NATIONAL RICE AND CORN CORPORATION (NARIC), PETITIONER, VS. CELSO HENSON, ET AL., AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

Petition to review on certiorari the order of respondent Court of
Industrial Relations dated January 13, 1959, and its resolution en banc of February 3, 1959.

In CIR Case No. 746-V, entitled “NARIC Workers Union vs.
NARIC”, petitioner National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) filed a
petition dated March 17, 1954, praying for the approval of the laying
off of employees voluntarily severing their services from it, in
pursuance of the retrenchment and austerity program of its management,
due to shortage of funds. Attached to said petition, was a list of
employees who manifested their desire to be voluntarily and permanently
laid off. Subsequently, a supplementary motion containing another list
of additional employees who likewise agreed to be permanently laid off
was submitted. Said 2 lists contained, among others, the names of all
respondents herein (Celso Henson and 40 others). The condition for the
voluntary and permanent laying off of said employees from the service
of petitioner corporation was that, they will be paid their gratuities
equivalent to 1 month salary for every year of service, but not
exceeding 12 months salary.

After a series of hearings and
conferences between petitioner corporation and the NARIC Workers Union
to which the employees concerned were affiliated, respondent court, on
September 20, 1954, issued an order approving the agreement of the
parties for the permanent and voluntary laying off of said employees
effective February 12, 1954, as prayed for in said original and
supplementary petitions, subject to the following provision:

“This
order does not include certain employees who received their gratuities
under protest which will be taken up together with those who did not
receive gratuity in a separate order or decision.”

Consequently, when respondent court, on October 9, 1954, rendered a
decision on the merits in said CIR Case No. 746-V, it resolved the case
of those “employees who received their gratuities under protest” or
“who did not receive gratuity”, expressly excluded from said order of
September 20, 1954. Said decision, in part, reads:

“The
Order dated September 20, 1954, in connection with the ‘urgent petition
for authority to permanently lay off employees effective as of February
12, 1954,’ states, among others, that the said ‘order does not include
certain employees who received their gratuity under protest which will
be taken up together with those who did not receive gratuity in a
separate order or decision. The said employees excluded from the said
order are the subject of the instant order. The said urgent petition to
permanently lay off employees is premised on the undisputed fact that
the corporation is overmanned and with no work to do and that it is in
a precarious condition. The workers, with the exception of the security
guards and few others, realizing the situation of the respondent,
agreed to be separated from the corporation in consideration of one
month gratuity, for every year of continuous service.

“The
situation of the security guards, however, is different in that, unlike
the other workers, they have work to do—guarding the buildings,
warehouses and their contents and other properties of the respondent.
In fact, the 19th BCT soldiers were detailed to guard the said
properties, together with the security guards from January, 1954 up to
February 12, 1954, when the said soldiers actually took over and
relieved the security guards from their work. According to the
testimony of the General Manager of the respondent, that was done upon
the directive of his Excellency, the President, Ramon Magsaysay, for
reasons of economy and better protection of company properties. * * *.

“From
the foregoing, the issue is whether the security guards and other
employees who did not receive their gratuity may be laid off.

“It
is important to note that the security guards have work to do and that
there is no charge whatsoever against them. * * *. Under ordinary
circumstances, the security guards could not have been laid off, and
therefore, should be reinstated with backpay. Considering, however,
that they were relieved by the 19th BCT soldiers, who received no
additional salary other than their salary as soldiers, for reason of
economy and better protection of company properties, the wisdom of
which is very apparent, there is nothing that the Court can do.
However, the Court understands that this state of affair is not
permanent, so that if and when the soldiers shall have been recalled
therefrom the respondent should take back the security guards before
taking in new ones pursuant to the agreement entered into by and
between the parties on January 7, 1953, the pertinent paragraphs of
which are hereunder quoted:

‘6. That
the parties hereby agree that no discrimination or favoritism will be
made by the corporation against any of its workers.

‘7.
Job Security.—That no worker shall be suspended, dismissed, or laid off
except for a justifiable cause. Members of the petitioner union may
only be laid off or dismissed after proper investigation by management.’

“As
to whether the security guards are entitled to backpay or something of
the sort, it is the sense of the Court that since the company is
generous enough to have given gratuities to all its employees who do
not have work, notwithstanding its financial condition, in justice and
fairness to the security guards who are out of work by force of
circumstances despite the fact that they have work to do, the
respondent should extend to them the same generosity by giving them
certain compensation at the same rate of one month pay for every year
of continuous service but not exceeding twelve months in order that
they will have something with which to go by in the meantime that they
have no work or until they are recalled to their work. For the sake of
industrial peace and following the same spirit of generosity the
respondent should and is hereby directed to consider even temporary
appointments of the security guards to any available position fit for
their respective qualifications.

* * * * * * *

“As
regards the other security guards who received their gratuities under
protest, it is apparent that they did so because they were compelled by
circumstances, and, therefore, their acceptance of their gratuity,
cannot and should not be construed as waiver of their rights to their
former work when the soldiers shall have been recalled. Now, with
respect to the other employees who are not security guards who were
laid off and; who received their gratuities under protest, they should
be treated in the same manner as those who voluntarily agreed to be
permanently laid off for lack of work in consideration of the gratuity
paid to them.

“Wherefore, the respondent is hereby enjoined
to comply with the terms of the foregoing order within three days from
receipt hereof with respect to the payments of compensation to the
workers concerned and to re-employ the security guards as soon as
possible.

“So Ordered.”

On August 6, 1955, the NARIC Workers Union filed with respondent court a petition (CIR Case No. 746-V[11]), praying inter alia,
for the immediate reinstatement of the laid off security guards
including their chief and to pay them back wages. On July 26, 1957,
respondent court issued an order directing petitioner corporation to
reinstate some (only 18) of the former security guards, but did not
include any of the 41 respondents herein.

On February 11,
1958, respondents Henson and 40 others, submitted their own petition
for reinstatement (CIR Case No. 746-V[13]), which was later amended,
alleging, among other things, that in spite of the withdrawal of the
19th BCT soldiers from petitioner on September 27, 1955, petitioner
failed to take back respondents in its employ, and instead employed new
security guards and employees, in gross violation of respondent court’s
order of October 9, 1954; and that contrary to the agreement of January
7, 1963V petitioner reinstated only 18 security guards, most of whom
are emergency employees in status, to the utter discrimination of
respondents. They prayed that petitioner corporation be ordered to
reinstate them immediately with fall back wages from September 27,
1955, until they are actually reinstated.

On April 10, 1958,
petitioner corporation filed a motion to dismiss said petition, on the
grounds that (1) the cause Of action is barred by prior judgment; and
(2) that the cause of action has been filed out of time. Acting on said
motion, respondent court resolved to hold action thereon in abeyance,
until the decision of the petition on the merits.

On April 30, 1958, petitioner corporation filed its answer to the petition for reinstatement, praying for its dismissal.

Thereafter, the petition was heard and, after hearing wherein
respondents presented only 2 witnesses, respondent court, on January
13, 1959, ordered the reinstatement of respondents (Henson, et al.), in
an order which, in pertinent part, reads:

“The records of this case show that General Circular No. 23 of the
Naric, dated March 24, 1954 (Exh. C), was addressed to all laid-off
employees of the NARIC central office who have not yet taken advantage
of the gratuity benefit, and that the board of directors set March 31,
1954 at 4:00 p.m. as the deadline for these laid-off employees of the
central office who have not yet availed themselves of the gratuity to
sign the payroll and receive their corresponding checks: and after the
date and time set forth, the benefit of gratuity will be considered
withdrawn in accordance with Resolution No. 17 of 1foe board of
directors of the NARIC.

“The petitioners (herein respondents Henson, et al,) do
not consider as voluntary on their part the receipt of the gratuity
because they were forced to avail themselves of the benefit offered
therein on account of the deadline set by the board of directors of the
NARIC. The testimony of Albert Arce to the effect that he signed a
petition protesting the laying off of employees and requesting for the
immediate reinstatement of the signatories, which petition he believed
was endorsed by the union to the manager of the NARIC, was never
contradicted by the respondent (herein petitioner corporation).

“In
its memorandum, the respondent urges that the petitioners have no cause
of action because the decision of the Court in Case No. 746-V dated
October 9, 1954 pertains only to certain employees who received their
gratuities tinder protest and to those who did not receive gratuity,
and that this Court approved in its order of September 20, 1954 the
voluntary and permanent lay off of all employees of the respondent who
received their gratuities.

“In citing the decision of
this Court dated October 9f 1954, the respondent missed the fallowing
important portion thereof, to wit:

‘It is important to note that the security guards have work to do and
that there is no charge whatsoever against them. It may not be out of
place to mention in this connection that the president of the
petitioner union, Isidro. Sinlao, was commended and awarded the sum of
P500.00 for his honesty in the performance of his duties as security
guard sometime ago. Under ordinary circumstances, the security guards
could not have been laid off, and, therefore, should be reinstated with
backpay. Considering however, that they were relieved by the 19th BCT
soldiers, who received no additional salary other than their salary as
soldiers, for reasons of economy and better protection of company
properties, the wisdom of which is very apparent, there is nothing that
the Court can do. However, the Court understands that this state of
affairs is not permanent, so that if and when the soldiers shall have
been recalled therefrom, the respondent should take back the security
guards before taking in new ones pursuant to the agreement entered into
by and between the parties on January 7, 19SS, the pertinent paragraphs
of which are hereunder quoted:

‘6. That the parties hereby agree that no discrimination or favoritism will be made by the corporation against any of its workers.

‘7. Job
Security. That no worker shall be suspended, dismissed, or laid off
except for a justifiable cause. Members of the petitioner union may
only be laid off or dismissed after proper investigation by management?

“It
will be noted that when the 19th BCT soldiers were withdrawn from the
service of the NARIC, the management of the corporation, instead of
taking back the security guards which it laid off forcibly, took new
ones in violation of the above-quoted portion of the decision of
October 9, 1954. The respondent accuses the petitioners of laches in
the presentation of the instant petition, and yet the said respondent
is remiss in its obligation to notify the said petitioners when the
occasion to avail their services arose.

“In its
memorandum, respondent stated that the cause of action of the
petitioner is barred by a prior judgment in Case No. 746-V (11). In
citing Case No. 746-V(11), the respondent missed the following important portion of the order of the Court in said case to wit:

‘But the respondent submits that the security guards have agreed to be
permanently laid-off in consideration of the gratuities received by
them. While that is true, the waiver does not apply to the
following * * * compelled to receive their gratuity because of the
deadline fixed by the respondent (Exhibit I) and/or received their
gratuities under protest. * * *

“From
the foregoing decision of the Court, the obligation of the respondent
to offer the available vacant positions for security guards started
from the withdrawal of the 19th BCT soldiers from the service of the
NARIC; while the duty of the petitioners to apply for reinstatement
commenced after the pull-out of the said soldiers from the compounds of
the NARIC. Inasmuch as the parties are both at fault, the backpay of
the petitioners, for the sake of justice and equity, should not begirt
from the withdrawal of the 19th BCT soldiers, but from the date they
filed the original and amended petitions in the instant case.” (Italics supplied.)

Of this order, petitioner corporation filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by respondent court in its
resolution, en banc, of February 3, 1959. Hence, this petition for review.

Petitioner claims that respondent court erred in ordering respondents’
reinstatement and payment of back salaries, despite the fact that it
was previously authorized to permanently lay-off and pay respondents’
gratuities.

The claim has no merit. True it is, that
respondent court had, in its order of September 20, 1954 (Annex G)
approved the lay-off of petitioner’s employees, including herein
respondents, whose names appear in the lists attached to the original
and supplementary petitions to lay off said employees (Annexes E and
F). But respondent court, in the same order, made the reservation that
it “does not include certain employees who received their gratuities
under protest, which will be taken up together with those who did not
receive gratuity in a separate order or decision.” Explaining said
reservation, respondent court, in its decision of October 9, 1954
(Annex H), stated that “said urgent petition to permanently lay off
employees is premised on the undisputed fact that the corporation is
overmanned and with no work to do and that it is in a precarious
condition. On this premise, it pointed out that “the situation of the
security guards, however, is different in that, unlike the workers,
they have work to do.” Finding, however, that they were relieved of
their work by the 19th BCT soldiers, respondent court said that there
was nothing it could do. While it approved said petitions to lay off
(Annexes E and F), it assured said security guards of reinstatement to
their work, when it declared: “However, the Court understands that this
state of affairs is not permanent, so that if and when the soldiers
shall have been recalled therefrom, the respondent (herein petitioner)
should take back the security guards before taking in new ones,
pursuant to the agreement entered into by and between the parties on
January 7, 1953” which provides, inter alia, that—

“6.
That the parties hereby agree that no discrimination or favoritism will
be made by the corporation against any of its workers.

“7.
Job Security. That no workers shall be suspended, dismissed, or laid
off except for a justifiable cause. Members of the petitioner union may
only be laid off or dismissed after proper investigation by management.”

Said agreement was approved by respondent Court in a partial decision
dated February 16, 1953. It was for this reason that it required in
said decision of October 9, 1954, as one of the conditions of the
approval of the lay-off of petitioner’s employees, that if and when the
19th BCT soldiers were recalled, it should re-employ the security
guards, before taking in new ones. In fact, having clarified the
situation of the security guards, it directed in the same decision that
“with respect to the other employees who are not security guards who
were laid-off and who received their gratuities under protest, they
should be treated in the same manner as those who voluntarily agreed to
be permanently laid off for lack of work in consideration of the
gratuity paid to them”. It will be noted, in this portion of the
decision, that although respondents security guards received their
gratuity, they were not to be considered permanently laid off. Only
those laid off for lack of work and paid their gratuity were considered
permanently separated.

When petitioner laid off respondents
herein, among other employees, it did so under its obligation to comply
with the conditions laid down in said decision of October 9, 1954,
approving the agreement on the lay-off, namely, to reemploy them before
taking in new employees, upon the recall of the 19th BCT soldiers. Its
obligation arose when the latter were recalled on September 27, 1955.
It failed to comply with said obligation when it employed new ones upon
the recall of said soldiers on said date, which obligation is
enforceable by respondent court itself (Sec. 14, Com. Act No. 103, as
amended). This it did, when it issued the appealed order and resolution.

Petitioner, next, contends that respondent court erred in ordering
respondents’ reinstatement and payment of back salaries, on the basis
of the testimonies of only two of respondents’ witnesses, citing as
authority the case of Dimayuga, et al., vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., (101 Phil., 290).

The contention is untenable. In the Dimayuga
case, the claim of more than 50 workers for reinstatement was based on
their alleged dismissal without cause, and we held that only 6 of them
who appeared and proved their case were properly ordered reinstated,
denying the claim of the rest who failed to establish their case. In
the instant case, the situation is different. Respondents’ claim for
reinstatement is based on a court mandate as stated in the dispositive
part of respondent court’s decision in CIR Case No. 756-V, dated
October 9, 1954, finding the dismissal of the security guards merely
temporary, and directing their reemployment as soon as possible. Unlike
in the Dimayuga case, the guards in the instant case, did not
have to prove their claim for reinstatement, considering that their
lay-off had already been adjudicated in a final judgment, to be
temporary in character. Thus:

“* * *
However, the Court understands this state of affairs is not permanent,
so that if any when the soldiers shall have been recalled therefrom the
respondent should take back the security guards before taking in new
ones pursuant to the agreement entered into by and between the parties
on January 7, 1953 the pertinent paragraphs of which are hereunder
quoted: * * *.” (Decision in CIR Case No. 746-V, Oct. 9, 1954.)

And, in concluding its decision, respondent court directed petitioner
to “reemploy the security guards as soon as possible.” All that was
incumbent upon respondents, therefore, was to prove that they were
among the security guards referred to in the said decision of October
9, 1954, and that they have not, as yet, been reinstated
notwithstanding that the 19th BCT soldiers had already been recalled on
September 27, 1965 and the need for their (respondents’) services then
arose. Petitioner does not dispute that respondents were not reinstated
to their work. It is also admitted that the 19th BCT soldiers were
recalled on September 27, 1955. It is, likewise, not disputed that
since then, new employees were employed by petitioner, instead of
respondents herein. In the circumstances, there was no necessity for
all respondents herein to testify in court. The testimony of their two
witnesses (Arce and Henson) was sufficient.

Petitioner,
likewise, argues that respondent court erred in not dismissing
respondents’ petition for reinstatement on the ground that it was
barred by prior judgment.

The argument is devoid of merit.
Petitioner cited the order of September 20, 1954 (Annex G) as one of
the judgments barring respondents’ petition for reinstatement. It was
already shown that said order does not bar the action, because the
petition is supported by the decision of respondent court dated October
9, 1954, which is supplementary to said order. While it is true that
the names of respondents were included in the lists attached to the
petitions for lay-off (Annexes C and D), it is equally true that the
lay-off of said security guards, was not permanent but only temporary,
conditioned as it was on the recall of the 19th BCT soldiers. The
petition is not barred either by respondent court’s order dated July
26, 1957 (Annex I). A perusal of said order, discloses that it was for
reinstatement, in compliance with the decision of October 9, 1954, of
some 18 security guards mentioned therein without, however, including
respondents herein, who were not parties in that CIR Case No. 746-V
(11). At the hearing of this petition (CIR Case No. 746-V [13]
respondents satisfactorily established the fact that they were never
included or made parties in said CIR Case No. 746-V(11), which was
initiated by the NARIC Workers Union on behalf of only 18 security
guards.

Petitioner, lastly, claims that respondent court
erred in not dismissing respondents’ petition for reinstatement on the
ground that it was filed out of time.

The claim cannot be
sustained. The present action, it will be observed, is an action to
enforce an agreement and decision still valid and subsisting at the
time the petition was filed. In fact, there are still pending with
respondent court cases involving CIR Case No, 746-V (the main case) for
decision. In other words, the dispute between the parties in CIR Case
No. 746-V has not as yet been terminated. As to the effectiveness of an
award, order, or decision of respondent court the law is clear and
explicit (Sec. 17, Com. Act No. 103, as amended). Our decision in the
case of Katipunan Labor Union vs. Caltex (Philippines) Inc., et
al. (G. R. No. L-10337, prom. May 27, 1957), is in point, on the
question of whether the petition (Annexes C and D) were filed out of
time. In said case, as in the instant case, (CIR Case No. 746-V[13]),
the parties entered into an agreement respecting tenure of employment,
among others. This was, in an order dated July 28, 1950, approved by
respondent court. Five years later, or on August 1, 1955, a case
incident to the main case was filed, involving the dismissal of an
employee, contrary to the agreement. We gave due course to the case
involving said dismissed employee, although it was filed 5 years after
the approval of the agreement.

In the instant case,
respondents’ right to reinstatement arose when the 19th BCT soldiers
were recalled on September 27, 1955. The petitions, for their
reinstatement were filed on February 12 and 18, 1958. Pursuant to
Section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, and the pertinent
facts in the cited case (Katipunan), respondents’ petitions for
reinstatement were not filed out of time.

Wherefore, finding
no error in the order and resolution appealed from, the same are hereby
affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.