-

“Art. 633. In order that a donation of real property be valid it must be made
by public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically
described and the amount of the encumbrances to be assumed by the donee
expressed.

“The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift or in a separate public
writing*; but it shall produce no effect if not made during the lifetime of the
donor.

“If the acceptance is made by separate instrument, authentic notice thereof
shall be given the donor, and this proceeding shall be noted in both
instruments.”

Under the above legal provisions, a donation transfers title effectively if
it is accepted with all the formalities that must accompany the acceptance of
donations of realty, to wit, thru the medium of a public instrument with
authentic notice to the donor, unless the acceptance is made in the deed of gift
itself- (Tagala vs. Ybeas, 49 Off. Gaz., 200). In the present case, the
deed of donation executed by Concepcion K. Salcedo in favor of her daughter
Marita Antonia Salcedo states “that the said donee, Marita Antonia Kapunan
Salcedo being a minor and being represented by her maternal grandmother,
Iluminada P. Vda. de Kapunan, does hereby accept and receive this donation and
gift, and further does express her appreciation and gratefulness for the
generosity of said donor.” The acceptance having been made in the deed of gift
itself, notification thereof to the donor in a “constancia autentica” was
evidently not necessary. It is true that the acceptance was made on another date
and in a place other than that where the deed was executed, but the deed of
donation as so worded implied a previous understanding between the parties who
intervened therein, and, what is more, the donor, Concepcion K. Salcedo,
admittedly knew of the actual acceptance by the donee through the latter’s
grandmother. Pursuant to Art. 623 of the old Civil Code, her knowledge of such
acceptance perfected the donation.

It is also argued that the acceptance of the donation by the donee’s
grandmother was not valid since at the time of the acceptance she had not yet
been appointed legal guardian of the donee. Under article 626 of the old Civil
Code, a donation to an incapacitated donee requires its acceptance by his lawful
representative.^[2] This rule, however,
appears to be applicable only in case of onerous and conditional donations,
where the donee may have to assume certain charges or burdens. As was said by
former Justice Montemayor in Perez vs. Calingo (CA, 40 Off. Gaz.,
Supp.ll, p. 53), “In simple and pure donations, a formal acceptance is not
important for the donor acquires no right to be protected and the donee neither
undertakes to do anything nor assumes any obligation. In this case, the
acceptance may be said to be a mere formality required by law for the
performance of the contract. Whenever the donation does not impose any
obligation upon the donee the acceptance may be made by the donee himself.”
Anyway, if under the rule provided in Article 626 of the old Civil Code the
donation of realty to a minor may be accepted in his behalf by his mother
(Laureta vs. Mata, 44 Phil., 668), we see no reason why a simple and
pure donation made by the mother herself in favor of her own minor daughter may
not be validly accepted through the grandmother the donee’s acting guardian who
was later appointed as her legal guardian. It should here be stated that
Iluminada Vda. de Kapunan who accepted the donation in behalf of the minor donee
was appointed legal guardian of the said minor on June 12, 1944, or prior to the
execution of the deed of conditional sale between the donor Conception &
Salcedo and herein respondent Alipio N. Casilan. There being no showing that the
donation had been revoked prior to the. appointment 4of the donee’s grandmother
as her legal guardian, it is apparent that said donation had been confirmed and
impliedly ratified by the parties intervening therein before the execution of
the deed of sale referred to. (See Atacador vs. Silayan, 67
Phil., 674.)

In conclusion, we find and so hold that the donation of the property in
dispute to^ Marita Antonia Salcedo by Concepcion K. Salcedo was valid, and
consequently the sale thereof by the latter in favor of respondent Alipio N.
Casilan was null and void. Said respondent, however, may still recover what he
has paid under the equitable principle that no one shall be unjustly enriched or
benefited at the expense of another.

Wherefore, the decision complained of is reversed and the sale of the
property in controversy in favor of respondent Alipio N. Casilan declared null
and void. Without costs.

Paras, C. J.,Bengzon, PadiUa, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., and
Barrera, JJ., concur.

Decision reversed.

^[1]Lots Nos. 13 and 14 later
consolidated into Lot No. 746 as appearing in Transfer Certificate of Title No.
10518 of the land records of Leyte.

^[2]Acceptance under Art. 741 of the
new Civil Code may be made on bebaif of minors or incapacitated donees by their
parents or legal representatives.